International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

Volume I

Drug and Chemical Control

March 2019
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## Common Abbreviations

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<tr>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Military Command for Africa</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Amphetamine-Type Stimulants</td>
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<td>CARICC</td>
<td>Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center</td>
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<td>CARSI</td>
<td>Central America Regional Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>U.S. Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<td>CBSI</td>
<td>Caribbean Basin Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DARE</td>
<td>Drug Abuse Resistance Education</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTO</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCB</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Board</td>
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<td>INCSR</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control Strategy Report</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF-S</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force South</td>
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<td>JIATF-W</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAOC-N</td>
<td>Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NIDA</td>
<td>National Institute of Drug Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OAS/CICAD</td>
<td>Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission</td>
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<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of National Drug Control Policy</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>New Psychoactive Substances</td>
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<td>SELEC</td>
<td>Southeast European Law Enforcement Center</td>
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<td>SIU</td>
<td>Special Investigative Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Military Command for the Caribbean, Central and South America</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational Organized Crime</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNCAC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTOC</td>
<td>United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>U.S. Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>Universal Treatment Curriculum for Substance Use Disorders</td>
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<td>WACSI</td>
<td>West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCL</td>
<td>Hydrochloride (cocaine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kg</td>
<td>Kilogram</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Metric Ton</td>
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International Agreements


UNCAC – UN Convention against Corruption (2003)

UNTOC – UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and its supplementing protocols:


INTRODUCTION
Legislative Basis for the INCSR

The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "FAA," 22 U.S.C. § 2291). The 2019 INCSR, published in March 2019, covers the year January 1 to December 31, 2018 and is published in two volumes, the second of which covers money laundering and financial crimes. In addition to addressing the reporting requirements of section 489 of the FAA (as well as sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as amended), the INCSR provides the factual basis for the designations contained in the President’s report to Congress on the major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing countries initially set forth in section 591 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115) (the "FOAA"), and now made permanent pursuant to section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (the "FRAA").

Section 706 of the FRAA requires that the President submit an annual report no later than September 15 identifying each country determined by the President to be a major drug-transit country or major illicit drug producing country. The President is also required in that report to identify any country on the majors list that has "failed demonstrably . . . to make substantial efforts" during the previous 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements and to take certain counternarcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. U.S. assistance under the current foreign operations appropriations act may not be provided to any country designated as having "failed demonstrably" unless the President determines that the provision of such assistance is vital to U.S. national interests or that the country, at any time after the President’s initial report to Congress, has made "substantial efforts" to comply with the counternarcotics conditions in the legislation. This prohibition does not affect humanitarian, counternarcotics, and certain other types of assistance that are authorized to be provided notwithstanding any other provision of law.

The FAA requires a report on the extent to which each country or entity that received assistance under chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act in the past two fiscal years has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the "1988 UN Drug Convention")."

Beginning in 2007, pursuant to The Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA) (The USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 2005, Title VII, P.L. 109-177), amending sections 489 and 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USC 2291h and 2291) section 722, the INCSR was expanded to include reporting on the five countries that export the largest amounts of methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as the five countries importing the largest amounts of these chemicals and which have the highest rate of diversion of the chemicals for methamphetamine production. This expanded reporting also includes additional information on efforts to control methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as estimates of legitimate demand for these methamphetamine precursors, prepared by most parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board. The CMEA also requires a Presidential determination by March 1 of each year on whether the five countries that legally exported and the five countries that legally imported the largest amount of precursor
chemicals (under FAA section 490) have cooperated with the United States to prevent these substances from being used to produce methamphetamine or have taken adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention. This determination may be exercised by the Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 12163 and by the Deputy Secretary of State pursuant to State Department Delegation of Authority 245-2.

Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake. Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering; to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs; and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends. The statute lists actions by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Drug Convention: illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

In attempting to evaluate whether countries and certain entities are meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Department has used the best information it has available. The 2019 INCSR covers countries that range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug control is a critical element of national policy, to small countries or entities where drug issues or the capacity to deal with them are minimal. The reports vary in the extent of their coverage. For key drug-control countries, where considerable information is available, comprehensive reports are provided. For some smaller countries or entities where only limited information is available, reports include whatever data the responsible U.S. diplomatic mission could provide.

The country chapters report upon actions taken – including plans, programs, and, where applicable, timetables – toward fulfillment of Convention obligations. Because the 1988 UN Drug Convention’s subject matter is so broad and availability of information on elements related to performance under the Convention varies widely within and among countries, the Department’s views on the extent to which a given country or entity is meeting the goals and objectives of the Convention are based on the overall response of the country or entity to those goals and objectives. Reports will often include discussion of foreign legal and regulatory structures. Although the Department strives to provide accurate information, this report should not be used as the basis for determining legal rights or obligations under U.S. or foreign law.

Some countries and other entities are not yet parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention; some do not have status in the United Nations and cannot become parties. For such countries or entities, we have nonetheless considered actions taken by those countries or entities in areas covered by the Convention as well as plans (if any) for becoming parties and for bringing their legislation into conformity with the Convention’s requirements. Other countries have taken reservations, declarations, or understandings to the 1988 UN Drug Convention or other relevant treaties; such reservations, declarations, or understandings are generally not detailed in this report. For some of the smallest countries or entities that have not been designated by the President as major illicit drug producing or major drug-transit countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are being met.
Unless otherwise noted in the relevant country chapters, the Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) considers all countries and other entities with which the United States has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those agreements.

Information concerning counternarcotics assistance is provided, pursuant to section 489(b) of the FAA, in section entitled "U.S. Government Assistance."
Section 489(a)(3) of the FAA requires the INCSR to identify:
(A) major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries;
(B) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; or
(C) major money laundering countries.
These countries are identified below.

The following major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit countries were identified and notified to Congress by the President on September 11, 2018, consistent with section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228):

Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Of these 22 countries, Bolivia and Venezuela were designated by the President as having “failed demonstrably” during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President determined, however, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that continued support for bilateral programs to aid the people of Venezuela is vital to the national interests of the United States.

The following countries and jurisdictions have been identified to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:

Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.

Information is provided pursuant to section 489 of the FAA in the section entitled "Chemical Controls."

**Major Money Laundering Countries**

A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one “whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking” [FAA § 481(e)(7)]. More information on the methodology is set forth in Volume II of the INCSR in the section entitled "Legislative Basis and Methodology for the INCSR." The following countries/jurisdictions have been identified this year in this category:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Burma, Cabo Verde, Canada, Cayman Islands, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Macau, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten Spain, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Further information on these countries/jurisdictions and United States money laundering policies, as required by section 489 of the FAA, is set forth in Volume II of the INCSR in the section entitled "Money Laundering and Financial Crimes."
Presidential Determination

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 11, 2018

Presidential Determination No. 2018-21806

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2019

By the authority vested to me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country’s presence on the foregoing Majors List is not necessarily a reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e) (2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the reason major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control law enforcement measures.

Pursuant to Section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Included with this determination are justifications for the designations of Bolivia and Venezuela, as required by Section 706(2)(B) of the FRAA. I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid the promotion of democracy in Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

Combatting the ongoing United States opioid epidemic is one of my Administration’s most urgent priorities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, which I signed into law this spring, dedicated nearly $4 billion in additional funding to confront this national crisis. My Administration is committed to addressing all factors fueling this drug crisis, which is devastating communities across America, including steps to curb over-prescription, expand access to treatment and recovery programs, improve public education programs to prevent illicit drug use before it begins, and to strengthening domestic drug enforcement at our borders and throughout our Nation. Alongside these massive and historic United States efforts, I expect the
governments of countries where illicit drugs originate and through which they transit to similarly strengthen their commitments to reduce dangerous drug production and trafficking.

In this respect, I am deeply concerned that illicit drug crops have expanded over successive years in Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan, and are now at record levels. Drug production and trafficking in these three countries directly affect United States national interests and the health and safety of American citizens. Heroin originating in Mexico and cocaine from Colombia are claiming thousands of lives annually in the United States. Afghanistan’s illicit opium economy promotes corruption, funds the Taliban, and undermines the country’s security, which thousands of United States service men and women help defend. Despite the efforts of law enforcement and security forces, these countries are falling behind in the fight to eradicate illicit crops and reduce drug production and trafficking. These governments must redouble their efforts to rise to the challenge posed by the criminal organizations producing and trafficking these drugs, and achieve greater progress over the coming year in stopping and reversing illicit drug production and trafficking. The United States will continue its strong support for international efforts against drug production and trafficking, as well as to strengthen prevention and treatment efforts in the United States. The urgency of our national drug epidemic requires significant and measurable results immediately, in the coming year and in the future.

You are authorized and directed to submit this designation, with the Bolivia and Venezuela memoranda of justification, under Section 706 of the FRAA, to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register.

/S/
Donald J. Trump
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR MAJOR ILLICIT DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2019

Bolivia

During the past 12 months, the Bolivian government has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under the international counternarcotics agreements or to uphold the counternarcotics measures set forth in Section 489 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended (FAA).

According to coca cultivation estimates from the United States government, the Government of Bolivia, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Bolivia remains the third largest producer of cocaine in the world. It is also a major transit zone for Peruvian cocaine. Cocaine cultivation in Bolivia continues to increase; the United States government estimated coca cultivation increased by three percent to 37,500 hectares (ha) in 2016 from 36,500 in 2015. Per United States government estimates, potential pure cocaine production has more than doubled in Bolivia over the past decade, and increased eight percent to 275 metric tons from 2015 to 2016.

In addition to excessive production levels, Bolivia’s inadequate controls over its legal markets are of concern. Until 2017, Bolivian law permitted 12,000 hectares of licit coca production per year. In March 2017, President Evo Morales signed into law a bill that replaces Bolivia’s former counternarcotics law and nearly doubles those limits; the area available for licit coca production will increase from 12,000 to 22,000 hectares. This exceeds the amount of coca needed for traditional purposes by 38 percent, according to a European Union (EU) estimate. UNODC officials have estimated that 90 percent of the Chapare region’s coca cultivation is destined for illicit cocaine production and not traditional consumption.

In 2013, Bolivia re-acceded to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a reservation permitting coca to be used only within Bolivia for traditional, cultural, and medicinal purposes. Despite these stated conditions, Bolivia continues to promote the use of coca in other countries and discuss potential export opportunities for coca products. These actions undermine Bolivia’s commitments to its international drug control obligations.

As a matter of official policy, the Government of Bolivia does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. President Morales and other senior officials have acknowledged serious corruption problems in the judiciary and police. Approximately 60 police officers were investigated for corruption associated with drug trafficking in 2015, the most recent year for which data is available. Corruption, interference by other branches of government, and insufficient judicial resources undermine due process and create delays in the administration of justice.

Increased Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation with other countries and in international fora would be welcome. Bolivia receives most of its foreign counternarcotic financial support from the European Union (EU). The EU is currently implementing a three-year (2016-2018)
assistance program budgeted at $50 million, and also provides an additional $10 million to support UNODC drug control programs and technical assistance through a contractor. The United States has not had a counternarcotics presence in Bolivia, but U.S. officials consult with international organizations and third-country governments involved in supporting Bolivian drug control goals and efforts to strengthen the rule of law. A customs mutual assistance agreement between the Government of Bolivia and United States to foster improved information sharing was signed in July 2017, which permits information exchanges and collaboration to prevent illegal shipments and related criminal activities, including drug trafficking.

Bolivia participated in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit held in November 2017, which attracted 125 maritime counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international agencies spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe. The United States and Bolivia are parties to a 1995 extradition treaty that permits the extradition of nationals for the most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. Bolivia and the United States do not have a mutual legal assistance treaty, but both countries can request assistance through various multilateral conventions to which both are parties.

In accordance with United States legislation, the determination that Bolivia has failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take counternarcotics measures set forth in the FAA results in the withholding of certain kinds of U.S. assistance, with exceptions for humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance under the FAA. United States assistance to and relations with Bolivia are extremely limited. It is not in the vital interest of the United States to grant a national interest waiver to Bolivia, given that any assistance necessitating such a waiver is neither contemplated by the United States, nor actively pursued by the Government of Bolivia.
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2019

Venezuela

During the past 12 months, the Venezuelan government failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under the international counternarcotics agreements or to uphold the counternarcotics measures set forth in section 489 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). A national interest waiver for Fiscal Year 2019 for Venezuela permits support for United States government-funded bilateral assistance programs vital to the national interest of the United States, such as democracy building and human rights advocacy.

Venezuela remained a major drug-transit country in 2018. Venezuela is one of the preferred trafficking routes for illegal drugs, predominately cocaine, from South America to the Caribbean region, Central America, the United States, Western Africa, and Europe, due to its porous western border with Colombia, weak judicial system, sporadic international counternarcotics cooperation, and permissive and corrupt environment.

Public corruption, including among senior government officials, is a major problem in Venezuela, making it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to smuggle illegal drugs. The Venezuelan government, as a matter of policy, does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor does it condone laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs; however, the Maduro regime knowingly maintains a United States designated Narcotics Kingpin in its Cabinet.

On February 13, 2017, the United States designated Venezuelan Executive Vice President Tareck El Aissami pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for his involvement in international narcotics trafficking activities. El Aissami facilitated, coordinated, and protected other narco traffickers operating in Venezuela. Specifically, El Aissami received payment for the facilitation of drug shipments belonging to Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid Makled Garcia. El Aissami also is linked to coordinating drug shipments to Los Zetas, a violent Mexican drug cartel, as well as providing protection to Colombian drug lord Daniel Barrera Carrera and Venezuelan drug trafficker Hermagoras Gonzalez Polanco.

In November 2016, nephews of Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, Efrain Campo Flores and Francisco Flores de Freitas, were convicted by a federal court in New York of conspiracy to traffic 800 kg of cocaine to the United States. In 2017, the nephews were unsuccessful in overturning their convictions on appeal. In August 2016, the United States unsealed indictments against General Nester Luis Reverol Torres, the former director of ONA and former commander of the National Guard, and Edylberto Jose Molina Molina, former sub-director of ONA, for participating in an international cocaine trafficking conspiracy. Immediately following the U.S. indictments, President Nicolas Maduro appointed Reverol as Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, in which he is responsible for overseeing both ONA and the National Guard.
In September 2015, the United States unsealed indictments against former Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN) chief of finance Pedro Luis Martin Olivares and former anti-drug official in the Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Corps (CICPC) Jesus Alfredo Itriago for alleged involvement in drug trafficking activities affecting the United States. In 2013, the U.S. Department of the Treasury added Vassily Kotosky Villarroel-Ramirez, a former captain in the Venezuelan National Guard, to the “Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons (SDN)” list under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). The Venezuelan National Guard reported the arrest of Villarroel-Ramirez in July of 2015.

In 2008, the Treasury designated former Minister of Defense and current Trujillo state Governor, Henry Rangel Silva and Guárico state Governor Ramón Emilio Rodríguez Chacin as “Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers” pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for assisting the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in trafficking narcotics. The Venezuelan government has yet to take action against these or other government and military officials with known links to the FARC or Mexican drug cartels.

In 2018, the Venezuelan government engaged in minimal bilateral law enforcement cooperation with the United States. Venezuelan authorities do not effectively prosecute drug traffickers, in part due to political corruption. Additionally, Venezuelan law enforcement officers lack the equipment, training, and resources required to significantly impede the operations of major drug trafficking organizations. The Venezuelan government occasionally reports drug seizures, arrests, and destruction of drugs and airstrips to the public, but did not share evidence about the destruction of illicit drug with U.S. officials.

Drug control cooperation between Venezuela and the United States has been limited and inconsistent since 2005, when Venezuela refused to sign a negotiated amendment to the U.S.-Venezuela bilateral Letter of Agreement on drug control cooperation. The United States and Venezuela have a bilateral agreement for counter drug operations. The agreement enables both countries to stop, board, and search vessels flying the other’s flag. Furthermore, this agreement enables direct case information sharing, and expedited vessel registry checks. In 2016, the Venezuelan government cooperated with the United States Coast Guard in six documented maritime drug interdiction cases, compared to 10 cases in 2015. Venezuela did not attend the 2017 International Drug Enforcement Conference for the first time in four years.

To advance cooperation with the United States, the Venezuelan government could increase the exchange of narcotics-related information to lead to more drug-related arrests, help dismantle criminal networks, aid in the prosecution of criminals engaged in narcotics trafficking, and stem the flow of illicit drugs transiting Venezuela.

The United States and Venezuela are parties to an extradition treaty that entered into force in 1923. Although the 1999 Venezuelan constitution bars the extradition of Venezuelan nationals, Venezuela periodically extradites or deports non-Venezuelan nationals to the United States for prosecution.
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, FRAA, though Venezuela has failed demonstrably, a national interest waiver under the FRAA allows the continuation of certain United States bilateral assistance programs to Venezuela; humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance can be provided to Venezuela without a national interest waiver.
POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS
Overview

Volume 1 of the 2019 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report provides an overview of actions taken during the previous year by the governments of nearly 70 countries to reduce illicit drug production, trafficking, and use. This global challenge bears more direct impact on the health and safety of Americans than at any time in our history. According to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, more than 70,000 people died in the United States from drug overdoses in 2017, making drug overdoses the leading cause of premature deaths in the country. The vast majority of the illicit drugs responsible for these deaths originate outside the United States, placing drug supply and demand reduction among the most urgent U.S. foreign policy priorities.

Opioids continue to fuel the majority of U.S. overdose deaths. What began as a prescription drug problem and morphed into a heroin epidemic has shifted to misuse of highly potent synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl and its analogues. Synthetic opioids are frequently laced into heroin and other drugs, or pressed into counterfeit pills and sold to often unsuspecting users, adding to the risk of overdose. These shifts have resulted in a staggering loss of American lives in recent years. Deaths from synthetic opioids, primarily fentanyl, soared to nearly 30,000 in 2017, up more than 45 percent from 2016.

Trafficking in these drugs offers numerous advantages to criminals. Synthetic drugs can be manufactured virtually anywhere, and production costs are low. The extreme potency of synthetic opioids lets traffickers reap high profits from small volumes. Criminals exploit the tools of global e-commerce to sell these drugs online directly to consumers and, due to their potency, small quantities of drugs can be delivered through the mail and express consignment services at minimal risk of detection. Virtually any community with a postal address and internet connectivity is at risk, and what began in North America has metastasized into what the United Nations now calls “a global opioid epidemic.”

Trafficking and abuse of synthetic opioids has become a top concern of governments across Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East, particularly involving counterfeit or illicitly manufactured tramadol. Within the European Union, over three dozen new synthetic opioids have been detected since 2009, with 13 reported in 2017, including 10 fentanyl analogues. This expansion is likely to continue, as traffickers adapt to outmaneuver regulatory controls and law enforcement efforts as they seek new markets.

These are considerable challenges that will test the capacities, resourcefulness, and political will of the international community. On September 24, 2018, President Trump launched the Global Call to Action on the World Drug Problem at the United Nations in New York City, where 130 countries committed to take further action to address and counter the world drug problem, including the emerging threat of synthetic drugs. Policies and legal frameworks developed to meet the drug control challenges of the previous century may require adjustments for the 21st century. The United States and many countries, for example, have enacted legal reforms to control new psychoactive substances (NPS) based on their psychoactive effects or chemical similarity to controlled drugs, rather than precise chemical structures. In December 2018, China
committed to control fentanyl compounds as a class. Once implemented, this move should help thwart illicit chemists and manufacturers who quickly change their illicit formulations to non-regulated analogues to evade law enforcement.

Effective global responses will need to target all vulnerabilities in the supply chain exploited by criminals, including online trafficking facilitated by virtual currencies and other emerging technologies. Further steps must also be taken to safeguard the integrity of international mail and express consignment services from criminal misuse, including the collection and sharing of advance electronic data to help identify suspicious parcels. The United States is committed to deploying the full range of its diplomatic, law enforcement, and foreign assistance tools to facilitate global action in these areas and, by doing so, to increase the cost, risk, and difficulties associated with trafficking and misusing synthetic opioids and other NPS.

While we adjust our posture to address these emerging 21st century threats, the United States will remain deeply engaged in working with partners to address traditional drug threats, particularly cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, which continue to inflict a heavy toll in the United States and many countries around the world. Experts from the United Nations and other organizations have warned that surging production, trafficking, and use of methamphetamine in some South East Asian countries has reached crisis proportions. Coca cultivation and cocaine production remains at historically high levels in Colombia, fueling rising use and overdose deaths in the United States and threatening Colombia’s efforts to establish enduring peace and security throughout its territory. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin production remain rampant in Afghanistan, undermining stability and economic development and fueling the Taliban insurgency and corruption. In Mexico, powerful transnational criminal organizations continue to reap billions of dollars in profits from controlling trafficking routes for methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine into the United States, increasing corruption and violence.

These are daunting challenges, and like-minded governments will need to continue working together in the years to come to reverse the tide. Progress will also require further steps to reduce demand for illicit drugs, including through expanding access to evidence-based treatment and recovery programs, and improving programs to prevent illicit drug use before it begins. The United States is committed to working through regional bodies, multilateral channels, and bilaterally with like-minded governments to promote coordinated international responses to address these challenges.
Demand Reduction

Drug demand reduction is a key foreign policy tool for addressing the interconnected threats of drugs, crime, and violence. The goal of demand reduction strategies calls for a comprehensive, balanced approach to the drug problem that targets prevention, treatment, recovery, research, and international cooperation.

Recognizing that substance use is a major public health threat, and that drug use is a preventable and treatable disease, many countries are requesting INL-sponsored technical assistance to improve and develop effective policies aimed at reducing use. INL works closely with international partners to coordinate and execute capacity building and training activities for service providers in drug prevention, treatment, and recovery. INL also promotes the sharing of critical information and evidence-based studies to preserve the stability of societies threatened by the drug trade.

The drug demand reduction program has four pillars: (1) develop the drug demand reduction workforce, (2) professionalize drug treatment, prevention, and recovery services, (3) build global networks and community coalitions, and (4) address populations with special clinical needs. In achieving these objectives, INL supports the following:

- Capacity building, training, mentoring, and credentialing aimed to educate governments, public organizations, and practitioners in the field on evidence-based practices in drug prevention, treatment and recovery;
- Development of drug-free community coalitions internationally, involving law enforcement and public/private social institutions aimed at preventing drug use and its consequences;
- Research, development, and outcome based evaluation efforts to determine the effectiveness of drug prevention and treatment programs; and
- Development of innovative tools to increase knowledge of and decrease deaths caused by toxic adulterants found in illicit substances.

Recognizing that there are populations with special clinical needs in the development and pattern of substance use disorders, INL supports technical assistance to address their unique treatment needs associated with substance use and related violence.

Significant completed and ongoing INL-funded demand reduction projects for 2018 include:

**Universal Prevention Curriculum:** INL’s Universal Prevention Curriculum (UPC) consists of two series, one for coordinators/managers of prevention programs and one for prevention implementers/prevention workers. This training program is based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Standards for Drug Use Prevention, offering innovative evidence-based approaches to drug prevention in a variety of settings such as family, school, workplace, media, and the community. The development of examinations and an International Certified Prevention Specialist credential is in the process of being developed. The effectiveness of the school-based program is currently being evaluated with INL support in collaboration with the Cayetano Heredia University in Lima, Peru.
Regional Treatment Training: INL supports the work of the Colombo Plan, UNODC, and the Organization of American States to strengthen the workforce providing drug prevention, treatment and recovery services through intensive trainings and credentialing examinations at the national level. These trainings improve the quality of services, helping prevent the initiation of drug use and improving treatment outcomes, lowering relapse rates, and generating overall greater confidence in the treatment system. Through 2018, the curriculum has been disseminated in 56 countries – Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

Child Addiction Initiative: INL is supporting the development of evidence-based training to establish effective and appropriate drug prevention and treatment practices to young children (aged 12 and under) exposed to drugs. This initiative is in response to increasing reports of acute and growing substance use disorders among children in Asia, Africa and South America, where age-appropriate treatment may be unavailable or not scientifically sound. Working with a panel of global child drug addiction experts, INL developed six child-focused psychosocial and pharmacological treatment training courses to serve as a tool to help strengthen international capacities in this field. This program is being implemented through Colombo Plan and UNODC in collaboration with the University of North Carolina.

Women’s Drug Treatment Initiatives: INL supports research-based prevention, treatment, and recovery programs in high-risk countries to improve services for addicted women and their children, a chronically under-served and stigmatized population. In 2018, INL redesigned its Guiding the Recovery of Women (GROW) curriculum addressing the unique needs of women with substance use disorders across the globe. The first course of four of the new curriculum Women’s Interventions for Substance Exposure (WISE) completed its pilot testing in December 2018 and will complete the remaining three courses in the spring of 2019 before it is peer reviewed and finalized.

Alternatives to Incarceration: The United Nations Special Session on Drugs Outcome Document and the U.S.-sponsored CND resolution in 2016 called on countries to support alternatives to incarceration and proportionate sentencing, especially for drug dependent, nonviolent offenders. Alternatives to incarceration – including an emphasis on gaining access to drug treatment and care – can occur before an arrest, at an initial court hearing, within the jail, at re-entry and through community corrections such as probation. In 2018, INL supported the development of training for policymakers and agency heads from both the public health sector and criminal justice sector to discuss critical areas of need within a particular country related to alternatives to incarceration. The course was pilot tested in Jamaica in October and will also be pilot tested in Guyana in 2019 before undergoing a peer review process and finalization.
Intranasal Naloxone Feasibility Study: In 2016, INL support to UNODC and the World Health Organization initiated a feasibility study (Stop Overdose Safely, or S-O-S) on community management of opioid overdoses, including the intranasal use of naloxone. This study includes training for people likely to witness overdoses on how to correctly administer naloxone. In 2018, training was provided for trainers and researchers from Ukraine, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to prepare for country-wide roll outs of trainings and data collection.

Development of the International Consortium of Universities for Drug Demand Reduction (ICUDDR): In June 2018, INL and a consortium of international organization partners and universities from around the world held its third ICUDDR meeting in partnership with San Diego University in San Diego, with participation from representatives of 32 universities from 24 countries. The ICUDDR is a network of universities working together to promote academic programs in addition studies (drug prevention and treatment) to further the dissemination of evidence-based practices and develop the drug demand reduction workforce. With INL support, ICUDDR membership grew by 565 percent in two years to 137 members in 47 countries.

Drug-Free Communities: INL assists civil society and grassroots organizations to form and sustain effective community anti-drug coalitions aimed at preventing substance use disorders in their communities. INL support has resulted in the establishment of over 280 active coalitions consisting of over 6,700 volunteers in 23 countries around the world (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Philippines, Indonesia, and Albania).
Methodology for U.S. Government Estimates of Illegal Drug Production

Introduction

Illicit drug crops are grown, refined into illegal drugs, trafficked, and sold on the street by criminal enterprises that attempt to conceal every step of the process. Accurate estimates of such criminal activity are difficult to produce. The estimates of illicit drug production presented in the INCSR represent the United States government’s best effort to assess the current dimensions of the international drug problem. They are based on agricultural surveys conducted with satellite imagery and scientific studies of crop yields and the likely efficiency of typical illicit refining labs. As we do every year, we publish these estimates with an important caveat: they are estimates. While we must express our estimates as numbers, these numbers should not be seen as precise figures. Rather, they represent the midpoint of a band of statistical probability that gets wider as additional variables are introduced and as we move from cultivation to harvest to final refined drug.

As needed, the United States government revises its estimate process and occasionally the estimates themselves – in the light of field research and technological advancements. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain. Weather can affect our ability to gather data, particularly in the Andes, where cloud cover can be a major problem.

Improved technologies and analytical techniques may also lead us to produce revisions to United States government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year. When possible, we apply these new techniques to previous years’ data and adjust appropriately, but often, especially in the case of new technologies, we can only apply them prospectively. These illicit drug statistics represent the current state of the art. As new information and technology becomes applicable, the accuracy of the estimates will improve.

Cultivation Estimates

The United States government conserves limited personnel and technical resources by employing sample survey methodologies to estimate illicit crop cultivation and concentrating survey efforts on areas with strategic amounts of illegal cultivation or areas most likely to have illicit crop cultivation. Each year, analysts review a variety of datasets – including eradication data, seizure data, law enforcement investigations information, previous field locations, and other information – to determine areas likely to have illegal cultivation, and revise and update the search area, if necessary. They then survey and estimate cultivation in new areas using proven statistical techniques.
The resulting estimates meet the U.S. government’s need for an annual estimate of illicit crop cultivation for each country. They also help with eradication, interdiction, and other law enforcement operations. As part of the effort to provide accurate and comprehensive assessments, the areas surveyed are often expanded and modified, so direct comparison with previous year estimates is sometimes not possible.

Production Estimates

Illicit crop productivity depends upon a number of factors. Changes in weather, farming techniques, soil fertility, and disease prevalence can produce widely varying yields from year to year and place to place. Some illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the U.S. government, which can make scientific information difficult to obtain. However, we continually strive to improve our drug production estimates. The relative productivity of poppy crops in some cases can be estimated using imagery, and our confidence in coca leaf yield continues to improve as a result of field studies conducted in Latin America. Coca fields which are less than 18 months of age (“new fields”) produce much less leaf than mature fields. In Colombia, for example, fields on average get their first small harvest at six months of age; in Bolivia and Peru, fields are usually first harvested at 12 months of age. The U.S. government estimates include the proportion of new fields detected each year and adjust leaf production accordingly.

Processing Estimates

The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by narcotics producers complicates the task of accurately assessing the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material and chemicals used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures all affect production.

The U.S. government estimates for coca leaf, cocaine, marijuana, opium, and heroin production are potential estimates; that is, it is assumed that all of the coca, cannabis, and poppy grown is harvested and processed into illicit drugs. This is a reasonable assumption for coca leaf in Colombia. In Bolivia and Peru, however, the U.S. government potential cocaine production estimates do not remove for coca leaf locally chewed and used in products such as coca tea. In Southwest and Southeast Asia and Latin America, it is not unrealistic to assume that virtually all poppy is harvested for opium gum, but substantial amounts of Asian opium are consumed or stored rather than being processed into heroin; the proportion of this opium ultimately processed into heroin is unknown.

Other International Estimates

The United States helps fund estimates done by the United Nations in some countries. These estimates use different methodologies from the U.S. government assessments and utilize a mix of imagery and ground-based observations. The UN estimates are often used to help determine the response of the international donor community to specific countries or regions.
There have been some efforts for the U.S. government and the UN to understand each other’s methodologies with the goal of improving both sets of estimates. These efforts are ongoing.

This report also includes data on drug production, trafficking, seizures, and consumption that come from host governments or non-governmental organizations. Such data is attributed to the source organization, especially when we cannot independently verify it.
# Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production 2009-2017

(all figures in metric tons; no USG estimates for 2018 were available at the time of this report)

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Notes:

Estimates may not add to totals due to rounding.

Opium production is reported at zero percent moisture.

Some Asian opium is consumed and not processed into heroin.
## Worldwide Illicit Drug Crop Cultivation 2009-2017

(all figures in hectares)

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Note on Colombia poppy cultivation: No estimates in 2008 and 2010-2013 due to cloud cover.

Note on Guatemala poppy cultivation: 2012 survey limited to fall season in San Marcos and Huehuetenango only.

Note on Laos poppy cultivation: Estimates for 2009-2010 are for Phongsali only. Survey area for 2011 was significantly expanded.

Note on Mexico poppy cultivation: 2011 and later surveys incorporate a major methodological change; 2007-2010 estimates have therefore been removed.

Note on Pakistan poppy cultivation: 2008 and 2012 estimates are for Bara River Valley in Khyber Agency only. 2009 estimate is for Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur Agencies only. 2013, 2015, and 2016 includes Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, and selected areas in Balochistan. 2014 includes Khyber and areas in Balochistan.
# Parties to UN Conventions

(with dates ratified/acceded)

As of 14 November, 2018

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*Not included on this list is the “State of Palestine,” which, according to the United Nations, has purportedly acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption (2014), to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2015), and to the 1988 UN Drug Convention (December 29, 2017). The Government of the United States of America notified the United Nations that it does not believe the “State of Palestine” qualifies as a sovereign state and does not recognize it as such. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America believes that the “State of Palestine” is not qualified to accede to the Conventions and does not believe that it is in a treaty relationship with the “State of Palestine” under the Conventions.*
USG ASSISTANCE
## U.S. Department of State FY 2018-2019 Budget

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International Training

International counternarcotics training is managed and funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and implemented by various U.S. law enforcement organizations including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and U.S. Coast Guard. Major objectives are:

- Contributing to enhanced professionalism of the basic rule of law infrastructure for carrying out counternarcotics law enforcement activities in countries which cooperate with and are considered significant to U.S. narcotics control efforts;
- Improving technical skills of drug law enforcement personnel in these countries; and
- Increasing cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement officials.

INL-funded training supports U.S. counternarcotics priorities worldwide, and focuses on encouraging foreign law enforcement agency self-sufficiency. The overarching goal of U.S. counternarcotics training is to support the development of effective host country enforcement institutions, capable of removing drugs from circulation before they can reach the United States. U.S. training can take two forms: as part of a planned bilateral assistance program in target partner countries; and as regional training with international participants from multiple countries. The regional training provided at International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) consists of both general law enforcement training as well as specialized training for mid-level managers in police and other law enforcement agencies.

U.S. bilateral training assistance program works closely with international organizations including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Organization of American States. The United States coordinates assistance planning with other donors through mechanisms such as the Dublin Group (an informal body of countries and organizations that provide law enforcement training), and the Paris Pact (an informal network of states dedicated to stopping the spread of Afghan opiates). The United States continuously works to promote burden-sharing with our allies in the provision of training, as well as ensuring that our respective efforts are complementary and directed towards common goals.

International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)

The International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) pursue three core objectives: building the capacity of foreign criminal justice partners of the United States to stop crime before it impacts the United States; fostering partnerships across national borders within important regions of the world; and advancing partner nations’ engagement with U.S. law enforcement agencies. These academies are an important part of the interagency U.S. effort to combat transnational criminal organizations.

Since the first ILEA opened in Budapest in 1995, the program has grown to six facilities worldwide, and has provided training to approximately 70,000 students in from countries in
Africa, Europe, Asia, and across Latin America. The ILEA program hosts approximately 150 courses per year. The program implements a number of key programming initiatives including an anti-corruption course series, courses focused on countering violent extremism, and executive-level symposiums on combating transnational criminal organizations. Training includes specialized skill development and tactics in law enforcement areas such as counternarcotics; investigating money laundering and financial crimes; cybercrime investigations; border control; and countering all forms of trafficking including weapons, wildlife, and trafficking in persons. ILEA also works with senior officers and administrators on principles of leadership and effective management at ILEA Roswell. The ILEAs help to develop an extensive network of alumni who exchange information with their regional and U.S. counterparts and assist in transnational investigations. Many ILEA graduates become the leaders and decision-makers in their respective law enforcement organizations. The Department of State coordinates with the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and Treasury, and with foreign government counterparts to implement the ILEA program.

**Africa.** ILEA Gaborone (Botswana) opened in 2001 and the Regional Training Center in Accra (Ghana) opened in 2012. ILEA Gaborone delivers one multi-week leadership and development course annually and also specialized courses for police and other criminal justice officials to boost their capacity to work with U.S. and regional counterparts. These courses concentrate on specific methods and techniques in a variety of subjects, such as anticorruption, financial crimes, border security, crime scene investigations, counternarcotics, explosives, trafficking in weapons and wildlife, gender-based violence, and community policing. A Regional Training Center is operated in Accra, Ghana, in coordination with the ILEA, and addresses the unique needs of the West African region. ILEA Gaborone and RTC Accra provided training to approximately 2,015 students in 2018.

**Asia.** ILEA Bangkok (Thailand) opened in 1999, and focuses on enhancing regional cooperation against transnational crime threats in Southeast Asia with ASEAN member states. ILEA Bangkok’s specialized courses focus on counternarcotics, anticorruption, financial crimes, environmental crimes, and trafficking in persons, weapons, and wildlife ILEA Bangkok trained approximately 1,107 students in 2018.

**Europe.** ILEA Budapest (Hungary) was the first ILEA and was established in 1995. ILEA Budapest delivers three multi-week leadership and development courses annually and also offers specialized courses on regional threats such as anticorruption, organized crime, cybercrime, financial crimes, women in law enforcement, gender-based violence, and specialized training for judges and prosecutors. ILEA Budapest trained approximately 1,060 students in 2018.

**Global.** ILEA Roswell (New Mexico) opened in September 2001. ILEA Roswell hosts senior officials and policy makers including top prosecutors, judges, police commanders and lawmakers to discuss policy formulation and enforcement to facilitate an effective criminal justice system in these priority areas. These delegates are at the senior levels of leadership in their countries, and are positioned to implement substantive changes to the criminal justice systems upon their return. ILEA Roswell draws senior officials from all participating ILEA countries. ILEA Roswell trained approximately 324 students in 2018.
Latin America. ILEA San Salvador (El Salvador) opened in 2005. ILEA San Salvador delivers two multi-week leadership and development courses annually and also offers specialized courses on regional threats, as well as specialized courses for police, prosecutors, and judicial officials. ILEA San Salvador courses concentrate on anti-gangs, human rights, counternarcotics, border security, and financial crimes. ILEA San Salvador trained approximately 1,154 students in 2018.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

The mission of the DEA is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States. As part of this mission, DEA seeks to bring to justice the criminal organizations and principal members of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) based in the United States or foreign nations involved in the cultivation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances, as well as the money laundering of illicit finances derived from drug trafficking.

To achieve this mission, DEA has nearly 10 percent of its Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst work force permanently assigned overseas at 90 DEA foreign offices located in 69 countries. DEA’s foreign offices act as conduits of actionable and strategic information, intelligence, and evidence to law enforcement and prosecutorial components in the United States and vice versa. In this manner, DEA is able to identify, target, and dismantle the entire global spectrum of the DTO. DEA foreign offices are tasked with four principle missions:

- Conduct bilateral and multilateral investigations with host law enforcement partners;
- Coordinate counternarcotics intelligence gathering with host governments;
- Implement training programs for host country police and prosecutor agencies;
- Support the advancement and development of host country drug law enforcement institutions.

The emphasis placed on each objective is determined by the host nation’s unique conditions and circumstances as it relates to their drug trafficking threat, infrastructure and law enforcement capabilities. DEA works side-by-side with host nation counterparts to develop relevant training, promote intelligence sharing, conduct bilateral investigations, and support joint counter-drug operations. The vast majority of DEA foreign efforts and resources are dedicated to conducting international drug and drug money laundering investigations. In addition to that mandate, in 2018 DEA dedicated considerable effort in the fields of training, multinational law enforcement collaboration, and forensic science.

International Training: In Fiscal Year 2018, DEA Training Division conducted 81 formal (bilateral) and multilateral seminars for 2,628 participants from 73 countries. DEA has been conducting international counter-narcotics training since its creation in 1973. DEA is recognized as the world pioneer in international training and serves as the model for a variety of international law enforcement training efforts. The specific courses and curricula offered by DEA have evolved over the years in response to experience, changes in law enforcement priorities, current international narcotics trafficking situations, new technologies, and specific requests of the host governments. All DEA international training programs have as a major objective the building of regional working relationships between countries.

International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) - Strengthening International Relations: In 1983, IDEC was established to institutionalize regional cooperation of drug law enforcement officials from countries within the Western Hemispher. Over the years IDEC has evolved into an important global forum where the highest ranking agency leaders and prosecutors from around 125 countries gather to develop a cooperative vision and establish strategies for
combating DTOs. Participants continue to build, balance, and integrate the tools of law enforcement power to combat these criminal networks and build a framework for international cooperation to protect all our citizens from the violence, harm, and exploitation wrought by drug trafficking and commensurate threats to national security. IDEC is an operational targeting opportunity and global forum for important topical issues in international drug enforcement, and to identify and attack DTO vulnerabilities. IDEC initiatives have demonstrated that a multilateral enforcement approach has a cumulative effect as member nations increasingly coordinate their law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute major DTOs and their leaders and to seize and block their assets. The 36th annual IDEC is scheduled for April 2019 in Baku, Azerbaijan, where it will be co-hosted by the Republic of Azerbaijan government and DEA.

The Special Testing and Research Laboratory’s Programs: The Heroin and Cocaine Signature Programs (HSP/CSP) at the DEA Special Testing and Research Laboratory (STRL) determine the geographic origins of heroin and cocaine seizure samples. In addition, the laboratory maintains a Methamphetamine Profiling Program (MPP) that determines the synthetic routes and precursors employed in producing methamphetamine. The classification schemes for these programs were developed using authentic samples collected from drug source countries world-wide, as well as drug processing laboratories within those countries. By collaborating with partner nations, numerous such “authentics” are submitted annually to the laboratory from the DEA foreign offices. Currently, the laboratory classifies several thousand drug exhibits seized within the United States and abroad annually.

The Signature and Profiling Programs provide the counterdrug intelligence community with science-based heroin and cocaine source data and intelligence information regarding methamphetamine synthesis. The HSP, CSP, and the MPP are viewed as crucial tools to investigate and support strategic intelligence regarding illicit production, trafficking, and availability of these three high profile drugs within the United States and foreign countries. Over the past several years, the laboratory has established a robust Emerging Trends Program to analyze new psychoactive substances for enforcement and intelligence purposes. This group has identified over 400 synthetic cannabinoids, substituted cathinones, opioids and powerful hallucinogenic compounds that have come into the drug market.

To assist with addressing the nation’s current opioid crisis, STRL developed and implemented a new Fentanyl Signature Profiling Program (FSPP). Through an in-depth analysis including quantitation, impurity profiling, isotopic characterization, and occluded solvents analysis, the FSPP provides unique science-based forensic investigative leads on seizures where linkages were unknown or only suspected; real-time data to investigators; answers to key questions from the counterdrug intelligence/enforcement community and U.S. policymakers; and direct support to the National Drug Control Strategy. Since its inception, this program has established 36 linkages involving 65 cases and 152 samples from DEA seizures of 250 kilograms of fentanyl.

Office of Global Enforcement/Financial Investigations (OGF): The Office of Global Enforcement, Financial Investigations Section (OGF) at DEA Headquarters serves as DEA’s lead body for coordinating DEA’s efforts across domestic and foreign offices with respect to the targeting of the financial aspects of drug trafficking organizations (DTO). OGF works in
conjunction with DEA field offices, foreign counterparts, and the inter-agencies to support and provided guidance in via a variety of investigative tools, as well as by providing oversight on DEA’s undercover financial investigation. OGF facilitates cooperation between countries, resulting in the identification and prosecution of money laundering organizations operating on behalf of DTOs, as well as the seizure of assets and denial of revenue around the world. OGF regularly briefs and educates United States government officials and diplomats, foreign government officials, and military and law enforcement counterparts regarding the latest trends in money laundering, narcoterrorism financing, international banking, offshore corporations, international wire transfer of funds, and financial investigative tools.

In conjunction with the DEA Office of International Training, OGF conducts training for DEA field offices, as well as foreign counterparts in order to share strategic ideas and promote effective techniques in financial investigations. During 2018, OGF participated and led a number of workshops and strategy sessions focused on money laundering trends, engagement with financial institutions, guidance and overview on undercover money laundering operations, virtual currency, and investigative case coordination.

DEA has prioritized having a financial component to its investigations by making it a key component of Priority Target Operations, the Domestic Cartel Initiative, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force investigations. DEA has approximately 20 dedicated financial investigative teams across DEA’s domestic offices, as well as approximately three foreign-based DEA team in Mexico, Peru, and Colombia.
United States Coast Guard (USCG)

The U.S. Coast Guard plays a crucial role in efforts to keep dangerous illicit drugs moving by sea from reaching the United States. Working within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in carrying out its responsibilities within the National Drug Control Strategy, the USCG maintains a multi-faceted, layered approach to attack Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) networks and their transport of illicit contraband from South America toward the United States via the Caribbean Sea, the Eastern Pacific Ocean, and through the littorals of Central America and Mexico. The overarching strategy is to increase maritime border security through a layered offensive system that extends beyond U.S. land borders to attack the networks responsible for smuggling drugs. This system begins overseas, spans the offshore regions, and continues into U.S. territorial seas and ports. The USCG’s mix of cutters, aircraft, boats, and deployable specialized forces, as well as international and domestic partnerships, allow the Coast Guard to leverage its unique maritime law enforcement authorities and competencies to address threats and improve security throughout the maritime domain.

USCG efforts focus on removing illicit drugs close to their origins and as far from U.S. shores as possible where drug shipments are in their most concentrated bulk form. Moreover, these illicit cargoes are most vulnerable while in transit at sea through international waters where interdiction forces have the highest tactical advantage and best opportunity to interdict drug movements. The next step in the maturation of maritime law enforcement is conducting operations to disrupt and dismantle the TOC networks by targeting any illicit activity in which they are engaged, to include drug, migrant, weapons and bulk cash smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing.

Counternarcotics Operations: Detection of drug-trafficking vessels occurs principally through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of tactical information and strategic intelligence combined with effective sensors operating from land, air, and surface assets. The six million square mile transit zone is far too expansive to randomly patrol; targeting information is necessary to focus efforts. Upon detection, U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies provide monitoring, relaying data, imagery, and position information until an appropriate interdiction asset arrives on scene. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead U.S. federal agency for drug interdiction on the high seas and takes tactical control of U.S. and allied assets for the interdiction and apprehension operational phase. A crucial ingredient for continued maritime drug interdiction success is the USCG’s counterdrug bilateral agreements and operational procedures held with over 40 partner nations. By facilitating operational communications and enabling law enforcement officers to stop, board, and search vessels suspected of illicit maritime activity, these agreements deter smugglers from using another nation’s vessel and/or territorial seas as a haven from U.S. law enforcement efforts.

International Cooperative Efforts: In 2018, the USCG had personnel permanently assigned overseas as Coast Guard Liaison Officers, Defense Attachés, and Support to Interdiction and Prosecution team members to facilitate maritime counterdrug activities, including security assistance, intelligence collection and dissemination, and to liaise with the U.S. interagency and international community. The USCG, in concert with the U.S. Department of State, hosts three counter drug summits per year: an annual Multilateral Maritime Interdiction and Prosecution
Summit (Caribbean) and two semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits (Central and South America). These summits have a combined annual attendance of more than 35 countries, over 60 international agencies, and more than 300 experts. Topics include maritime interdiction, prosecution, criminal investigations, and improving regional success in all aspects of the interdiction continuum. To counter trans-Atlantic drug flows, the USCG continues to work with U.S. Africa Command to expand maritime training and operations for West African countries through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership.

**International Training and Technical Assistance:** The USCG provides international training and technical assistance to enhance the interdiction capacities of international partners. The Technical Assistance Field Team, a joint initiative between the USCG and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is a team of nine Coast Guard engineers and logisticians whose purpose is to professionalize and improve the operational readiness of 11 Caribbean maritime forces through technical assistance visits. The USCG’s Security Assistance Program offers both resident training programs and mobile training teams (MTTs) to partner nation maritime services around the world to advance the capability of their naval and coast guard forces. In Fiscal Year 2018, the USCG deployed 55 MTTs to 26 countries, and approximately 297 students from 64 countries attended 297 resident courses at USCG training installations.

**Operational Highlights:** In Fiscal Year 2018, the USCG expended over 2,400 cutter days, over 1,400 Airborne Use of Force capable helicopters days, and over 3,400 surveillance aircraft hours on counter drug patrols, and USCG Law Enforcement Detachments deployed for over 600 days aboard U.S. Navy, British, Dutch, and Canadian warships. As a result, the USCG disrupted 222 drug smuggling attempts, which included the seizure of 160 vessels, detention of 602 suspected smugglers for further investigation and prosecution, and removal of 209.6 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and 24.4 MT of marijuana.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes all goods, vehicles, and people entering and exiting the United States. CBP officers are charged with identification and prevention of terrorist travel to the United States and interception of illicit drugs and other contraband, improperly classified merchandise, unlicensed technology and material, weapons, ammunition, fugitives, undocumented immigrants, and unreported currency at America’s 329 international ports of entry (POEs).

United States Border Patrol (USBP) agents are assigned the mission of securing the border against all threats between the POEs along the over 8,000 miles of land and coastal border. These threats include criminal/undocumented aliens, drug smugglers, potential terrorists, wanted criminals, and persons seeking to avoid inspection at the designated POEs. CBP’s drug interdiction activity includes staffing 35 permanent and 140 tactical checkpoints nationwide. CBP checkpoints utilize experienced agents, canine teams, technology, and shipper-CBP partnerships to detect and apprehend the above mentioned threats. Additionally, agents patrol targeted border areas that are frequent entry points for the smuggling of drugs and people into the United States.

Since its creation, CBP has also been charged with the border regulatory functions of passport control and agriculture inspections in order to provide comprehensive, seamless border control services. This merger of responsibilities is intended to simplify border security operations and is termed: "One face at the border." CBP is the nation’s first line of defense against the introduction of dangerous drugs from foreign sources.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) is a critical component of CBP's risk-based and layered approach for border security, with 1,300 federal agents, 248 aircraft, and 331 marine vessels operating throughout the United States and Puerto Rico. AMO interdicts unlawful people and cargo approaching U.S. borders, investigates criminal networks and provides domain awareness in the air and maritime environments, and responds to contingencies and national taskings.

International Training and Assistance: As part of its efforts to extend the nation’s zone of security beyond U.S. ports of entry, CBP works with other U.S. government and foreign government partners to provide a wide array of short-term and long-term technical training and assistance to countries throughout the world in conjunction with the Department of State, as appropriate. These programs are designed to standardize and build the capacity of foreign government organizations to implement more effective customs trade operations, border policing, and immigration inspection.

International Visitors Program: The State Department’s International Visitors Program can provide an opportunity for foreign customs officials and other foreign officials to consult with their U.S. counterparts and appropriate high-level managers in CBP Headquarters. International visitors can also participate in on-site tours of selected U.S. ports and field sites to observe actual CBP operations.
Port of Entry Interdiction Training: The correct approach to border interdiction varies with border environments, e.g., land, seaport, rail, and airport. Training are designed for the problems encountered and interdiction techniques useful for each type of operation. CBP also provides specialized U.S. Border Patrol training in techniques used by smugglers who do not use official ports of entry to cross borders, but who attempt to smuggle contraband in lightly patrolled border areas.

International Bulk Currency Smuggling Training: With an increased enforcement focus on money laundering, organized criminals and terrorists have turned to bulk cash smuggling to move valuables across borders. Bulk Currency Smuggling training assists foreign government enforcement personnel in identifying techniques used by bulk currency smugglers. Further, CBP training helps international partners to design and implement programs to counter that threat, resulting in seizures of millions of dollars from the proceeds of crime.

Overseas Enforcement Training: Overseas Enforcement Training encompasses a curriculum which includes Border Enforcement Training; Supply Chain Security; Detection, Interdiction and Investigation; Concealment Methods; Bulk Currency Smuggling; False and Fraudulent Documents; Train-the-Trainer; Anti-Corruption; Targeting and Risk Management; Hazardous Materials; and X-ray Systems. These courses can also be conducted at foreign ports of entry. They include both basic training and refresher training/mentoring abroad for graduates of training at U.S. port facilities.

CBP Attachés, Representatives and Advisors and Special Customs’ Programs: A growing network of attachés, representatives and advisors who serve in U.S. diplomatic missions, U.S. military bases, or directly for foreign border security agencies. Attachés have a broad mandate, including enforcement and investigative activities on behalf of CBP. They also exchange expert information with foreign counterparts, improving the effectiveness of law enforcement activity, policies, and resources relating to border enforcement. Their efforts help to ensure that enforcement cooperation is seamless across borders and that the battle against illegal transnational activity is effective.

Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements: CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) co-lead negotiations on Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAAs). CMAAs are negotiated with foreign governments and provide for mutual assistance in the enforcement of customs-related laws. Under the provisions of CMAAs, CBP provides assistance to its foreign counterparts and receives reciprocal assistance from them primarily in the exchange of information that facilitates the enforcement of each country’s laws. As of the end of Fiscal Year 2017, the United States had signed 80 CMAAs, with three signed during Fiscal Year 2017. CMAAs also provide a foundational basis for the development and implementation of other subsequent cooperation-based arrangements with foreign partners, especially as it relates initiatives that require information sharing and protections related thereto.

CBP Preclearance Field Office: Preclearance operations involve the strategic stationing of CBP law enforcement personnel overseas to inspect travelers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights. Through preclearance, CBP Officers conduct the same immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections of international air travelers typically performed upon arrival in the
United States before departure from foreign airports. CBP has more than 600 law enforcement officers and agriculture specialists stationed at 15 air preclearance locations in six countries. The aviation security benefits of preclearance are substantial because a uniformed, U.S. law enforcement officer interviews the precleared passenger before he or she boards the plane. This added security layer provides an additional opportunity to detect and stop threats as early in the process as possible.

In addition to enhancing security, preclearance has the potential to increase capacity and create growth opportunities for airports and air carriers in the United States and abroad, while improving the passenger experience. Preclearance generates the potential for significant economic benefits for the United States and our international partners by facilitating travel through all gateways, creating an overall increase in clearance capacity, and maximizing aircraft and gate utilization. For travelers, preclearance leads to faster connections and the ability to exit the airport immediately upon landing the United States.

**National Targeting Center:** The National Targeting Center (NTC) collaborates with international partners to identify, disrupt, and manage risks in the cargo and passenger environments through information sharing and implementing joint targeting operations in accordance with memoranda of understanding and CMAAs. As part of this collaboration, the Center hosts representatives from participating foreign agencies, and works with these international liaisons, as well as with other U.S. government agencies, to detect and disrupt terrorism, threats to national security and public safety, and transnational criminal activity including but not limited to drug smuggling operations and drug trafficking organizations and their associates. The NTC also provides training and technical assistance in risk assessment and targeting to foreign Customs, Immigration and other border enforcement agencies.

**DOD Preclearance:** The Customs Border Clearance Agent (CBCA) program is designed to permit cargo consigned to the care of the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as returning military personnel, to be pre-cleared for import/entry into the Customs Territory of the United States. The preclearance of such cargo and personnel is accomplished by DoD personnel that have been trained by CBP officers to perform pre-clearance inspections. CBCA personnel conduct Customs and Agricultural inspections and certify personnel and cargo have met all CBP and USDA entry requirements, as well as Defense Travel Regulations, prior to departing to the U.S. CBCA inspections are conducted at 28 locations in seven foreign countries throughout the Middle East. CBP officers also provide Technical Assistance Visits and annual Site Inspections/Certifications at these DoD preclearance facilities.

**Immigration Advisory Program:** Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) works with air carriers and host authorities, at foreign airports, to prevent terrorists and other high-risk passengers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. CBP’s Joint Security Program (JSP) is a component of the IAP with the goal of identifying high-risk air travelers and contraband arriving and departing the host country. In 2014, IAP and JSP expanded to include the deployment of Police Liaison Officers (LO) to foreign partner law enforcement agencies to enhance information exchange posed by terrorist and criminal travel. IAP, JSP and LO play a central role in CBP’s multi-layered strategy to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. IAP currently operates in 20 distinct engagements across the globe.
CHEMICAL CONTROLS
Introduction

Chemicals play two critical roles in the production of illicit drugs: as chemical inputs for the production of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine and fentanyl; and as refining agents and solvents for processing plant-based materials such as coca and opium poppy into cocaine and heroin. Preventing criminals from gaining access to chemicals needed to produce illicit drugs is a key international obligation codified by the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1988 UN Drug Convention), and an enduring challenge. This challenge has taken on new importance in recent years, corresponding to the growing threat of synthetic opioids and synthetic drug analogues known as new psychoactive substances (NPS). Comprehensive efforts to prevent chemical diversion require strong national efforts to control the production, transport, sale, and storage of these substances, as well as international coordination and information sharing between governments and cooperation from private industry.

Some of the most widely-known chemicals used to produce plant-based drugs include potassium permanganate (used to produce cocaine) and acetic anhydride (used to produce heroin). Preventing diversion of such chemicals depend on how nations improve their internal controls and take the initiative to join international regulatory efforts such as the ones managed by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The international community recognizes adherence to international regulatory efforts as an essential commitment to improve efforts against diversions of chemicals used to produce plant-based drugs.

Some illicit drug production methods have remained relatively constant through the years, involving the same common chemicals, particularly those used to refine traditional plant-based drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Chemicals used as key ingredients to produce synthetic drugs and NPS have shifted more regularly. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified over 850 different forms of NPS and estimate the number of potential fentanyl analogues alone to number in the thousands. Innovations in synthetic drug design and production continue to accelerate as drug producers seek to evade drug controls and tailor products to meet evolving consumer demand. Sustained cooperation and expanded information sharing both within and between national governments is critical to keep pace with emerging trends in this field.

In March 2017, the 60th session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) decided unanimously, at the request of the United States, to require all state parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention to control the two key precursor chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl: 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP). This binding international obligation went into effect in October 2017, and serves as a prime example of how the international drug control system should swiftly react to emerging drug control challenges and threats to public health, and to take concrete action to save lives, when quickly and properly applied.

In March 2018, at the 61st CND, the United States introduced a resolution focusing on the non-medical use of synthetic opioids and their precursors, including fentanyl and its analogues.
Specifically, the U.S. resolution, which the CND ultimately adopted by consensus, promotes expanded use of existing tools developed by UNODC and INCB that facilitate real-time cooperation between international law enforcement partners to disrupt the illicit supply chain of these dangerous precursors.

The International Framework

The 1988 UN Drug Convention is the legal framework for international cooperation to prevent precursor chemical diversion. Specifically, the 190 UN member states that are party to the convention are required, under Article 12, to monitor their international trade in the chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the Convention. These chemicals have legitimate industrial uses and the tables are updated regularly to account for changes in the manufacture of illicit drugs. State parties are required to share information with one another and with the INCB on their international transactions involving these chemicals to identify and prevent diversion for illicit purposes. Article 12, Sections 8 and 9 of the Convention requires licensing or similar control of all persons and enterprises involved in the manufacture and distribution of listed chemicals.

Resolutions from the CND – the treaty-based body within the UN system with prime responsibility for international drug-control policy – have provided additional guidance to states parties on how to implement their obligations according to specific best practices. These resolutions have also encouraged greater dissemination and use of the INCB’s International Special Surveillance List (ISSL) – a mechanism for monitoring chemicals not regulated by the Convention but for which substantial evidence exists of their use in illicit drug manufacture.

The INCB is an independent, quasi-judicial monitoring body for the implementation of the three UN international drug control conventions – the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. The INCB monitors compliance with the drug control treaties and proposes appropriate remedial measures and technical assistance to governments that are not fully applying the provisions of the treaties or are encountering difficulties in applying them. The United States provides funding to the INCB to monitor the measures called for in the Conventions, and to improve detection and tracking of chemicals subject to diversion.

In addition to ISSL, the INCB has developed a number of instruments to address the challenges of precursor chemicals:

- The Pre-Export Notification Online system (PEN Online) is an online database system that enables the exchange of information between member states on the import and export of chemicals required for the manufacture of illicit drugs, and to provide the ability to raise alerts to stop suspect shipments before they reach illicit drug manufacturers. The system facilitates information sharing on the global level by collecting data on precursor chemical trafficking and use trends, and then publicizing this data. In practice, electronic responses are sent to exporting countries which are required to acknowledge receipt and confirm clearance to export chemicals. Since the PEN Online system was first launched in March 2006, 162 governments have registered to use it. On average, there are 2,910 PEN pre-export notifications made monthly via
the online system. More than 35,000 pre-export notifications have been submitted using the PEN Online system.

- The Precursors Incident Communication System (PICS) is another INCB tool that facilitates real-time communication exchange among law enforcement officials worldwide. The system supports intelligence sharing and facilitates direct coordination and collaboration among national authorities to advance investigations on chemical trafficking. As of November 2018, more than 2,300 incidents communicated through PICS; an increase of more than 230 from the previous year. Those incidents involved more than 30 different countries and territories. The system has registered users from 109 countries and territories, representing nearly 250 agencies.

In addition to PEN Online and PICS, the INCB manages task forces to implement Project Prism, Project Cohesion, and Project ION — three INCB international initiatives in matters related to chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of drugs, specifically synthetic drugs (Project Prism), heroin and cocaine (Project Cohesion), and NPS (Project ION). These ongoing mechanisms facilitate coordinating the monitoring of chemical transactions and targeted, time-bound intelligence-gathering operations.

The Board also maintains a Precursor Task Force and a Project ION Task Force. At the 61st CND, the Precursor Task Force held a side event delivering presentations on flexible approaches to drug precursor control. Those included examples of voluntary cooperation with industry in Germany; regulatory measures in the United States to reduce administrative burdens on control measures; and steps to cope with non-scheduled precursor chemicals in China.

The Project ION Task Force is primarily engaged in the coordination, collection, and communication of strategic and operational information and intelligence related to synthetic NPS with little or no known medical, scientific, or industrial uses. This task force promotes international operational initiatives by supporting national authorities' efforts in preventing non-scheduled NPS from reaching consumer markets. Additionally, the INCB recently implemented a special project (Project Opioids) to interdict the illicit distribution and sales of synthetic opioids by developing partnerships and practical actions with governments and relevant industries.

**Regional Bodies.** The regulatory framework codified by the United Nations does not exist in isolation. Regional bodies, such as the European Union (EU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) actively work in partnership with the United States on multilateral chemical control initiatives, including the implementation of CND resolutions.

**Chemical Control Activities and New Trends**

**Fentanyl.** Fentanyl is a powerful and deadly Schedule II synthetic opioid that is between 50 and 100 times more potent than morphine. Within North America, drug traffickers are increasingly lacing illicit fentanyl into heroin and other drugs to create a more potent high for users. Fentanyl is also pressed into pill form and sold as counterfeit prescription opioid pills. In many instances, buyers are not aware of the presence of fentanyl in heroin, alternatively the user may have sought out fentanyl-laced heroin for the greater high.
Fentanyl is responsible for a surging number of overdose fatalities in the United States, Canada, and some European countries. Specifically in the United States between 2017 and 2018, fentanyl-related overdose claimed the lives of more than 30,000 Americans. In Canada, from January to June 2018, opioids, mainly fentanyl and its analogues, were responsible for nearly 2,100 overdose deaths. While fentanyl deaths have been highest in North America, fentanyl availability and overdose deaths have also increased in other parts of the world. In the United Kingdom, 122 fentanyl-related deaths were recorded from between 2017 and March 2018, up from 58 recorded in 2016.

The two precursor chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances (for example, acetyl fentanyl) are NNPP and ANPP. While there are several chemicals and pathways to manufacture fentanyl, the NPP and ANPP processing method is currently the preferred one used by clandestine manufacturers. On October 18, 2017, these two chemicals were added to Table I (internationally controlled chemicals) of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, implementing the decision of the 2017 CND. With the addition of ANPP and NPP, there are now 28 chemicals controlled under Table I. International control of these chemicals under the 1988 UN Drug Convention requires states parties to the convention to institute domestic regulation of the import and export of ANPP and NPP, which is intended to reduce their availability to criminals and reduce their availability in the illicit supply chain.

The INCB has identified a list of 93 fentanyl-related substances with no currently known legitimate medical or industrial uses, beyond limited research and analytical purposes. Seventy-seven of those substances are not currently scheduled under any of the three UN drug conventions. In response to Member State requests, the Board disseminated this list of fentanyl-related substances and invited all countries to refrain on a voluntary basis from any manufacture, import, export or distribution of the substances on the list. The list is a valuable tool used by DEA and international law enforcement practitioners to increase identification and detection of fentanyl-related substances in criminal channels.

**New Psychoactive Substances and Opioid Analogues.** NPS are substances of abuse, either in a pure form or a preparation, that are not controlled by the 1961 Convention or the 1971 Convention, but which may pose a public health threat. Producers modify and experiment with new chemical formulas in a search for new NPS that can avoid detection by authorities and skirt the international control regime.

The rapid proliferation of NPS is creating a critical challenge for law enforcement officials worldwide because of the speed in which they can be reformulated and remarketed to avoid international control. Over 850 formulations of NPS were reported to the United Nations through 2018, exceeding the capacity of law enforcement and regulatory authorities to curb this problem. Traffickers sell these substances via the Internet, through both open and non-indexed online websites (the so-called “Dark Web”), then utilize international mail and express consignment shipments to deliver them. Because of the extreme potency of these substances, tiny quantities, often only milligrams, are required to generate powerful and deadly highs; consequently, such small shipments can easily evade law enforcement and regulatory detection.
The UNODC’s Global Synthetics, Monitoring Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART) program helps law enforcement and forensic officials to combat the challenges posed by NPS through increased information sharing worldwide. The United States is a staunch supporter of the Global SMART program as a critical tool to increase voluntary cooperation among member states in sharing information on NPS trafficking and use trends on a global level. Data collected and analyzed by Global SMART informs CND scheduling decisions that affect international control of NPS under the UN drug conventions. This information is available on online portals, and is used to generate reports updating member states on the scope of this problem.

Illicit manufacture, trafficking, and use of synthetic opioids and NPS are poised to expand to new countries and regions. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa have reported increased trafficking and misuse of the synthetic opioid tramadol. Misuse of tramadol could lead to a demand for even more toxic forms of synthetic opioids. Criminals have been quick to capitalize on the low risk and cost of synthetic opioids, and continue to develop and introduce new analogues to markets. In 2012, governments reported just three synthetic opioid NPS to the United Nations, increasing to 10 in 2016. By 2018, according to the INCB, 37 countries had reported seizing 40 different opioid-type NPS, mostly fentanyl or fentanyl-related substances.

In addition to new fentanyl analogues, counterfeit variations of oxycodone, tramadol, and other pharmaceutical products continue to make inroads in the United States and other markets. Trafficking and abuse of synthetic opioids has become a top concern of governments in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East, particularly related to counterfeit or illicitly manufactured tramadol. Within the EU, 38 synthetic opioid NPS have been detected since 2009, with 13 reported in 2017, including 10 fentanyl analogues.

The international legal framework for drug control is struggling to keep pace with the speed by which criminals can develop new NPS. The United Nations drug control treaties, as well as the laws of many countries, continue to control drugs individually according to their chemical structure – a time consuming process. Many countries – including the United States – have enacted legislative reforms within the scope of international law to review and control NPS based on their psychoactive effects or broader category of classification (class-based scheduling), rather than precise chemical structure.

In November 2018, during the G-20 Meeting in Buenos Aires, China agreed to reclassify fentanyl as a controlled substance in its internal list of regulatory precursor chemicals. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, the country will schedule the entire category of fentanyl-type substances as controlled substances, and start the process of revising relevant laws and regulations. Full implementation of this announced reform could make an important impact in reducing the availability of fentanyl analogues.

**Carfentanil.** Carfentanil is a particularly potent fentanyl analogue not approved for use in humans that is contributing to opioid-related overdose deaths. Used as a veterinary tranquilizer for large mammals, carfentanil is up to 100 times more potent than fentanyl, and controlled under Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act.
Evidence obtained from seized drug supplies indicates that carfentanil is commonly used as an adulterant in other illicit drugs, such as heroin or cocaine, or mixed with diluents and pressed into counterfeit prescription pills. According to data obtained from National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS), there have been at least 2,900 domestic carfentanil encounters in over 21 states in the United States since 2016.

The presence of carfentanil in the illicit drug market poses a serious threat to the public health given users are often unaware the product they are purchasing contains carfentanil. At the 61st CND in March 2018, based on the WHO’s recommendation, UN Member states voted to internationally control carfentanil and five other fentanyl analogues under Schedules I and IV of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

The Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1961 is an international treaty barring production and supply of specific narcotic drugs of similar effects except under license for specific purposes, such as medical treatment and research. Schedules I and IV of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs are considered the strictest level of controls of dangerous narcotics and their production components.

**Heroin.** Heroin is derived from the opium poppy plant and can be lethal if taken on regular basis. Traffickers are increasingly mixing fentanyl into heroin to stretch supplies and maximize profits, often without the knowledge of users. The main precursor chemical used to produce heroin is acetic anhydride, a substance also widely used in legitimate industry. Drug trafficking organizations continue to channel acetic anhydride to illicit producers through diversion, or smuggling. Acetic anhydride may also be used as a compound substance to produce a chemical reaction in the production of methamphetamine.

According to the INCB, there has been a sharp increase in the demand for acetic anhydride for illicit purposes since 2016, particularly in the EU. However, detected attempts by traffickers to divert the substance from international supply channels have gradually decreased in number. One reason for the detected decline in diversion attempts could be that traffickers have succeeded in diverting and stockpiling sufficient amounts.

Seizures of acetic anhydride of suspected European origin continued in Europe and West Asia in 2017 and 2018. In total, 20 countries reported seizing shipments of acetic anhydride in 2017, amounting to almost 127,000 liters. The largest volume of total seizures was reported by Afghanistan (37,700 liters), followed by Turkey (23,200 liters) and Iran (20,300 liters). Countries reporting total seizures of more than 5,000 liters included Bulgaria, Mexico, Japan, the Netherlands, and Pakistan.

Despite the fact that diversion attempts appear to have decreased since 2016, suspicious requests for supplies of acetic anhydride continue to be posted on certain online trading platforms. In this regard, the United States continues to work closely with participant countries of the INCB Precursor Task Force of Project Prism and Project Cohesion to counter acetic anhydride diversion. The United States also provides assistance to expand international use of the INCB’s PEN Online and PICS to control and to monitor the diversion of acetic anhydride and other chemicals.
For activities under Project Prism and Project Cohesion, participating governments are requested to register points of contact (focal points) for their relevant national authorities involved in precursor control, such as national regulatory, law enforcement, customs and drug control agencies, and to actively use the system to communicate all incidents involving precursor chemicals. Governments that have not yet registered PICS points of contact for their national authorities involved in precursor control may request an account by writing to incb.pics@un.org.

**Methamphetamine.** Methamphetamine is produced using a variety of methods, but most require one or more of the following precursor chemicals: pseudoephedrine; ephedrine; pharmaceutical products containing these chemicals; phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P); and phenylacetic acid. Use of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine is predominant in Asia, Oceania, Africa and in some regions in Europe. In the Western Hemisphere, the bulk of illicitly manufactured methamphetamine is made using P-2-P-based methods.

As these precursor chemicals have become more difficult to obtain due to increased controls, traffickers have started using other chemicals, or seeking non-controlled pre-precursor chemicals or esters, and derivatives of phenylacetic acid to produce the precursor chemicals necessary for methamphetamine production.

In 2017, seizures of phenylacetic acid were predominantly in Mexico, with 19.5 metric tons (MT) seized in clandestine methamphetamine laboratories. It was not clear if the phenylacetic acid seized in Mexico had been illicitly manufactured from one of its precursors, such as 2-phenylacetamide, which is also controlled in Mexico.

Traffickers, particularly in Europe, may be still using the pre-precursor APAAN, or alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile for the production of methamphetamine. This chemical was added to the list of internationally controlled chemicals under the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 2014. In Europe, there are limited legitimate uses for APAAN, and therefore imports are likely to be intended for conversion to benzyl methyl ketone (BMK), an amphetamine precursor. According to the INCB, three European countries reported seizing APAAN between 2016 and 2017. Together, the amounts seized totaled less than 600 kilograms (kg) in 2017, less than half the amount seized in 2016.

Methamphetamine production takes place domestically within the United States and worldwide. Domestic small production capacity laboratories (SPCLs) are the most frequently encountered type of clandestine laboratory. These SPCLs tend to be low production operations (grams or ounces), and make up only a small percentage of the drug that is consumed in the United States. The emergence of the “one-pot labs” (a.k.a. “shake-n-bake” labs) constitute the majority of SPCLs found domestically. These laboratories typically use two-liter plastic soda bottles, 16-20 ounce drink containers, and other such receptacles. Only rudimentary technical skills are required to manufacture methamphetamine using these methods.

Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are the principal precursor chemicals used in the SPCLs and are purchased over the counter from retail pharmacies and convenience stores. Most of the
methamphetamine available in the United States, however, is produced abroad, and trafficking across the U.S. southern border increased exponentially in 2018. Traffickers increasingly prefer new production methods to manufacture methamphetamine that do not require ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. These methods were identified in 98 percent of all samples seized by the DEA in the United States in 2017.

Most large-scale manufacturers in Mexico are believed to use the P-2-P method to manufacture the precursor chemicals required to produce methamphetamine. However, there have been some indications of a possible shift to the phenylacetic acid method. Mexican authorities seized large volumes of phenylacetic acid (20 MT) in 2017. Chemical analysis of future seizures may help provide additional analysis on emerging production methods used by Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

Countries in Africa and Asia, where precursors like P-2-P and APAAN are relatively unknown, continue to rely on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to produce top quality methamphetamine. There are indications, however, that Mexican alternate methods to produce methamphetamine are being expanded in Africa. Moreover, traffickers may also be shifting to adopt the use of APAA, or Alpha-phenylacetoacetamide, as a substitute chemical for P-2-P and APAAN. This shift began after APAAN was scheduled under Table I of the 1988 UN Drug Convention in 2014. In 2018, the INCB recommended that APAA be added to the list scheduled under Table I.

**Cocaine.** Potassium permanganate, an oxidizer, is the primary chemical used to remove the impurities from cocaine base. It has many legitimate industrial uses, including waste-water treatment, and as a disinfectant and deodorizer. During the first 10 months of 2018, more than 30 countries shipped more than 25,500 MT of potassium permanganate to over 120 importing countries and territories. Potassium permanganate can also be combined with pseudoephedrine to produce methcathinone, a synthetic psychoactive stimulant controlled under the 1971 UN Convention.

In South America, the only region of the world where large quantities of coca leaf are cultivated, traffickers continue to divert chemicals from legitimate industry, either from domestic or international sources, for cocaine production. A growing trend cited by law enforcement officials is the recycling of chemicals, which allows clandestine laboratory operators to reuse chemicals up to four times before they need to be replaced. The two main sources of the potassium permanganate used for illicit purposes appear to be diversion from licit domestic distribution channels and subsequent smuggling to illicit processing sites either within the same country or across sub-regional borders, and illicit manufacture. Traffickers are also producing their own potassium permanganate, particularly in Colombia.

Alternative precursor chemicals as well as solvent mixtures used in cocaine manufacturing have also been detected. Countries in Central and South America have a variety of other chemicals under national control, which are known to have been used in the illicit manufacture of cocaine. These include common acids and bases, oxidizing agents, solvents used for the extraction of cocaine base from coca leaves and for the conversion of cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride, as well as precursors of and substitutes for potassium permanganate.
Additionally, traffickers continue to recycle the chemical containers, making it difficult to trace the origin of the chemicals inside. INCB’s Project Cohesion monitors the imports of potassium permanganate to cocaine processing areas. The United States, the INCB, and other international partners encourage countries in South and Central America to continue sharing information on these new trends.

**Future Trends.** Drug traffickers will continue to adapt to new production methods and exploit chemicals not controlled under the Convention or domestic laws. To avoid enforcement pressure, criminals will also continue to take advantage of countries with limited enforcement and regulatory capacity, and frequently obtain chemicals produced within countries where illicit drugs are produced, thereby escaping international monitoring, surveillance, and interdiction efforts. It is critical to continue efforts to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement, public health institutions, and transportation and shipment industries to minimize illicit precursor chemical diversion. It is also important to enhance international cooperation to combat the threats posed by domestic chemical diversion.

Toxic adulterants is also of concern as drug traffickers continue to manipulate illicit drug composition with distinct pharmacological products. Drug traffickers have traditionally mixed non-toxic materials such as lactose and glucose into drug supplies to increase profitability, but there is growing evidence that traffickers are increasingly mixing banned or controlled toxic substances including pharmaceutical drugs and fungicides into illicit drugs to increase drug potency and produce enhanced psychoactive effects.

Many street drugs contain multiple toxic adulterants, numerous controlled substances, and impurities from the heroin manufacturing process. However, crime laboratories, emergency departments, and medical examiners do not routinely test for adulterants unless given a specific reason to do so. It is vital that law enforcement authorities continue to test drug samples for toxic adulterants, alerting public health authorities of additional negative effects toxic adulterants can cause to the body, including death.

**Major Chemical Source Countries and Territories**

This section focuses on individual countries with large chemical manufacturing industries that have significant trade with drug-producing regions and those with significant chemical commerce susceptible to diversion domestically for smuggling into drug-producing countries. Designation as a major chemical source country does not indicate a lack of adequate chemical control legislation or the ability to enforce it. Rather, it recognizes that the volume of chemical trade with drug-producing regions, or proximity to them, makes these countries the sources of the greatest quantities of chemicals liable to diversion. The United States, with its large chemical industry and extensive trade with drug-producing regions, is included on the list.

Many other countries manufacture and trade in chemicals, but not on the same scale, or with the broad range of precursor chemicals, as the countries in this section. These two sections are broken down by region.

**Africa**
Nigeria

Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is the primary government agency responsible for preventing diversion of precursor chemicals in Nigeria. Since 2011, 11 clandestine methamphetamine laboratories have been detected in Nigeria, making Nigeria an emerging major producing country for methamphetamine. In addition to the emerging methamphetamine threat, Nigeria is also developing into a major transshipment country for ephedrine, a precursor chemical used in the production of methamphetamine. Precursor chemicals – mainly ephedrine – are imported from India and China then diverted to the laboratory operators.

In July 2018, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency’s Sensitive Investigative Unit reported that it seized 50 kg of ephedrine destined for a methamphetamine lab in Anambra, Nigeria. The ephedrine was produced in India then shipped to Ghana. From Ghana it was smuggled to Kano, Nigeria and was seized in Kogi, Nigeria while in route to Anambra. Aggregate 2018 seizure data pertaining to precursor chemicals were not available at the time of this report.

South Africa

South Africa is a leading regional importer of chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, particularly synthetic drugs. The South African Police Services (SAPS) has a trained, dedicated clandestine laboratory team. The SAPS division of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI) estimates 40-50 clandestine laboratories are dismantled annually within the country. According to statistics released in September 2018, SAPS reported a 10.5 percent increase in drug-related crimes from fiscal years 2016-2017 to 2017-2018. Enforcement teams from the South African Revenue Service (SARS) also seize illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, including ethanol and toluene.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine used in South Africa to synthesize methamphetamine largely originate in Nigeria and India. South African authorities regularly report newly identified precursor substances used in illicit drug production to the INCB. South Africa also submits information on seized precursor shipments to the INCB’s PICS. Restricting and analyzing the trade of precursors are mandated by the South Africa National Drug Policy, which mandates the establishment of computerized inventory control systems for scheduled chemicals and regulating and monitoring the purchase of medicines containing precursors via a registry system. Such measure have not been fully implemented.

The nexus between wildlife trafficking and trafficking in precursors and illicit drugs is being investigated. U.S. law enforcement collaboration with South Africa on investigations is productive but sporadic, and U.S. authorities regularly share information on container shipments suspected of containing possible illicit materials with South African counterparts.

North America
Canada

Canada has a large chemical industry and strong legislation, which allow for effective regulatory controls over the industry. Canada’s “Controlled Drugs and Substances Act” (CDSA) and its regulations provide the legislative framework for the control of chemical precursors. Health Canada submits an annual report to the INCB with respect to its obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The annual report provides information on licit imports and exports for the previous year, stopped shipments and seizures, and refusals of permit applications due to objections from foreign authorities. The report also details information received from the INCB, and incomplete or invalid application information.

Canada cooperates fully with the INCB in cases where shipments may pose a concern. Scheduling of substances under the CDSA and its regulations give law enforcement agencies the authority to take action against activities that are not in accordance with the law. These instruments also authorize Health Canada to communicate information collected to law enforcement agencies, border control officers, foreign competent authorities and the INCB if necessary. As a state party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, Canada is obligated to impose controls on substances in response to decisions of the CND. Canada continues to explore ways to prevent the illicit diversion of chemical precursors through legislative and regulatory channels.

Mexico

Mexico has several major chemical manufacturing and trade industries that produce, import, or export chemicals required for illicit drug production. Mexican laws regulate the production and use of many of these substances and the Mexican Federal Commission for the Protection Against Sanitary Risk (COFEPRIS) is responsible for enforcing chemical control laws. In addition, Mexico controls all chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Mexican government agencies, to include Customs and the Mexican Regulatory Agency, continue to monitor the importation of controlled precursor chemicals, but this has not significantly deterred local methamphetamine production.

Although Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations are major producers of methamphetamine, imports of methamphetamine precursors pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are outlawed, and they are not produced legally within the country. Mexico regulates the importation of precursor chemicals, including phenylacetic acid, methyamine, hydriodic acid, and red phosphorous. The importation of formaldehyde and ammonium chloride continues to be monitored due to their potential diversion, as these chemicals can be used to manufacture methyamine, a key chemical for methamphetamine production.

Despite monitoring and regulations, illicit precursor importers attempt to move chemicals undetected within the country. Importers continue to mislabel shipments, which poses a challenge for law enforcement in detecting the importation of chemicals coming from source countries such as India and China. Importers also exploit regulatory vulnerabilities in Central America to smuggle precursor chemicals into Guatemala and Honduras and eventually to Mexico for use in methamphetamine production.
The Mexican government controls two fentanyl precursor chemicals NPP and ANPP. While these controls have not fully deterred criminal organizations from obtaining these chemicals, it has forced criminals to seek chemical alternatives, while providing Mexican regulatory and law enforcement agencies a legal basis to seize these substances and file criminal or civil charges against those illegally importing them. Despite controls, the small quantities needed for fentanyl production present a challenge to law enforcement in the detection of these chemicals as they enter Mexico.

Mexico participates in international efforts to control precursors and has a strong bilateral working relationship with the United States. Mexico signed a memorandum of cooperation with the United States in 2012 to address precursor chemicals and clandestine laboratories. The two governments also cooperate to share best practices with Central American countries affected by the trafficking of precursor chemicals. U.S. government agencies continue to provide training and equipment to both Mexican and Central American law enforcement agencies to address existing and emerging synthetic drug threats in the region.

The United States

The United States manufactures and/or trades in almost all 28 chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Drug Convention to which it is a party, and it has laws and regulations implementing chemical control provisions.

The foundation of U.S. chemical control is the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988. This law and subsequent chemical control provisions of the U.S. drug law are interwoven into the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, rather than individual stand-alone legislation. The DEA is responsible for administering and enforcing these laws.

The Department of Justice, primarily through its U.S. Attorneys, handles criminal and civil prosecutions at the federal level. In addition to registration and recordkeeping requirements, the legislation requires importers and exporters to file import or export notifications at least 15 days before the transaction is to take place. The 15-day advanced notification permits DEA to evaluate the transaction. However, the legislation and regulations allow for a waiver of the 15-day advance notification if a company has an established business relationship for a specified listed chemical or chemicals with its foreign customer that has been reported to DEA, subject to the criteria in the Code of Federal Regulations. In these cases, same-day notification is permitted for future shipments. Diversion investigators and special agents communicate with exporting and importing government officials in this process. The legislation also gives the DEA the authority to suspend shipments.

U.S. legislation requires chemical handlers to report to DEA suspicious transactions such as those involving extraordinary quantities or unusual methods of payment. Criminal penalties for chemical diversion are strict; the penalties for some chemical trafficking offenses involving methamphetamine are tied to the quantities of drugs that could have been produced with the diverted chemicals. If the diversion of listed chemicals is detected, persons or companies may be prosecuted or the DEA registration may be revoked.
The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA) mandated DEA to establish total annual requirements, import quotas, individual manufacturing quotas, and procurement quotas for three List 1 chemicals: pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine. This affected those DEA-registered importers and manufacturers that wish to import or conduct manufacturing activities with these chemicals. The CMEA also restricted retail level transactions of nonprescription drug products that contain ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, now known as “scheduled listed chemical products.” The CMEA and other chemical control legislation are aimed at preventing the illicit manufacture of illegal drugs domestically and internationally.

The United States has played a leading role in the design, promotion, and implementation of cooperative multilateral chemical control initiatives. The United States also actively works with other concerned nations, and with the UNODC and the INCB to develop information sharing procedures to better control precursor chemicals and non-controlled substances used in the illicit production of drugs. U.S. officials are members of a combined task force for both Project Cohesion and Project Prism. The United States has established close operational cooperation with counterparts in major chemical manufacturing and trading countries. This cooperation includes information sharing in support of chemical control programs and to prevent chemical diversion.

Central America and the Caribbean

Costa Rica

Costa Rica has a stringent licensing process for the importation and distribution of precursor chemicals, and has implemented precursor diversion prevention measures recommended by the INCB. Costa Rica has controls for Table I and Table II precursor and essential chemicals as defined by the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Costa Rican government’s National Plan on Drugs for 2018-2025 recognizes the international problem of production and trafficking of chemical precursors. Costa Rica has yet to seize large amounts of the substances compared to elsewhere in the region and imports a relatively low volume of precursor chemicals.

The Costa Rican Drug Institute has a special unit dedicated to the control and regulation of precursor chemicals, and this unit has broad powers to monitor and respond to illegal activity. By law, importers and businesses that handle chemical precursors or certain types of prescription drugs are required to submit monthly reports through an online tracking system. During the first 10 months of 2018, there were 2,336 authorized import transactions, licensed to 199 registered importers of chemical precursors (three occasional importers and 196 regular importers). The system tracks the movement of chemical precursors and solvents and also generates alerts. Costa Rica received one specific alert during the January-October 2018 period for possible participation of one importer in irregular activity. The source of the alert provided limited information, which was in the process of being verified and investigated at the time of this report.
Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic has implemented a chemical control regime in accordance with Article 12 of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Dominican laws regulate the production and use of the 28 chemicals listed in the Convention and the Dominican Republic annually submits information required by the Convention. The National Directorate for Drug Control (DNCD) is responsible for enforcing chemical control laws.

The Dominican Republic does not have a large petrochemical industry engaged in the manufacturing, importation, and exportation of chemical products. Chemicals for industrial production are imported from the United States. The two largest chemical imports are sodium carbonate and toluene, used in the Dominican Republic as an additive for gasoline and as a solvent for paint.

The DNCD regulates and enforces the importation and use of precursor chemicals. The DNCD receives pre-notifications for precursor imports and issues certificates of importation. The DNCD also controls and regulates prescription drugs and issues annual permits to medical doctors, clinics, and hospitals, maintaining a register of the type of drug and amount each doctor prescribes each year, especially for drugs containing opiates. Clinics and hospitals are mandated to report prescriptions for certain drugs before dispensing them and the DNCD verifies that the prescription number and the doctor are valid before authorizing the sale. The DNCD is taking steps to automate its paper-based chemical control registration.

El Salvador

El Salvador is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and invokes its rights to pre-notification of scheduled precursor chemicals under Article 12. Precursor chemical trafficking remains a regional threat, as methamphetamine production continues to spread from Mexico into neighboring Guatemala.

With U.S. assistance, the INCB trains the Government of El Salvador and its national authorities to comply with the provisions of the three international drug control conventions in the regulatory control of the licit trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and the monitoring of precursor chemicals. The ultimate goal is to facilitate the appropriate availability of internationally controlled substances for medical, scientific and industrial purposes, yet prevent their abuse and diversion to illicit channels.

Guatemala

In 2018, the Guatemalan Vice Minister of Counter Narcotics devoted increased attention to the problem of precursor chemical diversion, after an annual seizure of 26 MT of precursor chemicals used to produce heroin, cocaine hydrochloride, and methamphetamine. However, the Ministry of Health is responsible for the regulation of chemicals in Guatemala and lacks the investigative depth to verify any information beyond cursory regulatory permits.
Due to a lack of cooperation between investigators and regulators, the Guatemalan government determined that it lacked legal standing to seize these chemicals, and these 26 MT were ultimately returned to their owner. Existing Guatemalan laws and regulations are not sufficiently utilized to determine whether chemical imports are ultimately used for legitimate commercial purposes or diverted to produce illicit drugs. Additionally, there are no verifications in place that would allow authorities to determine whether quantities of imports are reasonable for stated commercial purposes.

To improve the local government’s capability to manage the precursor chemical issue, the U.S. government supported training to increase the Guatemalan government’s ability investigate, and interdict precursors in 2018, as well as promote improved interagency cooperation. The United States is also working with Guatemalan authorities to establish a Precursor Chemicals Response Team, and provides training to local investigators on precursor cases. In addition, the United States is providing training for up to 50 drug detection canines to detect precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs, including fentanyl.

Since 2005, the Guatemalan government has been storing large quantities of seized precursor chemicals, though an incinerator donated by the United States in 2017 continues to be utilized by local authorities to reduce the backlog. As of October 2018, there were approximately 2,400 MT of seized precursor chemicals in Guatemala. Authorities are working to consolidate seized precursors currently stored around the country at the incinerator site.

**Honduras**

Precursor chemical diversion continues to be a problem in Honduras. The Government of Honduras works closely with U.S. authorities to disrupt the importation and diversion of precursor chemicals through Honduras. The United States provides training and other assistance to help strengthen the capacity of Honduran institutions responsible for controlling precursor chemicals.

Scientific knowledge within Honduras about precursor chemicals is limited and often out of date, and information sharing between government institutions regarding synthetic drug and precursor chemical trafficking is challenging. The responsibility for the control of precursor chemicals is spread through a variety of agencies in Honduras including the Directorate of Investigation and Intelligence; the Directorate for the Fight against Drug Trafficking; the Public Ministry; the HNP; the Health Ministry, the Agency of Sanitary regulation and the Customs Authority. These agencies have limited experience working together and do not have an established means to collaborate comprehensively to combat the diversion of precursor chemicals.

The 1989 Law on the Misuse and Illicit Traffic of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is the current legislation governing the illicit movement of precursor chemicals, but the legislation does not adequately address synthetic drug trafficking or precursor chemicals. The Precursor Chemical and Synthetic drug Board is working with health, justice, and law enforcement officials to draft a specific law to address the trafficking of chemical precursors.

**South America**
Argentina

Argentina’s proximity to top cocaine producing nations and its role as a large producer of chemical precursors makes it vulnerable to the use of precursors in the production of illegal narcotics. Argentina has enacted legislative measures to curb the illicit use and diversion of chemical precursors. The Security Ministry’s National Register of Chemical Precursors was created in 2005. Its Federal Council for Chemical Precursors is responsible for analysis and investigations of crimes associated with chemical precursor diversions. Argentina maintains a focus on chemical precursors used in the production of cocaine, but is shifting attention towards those used in the production of methamphetamines and synthetic drugs.

Brazil

Brazil is one of the world’s 10 largest chemical producing countries by volume. Brazil licenses, controls, and inspects essential and precursor chemical products, including potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride, in conformity with its obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Controls on both potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride allow for commercial sales without restriction for quantities of up to one kg for potassium permanganate and one liter of acetic anhydride.

The Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) Chemical Division controls and monitors 146 chemical products in conjunction with 27 DPF regional divisions and 97 resident offices. The Chemical Division is composed of two units: the Chemical Control Division, subordinate to the DPF Executive Directorate, and the Criminal Diversion Investigations unit under the Organized Crime Division. Both divisions routinely coordinate and share information when conducting administrative inspections and criminal investigations.

The Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) controls precursor chemical substances used in the pharmaceutical industry. In March 2017, ANVISA added ANPP and NPP to its list of controlled chemical substances, without banning their use.

Regulatory guidelines require chemical handlers to be registered and licensed to conduct activities such as manufacturing, importing, exporting, storing, transporting, commercializing and distributing chemicals. The DPF uses a National Computerized System of Chemical Control to monitor all chemical movements in the country, including imports/exports, and licensing. This system requires all companies to register with an online system and to report all activity conducted, including the submission of monthly reports for all chemical related movements and existing chemical inventories.

Brazil reports to the INCB its annual estimates of legitimate requirements for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for quantities above 10 grams, and P-2-P in any amount using the INCB’s PEN Online. The DPF routinely uses PEN Online in cases of international trade and in coordination with UN member states to alert importing countries with details of an export transaction.

Chile
Chile complies with its international obligations to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and furnishes reports through the International Narcotic Control Board’s online reporting system, PEN Online. Chile has a large mining industry engaged in the manufacturing, import, and export of chemical products. Most of the chemical substances seized by law enforcement are those used for the processing of cocaine products, such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, acetone and sodium hydroxide. Since 2009 there have been no seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, used as precursors for methamphetamine. The largest imports of controlled chemical substances and related products come from Germany and the United States, while Ecuador and Bolivia are the primary export destinations.

The regulatory entity for chemical controls is the Unit of Controlled Chemical Substances (DSQC), a sub secretariat of the Ministry of Interior and Public Safety. The DSQC manages the System of Registration and Administration of Controlled Chemical Substances (SIREGAD-SQC), which collects information on the production, manufacture, preparation, importation, and exportation of chemical substances that could be used in the production of illicit drugs. Companies that import, export, or manufacture chemical precursors must register with SIREGAD-SQC, maintain customer records, and are subject to regular inspections. The new online SIREGAD-SQC has improved capabilities for real-time data, and can analyze controlled chemical trends in Chile. Currently, 586 companies are registered in the system. In 2018, the government proposed to add 15 new chemical substances to the country’s control list, among them adulterants, bulking drugs derived from cocaine, and substances used for the manufacture of synthetic drugs.

Chilean law enforcement entities have specialized chemical diversion units and dedicated personnel assigned responsibility for investigating chemical and pharmaceutical diversion cases. Customs, which is not a traditional law enforcement agency, has a risk analysis unit that profiles suspicious imports and exports, which may include chemical precursors.

During 2017, the Ministry of Interior conducted training sessions for law enforcement and security personnel to highlight the role of chemical precursor agents in the illegal manufacture of psychoactive drugs. From 2017 to 2018, the DSQC conducted 304 inspections and audits, which resulted in sanctioning procedures against 64 companies for failure to comply with the registration and declaration requirements for Chilean precursor chemicals.

**Ecuador**

Under Ecuadorian law, potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride are designated as controlled chemicals. Buying, selling, or importing such chemicals requires the permission of the Ministry of Interior, the primary agency responsible for precursor chemical control in Ecuador. According to Article 219 in the 2014 Penal Code, the use of precursor chemicals to produce, manufacture, or prepare illicit materials, such as cocaine or heroin is punishable by three to five years in prison.

The chemical unit of the National Antinarcotics Directorate (DNA) in the Ecuadorian National Police plays an active role in chemical control by carrying out investigations and intelligence
operations. Although DNA’s chemical unit is a highly competent entity, its small size and outdated technology hinder operations. The unit conducts limited operations in Esmeraldas and Huaquillas, where drug labs and trafficking are prevalent, due to the porous land borders with Colombia and Peru. Because of its small workforce of only 26 employees, the chemical unit must often rely on ad hoc support from police officers from other units who generally lack adequate chemical training.

Ecuador has been importing large quantities of potassium permanganate for at least the past decade. According to the Central Bank of Ecuador, during the first eight months of 2018, Ecuador imported 31.2 MT of potassium permanganate, compared to 40.8 MT in all of 2017. Potassium permanganate is a controlled chemical and requires an import license in order to be imported into the country. Most 2018 imports of potassium permanganate originated from China. Similar to potassium permanganate, acetic anhydride is also a controlled chemical requiring an import license. During the first eight months of 2018, Ecuador imported 49.21 MT of acetic anhydride, compared to 0.12 MT imported during all of 2017. There were few imports of acetic anhydride imports in 2017 due to vendor difficulties in complying with importing controls that year. Most 2018 imports of acetic anhydride originated from Mexico. Traffickers also continue to smuggle liquid chemicals, including ether, from Ecuador to Colombia and Peru for cocaine processing.

Venezuela

Limited coca cultivation occurs along Venezuela’s border with Colombia. Some precursor chemicals used to produce cocaine are trafficked through Venezuela, but the quantity is unknown. In 2018, Venezuelan authorities did not release statistics on seizures of drug labs or precursor chemicals. The Venezuelan government has not reported the production of NPS in Venezuela.

Asia

Bangladesh

Transnational drug trafficking organizations with connections to Burma and India operate within Bangladesh. Over the past three years, Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies have reported trafficking of synthetic drugs such as “yaba” (a mixture of caffeine and methamphetamine, sometimes with heroin) and diverted pharmaceutical drugs, such as phensedyl (codeine-based cough syrup). Bangladesh has successfully engaged bilaterally with India to control the diversion of phensedyl, and Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies work closely with DEA to seize and disrupt illicit drugs and chemicals. According to the Bangladesh Ministry of Home Affairs, phensedyl diversion into the country reduced dramatically in 2018.

In October 2018, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina approved in principle the draft of “Narcotics Control Act 2018,” (NCA 2018) which prescribes a death sentence as a maximum punishment for anyone involved in producing, smuggling, distributing or using over five grams of yaba or amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). The minimum sentence is life in prison. NCA 2018 also prescribes between five and 15 years in jail for carrying, trafficking, or smuggling less
than five grams of yaba. Furthermore, NCA 2018 prescribes a death sentence as maximum punishment, and life imprisonment as a minimum, for anyone involved in producing, smuggling, distributing, or using 25 grams or more of “Category A” drugs, which include heroin or cocaine. Yaba and ATS are elevated to Category A drugs under the NCA 2018. Officials at the Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) and other law enforcement agencies have stated that drug offenders exploited loopholes under existing legislation in order to evade punishment.

The Government of Bangladesh is committed to the implementation of the 1988 UN Drug Convention and regional agreements regarding control of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals. Twenty-three of the 28 precursor chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Drug Convention are included in the “Schedule of Drugs” of NCA 1990 to comply with the provisions of Article 12 of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. NCA 1990 also allows financial investigations and freezing of assets derived from trafficking in drugs and precursors. The government provides the INCB with annual estimates of Bangladesh’s legitimate use requirements for imports of the four precursors frequently used in the manufacture of ATS—3, 4-MDP-2-P, pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and P-2-P under CND Resolution 49/3.

The Directorate General of Drug Administration has developed a draft national drug policy, approved by the Cabinet in December 2016, in response to the threat posed by the abuse of, and trafficking in, pharmaceutical preparations and other drugs. The “National Drug Policy 2016” replaced the “National Drug Policy 2005” and aims to ensure that the manufacturing of medicines is in compliance with international standards to increase export of pharmaceutical items. The new policy also proposes forming a National Drug Regulatory Authority to stop the adulteration of medicines and raw materials. Responsible authorities will be required to update the price of drugs every year and publish the updated prices online.

Bangladesh has a nascent but growing commercial pharmaceutical industry. Besides meeting 97 percent of the local demand, many pharmaceutical companies are exporting medicines to over 122 countries. In 2015, the first Bangladeshi company received U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval to export a prescription drug for hypertension to the United States, followed by a second approval to export a cardiovascular drug. Other top listed pharmaceutical companies are now trying to get FDA approval to enter the U.S. market.

Bangladeshi pharmaceutical companies focus primarily on branded generic final formulations. About 85 percent of the drugs sold in Bangladesh are generic and 15 percent are patented drugs. Bangladesh manufactures more than 450 generic drugs, sold under 5,300 registered brands that have 8,300 different dosages and strengths. These include a wide range of products from anti-ulcerants, fluoroquinolones, anti-rheumatic non-steroid drugs, non-narcotic analgesics, anti-histamines, and oral anti-diabetic drugs. Bangladesh is also producing high-tech medicines like anticancer drugs, hormonal products, enzymes and coenzymes at a limited scale, meeting only four percent of Bangladesh’s total requirements. As such, Bangladesh’s chemical imports are primarily in these pharmaceutical categories.

China
China has implemented a strict licensing regime for the production, sale, and transport of drug precursor chemicals. The National Narcotics Control Commission of China (NNCC) is the agency with primary responsibility for drug precursor chemical control. China maintains a list of controlled precursor chemicals called the “Catalogue of Precursor Chemicals,” which currently includes 32 drug precursor chemicals. China’s catalogue includes notable precursors potassium permanganate (cocaine), acetic anhydride (heroin), and ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (methamphetamine). In February 2018, China added key fentanyl precursors ANPP and NPP to the catalogue. China regularly provides precursor shipment data the INCB’s Pre-Export Notification system.

During the November 2018 G-20 Meeting in Buenos Aires, China agreed to reclassify fentanyl as a controlled substance in its internal list of regulatory precursor chemicals. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, the country will schedule the entire category of fentanyl-type substances as controlled substances, and start the process of revising relevant laws and regulations. Full implementation of this announced reform could make an important impact in reducing the availability of fentanyl analogues.

Both U.S. law enforcement and China’s NNCC recognize the diversion of drug precursors to illicit manufacture as a significant problem in China. In their 2017 Annual Drug Report, the NNCC reported 388 cases of drug precursor-related crime, an increase of 39.6 percent over the previous year. Additionally, the NNCC reported seizing 2,384 MT of precursor chemicals, an increase of 50.5 percent over the previous year. U.S. law enforcement reports that the most common diversion tactic used by traffickers is the intentional mislabeling of shipments containing precursors. Perpetrators caught mislabeling precursor shipments often face only civil penalties and small fines rather than criminal charges. The challenge of preventing precursor diversion is further exacerbated by China’s ineffective enforcement of land, air, and sea transport regulations.

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, is neither a drug manufacturing nor chemical producing economy. With well-developed logistics connectivity to China, one of the world’s largest precursor chemical exporters, Hong Kong’s chemical trade is mostly in the form of imports for consolidation and subsequent re-export or transshipments; only small amounts are consumed locally by industrial, pharmaceutical, testing or education activities.

In 2017, the most recent year for which data is available, controlled chemical imports totaled approximately 12.32 MT, with approximately 1.31 MT re-exported. Hong Kong supports international efforts to prevent precursor chemical diversion through a combination of effective legislation, strong law enforcement, and close collaboration with the INCB, other foreign counterparts, and the business community.

The Control of Chemicals (COC) Ordinance, in effect since 1996, is Hong Kong’s basic legislation for regulating possession, manufacture, transport, and distribution of designated controlled chemicals. In May 2018, the COC Ordinance (Amendment of Schedule 2) Order
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2018 and the Hong Kong Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (DDO) (Amendment of First Schedule) Order 2018 came into effect. The COC Order added a total of 29 chemicals, including ANPP and NPP, two precursor chemicals used in the synthesis of fentanyl and its analogues, and all chemicals in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, to Schedule 2 of the COC.

The DDO Order added additional synthetic drugs to the First Schedule of the DDO, including EPH, MPA, MDMB-CHMICA, SF-APINACA, and the synthetic opioid U-47700. The COC, which establishes a licensing regime over importers, exporters, dealers, traders, manufacturers, and handlers of the designated chemicals, applies equally to imports, exports, and transshipments. Permits for every shipment are mandatory. Government approval for all premises and containers used to store such chemicals is also mandatory. The maximum penalty for illicit chemical trafficking is imprisonment for 15 years and a fine of $130,000. The Controlled Chemicals Group (CCG) of the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s Drug Investigations Bureau administers and enforces the Ordinance.

Permit applications to handle controlled chemicals, including those for the partial removal of chemicals while in transit, must be received by CCG at least 10 days prior to the proposed date of activity. CCG uses this interim period to establish the bona fides of a proposed shipment, including through coordination with foreign counterparts via the Pre-Export Notification System. Export permits are only issued upon receipt of “No Objection” letters from competent authorities in importing jurisdictions. While Hong Kong does not control sales of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, CCG does investigate reports of possible diversion or parallel trading involving those substances.

Hong Kong supports international efforts to prevent illicit chemical diversion, though tends to be less engaged when chemicals transiting Hong Kong are not controlled in the territory.

India

India’s Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS) provides the country’s legislative framework to implement precursor chemical control obligations required by the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Act requires control measures pertaining to finished pharmaceutical products as well as chemicals used to manufacture those products.

India regulates 19 of the 28 precursor substances scheduled in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Of the 19 substances, India’s NDPS Act designates five as “Schedule A” (i.e., subject to the most stringent controls): acetic anhydride; ephedrine; pseudoephedrine; n-acetylanthranilic acid; and anthranilic acid.

India continues to participate in international precursor control initiatives such as the INCB-led Project Cohesion and Project Prism. Nevertheless, precursor chemical diversion from licit producers to illicit brokers remains a challenge. India-based precursor trafficking organizations are involved in the illicit exportation and domestic sale of precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, both of which are used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
To avoid Chinese controls on the export of precursors, DEA has observed entrepreneurs and dealers shift to India as their new source of supply for precursor chemicals and domestic production of drugs including fentanyl. Multi-ton shipments of precursor materials from India have been shipped to Africa and Mexico. This trend is expected to continue.

**Republic of Korea (South Korea)**

The Republic of Korea’s well-developed commercial infrastructure renders it an attractive location for criminals to obtain and transship precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs are imported from the United States, Japan, India, and China, and then either resold within South Korea or smuggled into other countries. In 2017, the most recent year for which data is available, South Korea imported approximately 38.25 MT of ephedrine, up from 28.5 MT in 2016, and approximately 37.75 MT of pseudoephedrine. As of September 2018, Korean authorities controlled 33 precursor chemicals, two more than in 2016. Acetic anhydride remains the chemical of greatest concern. The Republic of Korea imports acetic anhydride for legitimate use, such as film production, cigarette filters, and other industrial and medical applications. Law enforcement investigations have traced illicit acetic anhydride exports from South Korea to Pakistan and countries in the Middle East.

Both the Korea Customs Service and Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) participate in INCB-led taskforces, including Projects Cohesion and Prism, which monitor imports of potassium permanganate and chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants. Korean law enforcement authorities also cooperated with Southeast Asian nations to verify documents and confirm the identities of importing businesses, including by physical inspection.

The National Assembly passed a law in 2011 requiring manufacturers and exporters of precursor chemicals to register with the government. The MFDS periodically provides training and updates to South Korean businesses to keep them from unknowingly exporting precursor chemicals to fraudulent importers.

Illegal precursor chemical shipments can be hidden by exploiting South Korean customs and chemical regulations. Most chemicals are shipped by containerized cargo via ocean freighters. The 1,000 kg reporting requirement threshold in the current regulations makes the Republic of Korea vulnerable to the “smurfing” of acetic anhydride – a diversion method in which smugglers make multiple small quantity purchases from different retail outlets to avoid detection, then combine them for shipment. South Korean authorities work closely with U.S. counterparts to track suspect shipments.

**Singapore**

Singapore’s geographic advantage and robust port infrastructure contribute to its rank as one of the world’s top trade hubs, including for the trade of precursor chemicals. The Government of Singapore continues to be a partner with the United States and other concerned countries in international chemical control initiatives to prevent the diversion of synthetic drug precursor chemicals, including ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and other essential primary chemicals, like potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride. Singapore is one of the largest distributors of
acetic anhydride in Asia. Used in film processing and the manufacture of plastics, pharmaceuticals, and industrial chemicals, acetic anhydride is also the primary acetylating agent for heroin.

Singapore does not produce ephedrine or pseudoephedrine; however, Singapore sees significant volumes of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine coming through its ports. In 2017, Singapore exported approximately 21 MT of pseudoephedrine (down from 35.29 MT in 2016) and 6.55 MT of ephedrine (down from 8.78 MT in 2016). Singapore imported approximately 23 MT of pseudoephedrine and 6.38 MT of ephedrine in 2017 (down from 37.6 MT and 10 MT in 2016).

Most of the ephedrine imported to Singapore originated from India and Taiwan, the bulk of which is then re-exported to Indonesia’s pharmaceutical companies. The imported pseudoephedrine originates mostly from India, China, Germany, and Taiwan, and is also often re-exported to pharmaceutical companies in Indonesia. Singapore also exports both chemicals to Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Nepal for pharmaceutical purposes. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are not re-exported and remain in Singapore are used primarily by the domestic pharmaceutical industry.

In 2017, Singapore imported approximately 9.57 MT and exported 9.73 MT of acetic anhydride. Singapore imported 23.5 MT and exported 5.26 MT of potassium permanganate. Singapore uses potassium permanganate in the treatment of reclaimed water, rainwater, and seawater, which Singapore relies on for over 70 percent of its water supply.

Singapore imported 100 grams of phenyl-2-propanone in 2017. Singapore did not export any phenyl-2-propanone in 2016. Singapore did not import or export any ANPP and NPP, the two primary chemicals used to produce illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues. Since 2012, the Singapore Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) had no diversion-related seizures of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

The CNB is the competent authority in Singapore for the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is tasked with undertaking measures to prevent the diversion of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. All imports, exports and transshipments of these controlled substances require a permit from the CNB, and supporting documentation must be kept by the companies for a minimum of two years and made available for inspection by the CNB. Supporting documents may include invoice, sale contracts, and documentary proof from the competent authority of the exporting countries. The movement of these controlled substances is also tracked and monitored by CNB. If the permit application is approved, CNB will provide Pre-Export Notification or PEN-Online to the competent authority of the importing country for any exportation of substances.

Information on all goods imported and exported through Singapore’s borders must be provided in advance to enable Singapore Customs, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority or other controlling agencies to facilitate legitimate and secured trade through measures such as timely pre-clearance risk assessment. Singapore does not currently require advance cargo manifest information nor screen transshipments unless they involve conveyances from select countries of international concern, a Singapore consignee, or contain strategic or controlled items, including certain chemicals. However, Singapore is conducting a three-year trial of the World Customs
Organization’s Cargo Targeting System that utilizes carriers’ electronic cargo manifest data including transshipments to identify high-risk shipments across a variety of threats.

Singapore solicited carriers to provide data on a voluntary basis; as of October 2018, 11 shipping lines were transmitting manifest data electronically, representing over 50 percent of the cargo shipments in Singapore. In instances where precursor diversion for illicit drug manufacturing purposes was suspected, Singapore’s authorities have assisted foreign law enforcement agencies. The Government of Singapore conducts site visits of companies dealing with controlled chemicals to ensure awareness of the requirements and overall compliance.

The Port of Singapore is the world's second busiest port in terms of shipping tonnage and is the world's busiest transshipment port. Singapore’s authorities have never reported a diversion of precursor chemicals used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine from Singapore's pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and fine chemical industries, nor have they reported the seizure of any domestic clandestine methamphetamine laboratories.

Taiwan

The Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs Industrial Development Bureau imposes strict reporting requirements in tracking the production, distribution, sale, storage, and export/import of 25 of the 28 precursor chemicals scheduled under the 1988 UN Drug Convention. As of December 31, 2018, Taiwan’s government had not imposed controls over ANPP and NPP. In January 2019, however, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice initiated a process to control these chemicals.

Taiwan’s Food and Drug Administration (TFDA) supervises the trade and use of finished products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals under the Controlled Drugs Act, including by end-users such as hospitals.

Thailand

Thailand is not a major source country for drug precursors, nor are precursors widely imported into Thailand. Domestic drug production is relatively limited. The major drug threat to Thailand is finished product, such as crystal methamphetamine and methamphetamine tablets.

According to Thai authorities, most chemicals and precursors are imported for legitimate medical and industrial purposes. For exports, Thai chemical companies sometimes do not adequately identify their potential customers and may not be fully aware of the intended use of chemical shipments.

The legal and regulatory framework for preventing the diversion of precursors is extensive and long-standing, beginning with the Commodity Control Act of 1952. More recently, Order 32/2599 (2016) of the National Council for Peace and Order introduced new regulations to monitor the import, export, production, trafficking, and possession of precursors and chemicals. Pre-export notification is conducted to mitigate diversion. The Precursor Chemical Control Committee, which has been in place since 1993, formulates national strategy on precursor
control. Thailand is compliant with the controlling chemicals listed under the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

In 2018, there were two noteworthy seizures of sodium cyanide totaling 18.5 MT. Sodium cyanide is a non-regulated base chemical used to produce benzyl cyanide, which is a U.S. List I precursor chemical. The chemicals were seized at the border, transiting through Thailand en route to Burma for possible use in methamphetamine production. Although stable in-shipment, sodium cyanide produces deadly hydrogen cyanide vapor when mixed with an acid.

Europe

Chemical diversion control within the EU is based upon EU regulations binding on all 28 member states. EU regulations meet the chemical control provisions of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, including provisions for record-keeping on transactions in controlled chemicals, a system of permits or declarations for exports and imports of regulated chemicals, and authority for governments to suspend chemical shipments. EU regulations are updated regularly and directly applicable in all EU member states.

EU regulations establish common risk management rules to counter chemical diversion at the EU’s borders. Member states are responsible for investigating and prosecuting violators.

The U.S.-EU Chemical Control Agreement, signed May 28, 1997, is the formal basis for U.S. cooperation with the EU and its member states in chemical control through enhanced regulatory cooperation and mutual assistance. The agreement calls for annual meetings of a Joint Follow-up Group to review implementation of the agreement and to coordinate positions in other areas, such as national or joint positions on chemical control matters before larger multilateral fora, including the CND.

In December 2013, the EU adopted new basic legislation that strengthens controls on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, and tightens controls on companies in the EU using acetic anhydride.

For external trade, the change strengthened controls on medicinal products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine exported from or transiting through the EU. The EU developed a new category of scheduled substances (Category 4), imposed mandatory export authorization and pre-export notification, and extended enforcement power to stop and seize cargo if there is “reasonable doubt” concerning the shipment. For trade within EU territory, compulsory registration of end-users for acetic anhydride was introduced by creating a new subcategory (2A). Additionally, a definition of “user” was added for natural or legal persons possessing substances for purposes other than placing them in the market.

Other amendments to the regulation to facilitate tracking and enforcement include: clarifying definitions for scheduled substance and natural products; strengthening the rules for licensing and registration by introducing explicit criteria for granting or refusing licenses and registrations; increasing the power of competent authorities to control non-scheduled substances; implementing a quick reaction mechanism to add new chemicals to the list of scheduled
substances via the so-called 'catch-all'-provision; and developing an EU database on drug precursors, and improving data protection provisions.

In 2015, a Commission Delegated Regulation and a Commission Implementing Regulation entered into force (replacing previous implementation legislation). These regulations complete the revision of the EU drug precursor legislation that started at the end of 2013. However, the EU is currently carrying out an evaluation of the EU drug precursor legislation. This is expected to be finalized by the end of 2019. If needed, the EU may introduce amendments to its drug precursor legislation. Additionally, on November 23, 2018, the EU introduced new legislation for a quick response to public health and social threats against NPS. The new legislation intends to strengthen the EU Early Warning System and risk assessment procedures on NPS and shortens control processes.

Bilateral chemical control cooperation continues between the United States and the EU as well as its member states. Many EU member states participate in voluntary initiatives such as Project Cohesion and Project Prism. In 2007, the EU established guidelines for private sector operators involved in trading in precursor chemicals, with a view to offering practical guidance on the implementation of the main provisions of EU legislation on precursor chemicals, in particular the prevention of illegal diversion. These guidelines, now titled “Guidelines for Operators – Drug Precursors' Control in the EU,” have been updated in 2017.

Germany

Germany continues to be a leading manufacturer of legal pharmaceuticals and chemicals that can be used to produce illicit drugs. According to the most recent available data from 2017, Germany was one of the largest global exporters of ephedrine (20.6 MT) and pseudoephedrine (259.1 MT), as reported by the Global Trade Atlas (GTA) database, which relies on statistics from the European Commission Statistics Office (Eurostat). Most of the 28 scheduled precursors under international control and listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Drug Convention are manufactured and/or sold by the German chemical and pharmaceutical industry.

Germany’s National Precursor Monitoring Act complies with EU regulations. Germany has a highly developed chemical sector, which is tightly controlled through a combination of national and EU regulations, law enforcement action, and voluntary industry compliance. Cooperation between the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, merchants, and German authorities is a key element in Germany’s chemical control strategy.

Germany works closely with the UNODC, and is an active participant in chemical control initiatives led by the INCB, including Project Prism and Project Cohesion. The United States works closely with Germany’s chemical regulatory agency, the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices, on chemical control issues and exchanges bilateral information to promote transnational chemical control initiatives. German agencies cooperate closely with their U.S. counterparts to identify and stop chemical precursor diversion.
The Netherlands

The Netherlands has a large chemical industry with large chemical storage facilities, and Rotterdam serves as a major chemical shipping port. The Netherlands has strong legislation and regulatory controls over the industry, and law enforcement authorities track domestic shipments and work closely with international partners. Trade in precursor chemicals is governed by the 1995 Act on the Prevention of Misuse of Chemicals to Prevent Abuse of Chemical Substances (WVMC), which aims to prevent the diversion of legal chemicals. Parliament approved minor legislative changes October 9, 2018, to bring the WVMC in line with changes in EU Regulation. Chemical substances are also governed under The Act on Economic Offences and the Opium Act, and EU regulations.

Production of synthetic drugs is significant in the Netherlands. Recent trends show an increase in new types of precursors and pre-precursors to circumvent national and international legislation. APAAN is used in amphetamine production and acetic anhydride is used as a pre-precursor for benzyl methyl ketone (BMK). Safrole continues to be used as a pre-precursor for piperonyl methyl ketone (PMK), though availability has decreased since 2014. The main (pre-) precursors used in the Netherlands are APAA, PMK, and BMK-glycidates.

In recent years, law enforcement, especially in the south, reinforced its efforts to combat synthetic drugs and pre-precursors.

The Financial Investigation Service (FIOD) of the Ministry of Finance oversees implementation of the WVMC and has responsibility for law enforcement efforts targeting precursors. Customs monitors the trade and production of chemicals.

The chemical industry is legally obliged to report suspicious transactions. The Netherlands abides by all EU regulations for drug precursors. The Netherlands an active participant and an initiator of the INCB-led Project Prism taskforce. The Dutch government also continues to work closely with the United States on precursor chemical controls and investigations. The Netherlands has had a memorandum of understanding with China since 2004 concerning chemical precursor investigations.

The Netherlands requires a license for the manufacture and trade of ephedrine. Relevant reports on suspicious transactions are shared nationally and internationally. The Netherlands also monitors a number of non-registered substances used in the production of methamphetamine.

Poland

Poland is both a transit country for drug trafficking and the source of production of synthetic drugs for Western European markets. Poland is one of the major source countries of amphetamine-type stimulants in the European market, and in recent years the production of methamphetamine has also emerged. The manufacturing process and the distribution of illicit drugs are handled by organized criminal syndicates, which establish, equip, and supply clandestine laboratories. Polish police have reported changes in the modus operandi of criminal
groups, which have started to divide amphetamine manufacturing into stages. These production stages take place in various locations, which tend to change frequently.

The 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction prohibits the production, import, and marketing of precursor chemicals in Poland. The State Sanitary Inspector exercises supervision over compliance with this prohibition. The division of roles and responsibilities for drug and chemical controls in Poland are delineated in a 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between the Chief Sanitary Inspector, Commander of the National Police, Customs Service Chief, and Chief Pharmaceutical Inspector. The memorandum lists the goals of the memorandum; general provisions; and applicable laws, procedures, and protocols for each entity, as well as information sharing agreements.

Poland’s precursor chemical controls are governed by a number of national anti-drug laws, which also implement UN and EU requirements on chemical controls. Most recently, updated anti-drug regulations came into force, namely the Act of July 20, 2018, which amended the 2005 Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction and the Act on the State Sanitary Inspection, as well as the August 17, 2018, law regarding the Health Ministry’s list of psychotropic substances, intoxicants and NPS. These recent amendments aim to strengthen the scope of NPS risk assessments, due to their growing availability.

The Ministry of Health’s State Sanitary Inspector and State Pharmaceutical Inspector are the lead entities in implementing drug and chemical controls. The State Sanitary Inspector is in charge of controls for category 2 and 3 drug precursors (such as permanganate and acetic anhydride), and supervises manufacturing, importation, and commercial entities associated with handling these substances. The State Pharmaceutical Inspector is the competent authority in controlling category one drug precursors (such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine) and supervises manufacturing, importation, and commercial entities associated with handling these substances. In situations of possible illegal handling of said precursors, the relevant Chief Inspectors notify the Central Bureau of Investigation Police (CBŚP). In 2015, an amendment to the 2001 Pharmaceutical Law came into force, restricting the sale of over-the-counter medical products containing psychoactive substances (including pseudoephedrine).

According to the September 6, 2001, Pharmaceutical Law, manufacturers, importers, and distributors of pharmaceutical substances must be an approved business entity on Poland’s National Register of manufacturers, importers, and distributors of active substances, run by the State Pharmaceutical Inspector. A business entity wanting to enter the market must apply for a license, and the State Pharmaceutical Inspector will conduct an inspection of the business entity within 60 days. If approved, the business entity can be registered and begin operating. The State Pharmaceutical Inspector conducts control audits on all registered entities every three years thereafter. Poland’s National Registry complies with EU-Directive 2011/62/EU relating to medicinal products for human use.

Polish law enforcement activities are mainly focused on the detection and prevention of the illegal production of synthetic stimulants, including the control of precursors and pre-precursors. These activities are coordinated by the Central Bureau of Investigation Police (CBŚP), in close cooperation with the State Sanitary Service. In 2016, police reportedly dismantled 24
laboratories: 18 for the production of amphetamine; three for methamphetamine; two for mephedrone; and one producing an NPS (4-CMC). In July 2017, CBŚP, in cooperation with the State Sanitary Inspection, dismantled a laboratory producing 4-chlorometcatinone (4-CMC), seizing a total of 128 kg of substances in various stages of production, including over 56 kg of finished product.

While retail shops selling NPS are actively identified and shut down, challenges persist with online sellers of NPS within Poland. The State Sanitary Inspectorate have also found difficulties in prosecuting transnational crimes outside the EU concerning illegal chemical product trade through e-commerce.

The Republic of Poland enters information into the PEN system for all exports and imports of drug precursors. This information is forwarded to the International Narcotics Control Board by the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector in cooperation with the Chief Sanitary Inspector.

**Switzerland**

The Government of Switzerland continues to be a strong partner with the United States and other concerned countries in international chemical control initiatives to prevent the diversion of synthetic drug precursor chemicals, including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, and other primarily essential chemicals, including potassium permanganate and acetic anhydride. Switzerland is a significant importer and exporter of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

In 2017, according to the most recent available U.S. data, Switzerland imported approximately 70.94 MT of pseudoephedrine (2nd largest importer) and 1.8 MT of ephedrine (19th largest importer). Switzerland exported approximately 47.3 MT of pseudoephedrine (4th largest exporter) and 178 kg of ephedrine (5th largest exporter) during the same period. Data from Swiss Customs shows negligible differences in the amounts listed above, with the exception of ephedrine imports, which Swiss Customs data lists at just 176 kg for 2017.

Swiss control measures concerning precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are governed by the Federal Narcotics Control Ordinance and the Federal Department of Home Affairs’ Ordinance on the Directory of Narcotics. The Ordinances require importers and exporters of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to obtain a license from Swissmedic, Switzerland’s relevant regulatory authority, and require chemical manufacturers to provide “end user” certificates. To more effectively deter illegal dissemination of these precursor chemicals, regulations were enacted in October 2017 requiring a license and “end user” certificates for import or export of preparations containing these precursor chemicals. In 2018, there were no significant changes reported to Swiss legislation regarding import and export of these substances.

Switzerland participates in multilateral chemical control initiatives led by the INCB, including Project Prism and Project Cohesion. Switzerland also participates in the International Import and Export Authorization System (I2ES), which facilitates effective implementation of import and export authorization systems for legal international trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Swiss law enforcement agencies have established close cooperation with the Swiss chemical manufacturing and trading industries and counterparts in major chemical manufacturing and trading countries. This cooperation includes information exchanges in support of chemical control programs and in the investigation of diversion attempts. Cooperation between U.S. and Swiss law enforcement agencies on chemical control related issues is excellent, particularly with the Swiss Federal Criminal Police.

**The United Kingdom**

The UK is a leading producer of precursor chemicals commonly used to manufacture illicit drugs. However, because the UK applies a strict regulatory regime to control the production and trade of precursor chemicals, only relatively small amounts of these chemicals are believed to be diverted for illicit use. Between January 2017 and early 2018, the UK Border Force seized over two metric tons of precursor chemicals destined for northwest England intended for the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants and methamphetamine. Law enforcement authorities estimate that this volume of chemicals had the potential to produce as much as two metric tons of unadulterated amphetamine sulphate, with an estimated street value of over $51 million. The United States and United Kingdom cooperate closely in international bodies to promote global regulation of precursor chemical.

**Middle East**

**Egypt**

Egypt oversees the import and export of all internationally-recognized chemicals through a committee composed of the Ministry of Interior (ANGA), Ministry of Finance (Customs), and Ministry of Health (Pharmaceutical). This committee approves or denies requests to import or export chemicals. Over the past few years, there was a spike in the importation of ephedrine. With the large amounts of ephedrine imported relative to the population of Egypt, it is possible that not all of it is used for legitimate medicinal production. However, the Egyptian government has not reported any large scale diversion of ephedrine or observed any increase in the use of methamphetamine.

During 2018, there was an increase in the amount of tramadol seized by the Egyptian government at the ports. There was also an increase in the amount of heroin smuggled into the country, as well as a rise in new drugs combining aromatic plants – such as marjoram or incense – infused with synthetic cannabinoids up to 100 times as powerful as natural marijuana.

**United Arab Emirates**

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a major cargo transshipment point, and therefore an ideal transit point for precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs. UAE chemical controls and customs regulations are based on international conventions, Gulf Cooperation Council guidelines, and local laws and ordinances. In the UAE, the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Climate Change and Environment, and the Export Control Executive Office are responsible for the licensing of export and transshipment of controlled chemicals. UAE authorities adhere to
UN conventions related to the shipment of chemical precursors and other commodities through established licensing procedures.

According to UAE Ministerial Decree No. 1986 issued in 1995, the MOH must approve the import of chemicals listed in the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which includes ANPP, NPP, potassium permanganate, and acetic anhydride. The UAE signed onto and implemented the convention in May 1990 with publication in the official gazette. According to the 2015 GCC Unified Guide for Customs Procedures at First Points of Entry, shipments of restricted goods must include approvals and authorizations from the competent authorities. These shipments must also include the Harmonized System codes for hazardous goods and chemicals on the packing list.

In August 2007, the UAE government enacted Federal Law Number 13 of 2007, which bans the export or re-export of certain strategic and controlled items and established penalties for parties involved in the diversion of controlled shipments, including chemical and biological materials. The law authorizes government bodies to restrict or ban the import, export, or re-export of goods deemed a threat to UAE national security, foreign policy, natural resources, public health and safety, or the environment.

On January 7, 2018, the MOH issued a ministerial decree updating the list of banned medications, narcotics, and psychotropic drugs. The MOH cited concerns over individuals importing large quantities of controlled drugs potentially destined for resale rather than personal use. Pharmacy law No. 4 of 1983 and Narcotics Law No. 14 of 1995 warn travelers entering the UAE against bringing in controlled or psychotropic medicines and illegal narcotics. On February 10, 2018, the Anti-Narcotics Council approved strategic indicators for combatting drugs in order to intensify drug enforcement efforts.

Transshipment of methamphetamine and cocaine precursors is virtually non-existent in UAE ports. However, the UAE is a crossroads for methamphetamine from Iran, heroin from Afghanistan, and cocaine from Latin America, in the form of finished product. Traffickers generally prefer to use larger ports in order to increase the odds of evading detection due to the large shipping volume at such ports. Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port is the largest container port in the Middle East and the ninth largest in the world, with a total volume of 15.4 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) in 2017 and capacity of approximately 20 million TEU. The Dubai Airport Free Zone (DAFZA) and Dubai International Airport Cargo Gateway, formerly Dubai Cargo Village, handled 1.74 million tons of freight in 2017 and the Al Maktoum Airport (DWC) 972,295 tons of air cargo in 2017.

**Significant Illicit Drug Manufacturing Countries**

This section is also broken down by region and focuses on illicit drug manufacturing countries, their chemical control policies, and related efforts.

**Asia**

**Afghanistan**
Inadequate border security and weak enforcement capacity hamper control of precursor chemicals in Afghanistan.

Both acetic anhydride and ammonium nitrate are illegal in Afghanistan and have no legitimate uses. Hydrochloric acid, acetone, and sulfuric acid are controlled substances and subject to seizure for other reasons, such as customs violations. Ammonium chloride is not illegal, but if found at a laboratory site, Afghan authorities seize and destroy it. Since 2013, the United States has supported the UNODC Container Control Program (CCP) to develop units in Kabul and at key ports of entry on Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Through training and assistance, CCP promotes effective container controls to prevent drug trafficking and other illicit activities and to facilitate legitimate trade. The program enables effective information sharing with other countries participating in CCP, especially the neighboring Central Asian states.

The Precursor Control Unit (PCU) of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan is a specialized unit devoted to combating the precursor problem. Afghanistan uses the INCB’s PICS to enhance information sharing between national authorities on precursor incidents. The PCU communicates directly with the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors as well as the Pre-Export Notification system. Beginning in early 2016, the United States funded capacity building for regional PCU staff through a UNODC training program.

Afghanistan maintains a Drug Regulation Committee (DRC) to monitor and regulate the licit precursor chemical trade. The DRC licenses chemicals for licit use and stores data on the use of chemicals so authorities can better understand emerging trends. The DRC also authorizes investigations and spot checks on companies importing chemicals.

Burma

The illicit production and export of synthetic drugs in Burma continued to increase in 2018, and Shan State has become the locus of synthetic drug production in the region. The fact that Burma does not have a major chemical industry and does not manufacture the precursor chemicals necessary to produce heroin and ATS on an industrial scale indicates the sheer volume of essential and precursor chemicals smuggled into the country from elsewhere.

Organized criminal syndicates transport precursor chemicals into Burma across porous borders primarily from China, and to a lesser degree from Thailand and India. The precursor chemicals are then diverted to clandestine laboratories and refineries in regions of northern and eastern Shan State that are under the control of armed ethnic groups or militias. Recent record-breaking seizures along the Burmese-Thai border indicate the establishment of numerous clandestine laboratories in key transit towns on the Burmese side of the border. The best available information suggests that significant methamphetamine production takes place in clandestine laboratories that operate in the Wa Self-Administered Division in Shan State.
The Supervision Committee for the Control of Precursor Chemicals, which functions within the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC), monitors the possession, use, sale, production, and transportation of chemical precursors. Importers of licit chemicals are required to use a pre-import notification system to obtain a certificate of verification from the CCDAC, and retailers must also apply for a certificate to transport chemicals across and within Burma’s borders. After the Committee added two precursors (ANPP and NPP) in 2017, there are now 28 identified precursor chemicals prohibited for import, sale or use in Burma.

However, authorities faced overwhelming challenges that fundamentally limited their ability to control the illicit import and diversion of precursor chemicals for use in the production of illegal narcotics. The most significant of these challenges involve extremely porous borders, particularly those portions of the border in eastern Shan State that are not under government control. A UNODC finding showed that 70 percent of law enforcement officials in border areas had not received any specialized training to police cross-border crimes, nor any training on how to conduct presumptive drug and precursor tests in the field.

During the first nine months of 2018, Burmese authorities reported seizing 450,000 tablets of pseudoephedrine; 18.66 metric tons of caffeine powder; 47,787 liters of sulfuric acid; 165,733 liters of hydrochloric acid; 190,578.25 liters of ethyl ether; and 75,450.15 liters of sodium hydroxide. Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has not instituted laws to meet all of the UN chemical control provisions.

The United States funds UNODC’s support for Border Liaison Offices to strengthen border management. This program includes capacity-building trainings for frontline officers on effective uses of field test kits, training-of-trainers courses, and delivery of field test kits. UNODC, also with U.S. support, hosted a High-Level Asia Regional Conference on Precursor Control in November 2018. Heads of law enforcement agencies from ASEAN and neighboring countries shared information and discussed steps needed to establish a coordinated response to precursor chemical diversion and trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s 2009 National Narcotics Law gave the country’s National Narcotics Board of Republic of Indonesia (BNN) the authority to monitor narcotics and precursor production at pharmaceutical plants, and to conduct investigations and arrests in response to precursor and narcotics violations. Although there were several laws and regulations regarding the import and export of precursor chemicals, the extent of enforcement was largely unknown.

Regarding the two most widely sought-after precursor chemicals used for cocaine and heroin production – potassium permanganate (cocaine) and acetic anhydride (heroin) – the United States was unaware of a single seizure in 2018 by Indonesian law enforcement. BNN reported that it regularly conducts unannounced inspections to companies that are listed importers of precursor chemicals. In the past year, BNN hired an additional 300 personnel.

Every year, through the Ministry of Health, Indonesia reports estimates of its legal domestic narcotics precursors to the International Narcotics Control Board. The bulk of precursors comes
in via ocean routes from China, Taiwan, and India; however, Indonesia is not a prime destination for precursors, as the vast majority of illegal narcotics is not manufactured within country.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan is a destination and transshipment point for diverted shipments of acetic anhydride and other precursor chemicals used in the production of heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants. Pakistan does not domestically produce industrial-scale quantities of either acetic anhydride or ephedrine, though it has chemical and pharmaceutical industries with a legitimate, albeit modest, demand for these substances.

Pakistan enforces a basic precursor control regime as part of its obligations under the UN drug control conventions, covering the import of seven multi-use chemicals: acetic anhydride; pseudoephedrine; anthranilic acid; acetone; potassium permanganate; methyl-ethyl ketone; and toluene. The country’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is charged with managing precursor control and does so largely by conducting ground checks on importing businesses, licensing those businesses, and reviewing Pre-Export Notifications (PENs) requesting the sale of these substances within Pakistan. Besides ANF, 15 federal and provincial agencies share responsibility for chemical control throughout the country. Per UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs Resolution 49/3, ANF established two review committees to manage the precursor control mechanism, the Committee for Granting Non Objection Certificates to Companies and Firms for Use of Precursor Chemicals and the Committee for Quota Allocation to Pharmaceutical Companies.

During the first nine months of 2018, ANF received 63 PENs, approving 54 and denying nine. It is likely that significant imports of precursor chemicals circumvent the PENs system via mislabeled shipping containers and by maritime smuggling along Pakistan’s coastline. During the first nine months of 2018, ANF reported seizing 4,283 liters of acetic anhydride.

In 2018, both ANF and Pakistani Customs continued to submit information via the International Narcotics Control Board Precursor Incident Communication System, which distributes real-time information on precursor seizures to law enforcement agencies worldwide.

**The Andean Region**

**Bolivia**

Bolivia’s government passed a Controlled Substances Law in March 2017 that schedules precursor chemicals in coordination with the International Narcotic Control Board. Precursor chemicals continue to be diverted through black market channels into Bolivia for processing cocaine. According to the Chemical Substances Investigations Group (GISUQ) of the Bolivian counterdrug police (FELCN), the majority of these chemicals come from Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

The most common chemicals seized as contraband match those commonly found in drug factories (where base paste is prepared) and cocaine labs (where base paste is transformed into
cocaine HCl). In addition to serving as a transit country for illicit drug shipments, Bolivia is also a source country for coca and cocaine processing. The number of labs within Bolivia that process Peruvian base paste and Bolivian base paste into cocaine has significantly increased over the last five years. The most common chemicals found in cocaine factories and labs are sulfuric acid; hydrochloric acid; sodium carbonate; caustic soda; phenacetin; sodium metabisulfite; activated carbon; ethyl acetate; and levamisole. The last five products are not listed as controlled substances under Bolivian law, and GISUQ believes they are alternative chemicals that drug producers use to avoid law enforcement controls. Traffickers use activated carbon to deodorize and discolor water and other liquids, and phenacetin, a highly toxic analgesic, is used to increase the volume of cocaine.

The GISUQ is charged with locating and interdicting chemicals used in the traditional cocaine process, such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, and gasoline. The GISUQ coordinates activities with the General Directorate for Controlled Substances, a civilian entity under the Government of Bolivia that administers and licenses the commercialization and transport of controlled substances listed under Bolivian domestic law. Under the Controlled Substances Law, violation of controlled substances could result in penal action against all participants, a change from the old law wherein unlicensed transport and commercialization generated only an administrative violation. The new law provides the legal framework for GISUQ, in coordination with other agencies, to add or eliminate chemical substances controlled under Bolivian law.

The Bolivian government does not have control regimes for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The GISUQ, however, coordinates with the Ministry of Health to supervise and interdict illegal commercialization of methamphetamine. In September 2016, the Ministry of Health created the State Agency of Medicines and Health Technologies to regulate the use and commercialization of synthetic drugs.

In 2018, the GISUQ seized 236.8 MT of solid substances and 597,210 liters of liquid precursor chemicals.

**Colombia**

Precursor chemical diversion in Colombia is a serious problem that the government is working to address. The Colombian government has tightened controls on coca-processing chemicals, though traffickers still are able to import them illicitly into Colombia. Colombian police and military forces have stepped up enforcement efforts. The Ministry of Justice reported that during the first nine months of 2018, the Colombian National Police (CNP) and military forces seized 18,681 MT of solid precursors and 3,815,216 gallons of liquid precursors.

The Colombian government controls the import and distribution of chemicals needed for processing coca leaves into cocaine, such as sulfuric acid, hydrochloride acid, and potassium permanganate, as well as cement. It limits production, distribution, and storage of precursors nationwide and prohibits gasoline and other chemicals in certain zones. Additionally, Colombian companies are not authorized to export ephedrine or pseudoephedrine in bulk form. Colombian law bans all pharmaceutical products containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine from domestic distribution.
Since 2015, the government has focused on regulating essential chemicals for drug production and has expanded its enforcement efforts related to these chemicals. Also in 2015, the government began implementing the Information System for the Control of Substances and Chemical Products (SICOQ), a tracking tool that the CNP and the Ministry of Justice developed to strengthen the control of chemicals in real time. In October 2018, more than 5,811 companies were registered in the platform, which allows the government to track the movement of chemicals. However, of the over 5000 registered companies, only 3,330 have valid government-issued authorizations for the legal use of controlled substances and chemical products as of October 26, 2018. The remainder either have not yet been inspected or must provide additional information regarding their use of chemicals in their businesses.

While the Colombian government has strengthened chemical-control legislation, traffickers are still able to camouflage precursors to import them clandestinely into Colombia. Although chemical companies require government permission to import or export specific chemicals and controlled substances, the CNP have the burden to prove seized chemicals were intended for illicit drug production. Further, to bring U.S. charges against an illicit chemical trafficker, the CNP must be able to prove that the trafficker had knowledge that the chemicals seized were going to produce drugs that would end up in the United States. Additionally, traffickers and clandestine laboratories recycle controlled chemicals and replace controlled chemicals with non-controlled chemicals.

The CNP created a special unit specifically tasked with the interdiction of precursor chemicals. The Colombian Marines have also increased their efforts against precursor chemicals traveling via rivers, particularly in the Department of Nariño, the department that produces the most coca and cocaine in Colombia. Nariño has over 745 miles of rivers and few roads connecting it to the rest of the country, making the riverine route the most attractive option for precursor traffickers. Recognizing this challenge, the Colombian Marines have increased the operational tempo on the rivers to better cover riverine chokepoints, areas through which traffickers must cross to move illicit chemicals.

**Peru**

Peru is a producer and major importer of chemicals essential to cocaine production. Chemicals are principally imported into Peru licitly by wholesalers through the Port of Callao and are later diverted for illicit purposes by smaller actors for cocaine production. Peru requires all chemical sector entities to obtain a license.

Peru’s authority to regulate the precursor chemicals used in illicit drug production is based on Legislative Decree 1126 and the regulation set forth in Supreme Decree 010-2015EF, which establish protocols for sanctions and fines related to the chemical industry. However, Supreme Decree 010-2015EF is not effectively enforced. The National Superintendence of Tax Administration (SUNAT) is the regulatory agency handling all issues related to the chemical industry, but SUNAT does not have law enforcement powers and is limited to investigative activities. SUNAT coordinates with the Peruvian National Police (PNP) to combat diversion of precursor chemicals.
The PNP’s Precursor Chemical Unit, DEPCIQ, reported an increase in PNP seizures of precursor chemicals over the first nine months of 2018 in comparison to the same period in 2017 – from 7,826 MT in 2017 to 8,199 MT. Peru continued to implement the 2015 Precursor Chemicals Initiative to cover approximately 70 percent of roads in the VRAEM, the Peru-Bolivia border, as well as the Junín, Ayacucho, and Lima regions, utilizing 12 backscatter x-ray scanners in strategic corridor routes.

Alleged corruption within SUNAT and the PNP fosters mistrust between the entities, leading to an unwillingness by either to share investigative information related to precursor chemicals.

The Ministry of Health manages estimates of Peru’s INCB licit demand for ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and P-2-P. The Ministry’s Health Department does not have a regulatory or enforcement arm to prevent the diversion of chemicals. According to INCB records, Peru does not have strict controls to prevent the diversion of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and P-2-P. Indications suggest that ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are entering the country in larger quantities than required by the INCB assessment.

**Major Exporters and Importers of Pseudoephedrine and Ephedrine (Section 722, Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act “CMEA”)**

This section of the INCSR is produced in response to the CMEA’s Section 722 requirement to report on the five major importing and exporting countries of the identified methamphetamine precursor chemicals. In meeting the CMEA requirements, the Department of State and DEA considered the chemicals involved and the available data on their export, import, worldwide production, and the known legitimate demand. The available data does not address illicit trafficking and production.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are no longer the preferred chemicals for methamphetamine production shipped to the United States, since traffickers are increasingly using substitutes or pre-precursors. The phenomenon of substitute chemicals used in methamphetamine production is particularly observed in Mexico, where the nitrostyrene method is used to produce P-2-P, which starts from benzaldehyde and nitroethane, or from the intermediary product 1-phenyl-2-nitropropene, and in Europe, where the method using APAAN, are largely used. Phenylpropanolamine, a third chemical listed in the CMEA, is not a methamphetamine precursor, although it can be used as an amphetamine precursor.

In 2000, the FDA issued warnings concerning significant health risks associated with phenylpropanolamine. As a result, phenylpropanolamine is no longer approved for human consumption. Phenylpropanolamine is still imported for veterinary medicines, and for the conversion to amphetamine for the legitimate manufacture of pharmaceutical products. Phenylpropanolamine is not a methamphetamine precursor chemical, and trade and production data are not available on phenylpropanolamine. Therefore, this section provides information only on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.
The Global Trade Atlas (GTA), compiled by Global Trade Information Services, Inc. (WWW.GTIS.COM), provides export and import data for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine collected from major trading countries. However, given the reporting cycles by participating countries, data often lags behind one year. The most recent year for which full-year data is available is 2017. The data, including data from the previous year, is continually revised as countries review and revise their data. GTA data analysis and a chart identifying the sources of the data are presented in the tables at the end of this section.

During the preparation of the 2018 CMEA report, GTA data for U.S. exports and imports for both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for calendar years 2014-2016 were updated in light of revised estimates provided by DEA. For the 2019 CMEA report, GTA data for U.S. exports and imports for both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for calendar years 2015-2017 were also updated in light of revised estimates provided by DEA.

Obtaining data on legitimate demand also remains problematic. Such data is still not sufficient to enable any accurate estimates of diversion, or to comply with the economic and compliance analyses required by the CMEA report. There are significant numbers of countries that have yet to report regularly to the INCB on their reasonable estimates about the trade in the end products that form the basis of legitimate demand – although each year the number of countries reporting increases.

Nevertheless, many countries do not report trade in ephedrine and pseudoephedrine when it is incorporated into a finished pharmaceutical product, in the form of finished dosage units such as liquids, tablets, and capsules, due to concerns that this type of information is commercially sensitive. Further challenges include governments that may not be able to ascertain this data if, for example, they do not subject pharmaceutical preparations to national control, or if a different ministry with different or less stringent means of oversight regulates preparations versus bulk chemicals.

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine pharmaceutical products are not specifically listed chemicals under the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Therefore, reporting licit market trade and demand for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine as well pharmaceutical products derived from them is voluntary. Even so, the trend toward better reporting has been positive.

Thus far, the economic analysis required by the CMEA remains challenging because of outdated, insufficient, and unreliable data. Often the collection and reporting of such data requires a regulatory infrastructure that is beyond the means of some governments. It is also important to note that not all countries are familiar with the methodology and data sources used by the GTA to report the final numbers and some countries dispute the accuracy of the data. This increases the difficulty of comparing import or export totals across years. It remains challenging to determine with precision the top-five countries exporting and importing the largest amount of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine.

Nevertheless, the United States will continue to urge countries in diplomatic and technical fora – in both bilateral and multilateral settings – to provide reporting on their licit domestic requirements for methamphetamine precursor chemicals to the INCB. The United States will
also continue to work with the INCB and with authorities in the reporting countries to secure explanations for anomalies between reported imports and reported licit domestic requirements, and to follow the development of other chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine.

This report provides export and import figures for both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine for calendar years 2015-2017. The report illustrates the wide annual shifts that can occur in some countries, reflecting such commercial factors as demand, pricing, and inventory buildup. GTA data on U.S. exports and imports have been included to indicate the importance of the United States in international pseudoephedrine and ephedrine trade. Complete data on the worldwide production of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are not available because major producers will not release this proprietary data.

CMEA Trade data. All units in kilograms (KG).

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<tr>
<th>Reporting Country</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2015</th>
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**Analysis of Export Data:** The top-five exporters of ephedrine in 2017 were India, Italy, Germany, China, and Singapore. According to the Global Trade Atlas (GTA) database, ephedrine exports increase 20.24 percent in 2017, due to a substantial increase in exports from Italy and China. India’s exports had a 10.22 percent decrease; going from 80,274 kg in 2016 to 72,829 kg in 2017. The country continues to rank as the top global exporter of ephedrine for this year’s report. Italy increased its export from 567 kg in 2016 to 32,824 in 2017, a 98.27 percent increase. The reason for this increase is unknown. China now appears as the fourth top exporter of ephedrine, going from 3,259 kg in 2016 to 10,963 kg in 2016; a 70.27 percent increase. The top-five economies in 2016 were: India, Germany, the UK, Singapore, and Switzerland.

According to the most current information provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. exports were 2 kg in 2015, 0 kg in 2016, and 1.8 kg in 2017. For the purposes of this report, we have relied on the data provided by DEA.
Analysis of Export Data: According to the GTA database, the aggregated volume of worldwide exports of pseudoephedrine for the 2017 top-five exporters slightly decreased from 1,042,882 kg in 2016 to 966,224 kg in 2017; a 7.93 percent decrease. The top-five exporters of pseudoephedrine in 2017 were India, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and China. In 2016, the top-five economies were India, Germany, the UK, Singapore, and Switzerland. Only Switzerland and China increased their pseudoephedrine exports in 2017. Switzerland exports increased from 33,027 kg in 2016 to 47,298 kg in 2017; a 30.17 percent increase. By the same token, China exports increased between 2016 and 2017, going from 30,530 to 42,539; a 28.23 percent increase. India, Germany, and the UK’s exports dropped .5 percent, 6.86 percent, and 44.84 percent respectively.

According to the most current information provided by the DEA, the United States increased its pseudoephedrine exports from 23,870 kg in 2015 to 26,327, a 9.33 percent increase. In 2017, the United States decreased its pseudoephedrine exports from 26,327 kg in 2016 to 22,638 kg, a 14.01 percent decrease.
Analysis of Import Data: According to the GTA database, the top-five ephedrine importers in 2017 were Republic of Korea, Indonesia, India, Egypt, and Taiwan. The Republic of Korea has appeared this year as the top ephedrine importer. The country had a 25.60 percent increase in ephedrine importation, going from 28,504 kg to 38,313 kg. The reason for such importation increase is unknown. Indonesia and India also increased their ephedrine importation. Egypt’s imports significantly decreased, going from 86,775 kg in 2016 to 11,491 kg in 2017; a 655.16 percent decrease. Taiwan appears fifth in 2017, with no major variations between 2016 and 2017. Greece, Egypt, Republic of Korea, Spain, and Switzerland were the top-five ephedrine importers in 2016.

According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. ephedrine imports decreased from 3,494 kg in 2016 to 2,789 kg in 2017, a 20.18 percent decrease.

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Analysis of Import Data: According to the GTA database, the quantity of pseudoephedrine imported by the top-five importers has increased in 2017. The aggregated amount of pseudoephedrine imported by the top-five economies in 2017 was 264,761 kg; a 33.50 percent increase compared to 2016. Switzerland imports went from 49,965 in 2016 to 70,938 in 2017, a 29.57 percent increase. According to the same database, in 2016, Greece originally reported the importation of 1,409,807 kg of pseudoephedrine. However, that amount has been corrected by GTA to 15,756 kg. Based on the latest GTA information, Greece has increased its pseudoephedrine importation from 15,756 kg in 2016 to 66,886 in 2017, a 76.44 percent increase. The reason for this increase is unknown.

The top-five pseudoephedrine importers in 2017 were Switzerland, Greece, Turkey, France, and Republic of Korea. In 2017, all top-five importing economies increased their pseudoephedrine imports. The 2016 list was Greece, Switzerland, Indonesia, Turkey, and Republic of Korea.
According to the most current information provided by DEA, U.S. imports decreased from 173,752 kg in 2016 to 126,683 kg in 2017, a 27.09 percent decrease. It should be noted that the United States no longer bulk manufactures pseudoephedrine.
**INCB Tables on Licit Requirements**

Annual legitimate requirements (ALR) as reported by Governments for imports of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, 3,4-methylenedioxymethyl-2-propanone, 1-phenyl-2-propanone and their preparations

**Status: 8 October 2018**

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Notes: The names of territories, departments and special administrative regions are in italics.

A blank field signifies that no requirement was indicated or that data were not submitted for the substance in question.

A zero (0) signifies that the country or territory currently has no licit requirement for the substance.

The letter “P” signifies that importation of the substance is prohibited.

Reported quantities of less than 1 kg have been rounded up and are reflected as 1 kg.

a 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.
b 1-Phenyl-2-propanone.
c Including the licit requirements for pharmaceutical preparations containing the substance.
d The required amount of ephedrine is to be used for the manufacture of injectable ephedrine sulphate solution. The required amount of pseudoephedrine is to be used exclusively for the manufacture of medicines for export.
e In the form of injectable ephedrine sulfate solution.
f Imports of the substance and preparations containing the substance are prohibited, with the exception of the imports of injectable ephedrine preparations and ephedrine as a prime raw material for the manufacture of such ephedrine preparations. Pre-export notification is required for each individual import.
g Imports of the substance and preparations containing the substance are prohibited, with the exception of the imports of injectable ephedrine preparations and ephedrine as a prime raw material for the manufacture of such ephedrine preparations. Such export requires an import permit.
h. Includes products containing P-2-P.

i. The Board is currently unaware of any legitimate need for the importation of this substance into the country.
Afghanistan

A. Introduction

Afghanistan remains the dominant source of the world’s illicit opiate supply. The insurgency and widespread corruption present major challenges to the central government’s efforts to establish the physical and economic security necessary to bring the illicit drug trade under control. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) estimate the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for the 2018 season to be approximately 262,673 hectares (ha). This is a decrease of 20 percent in area under cultivation compared with 2017, due largely to an ongoing drought and lower market prices. Afghan opium is typically refined into heroin or morphine in Afghanistan or neighboring countries for export.

A symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and illicit drug trafficking. Traffickers provide weapons, funding, and material support to the insurgency in exchange for protection. Some insurgents traffic drugs or tax their production and transportation to finance their operations. However, trafficking is not limited to insurgent-controlled areas. The drug trade is also a primary driver of corruption, which undermines governance and rule of law throughout Afghanistan.

Afghanistan suffers from widespread illicit drug use. The U.S.-supported 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey profiling urban, rural, and national drug use conservatively estimated that roughly 11 percent of the population tested positive for one or more drugs, including 5.3 percent of the urban population and 13 percent of the rural population. Drug use by women and children is among the highest documented worldwide, and 38.5 percent of rural households tested positive for some form of illicit drug. These figures portend a massive health crisis that Afghans are gradually acknowledging.

Senior Afghan government officials state that the government recognizes the deleterious impact of illegal drugs and is attempting to address the problem, citing the 2015 adoption of the National Drug Action Plan (NDAP) as proof. Despite public displays of support for this comprehensive national drug control strategy, the Afghan government has been slow to implement it. The Afghan government will require financial and technical assistance from the international community for the foreseeable future to achieve the NDAP’s objectives.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Afghan government is publicly committed to confronting the drug problem in Afghanistan, focusing particularly on what it identifies as the underlying root causes of the drug economy, including instability, poverty, organized crime, and lack of economic opportunity. MCN is the lead agency for developing drug control policy and coordinating related government activities. As part of President Ashraf Ghani’s reform agenda, the Afghan National Unity Government (GNU) has pledged “to intensify efforts to control narcotic production and sale.” MCN is also
working to “mainstream” drug control into the activities of the entire government. Enlisting the support of other ministries to counter illicit drugs requires top-level Afghan government support, which has been historically lacking.

To combat drug trafficking, the Afghan government, with assistance from the United States and other donors, operates the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), a self-contained judicial unit established under the 2010 Counter Narcotics Law and housed at the Counternarcotics Justice Center (CNJC). CNJC also houses the Counter Narcotics Tribunal and a detention center. It serves as the central facility for the investigation, prosecution, and trial of major drug and drug-related corruption cases. From December 22, 2017, through September 22, 2018 (the first nine months of 2018 according to the solar calendar), the CNJC processed 269 cases, involving 322 suspects. From these cases, the government confiscated approximately 1.69 metric tons (MT) of heroin, along with 19.4 MT of raw opium, 3.87 MT of morphine, and 31.09 MT of hashish.

The United States and Afghanistan have neither a bilateral extradition treaty nor a mutual legal assistance treaty in force, but they do cooperate on investigations on a case-by-case basis. Afghanistan’s new penal code authorizes confiscating assets (including land, structures, and vehicles) used in, or earned through, narcotics production and trafficking. However, the government did not have procedures in place to distribute the proceeds of seized assets to support law enforcement.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the 2018 Afghanistan Opium Survey – jointly produced by UNODC and MCN – growers cultivated 262,673 ha of opium poppy in 2018, a 20 percent decrease from 2017. MCN analysis suggests the decrease is due to both lowered crop yield resulting from drought conditions and a low market price following 2017’s record crop. The 2018 poppy cultivation figure for Helmand province was 136,798 ha, which was the highest of any province and 48 percent of the 2018 country total. U.S. government estimates for 2018 Afghanistan opium production were not available at the time of this report. Aside from opium, Afghanistan cultivates cannabis and produces significant amounts of hashish. The latest available cannabis survey (2012) estimates that 10,000 ha of commercial cannabis cultivation is sufficient to potentially produce approximately 1,400 MT of hashish.

Poppy eradication decreased in 2018, with officials destroying 327 ha of opium poppy fields, compared to 750 ha in 2017. This is well short of eradication totals in 2015 (3,760), 2014 (2,692), and 2013 (7,348). Only four provinces conducted eradication in 2018, and the majority of eradication took place in Nangarhar province (287 ha). Deteriorating security conditions, changes in the way eradicated fields are verified, a lack of political will, Taliban control over many rural areas, and MCN’s ineffective management of the Afghan inter-ministerial process all contributed to anemic eradication efforts in 2018. The United States supports the Afghan government-led eradication efforts through the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program that reimburses provincial governors at a rate of $250 per hectare for costs associated with verified poppy eradication.
The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) are increasingly able to plan and conduct effective counterdrug operations. The United States supports specialized units within the CNPA, including the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU). These units are mentored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S. Special Operations Forces, a relationship that has increased access to key military enablers and has led to record seizures. During the first nine months of 2018, the NIU and the SIU conducted 85 joint operations and reported the seizure of drugs and chemicals worth more than $109 million, including nine MT of opium, 1.3 MT of heroin, and 15.7 MT of morphine base, according to figures provided to DEA by the Afghan specialized units. Additionally, the NIU and SIU arrested 175 individuals during this period, including 29 leaders identified by DEA as “Major Targets.”

Primary trafficking routes into and out of Afghanistan are through the Balkan route (Iran to Turkey to Eastern and Western Europe); the southern route (Pakistan and Iran to Africa, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Canada); and the northern route (Central Asia to the Russian Federation). Clandestine drug laboratories within Afghanistan and in neighboring countries process a large portion of the country's opium into heroin and morphine, illicitly importing large quantities of precursor chemicals to facilitate production. NIU operations targeting these laboratories and chemicals resulted in the destruction of over 100 laboratories and the reported seizure of nearly 93,800 liters and 16.3 MT of precursor chemicals during the first nine months of 2018.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Afghan government acknowledges that Afghanistan has one of the highest substance abuse rates in the world. The 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey identified that rural drug use is far higher than urban use, and more than 38 percent of rural Afghan households included at least one member who tested positive for some form of illicit drug. To stem the effects of this public health crisis, the United States funded a rural treatment pilot project to expand substance abuse treatment to the hardest hit local communities, in addition to continuing to support 86 drug treatment centers across the country in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Health. The demand for treatment and prevention services far exceeds the capacity of the centers, most of which have extensive waiting lists for new patients. The United States also supports UNODC’s global children’s addiction program to develop protocols for treating children, training treatment staff, and delivering services through non-governmental organizations.

The United States engages in robust public information programming and funds communication and outreach programs aimed at discouraging poppy cultivation, preventing drug use, and encouraging licit crop cultivation. The United States also supports an anti-drug curriculum in Afghan schools, which has trained more than 1,900 teachers and reached more than 600,000 students in 900 schools.

4. Corruption

The Afghan Government as a whole does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering illicit proceeds. Widespread and longstanding
credible allegations and media reporting suggest, however, that many individual government officials directly engage in, and benefit from, the drug trade. Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to benefiting from drug trade revenue streams, to thwarting arrests and prosecutions.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In 2015, President Ghani approved a four-year National Drug Action Plan (NDAP), establishing three interrelated goals: 1) decrease the cultivation of opium poppy; 2) decrease the production and trafficking of opiates; and 3) reduce the demand for illicit drugs while increasing the provision of treatment for users. The NDAP targets all facets of the drug trade, from cultivation and production to trafficking and use, by employing incentives such as alternative development and deterrents such as eradication, interdiction, and prosecution. The U.S. government’s drug control priorities for Afghanistan include disrupting the drug trade and targeting drug revenues that finance the insurgency; developing licit alternative livelihoods; strengthening law enforcement and eradication efforts; reducing the demand for drugs; and building the Afghan government’s drug control capacity.

More broadly, the United States seeks to restore Afghanistan’s agriculture economy, to strengthen its institutional capacity, and to disrupt the nexus of drugs, insurgents, and corruption. Agriculture accounts for one quarter of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product and employs approximately 62 percent of its workforce; a key challenge to reducing drug production is developing economically viable alternatives to poppy and sustained workforce employment. The United States, in coordination with Afghan and international partners, promotes licit crop production where poppy is cultivated and funds projects designed to support farmers and agri-businesses in targeted value chains, including wheat, livestock, and high-value horticulture.

The United States is currently implementing alternative development initiatives, within the framework of the Afghanistan Integrated Country Strategy, to reduce illicit drug production and promote sustainable agriculture-led economic growth. The Boost Alternative Development Interventions through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL) project, implemented by UNODC, aims to strengthen and diversify licit livelihoods of small and marginal farmers through alternative development methods. The project supports and strengthens selected value chains in production, processing, quality control, and market linkages across 13 target provinces. The Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development projects implemented by the UN Development Program (UNDP) work to improve household income while reducing dependency on illicit poppy cultivation for selected communities in 12 high-poppy cultivating districts in Badghis, Farah, and Nangarhar provinces. The projects will also develop and strengthen community-based agri-business infrastructure, such as irrigation, transportation, and storage facilities.

D. Conclusion

The illicit cultivation, production, trade, and use of illicit drugs undermine public health and good governance in Afghanistan, while fueling corruption, providing significant funding for insurgents, and eroding security. Opium cultivation is most prevalent where physical and economic infrastructure is least developed, and where the Afghan government lacks control.
Afghanistan will not succeed in combating the drug trade and drug use until Afghans view illicit drugs as a serious domestic problem. That awareness is slowly building, but will remain incomplete until the Afghan government demonstrates the political will to challenge vested political and economic interests more robustly.

Most importantly, security will need to be established in areas controlled or contested by the Taliban before meaningful progress can be expected. Afghanistan cannot interdict or eradicate itself out of this problem. Alternative development, demand reduction, and public information, are important elements of a comprehensive poppy reduction strategy. Increased efforts to enforce Afghan laws against illicit poppy cultivation and to arrest traffickers are necessary for success. In addition to mainstreaming drug control efforts into other existing national strategies and programs, Afghanistan must actively combat corruption at all levels of government to regain public trust in its counterdrug campaigns, and ensure that provincial governors and other subnational officials genuinely cooperate on national drug control plans and policies. None of these achievements would be sufficient by itself, and each faces significant challenges in the coming years. Success in countering Afghanistan’s place in the global drug trade will not come quickly or easily.
Albania

Albania is both a source country of cannabis and, increasingly, a transit country for cocaine and heroin commanded largely by organized crime elements moving illicit drugs from source countries into European markets. The volume of drug seizures and number of drug-related arrests in 2018 was significant, driven largely by Albanian law enforcement cooperation with international partners, increased international pressure, and Albania’s efforts to accede to the European Union.

Albania’s role as source or market for illicit drugs beyond cannabis is minor, but there has been an increase in seizures of cocaine transiting Albania to Europe, in addition to discoveries of heroin and cocaine processing labs in northern and central Albania. Albanian crime groups traffic cocaine and heroin to European markets from source countries in South America and Asia.

Albania’s institutions are moderately equipped to fight drug crimes, but corruption at every level of government limits their overall effectiveness. Official corruption is pervasive and fosters an environment in which drug traffickers are largely able to operate with impunity.

Efforts to eradicate and prosecute cannabis growers have been extensive but uneven, and disrupting the drug trafficking infrastructure that has developed over two decades is a challenge. A high rate of unemployment and weak rule of law have created an ideal environment for the organized crime groups driving Albania’s drug control problem. Albania’s exportation of cannabis and movement of illicit drugs to European markets is a highly lucrative enterprise for drug traffickers. The status quo, which infrequently leads to convictions or imprisonment, is no deterrent for criminals. Albania is, however, moving towards justice reform to prosecute and convict criminals of trafficking drugs by leveraging organized crime affiliation. Prosecutors now combine drug-related charges with organized crime charges.

U.S. assistance supports Albania’s integrated border-management risk analysis to identify potential drug traffickers; law enforcement training on investigative techniques; provision of equipment to enhance drug search capabilities; and implementation of justice reforms that are impacting the legal landscape of drug trafficking. Sustained U.S. engagement has increased Albania’s ability to detect drug smuggling at borders and set up a framework for Albania to target organized crime rings moving illicit drugs across the globe. It is vital that the Albanian government continues implementation of justice reform and works to erode the influence of organized crime.
Algeria

Algeria is principally a transit country for illicit drugs rather than a center of production or consumption. The Government of Algeria is actively working to address the problem through increased enforcement and treatment efforts. Although the Algerian government’s security forces focus primarily on counter-terrorism efforts and border security, officials have become increasingly concerned about possible links between al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb and drug trafficking. Algerian authorities report the bulk of drugs transiting Algeria consisted of cannabis originating from Morocco. Traffickers also smuggle smaller quantities of cocaine, heroin, and psychotropic drugs into and through Algeria. Most of these drugs travel by sea to Europe, while some are smuggled overland to Middle Eastern destinations. Algeria’s borders stretch over 4,000 miles and are sparsely populated and difficult to monitor. Cannabis resin remains the most widely consumed and transited drug, though cocaine, heroin, and psychotropic substances are also used and trafficked through the country.

The government is combatting domestic consumption of illicit drugs through expanding facilities for treating drug addiction. Currently, there are 42 Intermediate Addiction Treatment Centers (CISAS) operating in Algeria. Patients received at these centers rose from 9,897 in 2007 to 22,444 in 2017. Voluntary hospitalization, therapeutic interventions, and outpatient consultations form the basis of CISAS treatment.

Algerian law provides for jail time of up to two years for use and between 10-20 years for drug trafficking and distribution. For consumption cases, the law gives preference to treatment over penal judgments. Algeria has updated its drug control regulations to conform to international agreements, including relevant UN treaties. Algeria works within the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation network MedNET, created in 2006 to advance regional cooperation in the fight against drugs.

The National Office for the Fight Against Drugs and Addiction coordinates the Government of Algeria’s drug policies and produces official reports on the country’s drug problem. The National Police, Customs, and National Gendarmerie are responsible for day-to-day enforcement. During the first eight months of 2018, authorities seized 27.7 metric tons of cannabis and 958,476 doses of psychotropic substances, and arrested 33,595 individuals on drug-related charges. In May 2018, authorities seized a shipment of 701 kilograms of cocaine in the port of Oran. Algeria would benefit from further training to boost counterdrug capabilities of its security forces.
Argentina

Transnational criminal organizations utilize Argentina as a transshipment point for Andean cocaine destined to European and other international markets. Domestic cocaine processing and consumption are growing concerns, and the consumption of domestically processed cocaine base is prevalent in poorer neighborhoods. U.S.-Argentine security cooperation has strengthened under President Mauricio Macri’s administration. The Security Ministry has adopted best practices from U.S. law enforcement, strengthening collaborative criminal intelligence efforts between federal and provincial forces through interagency task forces. An interagency task force launched in 2018 in Salta province focuses on a key entry point for Andean cocaine.

The government unveiled a national program to combat drug trafficking in 2016 that proposed increased targeting of drug trafficking organizations and efforts to reduce cocaine base consumption. A presidential decree in 2016 declared a state of national emergency that resulted in the federal Drug Demand Reduction Agency implementing demand reduction policies throughout the country. The government continues to deploy federal forces into major urban centers in response to public safety concerns. These efforts reduce resources available for combating smuggling at the border and along key corridors. In July 2018, President Macri issued executive decree 683 authorizing the military to support domestic civilian security efforts against non-state actors, including transnational drug traffickers.

Seizures of cocaine conversion laboratories and the availability of cocaine base suggested increased domestic processing. Official statistics show seizures of cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic drugs all increased from 2015 to 2017. During the first 10 months of 2018, Argentine authorities reported seizing approximately 137.8 metric tons (MT) of marijuana and 5.56 MT of cocaine, a 66 percent increase and a 35 percent drop, respectively. Most cocaine seizures were in the Salta and Jujuy provinces bordering Bolivia and Paraguay. Marijuana seizures primarily were in the Misiones and Corrientes provinces, bordering Brazil and Paraguay. Argentina is a regular participant in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits, which bring together maritime counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international organizations spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe.

Argentina adopted legal and procedural reforms to improve investigations and prosecutions of drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises. These reforms allow for greater use of certain special investigative measures, including informants and undercover officers in investigations. New legislation enabling cooperating witnesses helped advance corruption cases.

Constructive measures Argentina could undertake include focusing interdiction efforts on targeted regions and transportation sectors; allowing defendant cooperation for sentence reductions and controlled deliveries to further investigations; further enhancing federal and provincial coordination; boosting judicial efficiency in case management, investigations, and prosecutions; increasing border security resources; and coordinating drug supply and demand reduction strategies.

Argentina’s extradition, customs, and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States are utilized to the benefit of both countries.
Armenia

Armenia is primarily a transit country for illicit drugs originating in Southwest Asia and destined for markets in Europe and Russia. Most drug supplies transiting Armenia originate in Afghanistan and transit Iran before entering Armenia over land borders or by aerial transshipment. The Armenian Government maintains directive control over law enforcement, border enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial functions. Russian border guards manage Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran and compose part of the immigration staff at the Yerevan and Gyumri international airports. Armenian law enforcement agencies typically do not cooperate with the Armenian customs service on international investigations.

A popular revolution in April-May 2018 resulted in a new government that promised to fight corruption, but said little about illicit drugs until October 2018, when the acting prime minister pledged to eliminate drug trafficking through Armenia’s Syunik province. Despite an increase in the volume of drugs seized over the first six months of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017 that included some highly publicized seizures, there have been no arrests of high-level criminal figures related to drug trafficking. Interceptions of large shipments remain rare.

Between January and June 2018, Armenian law enforcement registered 512 criminal cases involving illegal distribution of illicit drugs, including 45 cases of drug smuggling. Authorities seized 32.2 kilograms (kg) of illicit drugs, 25.5 grams of psychotropic substances, and three grams of precursor chemicals. Heroin seizures increased by over 300 percent in the first six months of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017, which could be due to better screening practices at borders and checkpoints and/or a more robust focus on anti-drug policing. Multi-ton quantities of heroin, nevertheless, likely continue to pass through Armenian borders.

On May 1, two Iranian nationals flying to Armenia were detained carrying “large quantities” of opium, methamphetamine, and heroin. In June, Armenia announced the investigation of a transnational criminal group that attempted to smuggle opium, heroin, and marijuana from Iran through Armenia to Georgia. On September 30, a Guatemalan citizen was detained at Yerevan’s international airport for smuggling 3.5 kg of cocaine.
The Bahamas

A. Introduction

The Bahamas is not a significant drug producing country, but remains a significant transshipment point for illicit drugs bound for the United States and other international markets. The Bahamas’ location, less than 50 miles off the coast of Florida at its closest point, makes it a natural conduit for drug trafficking. The Bahamian archipelago stretches over a nautical area the size of Florida with over 700 islands and 2,000 cays, the vast majority of which are uninhabited. The Bahamas boasts 10 international airports, 56 airstrips, and more than 80 marinas. Traffickers blend in among numerous pleasure craft moving between Florida and The Bahamas. Trafficking also occurs through commercial freighters and commercial and private planes. Trafficking enables and strengthens transnational criminal organizations and gang activity.

The United States and The Bahamas enjoy a long-standing history of law enforcement cooperation. There is strong political will within the Bahamian government to tackle drug trafficking and organized crime. Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), a tripartite agreement dating back to the 1980s, spells out the obligations of The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the United States to improve their effectiveness in the fight against drug trafficking. Bolstered by this agreement, Bahamian and U.S. law enforcement agencies have partnered in several major law enforcement operations targeting trafficking organizations. In 2018, these operations resulted in numerous arrests and the seizure of cocaine and marijuana.

Demand for cocaine within the country remains low, though a small domestic market does exist. Use of marijuana, including among adolescents, remains a concern. The government is reviewing a 2018 CARICOM Regional Commission on Marijuana report that recommended the decriminalization of marijuana as a dangerous drug and its reclassification as a controlled substance; however, the government has not proposed any associated policy changes.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

During 2018, there was a notable increase in communication, effectiveness, and cooperation between Bahamian law enforcement agencies and the United States. New leadership in the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF) and Ministry of National Security, as well as the leadership within the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF), were integral to many of these improvements.

The Bahamas passed a new Proceeds of Crime Bill in March 2018, which strengthened the measures to recover any income or assets received from criminal activity and created a new category for unexplained wealth. The Bahamas also updated The Financial Transactions Reporting Act in 2018, which increased reporting requirements, as well as abilities for investigation into financial matters by relevant bodies.
The greatest challenge to the host government in tackling the trafficking issue remains the weakness of the Bahamian criminal justice sector. While the average time between initial arraignment and trial in 2017 was within 90 days for minor offenses, for more serious matters, such as those involving trafficking, smuggling, firearms, or gang violence, regular adjournments prolonged cases, in some instances for several years. Many accused choose to go to trial, confident the courts will take years to move their case through the system and the government will eventually drop the charges. Despite these challenges, the Judiciary has begun making important improvements. In 2018, the Magistrate Courts, Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals courts introduced U.S.-provided digital audio recording equipment in the courtroom to record procedures and serve as the official record in the Magistrate’s courts. The Judiciary expects this improvement to increase both the transparency and efficiency of the justice sector.

The Bahamas signed a comprehensive maritime agreement with the United States in 2004, which continues to enable cooperation in counterdrug and migrant interdiction operations in and around Bahamian territorial waters. The Bahamas has an extradition and mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) in place with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

U.S. law enforcement agencies integrate with the RBPF and RBDF to gather law enforcement intelligence, conduct investigations, and execute interdictions. These operations are supported by marine, technical, and training resources provided through U.S. assistance programs. With a small population base (353,000 according to the 2010 Census) and significant territory to cover, pooling U.S. and local resources and knowledge are essential to efficient deterrence and interdiction.

Beginning in January, four major law enforcement operations targeting trafficking networks were executed within The Bahamas in 2018. All four operations resulted in multiple arrests, as well as weapons and drug interdictions. For three of the four operations, the RBPF and RBDF worked in partnership - a first in many years and a sign of increasing cooperation between the two agencies. Additionally, the RBPF and RBDF prioritized the forward deployment of their marine assets throughout the archipelago, improving interdictions further afield, including numerous interdictions from the windward pass and throughout the southern Bahamian islands.

On March 20, Bahamian security forces successfully executed Operation Northern Strike, one of the most significant Bahamian-planned, executed, and led operations in recent history. With technical assistance and planning support from U.S. law enforcement, Bahamian law enforcement accomplished their mission of targeting transnational criminal organizations responsible for trafficking drugs, people, and weapons, arresting 51 individuals and confiscating narcotics, weapons, and currency. On September 24, RBPF and RBDF forces successfully executed Operation Tidal Surge in the Abaco Islands, targeting another smuggling network. This operation resulted in 26 arrests and the seizure of cocaine, marijuana, and weapons. This operation demonstrated the ability of these Bahamian forces and U.S. law enforcement to work together and across a distance in the archipelago. On November 5, RBPF forces intercepted two high-speed vessels travelling from Andros Island to Nassau resulting in the seizure of nearly 900 kilograms (kg) of marijuana.
During the first 10 months of 2018, coordinated U.S.-Bahamian operations in The Bahamas led to 203 arrests and the seizure of approximately 176 kg of cocaine, 5.66 metric tons of marijuana, and $1,693,809 in currency and $43,400 in assets. Joint operations also eradicated 2,520 cannabis plants – an amount similar to 2017 and an indication that cannabis cultivation remains steady. U.S. and local law enforcement investigations indicate that illicit trafficking through The Bahamas remains high. The total number of major operations increased significantly from the previous year due to increased levels of cooperation.

Throughout 2018, traffickers continued to split up larger loads into smaller loads before entering the southern Bahamas. Traffickers move cocaine through The Bahamas via “go-fast” boats, small commercial freighters, maritime shipping containers, and small aircraft. Traffickers move cocaine from The Bahamas to Florida by blending in with legitimate traffic that transits these areas. Larger go-fast and sport fishing vessels transport marijuana from Jamaica both to The Bahamas and through The Bahamas into Florida. Haitian and Haitian-Bahamian drug trafficking organizations, networked between Haiti and the significant Haitian diaspora in The Bahamas, continue to play a role in the movement of cocaine.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

With U.S. support, the Bahamian government partnered with the Organization of American States to conduct a comprehensive drug use survey in 2018. According to the survey respondents, 20 percent of male respondents admitted to smoking marijuana, while the same was true for 7 percent of females. Of the respondents who admitted to smoking, 40 percent admitted to smoking on a daily basis. Only 1 percent of respondents admitted to cocaine usage. Over 40 percent claimed to know a friend or family member who takes illegal drugs, with most reporting knowing two or more people.

The Public Hospitals Authority offers residential substance abuse treatment programs, drop-in treatment programs, substance abuse prevention programs, and relapse prevention programs. The United States partnered with the Public Hospitals Authority to train, mentor, and certify drug treatment professionals both from within and outside government. Following the certification of its professionals, the Public Hospitals Authority and other partners developed a training program for other substance use treatment staff in the country to learn about substance use issues. From the completion of the certification program in 2016, the Public Hospitals Authority has trained over 150 staff from local hospitals, the prison, the school for boys and girls, and local emergency rooms on New Providence Island and Grand Bahama Island.

The Bahamas Department of Correctional Services has a small residential drug treatment program, which can accommodate up to 21 inmates at a time. The United States has provided training for the corrections officers that provide drug treatment programs at the facility; several prison guards have also received additional training from the Public Hospitals Authority.

4. Corruption
The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Further, Free National Movement government has prioritized addressing public corruption as part of its national agenda. During calendar year 2018, at least four government employees were arrested and charged with drug-related offenses. These officials were investigated by the RBPF.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). In 2018, a CBSI-funded maritime surveillance system radar was installed in the southern-most island of Great Inagua to provide greater visibility of maritime and air traffic through the windward pass. CBSI funds have also been used over the past two years to provide maintenance and logistic support for the RBDF maritime interceptor vessels. In addition, security cooperation activities with the RBDF enhance capabilities in maritime law enforcement, intelligence, small boat operations, port security, engineering, disaster relief, and maintenance.

The United States and The Bahamas maintain close maritime law enforcement cooperation and coordination under a comprehensive maritime agreement to combat illicit trafficking of illicit drugs by sea and air. The Bahamas is a regular participant in the annual Multilateral Maritime Interdiction and Prosecution Summit and hosted the sixth iteration of the summit in Nassau on August 7-8, 2018, bringing together over 100 maritime counterdrug professionals from over 15 countries from across the Caribbean and Europe.

The United States has delivered training, technical assistance, and equipment needed by Bahamian government counterparts to combat transnational organized criminal networks and improve citizen security in The Bahamas. In October 2018, the United States completed the installation of digital recording equipment in the Magistrates and Supreme Court courtrooms in New Providence, Grand Bahama, and Abaco Islands. The courts use this equipment to record court proceedings in support of Bahamian plans to increase justice sector efficiency. Additionally, the Embassy donated ballistics vests and protective gear, a new Leica macroscope, and updated licenses and training on IBM computer programs to the RBPF. Finally, the Embassy provided training for the Internal Affairs Division within the Bahamas Department of Corrections.

The United States sent officials from the police and justice sector to external training focused on organized crime, investigating gangs, and trafficking in persons. The United States organized a training for magistrates and registrars to prepare them for the administrational changes involved with the new digital audio recording equipment. Additionally, the United States provided a senior justice advisor to meet with key staff in the Ministries of National Security, Legal Affairs, and Finance to provide technical assistance as these ministries establish practices to address issues with corruption. The advisor provided guidance on draft legislation, as well as established a program for increasing contact between these ministries and several U.S. counterparts. The United States supported Bahamian participation in the International Drug Enforcement Conference (organized by DEA) and other regional counterdrug training opportunities.
U.S. assistance for demand reduction supports the Ministry of National Security, the Public Hospitals Authority, and nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, the United States supported training focused on drug demand reduction and improved corrections policies addressing drug use and demand within prisons.

D. Conclusion

The United States and The Bahamas enjoy a long-standing cooperative relationship against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Drug trafficking and related smuggling will remain a primary concern for the United States in The Bahamas. The United States will continue to assist Bahamian efforts to counter these networks and increase efficiencies in the administration of justice through a range of assistance, and OPBAT and the CBSI framework will continue to bolster Bahamian drug-control institutions and enhance U.S. and Bahamian law enforcement relationships.
Belgium

Belgium is a primary entry point for cocaine smuggled into Europe. South America-based drug trafficking organizations transport cocaine through the Port of Antwerp to reach the lucrative European drug market and beyond. Highly profitable cocaine sales in Europe strengthen the various drug trafficking organizations, allowing them to expand their reach to other points around the world, including the United States.

The Port of Antwerp has experienced record-breaking cocaine seizures over the past several years from within containerized cargo arriving at the port. This is the result of increased coca production in Colombia, the port’s relative exposure as an area difficult to fully police, and successful law enforcement at other European ports. Belgian authorities seized approximately 30 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in 2016, approximately 41 MT of cocaine in 2017, and approximately 36 MT of cocaine during the first 10 months of 2018 at the Port of Antwerp. In addition, South American authorities seized approximately 28 MT of cocaine destined for Antwerp during the same period in 2018.

The seized cocaine in 2017 alone would have generated more than $1.2 billion in drug proceeds, and consequently, significant drug money laundering. Criminal networks increasingly use virtual currencies to facilitate illicit drug trafficking in Belgium. The online sale of synthetic drugs, including via non-searchable web sites (“Dark Web”), has increased significantly, resulting in more cyber currency investigations by Belgian police authorities.

Belgium and U.S. law enforcement agencies maintain close operational cooperation, focusing on cocaine trafficking and drug money laundering. The United States and Belgium fully utilize extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements. Despite strong international information sharing and cooperation, local capacity issues have prevented police from fully carrying out many large-scale drug investigations. Drug trafficking organizations appear to operate with little fear of legal reprisal, in part due to the relative lack of applicable criminal sanctions.

Belgium has not historically been a source of precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs, despite a robust chemical industry. Belgium has, however, served as transit point for precursor chemicals sourced out of China and India and destined for clandestine synthetic drug laboratories in the Netherlands, Mexico, and elsewhere.
Belize

A. Introduction

Belize is a major transit country for illegal drugs that originate from countries in South America. Due to Belize’s location and sparse population, transnational criminal organizations exploit both clandestine and legal airstrips to refuel or offload drugs, primarily cocaine, for further transshipment by land through Guatemala or Mexico and ultimately to the United States. Traffickers also exploit Belize’s offshore barrier islands and porous coastline to move drug shipments by “go-fast” boats. Authorities in 2018 successfully seized 996.2 kilograms (kg) of cocaine from aircraft carrying illicit drugs, the first major interdictions in eight years. Better-resourced drug interdiction efforts in neighboring Guatemala and nearby Honduras will increase the likelihood that traffickers will expand their efforts to exploit Belize’s permissive environment and limited law enforcement capacity.

The Belizian police, military, and Coast Guard share responsibility for drug interception, but none is adequately resourced. Belize has no air defense systems, no radar systems capable of monitoring night flights, and no maritime radar. It has significant equipment and equipment maintenance needs, limited law enforcement response capability, and systemic investigative and prosecutorial limitations. These resource constraints directly inhibit Belize’s ability to interdict shipments and prosecute traffickers.

B. Drug Control Accomplishment, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Government of Belize is cognizant of the dangers posed by its status as a transit point. It is particularly concerned that growing violence in Belize is, and will increasingly be, tied to the drug trade. However, Belize’s domestic criminal concerns are focused on extremely high levels of local gang-related violence, which is not yet clearly tied to transnational organized crime. Members of transnational criminal gangs, such as MS-13, have been arrested in Belize, but such regional groups do not appear to be organized in the country. Given Belize’s resource constraints, most of its law enforcement and legislative initiatives are necessarily tied to domestic gang activity. U.S.-funded programs focus on improving specialized units, police and criminal justice procedures, border security, technology, information sharing (internally and regionally), forensic improvements, and police professionalism.

Belize assists in the capture and repatriation of U.S. citizen fugitives through provisions of the Belize Immigration Act. Extraditions from Belize have been less successful. A bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Belize has been in force since 2001, and a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and Belize has been in force since 2003. Belize also has an extradition treaty with Mexico.

Belize also has a shiprider agreement with the United States (1992, amended in 2000). Belize’s other shiprider agreements are the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean
Area and the Proliferation Security Initiative Agreement. Regionally, Belize is a party to the Inter American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Belize also has a Mutual Legal Assistance Act, which provides a basis for considering request for legal assistance with countries with which it does not have a legal assistance treaty. Belize is giving consideration to adhering to the CARICOM Arrest Warrant Treaty.

A Pharmaceutical Ad Hoc Committee, established in 2014 to assess the trends relating to the movement of pharmaceutical drugs in Belize, dissolved from inactivity. In late 2018, the Ministry of National Security instructed the National Security Council to establish a task force to begin collecting precursor chemical data.

2. Supply Reduction

Belize operates a multi-agency approach to drug interdiction. The Belize Police Department is the primary agency responsible for drug law enforcement. It has two U.S.-supported specialized units – the Anti-Narcotics Unit comprised of 15 police officers and Mobile Interdiction Team comprised of 38 members. The Belize Coast Guard is responsible for the protection of Belize’s territorial waters and interdiction of illicit activities in the maritime environment. The Belize Defense Force (army) is often used as a supplemental force. Interdiction activities are coordinated through the Joint Intelligence Operations Center.

Since November 2017, eight aircraft became stranded in Belize, mainly due to suspected damage from rough landings at illicit strips. Authorities seized 556.2 kg of cocaine from one of the planes. An additional seizure of 440 kg of cocaine was made after a ninth illicit aircraft landing. Based on the size of the aircraft that are known to have landed, the smallest being a Cessna and the largest a Hawker jet, the potential quantity of narcotics transported ranges from 300 to 3,000 kg per aircraft. It is unknown how many total aircraft landed and successfully departed undetected.

The Belize Defense Force, Coast Guard, Anti-Narcotics Unit, and other police forces conducted multiple cannabis eradication operations in the first nine months of 2018. The Anti-Narcotics Unit seized 44.32 kg of cannabis and arrested six persons between those seizures and the aircraft interdiction; the Mobile Interdiction Team seized approximately 31 kg of cannabis and arrested six persons at highway checkpoints in the same timeframe. If other seizures are made by the police, the numbers are not disseminated.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Belize’s domestic drug use is difficult to quantify, and no data is collected by the government. Historically, marijuana is the primary illicit drug used in the country. In November 2017, Belize decriminalized the possession of up to 10 grams of marijuana for both recreational and medicinal purposes. There are some indications that there is increasing public use of cocaine and crack cocaine. However, Belize does not have the capacity to locally test for cocaine, other narcotics, or synthetics by its forensic services. The public health sector is able to test for marijuana and cocaine.
Belize’s National Drug Abuse Control Council (within the Ministry of Health) is the lead agency in the prevention and control of drug abuse. The Council provides drug education prevention programs to schools and communities. Its objective is to reduce the demand and supply of drugs and alleviate the associated consequences. From 2015-2017, the Council provided drug prevention education programs to 48,138 students. Its outreach services for persons living with drug addiction grew from 256 clients in 2015 to 373 clients in 2017 (the most recent available data). Its other efforts include attending regional fora and organizing community health and education fairs, workshops on drugs and the workplace, and prevention training for school counselors.

Belize’s central prison, co-managed by the government and a church-affiliated non-governmental organization The Kolbe Foundation, launched the Ashcroft Rehabilitation Center in 2018. The program features a group-based approach to address personality disorders, substance abuse, and habitual addiction, all aimed at inmate reform reducing recidivism rates, including drug-related crimes.

4. Corruption

The Government of Belize does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution. However, insufficient resources, weak law enforcement institutions, an ineffective judicial system, and inadequate compensation for civil service employees and public safety officials facilitate corruption.

Belize lacks laws specifically addressing drug-related corruption. The Prevention of Corruption Act, passed in 2000, includes measures to combat corruption related to illicit monetary gains and the misuse of public funds while holding public office. It also provides a code of conduct for civil servants. Belize did not charge anyone under this act in 2017 or 2018. A Special Audit of the Immigration and Nationality Department found multiple cases of fraud and corruption within the department. After this revelation and other reports of corruption among senior government officials (not related to illicit drugs) and significant public pressure, Belize signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2016. In the course of implementing UNCAC, the government completed a self-assessment checklist; participated in a technical exchange visit in Jamaica; and initiated an impact of corruption assessment.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S.-funded programs support citizen security, border security, and rule of law programs aimed to improve Belize’s security structures. U.S. assistance, consistent with the U.S. Strategy for Central America, through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), focuses on building transparency and accountability, capacity building, and other institutional-level improvements.

Belize is a participating member of the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), which provides research and passenger data support through the Joint Regional Communications Center based in Barbados. IMPACS is assisting Belize in
implementing the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), a widely-used data interchange system that allows air and sea carriers to streamline and transmit traveler data. APIS is recognized by commercial carriers and the international community as the standard for passenger processing and enhanced security in the commercial air and vessel environment. Once implemented, commercial carriers will be able to share information with Belizean officials on individuals and cargo flagged by international law enforcement authorities for suspicious behavior or outstanding warrants, including related to drug crimes.

Belize is also focused on improving its information and data sharing processes and is working with the United States and international partners. The Joint Information Operations Center was designed to be the hub for collating and sharing information within Belize and with international partners. Through the information sharing process, its goal is to combat transnational criminal threats and transnational criminal networking by addressing the reduction of violent crime, border crossings, weapon smuggling, human and drug trafficking, and dismantling of local criminal networks. U.S. advisors are working with the Government of Belize to improve the policies and procedures that will provide a better process for responses to transnational threats and drug crimes.

The United States and Belize have signed Letters of Agreement (LOAs) concerning both drug control and maritime security. The LOAs, dated August 2010, include elements of establishing the police vetted unit and its area of responsibility, security sector reform, drug control, transnational crime, demand reduction, and community policing.

The United States also maintains a bilateral agreement with Belize to suppress illicit traffic by sea and air, which includes provisions for ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry to investigate, over flight of territorial seas, order to land, and for the use of third-party platforms. Belize is a regular participant in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits, which bring together maritime counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international organizations spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe.

D. Conclusion

Belize faces a challenging drug control environment and strong leadership is necessary to reduce the impact of drug trafficking and crime in the country. The United States will continue to assist Belize’s law enforcement and justice sectors by providing training, advisory, and institutional support to combat drug trafficking. The United States encourages Belize to strengthen its public security and law enforcement institutions through more effective anti-corruption legislation, modern drug control legislation, comprehensive background checks and vetting of new and existing personnel, enhanced training, and continuing education programs.
Benin

Benin is a significant transshipment point for cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and chemical precursors used to produce illicit drugs. Nigerian drug syndicates partner with Beninese nationals based in Benin. Cocaine from South America and heroin from Southwest Asia via East Africa transit Benin for major markets in Western Europe. Methamphetamine produced in Nigeria transits Benin for markets in Europe, Southeast Asia, and South Africa. There was also some evidence of illicit drug trafficking to the United States in 2018, according to U.S. law enforcement authorities.

Locally cultivated cannabis remains the most accessible illegal drug for consumption in Benin. There is a small but growing domestic market in Benin for heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine. Benin receives registered commercial freight shipments from India of the prescription opioid tramadol, destined for the Sahel, with high levels of local consumption and abuse. Tramadol pills exceeding the usually prescribed dosage by tenfold (500 milligrams vs 50 milligrams) are commonly sold in Benin.

Benin introduced new measures in 2018 aimed at improving efficiency and performance in law enforcement and judicial operations. In January, Benin merged its National Police and Gendarmerie to create a single law enforcement unit, the Republican Police. The merger eliminated overlapping responsibilities in practice between units involved in drug control. In September, a specialized criminal court with exclusive jurisdiction for drug-related crimes began hearing cases. The ability of police and courts to insulate themselves from corruption and partiality remains a longstanding challenge in Benin and the region.

The Central Office for Repression of Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Precursors (OCERTID) was created in 1999 under the national police to coordinate drug enforcement operations. OCERTID reports monthly statistics on drug seizures; the national drug lab lacks equipment to test drugs or confirm purity. Benin's Law on Control of Drugs and Precursors provides penalties of between one and 20 years in prison for trafficking drugs. Individuals prosecuted for drug-related crimes in Benin are typically human couriers. The Government of Benin must continue to make progress in improving coordination between its relevant agencies and build cooperation and trust with neighboring countries to successfully pursue complex case investigations.

Benin does not have a bilateral extradition treaty or a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States, though it is party to multilateral conventions that enable cooperation.
Bolivia

A. Introduction

Although illicit drug consumption remains low in Bolivia, it remains the third largest source country of coca in the world, according to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates, and is also a major transit zone for Peruvian cocaine. In March 2017, President Evo Morales signed into law a bill increasing the licit area of coca production from 12,000 hectares (ha) to 22,000 ha. However the United States government estimated 2017 cultivation amounts to be 31,000 ha (a modest decrease in coca cultivation from 2016 to 2017), and UNODC estimated Bolivia coca cultivation to be 24,500 ha (an increase of 1,400 ha from 2016 to 2017), both in excess of the limits established by the Government of Bolivia. European Union (EU) studies reveal that domestic demand for the traditional, cultural, and religious use in Bolivia is less than 15,000 ha.

The Bolivian government has inadequate controls over its domestic coca cultivation, and UNODC calculated an estimated 35-48 percent of the coca that was cultivated in 2017 did not go to the two authorized coca markets for sale. The United States government estimated cocaine production potential in Bolivia to be 249 metric tons (MT) in 2017. Most Bolivian cocaine is exported to other Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, for domestic consumption, or for onward transit to West Africa and Europe, rather than to the United States.

In September 2018, the United States again determined that Bolivia “failed demonstrably” to adhere to its obligations under international drug control agreements and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This Presidential determination was based, in part, on insufficient justification for the increase in coca production authorized under Bolivian law. According to the 2017 UNODC report, 91 percent of the coca grown in the Yungas region, approximately 20,822 MT, is sold in the legal market. Conversely, nearly 91 percent of the coca grown in Cochabamba’s Chapare region, approximately 21,738 MT, is diverted away from the legal market. Bolivian President Evo Morales is “president in perpetuity” of the coca growers’ federation in the Chapare region.

Peruvian officials estimate 41 percent of all Peruvian cocaine departs to or through Bolivia via ground or aerial transshipment, commonly known as the “air bridge.” Bolivia reportedly confiscated seven aircraft involved in drug trafficking in 2018, down from 17 reportedly seized in 2017 by the Special Counter-Narcotics Police Force (FELCN). In traditional (authorized) coca cultivation areas, Bolivia maintains a “social control” policy to curb illicit coca production. Under this approach, the government usually negotiates with coca growers to obtain their consent for eradication. In nontraditional (unauthorized) areas, including national parks, eradication is officially mandatory.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development
In March 2017, President Morales promulgated two new laws to replace the Coca and Controlled Substances Law 1008 (1988). In addition to increasing the licit area of coca production from 12,000 ha to 22,000 ha, the General Law on Coca (Law 906) provides a framework for the regulation of the production, circulation, transportation, marketing, consumption, research, industrialization, and promotion of coca in its natural state. The new Controlled Substances Law (Law 913) includes three key enhancements: a procedure for the payment of informants and plea-bargaining in drug-related cases; a procedure for asset forfeiture; and a framework for wiretapping in drug-related investigations. It also provides a legal basis for two studies – one on coca yield per hectare and another to determine coca leaf-to-cocaine yield. Both studies are under way by UNODC with European EU funding and their results are expected in the second half of 2019. As of November 2018, the Controlled Substances Law’s implementing regulations were still pending approval from the Bolivian legislature and not in effect.

Bolivia has numerous entities with drug control mandates. The National Drug Control Council (CONALTID), chaired by the Ministry of Government, is the central drug control policy-making body in Bolivia. The Vice Ministry for Social Defense and Controlled Substances (VMSD) is mandated to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production, advance coca eradication and drug prevention, and execute rehabilitation programs. The General Law on Coca is enforced through a series of regulations that clarify responsibilities between governmental institutions and reinforce the role of the National Council for Revaluation, Production, Marketing, Research and Industrialization of Coca (CONCOCA) as the point for intergovernmental coordination. Biometric registration of all coca producers and sellers is also mandatory by law, and regulations exist to monitor coca transportation routes, markets, and industrial research on coca.

FELCN reports to the VMSD and comprises approximately 1,700 personnel, and is the agency that focuses primarily on interdiction and money laundering cases. The Joint Eradication Task Force (FTC) conducts manual coca eradication with approximately 2,300 personnel. The Unit for the Execution of the Fight against Narcotics (UELICN) plans and funds drug enforcement operations. In 2018, UELICN’s budget remained unchanged from 2017 at $48.3 million; however, a budget increase of about 25 percent is expected for 2019. In 2018, Bolivia, with UNODC support, created the Regional Center for Counternarcotics Intelligence (CERIAN), a regional fusion center for intelligence analysis and information sharing based in Santa Cruz with the participation of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Other border countries may join once a framework is finalized.

Bolivia’s 2016-2020 Strategy to Combat Drug Trafficking and Reduction of Excess Cultivation of Coca Leaf prioritizes actions against criminal organizations rather than what the Bolivian government considers legitimate farmers who cultivate coca for traditional uses. The strategy includes four pillars: reduction of supply; reduction of demand; control of the excess supply of coca; and shared international responsibilities. Current Bolivian coca cultivation far exceeds the country’s demand for coca for traditional purposes. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States continues to recommend that Bolivia implement a system to monitor narcotics and psychotropic drugs used in healthcare settings to ensure the medicines are not diverted for illegitimate uses.
Bolivia receives most of its foreign counternarcotic financial support from the EU. The EU is currently implementing a $50 million three-year (2016-2018) assistance program, and provides an additional $10 million to support UNODC drug control programs and technical assistance. The Bolivian government denies that foreign drug cartels operate within its borders, but acknowledges the presence of cartel emissaries.

The United States and Bolivia are parties to a 1995 extradition treaty that permits the extradition of nationals for the most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. Bolivia and the United States do not have a mutual legal assistance treaty, but both countries can request assistance through various multilateral conventions to which both are signatories.

2. Supply Reduction

FELCN reported destroying 93 cocaine hydrochloride processing labs and 1,004 rustic cocaine labs during 2018, a 62 percent increase and 62 percent decrease, respectively, from 2017. According to the Bolivian government, FELCN seized 10.48 MT of cocaine base and 7.59 MT of cocaine hydrochloride in 2018 – a 7.4 percent decrease and 153 percent increase, respectively, from what was seized during the first 10 months of 2017. FELCN arrested 3,986 individuals on drug-related offenses in 2018. Corruption, interference by other branches of government, and insufficient judicial resources undermine due process and create delays in the administration of justice.

The United States government estimated that coca cultivation was 31,000 ha in 2017, a 17 percent decrease from 2016, and that the production potential of cocaine decreased 9 percent from last year to 249 MT. The modest reduction in the U.S. cultivation estimate is attributable to better survey data and analysis. UNODC estimated that 24,500 ha of coca were cultivated within Bolivia in 2017, a 6 percent increase from 2016. UNODC officials have noted that 91 percent of the Chapare region’s coca cultivation is destined for illicit cocaine production and not traditional consumption. According to UNODC’s 2017 report published in August, there were 8,400 ha of coca cultivated in the Chapare region, an increase of 17 percent over the previous year. According to the most recently available information from the Bolivian government, Bolivian authorities eradicated 8,600 ha of coca as of October, compared to 7,237 ha during all of 2017. The Bolivian government estimates it needs to eradicate 11,000 ha of coca yearly to see a net reduction in coca cultivation.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Illicit drug consumption remains low in Bolivia, according to UNODC and the 2016 World Drug Report. According to a joint 2016 CONALTID/UNODC study funded by the European Union on drug use in the university student population, 6.1 percent of Bolivian university students had used illicit drugs in the previous year. Broken down by category, 5 percent of surveyed students had used marijuana; 0.8 percent used LSD; and 0.4 percent used cocaine. In October 2017, CONALTID, the EU and UNODC launched a “Listen First” campaign aimed at preventing the abuse of drugs by children, focusing on parents, prevention staff, health workers, teachers, and decision makers.
There are approximately 80 drug treatment and rehabilitation centers in Bolivia. According to the Bolivian government’s 2016-2020 Strategy to Combat Drug Trafficking and Reduction of Excess Cultivation of Coca Leaf, 98 percent of those centers are run by nongovernmental organizations. There are only two public treatment centers, one in Tarija and one in Santa Cruz.

4. Corruption

As a matter of official policy, the Government of Bolivia does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, President Morales and other senior government officials have acknowledged serious corruption problems in the judiciary and police. In 2017, the Ministry of Anticorruption and Transparency was dismantled and its responsibilities transferred to the Ministry of Justice, which was thereafter named the Ministry of Justice and Transparency.

FELCN is the only police unit with a known polygraph program. All FELCN members are required to take an annual polygraph test, and those who do not pass are supposed to transfer out of the program. However, reports vary as to whether those two requisites are uniformly applied.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States Embassy meets periodically with the Vice Ministry for Social Defense and Controlled Substances and FELCN officials to discuss Bolivia’s drug control efforts. Bolivia sent participants to five courses at the U.S.-funded International Law Enforcement Academy in 2018. The participants represented two Bolivian institutions: FELCN and the Financial Investigative Unit. The United States does not have a counterdrug presence in Bolivia, but it consults with international organizations and third-country governments involved in supporting Bolivian drug control goals and efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

Bolivia participated in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit held in May, which attracted 125 maritime counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international agencies spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe. In conjunction with the Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit, the Vice Minister of Social Defense visited the State Department and requested continued cooperation and exchange of information of eradication imagery and data.

D. Conclusion

Bolivia remains the third largest source of coca and cocaine in the world, and a major transit country for Peruvian cocaine. For the second time since 2010, UNODC estimates coca cultivation is increasing and, even with a decrease in U.S. coca cultivation estimates, both UNODC and U.S. 2017 estimates are well above the government-sanctioned limit of 22,000 ha. Despite a decrease in U.S. estimates in 2017, potential pure cocaine production in Bolivia remains historically high at 249 MT when compared to 170 MT less than a decade ago. There is no available data to support the Bolivian government’s statements that traditional, cultural, and medicinal coca consumption have increased, which it made in justifying the increase in the legal limit of coca cultivation in the new General Law on Coca from 12,000 ha to 22,000 ha. This
limit exceeds the amount of coca needed for traditional purposes by approximately 38 percent, per EU reporting.

Bolivia’s inadequate controls over its legal coca markets remain a matter of concern, as is Bolivia’s status as a transit country for cocaine trafficking. In 2013, Bolivia re-acceded to the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs with a reservation permitting coca to be used only within Bolivia for traditional, cultural, and medicinal purposes. Despite these stated conditions, Bolivia continues to promote the use of coca in other countries and discuss potential export opportunities for coca products. These actions undermine Bolivia’s commitments to its international drug control obligations.

In addition, Bolivia should strengthen efforts to stem the diversion of coca to cocaine processing by tightening controls over the coca leaf trade, achieving net reductions in coca cultivation, and improving law enforcement and judicial efforts to investigate and prosecute drug-related criminal activity. Provisions of the new Controlled Substances Law are still not in effect nor will they be until the Bolivian legislature approves the implementing regulations. The law nonetheless could be a significant advance in the fight against drug trafficking, as it will institutionalize the use of modern investigative techniques previously absent from the Bolivian legal framework.
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a major producer or consumer of illicit drugs or precursor chemicals. It is primarily a transit country, positioned between drug processing centers in Southwest Asia and markets in Western Europe. The Adriatic coast is also a major gateway for South American cocaine destined for Europe.

Transnational criminal organizations dominate the drug trade in the Balkans and largely traffic cannabis, heroin, and cocaine. Bosnian criminal organizations often operate outside of the Balkans, though leaders of these organizations reside within the country. Law enforcement and security institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain limited and do not effectively deter trafficking. The fragmented structure of law enforcement agencies and inter-agency rivalries impede effective cooperation in detecting drug crimes and pursuing joint investigations. There is little coordination between units that could connect drug activity to larger organized crime and money laundering operations. Little political will exists to create policies and programs to reduce demand for illicit drugs. Corruption is an endemic problem, which can also hamper effective investigations and prosecutions.

Drug demand is increasing within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but remains relatively low compared with other European countries. During the first 10 months of 2018, police seized 3.35 kilograms (kg) of heroin; 2.7 kg of cocaine; 1.84 metric tons of marijuana/cannabis products; 2,500 tablets of cannabis sativa and 8,998 cannabis plants; 23.9 kg and 10.6 liters of amphetamine-type stimulants; 1,605 tablets and 17.7 kg of MDMA (ecstasy); and 67,968 tablets of diverted pharmaceutical products. Many of these seizures resulted from joint investigations with neighboring countries.

Nationally, the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Border Police are responsible for drug control enforcement. The Customs Administration, within the Indirect Taxation Authority, conducts routine drug seizures at border crossings but does not possess investigative or arrest authorities. Seized drugs are transferred to either the Border Police or SIPA for criminal investigation and prosecution. At the entity-level, the Federation Ministry of Interior, Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior, Brecko District Police, and the 10 cantonal Ministries of Interior are engaged on drug issues. During the first 10 months of 2018, Bosnian police filed 2,014 reports related to drug crimes.

Bosnia and Herzegovina law enforcement agencies’ ability to conduct complex investigations is limited. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to work closely with the United States to develop its interdiction, investigative, and prosecutorial capacity, and also cooperates with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and other bilateral partners.
Brazil

A. Introduction

Brazil is a significant transit and destination country for cocaine. The country’s borders with the cocaine source countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are porous and over three times the length of the U.S. border with Mexico. The government views the large, violent, and well-organized drug trafficking organizations operating throughout the country as its primary domestic security threat. Brazil suffers from a substantial and growing domestic drug consumption problem. After the United States, Brazil is the world’s second-largest consumer of cocaine hydrochloride and likely the largest consumer of cocaine-base products. The Brazilian government appreciates the gravity of the illicit drugs issue and is committed to combating drug trafficking, but lacks the capacity to fully stem the flow of illicit drugs across its borders.

In 2018, Brazil entered into another year of economic recession and fiscal short-fall, combined with inflation, resulting in austerity cuts across the government, including at enforcement and social welfare agencies that address drug flows and substance use disorders. The government continues to prioritize border security and pursues a whole-of-government approach to counter drug trafficking and other forms of organized and violent crime, working in cooperation with international partners.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Brazilian government’s lead agency for combating drug trafficking is the Federal Police (DPF). The lead agency for policy on reducing drug demand is the National Secretariat for Drug Policy (SENAD). SENAD is part of the Ministry of Justice, the Brazilian government’s lead agency for drug control policy.

The DPF’s 2018 budget increased by 18 percent, a significant increase over 2017 levels. However, DPF operations continued to be impacted by across-the-board fiscal austerity and deep cuts to some operational budgets. The DPF is capable by global standards, but recognizes that its force of 11,000 agents is insufficient to effectively combat drug trafficking in addition to other duties. SENAD’s National Anti-Drug Fund budget was cut by 11 percent from 2017 levels.

Reform of drug sentencing laws is a source of public debate, as nearly a quarter of the Brazilian prison population is incarcerated for drug-related crimes (150,000 people), more than any other single crime. The National Justice Council, which oversees Brazil’s federal judiciary, is creating standardized sentencing guidelines to better distinguish between drug consumers and traffickers.

Brazil maintains bilateral drug control agreements with the United States and every country in South America, in addition to formal partnerships with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, and INTERPOL. In May, the United States and Brazil launched a Permanent Security Forum to facilitate bilateral cooperation and plan coordinated strategies in six areas,
including drug trafficking. Brazil has extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

Brazil remains a major transit route for cocaine from the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Cocaine products are smuggled across land borders via small aircraft and trucks, as well as by boats using the Amazon riverine system. Brazil's seaports play a key role in drug smuggling, and Brazilian law enforcement and customs continue to improve port screening and interdiction. The majority of cocaine entering Brazil is destined for its domestic market and Europe, often through West Africa. In August, Brazilian police in conjunction with United States law enforcement seized 2.2 metric tons (MT) of cocaine from a drug trafficking organization in Belém, Para destined for Antwerp, Belgium. In September, Brazilian police cooperated with United States law enforcement to seize 840 kilograms of cocaine HCL base in Manaus, Amazonas destined for transport to the port of Belém at the mouth of the Amazon River.

Since 2011, Brazil’s Strategic Border Plan has confronted drug trafficking and transnational crime, including support of periodic operations. Operation Sentinela, supervised by the Ministry of Justice, is an ongoing intelligence-building effort to coordinate state, local, and federal police forces, particularly on the border. Operation Ágata, coordinated by the Ministry of Defense, conducts periodic tactical missions at strategic border points. These operations took place periodically in 2018 with some success, but consolidated seizure statistics were not available at the time of this report. In April, Brazil approved the Strategic Plan of the Integrated Border Program, established in November 2016 to improve cooperation among agencies and with international partners.

The first nine months of 2018 saw an increase of counter drug operations and seizures of cocaine and other illicit drugs, though aggregate volumes have not yet been made available. A lack of a central uniformed reporting system makes consolidated statistical data difficult to attain.

Brazil conducts recurring cannabis eradication operations in the country’s northeast. In a single operation in June, the DPF eradicated approximately 2.5 hectares of cannabis plantings, with an estimated yield of 88 MT. Comprehensive statistics for cannabis eradication in 2018 have not yet been released.

Synthetic drugs are present in Brazil, though combating them is a lower government priority given the overwhelming cocaine problem. Complex synthetic drugs such as MDMA and LSD are usually smuggled in small amounts via couriers flying commercial airlines from Europe. A study published in June based on data from the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) showed an increase of opioid sales by 465 percent in Brazil between 2009 and 2015, including fentanyl and fentanyl analogues.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment
Brazilian federal and state authorities continued to actively promote drug threat awareness, demand reduction, and treatment programs in 2018. The government continues to implement its 2005 National Drug Policy via its regular budget process, with emphasis on distance-learning training for substance use disorder professionals and civil society organizations and building social service capacity at the municipal level. In 2018, SENAD approved a new resolution that provides for studies to realign the National Drug Policy.

Brazil approaches the reintegration of people with substance use disorders into society holistically, providing a range of services from medical care to job training. Brazil’s programs are not yet commensurate with the size of the addicted population.

4. Corruption

As a matter of government policy, the Brazilian government does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking, and there is little evidence to suggest that senior government officials are engaged in such activity. While there were numerous allegations and examples of political corruption throughout Brazil, including at the highest levels of government, there were no direct links between political corruption and drug trafficking at the national level. Delays in judicial proceedings often resulted in cases being dismissed.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The 2008 U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement supports capacity building in Brazilian federal and state agencies to combat illicit drug trafficking. In 2018, the United States provided significant training support to Brazilian law enforcement through 29 courses reaching nearly 1,000 officers on topics ranging from money laundering to community policing. Cooperation between Brazilian and U.S. law enforcement is excellent. The United States also regularly engages with Brazilian security forces and the Brazil Navy to strengthen cooperation against drug trafficking through subject matter expert exchanges, forums, and other engagements. The U.S.-Brazil Permanent Security Forum on Security launched in May 2018 as a formal mechanism to coordinate six thematic areas of cooperation, including drug trafficking. The drug trafficking working group convened in September.

D. Conclusion

Brazil has institutionalized its commitment to combating illicit drug trafficking and addressing a growing domestic consumption problem. Brazil would benefit from comprehensive population surveys to determine the scope of its domestic drug consumption, consolidated nationwide data on drug interdiction, increased monitoring of its seaports, and greater cooperation with neighboring countries.
Burma

A. Introduction

Burma continues to be a major source of illicit opiates and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Burma is the world’s second largest source country of opium poppy cultivation, and one of the largest producers of heroin. Burma is also one of the world’s largest producers of methamphetamine, primarily in the forms of crystallized methamphetamine and “yaba” tablets (caffeine with small doses of methamphetamine). In 2018, countries across Southeast Asia and beyond experienced record-breaking seizures of crystal methamphetamine and yaba tablets that originated in Burma. Production sites for heroin and ATS are generally situated in Shan State along Burma’s eastern borders in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups and militias. There are also mobile ATS laboratories along the Burma-Bangladesh border, which have created another hub for ATS trafficking. Precursor chemicals are brought to these production sites from outside the country, primarily from China.

Illicit drugs produced in Burma are trafficked throughout the region, with routes extending beyond the Mekong countries to Australia and New Zealand. Burma is not a major source of or transit country for drugs entering the United States. Domestic consumption of illicit drugs is substantial and widespread, though it varies by region. However, there are no reliable comprehensive studies providing statistics on the scope of the problem.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) is Burma’s interagency mechanism for coordinating drug control efforts, which involve multiple ministries and justice institutions. In February 2018, the CCDAC passed and enacted a National Drug Control Policy in accordance with recommendations from the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS). The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law was amended in February 2018 to be consistent with the new policy.

Burma’s Drug Enforcement Division (DED) is the country’s primary interdiction force, but it lacks resources commensurate with the size of the problem. Burma’s justice system is underdeveloped, and judicial and prosecutorial institutions lack the legal framework to effectively handle the volume of drug-related crimes and complex drug networks. The DED is theoretically allotted nearly 4,000 employees; however, as of August 2018, there were only 1,164 employees on staff. The country’s criminal legislation does not permit law enforcement actions that are essential for sophisticated narcotics investigations, such as controlled deliveries. Accordingly, there have been few investigations and prosecutions of mid- or high-ranking drug trafficking suspects.

In June 2018, President Win Myint ordered the establishment of a Drug Abuse Reporting Department within his office to identify drug offenders. While the initiative shows a growing
recognition of drug use and trafficking in the country, it has thus far not provided law enforcement with the tools or resources necessary to interdict significant drug networks.

The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement (MSW) and the Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS) share responsibilities for addressing drug treatment, and rehabilitation. The MSW established a new Department of Rehabilitation in January 2018 to oversee rehabilitation facilities and services. The Government of Burma recognizes that the social sector remains significantly underfunded, and that the country still lacks a corps of health and social welfare officials qualified to provide services to those using or addicted to drugs.

The amended Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law places more focus on treating drug use as a public health matter rather than exclusively as a criminal justice matter. However, law enforcement authorities continue primarily to arrest and prosecute low-level users and traffickers due to inadequate resources and poor understanding of the new law, as well as limited access to health services for drug users. The majority of tips sent to the Drug Abuse Reporting Department concern low-level drug dealers, and the burden for handling these cases falls on law enforcement, justice, and correctional institutions. According to CCDAC reports, 48 percent of prisoners nationwide were arrested for drug-related offences; in Kachin and Shan States, this figure is closer to 70 or 80 percent. The Union Attorney General’s Office (UAGO) has estimated that as many as 50 percent of all cases prosecuted nationwide relate to drug offenses.

The UAGO oversees all prosecutions in the country, and consults on legislation in the criminal justice field. Prosecutors below the Union level work in 14 state and regional, 71 district, and 330 township level law offices. In addition to the lack of resources and rudimentary investigative techniques, they face challenges including: inconsistent testimony from civilian witnesses; the requirement to have a township elder present during a search warrant; and a lack of by-laws for implementation of the Narcotics Law. The UAGO recognizes the benefits of police-prosecutor cooperation on investigations and prosecutions. However, there has been no specialized drug prosecution training to date, and prosecutors receive drug cases after the police have already completed their investigations, without prior consultations, which makes prosecutions more difficult.

Burma’s law enforcement and justice institutions have the ability, in principle, to cooperate internationally. However, due to lack of experience and exposure to international institutions, local law enforcement and judicial officials have limited understanding of regulations relating to extraditions and mutual legal assistance. On a working level, DED officers and commanders maintain relationships with counterparts in neighboring countries, most notably Thailand and China. Burma signed new agreements related to drug control in 2018; in addition, Burma is undergoing the process to sign memoranda of understanding with Indonesia and the Philippines on law enforcement cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the 2017 UNODC Burma Opium Survey, an estimated 41,000 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in Shan and Kachin States, representing a 25 percent decrease from to the results of the 2015 survey. Shan State remains the largest source of opium cultivation. The
Burmese government and UNODC are conducting a survey for the 2018 opium poppy season, the results of which are expected to be released in early 2019. DED officials anticipate that opium and heroin production will continue to decline due to low opium prices and reduced regional demand for opium and heroin.

During the first nine months of 2018, Burmese authorities seized approximately 84,148,000 ATS tablets; 2.57 metric tons (MT) of opium; 750.6 kilograms (kg) of heroin; 2.68 MT of crystal methamphetamine; 72.2 kg of concentrated opium; 29.7 kg of low-grade opium; 1.97 liters of opium oil liquid; 353.5 kg of brown opium powder; and 11.65 liters of liquid opium. At three drug destruction ceremonies on June 26 marking the annual International Day Against Drug Abuse, law enforcement officers destroyed $187 million worth of seized narcotic drugs, a reduction of more than 50 percent compared to the $386 million worth of seized illicit drugs destroyed in 2017.

During the first nine months of 2018, there were 14,008 drug-related arrests, compared to 13,734 arrests during the entire year in 2017. As of September 30, there had been 9,784 drug-related prosecutions, compared to 9,366 in all of 2017. In January, law enforcement officials seized 30 million methamphetamine pills and more than two metric tons of crystal methamphetamine and heroin in Shan State. This single seizure, worth $54 million on the illicit market, was the largest of the year.

Drug traffickers are consolidating larger volumes of drugs for transport, compared to small retail trafficking in the past. In June 2018, 12 drug traffickers received prison sentences up to 48 years in connection with a 2015 case involving the largest single seizure ever of ATS in Southeast Asia (and second largest in the world), worth $26.7 million.

### 3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Ministry of Home Affairs did not grant the CCDAC permission to develop Burma’s first National Drug Use Survey in 2018, despite an agreement with UNODC and the United States to support and fund the project. Anecdotally, domestic consumption of illicit drugs is extremely high, especially associated with migrant workers in extractive industries, such as jade and gold mines. The country’s existing public health capacity falls far short of accommodating those who seek or need treatment.

The government, with technical support from UNODC, adopted the first National Drug Control Policy in February 2018. The policy references international best practices and aligns with the approach of the 2016 UNGASS and complies with the three international drug conventions.

The MOHS and the MSW rely on the international community to provide much of the training on drug treatment and prevention that health and education professionals receive. The United States continues to fund the Colombo Plan, which trains health professionals on the U.S.-developed Universal Treatment Curriculum for Substance Use Disorders and teachers from the Ministry of Education on the Universal Prevention Curriculum. Basic education teachers received drug prevention curriculum assistance for the first time in 2018, and expressed eagerness to benefit from additional capacity-building programs. The United States also
provides support through local organizations to deliver effective training in life skills and behavior change interventions as well as link drug users to various services, including detoxification, methadone maintenance, HIV testing and AIDS treatments. The United States also supports drug use prevention through community engagement activities, including a successful Facebook social media campaign.

The MOHS National Methadone Maintenance Therapy Program opened four new sites in 2018 and now has a total of 55 sites nationwide. Currently, there are 26 major and 47 minor drug treatment centers, and the Government of Burma plans to open an additional three major and nine minor centers. Significant challenges remain to reaching rural and remote communities. The U.S. government has donated health and recreational materials to the CCDAC rehabilitation center, and worked with local authorities in 2018 to launch Kachin State’s Drug Use Prevention Strategic Plan. A similar plan is in development for northern Shan State.

4. Corruption

The Government of Burma does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, corruption is widespread in Burma, and illicit proceeds from the drug trade fuel corruption.

The Anti-Corruption Commission has made important strides in building capacity to identify and investigate corruption, and has initiated important cases. However, it still lacks the resources to lead a systematic fight against corruption. Government officials participate regularly in conferences and trainings on corruption and related topics sponsored by international partners.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

CCDAC, in collaboration with UNODC, developed Burma’s first modern National Drug Control Policy in 2018, which presents a comprehensive approach to tackling the drug situation, involving government, non-government, and civil society stakeholders. In addition to law enforcement and criminal justice efforts, it includes health and social policy responses, outlining a path to promoting sustainable alternative development for opium poppy farmers, and promoting international cooperation. Major changes in this policy include increasing compliance with international standards of human rights.

In August 2017, Burma signed an amended Letter of Agreement with the United States that facilitates broadened engagement in law enforcement, drug control, and rule of law issues.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) continues to work closely with the DED on operations and the collaboration has expanded to regional level cooperation in forms of intelligence sharing and conducting joint investigations. However, the government’s ongoing objections to Leahy vetting for in-country police training has hindered U.S. efforts to conduct in-country capacity building trainings. DEA provided joint interdiction training for Burmese and Thai law enforcement officials in late 2018, and introduced specialized technical equipment to assist Burmese officials in interdicting and analyzing drug shipments. During the year, 38 law
enforcement officials attended 16 courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. Burmese law enforcement officials also participated in additional international training opportunities, including courses pertaining to illicit drugs; cyber-enabled crime; and crimes against children.

D. Conclusion

The scale of Burma’s drug problem – the consumption and trafficking of illicit opiates and ATS – is enormous. Domestic consumption is widespread and degrades many communities. Burma is a major source of illicit drugs throughout Southeast Asia, and illicit proceeds from the trade threaten political stability in many places. Burma requires legal and organizational reforms to facilitate effective criminal investigations and transparent criminal prosecutions, and the country needs to dedicate resources to building law enforcement capacity to investigate and effectively prosecute drug traffickers and interdict drugs and precursor chemicals in order to see improvements in the future. The United States remains a close partner with the Government of Burma on all elements of the country’s drug control policy and will continue to work with regional and international partners to help the country address its challenges.
Cabo Verde

Cabo Verde remains an important transit hub for cocaine, cannabis, and small amounts of other drugs trafficked from Latin America to Europe. The archipelago’s extensive maritime territory, minimal interdiction resources, and remote parts of its 10 islands make Cabo Verde vulnerable to trafficking via aerial and maritime conveyance. Tourist and business traffic continues to expand through the major international airports on the islands of Santiago and Sal and the secondary airports on the islands of Boa Vista and Sao Vicente, expanding opportunities for drug trafficking via human couriers. Expanding cargo and cruise ship traffic through the country’s major ports on Santiago, Sao Vicente, and Sal also increase opportunities for drug trafficking. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that cannabis, cocaine, hashish, heroin, and methamphetamine are the most commonly used illicit drugs in Cabo Verde. There are reports that synthetic drugs including MDMA (ecstasy) are available on the tourist destination islands of Sal and Boa Vista.

Corruption is relatively low in Cabo Verde. Support from the United States and other international donors is helping to improve the capacity of Cabo Verdiean law enforcement agencies to identify and interdict illicit drug shipments. U.S. support has also increased Cabo Verde’s ability to combat money laundering and other financial crimes often associated with drug trafficking. There are few drug demand reduction programs active in the country, and recidivism for drug crimes is a major problem.

In August 2017, police seized a reported 1,157 kilogram shipment of cocaine from a private yacht in Mindelo, headed from Brazil to Europe. The crew, three Brazilians and a French national, were found guilty and are serving a 10-year sentence.

The United States and other partners support Cabo Verde in combating drug trafficking and associated crime, providing robust and varied training to law enforcement and armed forces in Cabo Verde. The Center for Maritime Security Operations (COSMAR) in Praia and the Joint Operations Center in Mindelo provide oversight of Cabo Verde’s maritime territory. U.S. Africa Command partners with Cabo Verdiean authorities on periodic patrols in the region to interdict suspected drug shipments and other illicit activities, as well as providing training and building capacity within Cabo Verdiean security sector institutions.
Canada

A. Introduction

The Government of Canada continued to combat the production, distribution, and consumption of illicit drugs in 2018. Canada and the United States cooperate extensively in drug control efforts, including by sharing information and coordinating operations. Canada is a source of MDMA (ecstasy), cannabis, and fentanyl to the United States. Canada aggressively targets the trafficking of synthetic and conventional drugs, particularly fentanyl and fentanyl precursors.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Canada’s national drug control policy is codified by the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy (CDSS), which was announced in 2016 and includes four pillars – prevention, treatment, harm reduction and enforcement. The Strategy has a five-year budget (2017-2022) of $660 million. Provinces and territories have separate dedicated budgets to address problematic substance use.

In May 2017, Canada’s Parliament passed Bill C-37, amending the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The bill authorized temporary scheduling to control dangerous emerging drugs and streamlined the process for establishing supervised consumption sites. It also prohibits unregistered importation of devices that could be used to manufacture controlled substances, such as pill presses and encapsulators, and authorizes Canadian border officers to open mail weighing 30 grams or less that may contain controlled substances.

Effective October 17, 2018, the production, sale, and use of recreational cannabis (Cannabis Act) became legal throughout Canada. However, under this legislation, unauthorized cross-border movement of cannabis remains subject to criminal prosecution.

Canada continued to experience a growing number of opioids-related overdose deaths, with over 8,000 deaths since 2016, including 3,996 in 2017; there were more than 1,000 apparent opioid-related deaths during the first quarter of 2018.

Canada is party to the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is a member of the International Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) Task Forces, including Project ION (International Operation on New Psychoactive Substances).

2. Supply Reduction

Canada is a primary source of cannabis and MDMA to the United States, and a source of synthetic drugs and amphetamine-type stimulants to Asia and Australia. Synthetic opioids have also reached the United States from Canada. Cannabis cultivation and synthetic drug manufacture are concentrated in British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario. Methamphetamine also continues to be produced in Canada. South America remains Canada’s primary source for
cocaine, some of which transits the United States. Afghanistan remains Canada’s primary source of heroin.

Canadian officials report that the volume of fentanyl trafficked from China decreased in 2018, and the majority of fentanyl seizures were trafficked in powder form through the postal stream with minimal concealment. During the first six months of 2018, Canada seized 20 fentanyl shipments totaling 1.28 kilograms (kg) in powder form. In 2017, there were 113 seizures for a total of 11.95 kg seized in powder form.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Substance Use and Addictions Program is a federal program under the CDSS. It provides $28.3 million annually to Canada’s provinces, territories, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders, particularly for activities and research to combat the opioid crisis.

The Canadian government produces and implements various public education materials and campaigns to inform Canadians about the health and safety risks of using dangerous drugs and substances, including opioids, and cannabis. One of the government’s priorities is to reduce the negative stigma associated with seeking mental health services and treatment for substance use disorders. Health Canada plans to invest more than $350 million annually in community programming to help address the mental wellness needs of First Nations and Inuit populations.

Canada’s comprehensive approach to substance use involved various harm reduction initiatives, including: needle exchange programs; supervised consumption sites; overdose prevention sites; and legislation to protect individuals seeking emergency assistance for overdoses. Canada also supports medication-assisted therapies for the treatment of opioid dependence, and naloxone is widely available without a prescription, including in all First Nations primary health care centers.

According to the INCB, Canada is the second largest per capita consumer of prescription opioids in the world. In 2015, 13 percent of Canadians aged 15 years and older reported using an opioid pain reliever in the past year. Among them, 2 percent reported abusing opioids, a decrease from 2012 (5 percent).

The Government collects substance use prevalence data through the Canadian Tobacco Alcohol and Drugs Survey and the Canadian Student Tobacco, Alcohol and Drugs Survey. The most recent data showed the prevalence of cannabis use among Canadians aged 15 years and older was 16 percent in 2018, up from 2013 (11 percent). In 2016-17, 17 percent of students in grades 7 to 12 (approximately 340,000) reported using cannabis in the year preceding the survey, unchanged from 2014-15. Use of other illicit drugs such as MDMA (0.4 percent), hallucinogens (0.6 percent), cocaine (0.9 percent) and methamphetamine (0.2 percent) remained largely unchanged since 2004.

4. Corruption

Canada has strong anti-corruption laws and policies and holds its officials to a high standard of conduct. The Canadian government pursues malfeasant civil servants and subjects them to
prosecution. No government officials are known to engage in, encourage, or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. Corruption among law enforcement officials is rare.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Canada exchange forfeited assets through a bilateral asset-sharing agreement and share information on customs offenses through a customs mutual assistance agreement. Judicial assistance and extradition matters operate under a mutual legal assistance treaty, an extradition treaty, and related domestic legislation and law-enforcement protocols, including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and RCMP.

U.S. federal, state, local, and tribal entities collaborate with RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), provincial and local police, and other Canadian law enforcement authorities to combat drug trafficking. Cooperation is coordinated through the Cross Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee, Joint Management Teams, and other bilateral groups. Integrated teams of Canadian and U.S. law enforcement authorities operate along the Northern Border across a variety of structures, including Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST), Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET), and the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (aka "Shiprider").

Canada participates with the United States and Mexico in the North American Dialogue on Drug Policy (NADD). On November 9, 2018, Canada hosted the third annual high-level NADD in Ottawa. Canada also takes part in the North American Maritime Security Initiative, a joint operations and information sharing effort to target suspect vessels. Through a longstanding MOU, U.S. Coast Guard detachments are deployed on Canadian Navy ships in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean, which resulted in the seizure of over 3.64 metric tons of cocaine during the first six months of 2018.

D. Conclusion

The United States cooperates extensively with Canada on law enforcement matters and acknowledges the strong and consistent anti-drug efforts of Canada’s federal government. The United States will continue to work with Canada to stem the flow of illegal drugs across our shared border and enhance regulatory frameworks to prevent access to precursor chemicals and lab equipment for criminal use.
China

A. Introduction

China's geographical location, vast land area, massive population, and expanding economy have all contributed to the country becoming a hub for drug and precursor chemical production and trafficking. China also faces significant illicit drug consumption challenges, including synthetic drugs. China shares borders with drug source countries in both Southeast and Southwest Asia and remains a major destination and transit country for heroin produced in these areas. Its numerous coastal cities with high-volume seaports and its vast network of major international airports make China an ideal destination and transit country for illicit drugs. China is a major source of synthetic drugs, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs. Domestic Chinese criminal organizations traffic illicit drugs within China as well as to international markets, and Chinese authorities have noted the presence of international drug trafficking organizations originating from Mexico and Southeast Asia operating within the country.

China is a major source of NPS and other synthetic drugs, including fentanyl and methamphetamine, and domestic use of synthetic drugs (primarily methamphetamine and ketamine) is becoming increasingly prevalent. China's large chemical and pharmaceutical industries provide an ideal environment for the illicit production and export of these drugs. According to U.S. and international law enforcement sources, China remains a major source of NPS seized in North America and Europe, which are often purchased via the internet and shipped to overseas customers. Chemical alterations of scheduled drugs to circumvent existing anti-drug laws have hampered efforts to stem the flow of these drugs.

The current opioid crisis in the United States underlines the importance of bilateral U.S.-Chinese drug control cooperation. Based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection seizure data, China is the principal source country of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl-related compounds in the United States, including both scheduled and non-scheduled substances. The challenges posed by trafficking via the internet and small parcel trafficking patterns are formidable and will test the cooperative spirit and ingenuity of law enforcement authorities in both countries.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

China’s drug control strategy focuses on prevention, education, illicit crop eradication, interdiction, rehabilitation, commercial regulation, and law enforcement. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) is the primary national drug enforcement entity and works in conjunction with provincial public security bureau offices. The Anti-Smuggling Bureau within the General Administration of Customs is responsible for the enforcement of China’s drug control laws at seaports, airports, and land border checkpoints. China maintains bilateral drug control agreements with many countries and international organizations, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and participates in a variety of international drug conferences and bilateral meetings. There is no extradition treaty
between China and the United States. China and the United States signed a bilateral mutual legal assistance agreement in 2000, which entered into force in 2001. Despite the existence of a mutual legal assistance agreement, many outstanding requests by both the United States and China remained unfulfilled.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the NNCC’s 2017 Annual Drug Report (published June 2018), Chinese law enforcement investigated 140,000 drug-related cases, including 102,000 trafficking-related investigations and made 169,000 drug related arrests in 2017, a slight increase over the previous year. Chinese authorities also targeted clandestine labs used to produce NPS and other synthetic drugs, illicit drugs, and precursors, destroying 317 clandestine laboratories, arresting 1,345 suspects, and seizing 2,384 metric tons (MT) of precursor chemicals in 2017, an increase of 50 percent over the previous year. In 2017, Chinese authorities seized a total of 89.2 MT of illicit drugs, including 9.5 MT of heroin (an increase of 8 percent), 28.2 MT of methamphetamine (a decrease of 3 percent), and 7.3 MT of ketamine (a decrease of 30 percent).

In February 2018, China added two fentanyl precursors, NPP and 4-ANPP, to the controlled substances schedule. In August, China scheduled an additional 32 NPS, including two fentanyl analogues, bringing the total number of controlled NPS and related precursors to 175 and the total number of controlled fentanyl analogues to 25. During the reporting period, the NNCC initiated “equipment control” measures requiring the registration of nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry equipment that could be used in synthetic drug production.

The NNCC identified the emergence of new types of NPS as a particular challenge. According to China’s National Narcotics Laboratory, 230 types of NPS, including 34 previously unidentified substances, were found in China during 2018. At the November 2018 Group of 20 summit, China announced plans to control all fentanyl-related substances as a class to get ahead of traffickers who switch to non-scheduled NPS as individual substances are scheduled. No timeline for implementation had been announced by the end of 2018.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to NNCC, synthetic drugs – primarily methamphetamine and ketamine – have surpassed heroin and other opioids as China’s primary domestic drug threat. In public statements, the NNCC identified the increase in NPS abuses cases as an emerging trend, and, in addition to ketamine, identified methcathinone and the synthetic cannabinoid JWH-018 as commonly abused NPS. According to the NNCC’s 2017 Annual Drug Report, the total number of registered illegal drug users in China is 2.553 million, but the actual number of drug abusers is estimated to be at least 14 million, according to media reports. Of the reported registered drug users, 1.538 million (60.2 percent) reportedly used synthetic drugs, while 970,000 (38 percent) reportedly used opioids (e.g., heroin) and 46,000 (1.8 percent) reportedly used cocaine, cannabis, and other drugs. According to NNCC, 18 to 35 year olds were the largest demographic among registered drug users (55.6 percent). In 2018, 344,000 new registered drug users were identified, with synthetic drug abusers accounting for 77.1 percent of new registered drug users.
In 2016, NNCC formulated and distributed its “Work Plan on Community-based Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation, 2016-2020” to further the development of a community-based drug treatment and recovery system. The Plan supports NNCC efforts to combine methadone maintenance treatment and community-based drug treatment and recovery. In addition to 770 clinics offering methadone maintenance treatment, China has in place 3,258 job placement sites and 29,000 township level offices responsible for community-based drug treatment and recovery work, employing 31,000 full-time community workers. According to the NNCC annual report, China placed 321,000 drug users into compulsory rehabilitation, and ordered another 260,000 people for treatment at community rehabilitation centers. NNCC has an outreach program to raise awareness of the negative health effects of illicit drug use and promote drug demand reduction.

4. Corruption

The Ministry of Public Security takes allegations of drug-related corruption seriously, and launches investigations when deemed appropriate. Despite efforts to stem drug-related corruption, financial corruption among provincial, prefectural, county, and district government officials continues to be a concern. The Government of China does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Based on publicly available information, no senior Chinese official at the central government level is known to have facilitated the illicit production or distribution of drugs in 2017. Similarly, no senior Chinese official from the central government is known to have laundered proceeds from drug-related activities.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S.-China Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group, the Counter Narcotics Working Group, and a group of chemists and experts meet annually to exchange information on drug trends; discuss laws, regulations, and policies; seek progress and address challenges in precursor chemical control; and improve cooperation on investigations of mutual interest. The August scheduling of 32 NPS was a result of these working-level exchanges. During the reporting period, Chinese and U.S. law enforcement agencies cooperated in several drug-related investigations and officials from both countries met frequently outside of the formal dialogue mechanisms to discuss practical cooperation.

D. Conclusion

Drug control cooperation between the United States and China continues to improve through law enforcement operational cooperation and various working groups and consultative mechanisms. While drug trafficking, manufacturing, diversion, and other drug-related crimes remain significant problems in China, the central government continues to take steps to integrate China into regional and global drug control efforts, as well as to address the country’s domestic drug problem through enforcement and rehabilitation. U.S. law enforcement has made inroads in building working relationships with provincial public security bureaus, with oversight by central authorities, and relations continue to strengthen.
In order to confront the emerging trend of NPS and stem the future flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids to the United States, China should implement and strictly enforce as soon as possible the announced class-based scheduling of fentanyl related substances. China also should strengthen enforcement of chemical control laws to prevent the diversion of drug precursors to illicit drug manufacture.
Colombia

A. Introduction

Colombia is the world’s top producer and exporter of cocaine, as well as a source country of heroin and marijuana. Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine production exceeded all-time record levels during 2017 (the most recent year for which data is available). The United States estimates potential pure cocaine production increased by 19 percent, from 772 metric tons (MT) in 2016 to 921 MT in 2017. The United States further estimates coca cultivation increased 11 percent from 188,000 hectares (ha) in 2016 to 209,000 ha in 2017. On March 1, 2018, the U.S. and Colombian governments agreed to an ambitious Five-Year Goal to reduce Colombia’s coca cultivation and cocaine production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. Since taking office on August 7, 2018, Colombian President Ivan Duque has endorsed this goal and instituted an aggressive plan for police and military to increase coca eradication, interdiction, and operations targeting criminal organizations to achieve the Five-Year Goal. In December 2018, the Duque administration released its whole-of-government drug control strategy, which aims to reduce drug consumption, decrease supply, dismantle criminal organizations, disrupt illicit financial flows, and increase state presence and economic opportunity in poor rural areas where criminal organizations and coca cultivation thrive.

In 2018, the Colombian government took initial steps to increase efforts to reduce cocaine availability. Colombia reported seizing or assisting with the seizure of over 450 MT of pure cocaine and cocaine base. Coca eradication efforts increased, particularly since President Duque took office. The Colombian government reported eradicating approximately 85,000 ha of coca during the calendar year through forced eradication and the crop substitution program, which resulted from the peace accord between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). By increasing eradication results, the Colombian government eliminated tons of potential cocaine from the drug supply chain.

According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), over 90 percent of the cocaine samples seized en route to and in the United States by U.S. law enforcement in 2017, and subjected to laboratory analysis, were of Colombian origin.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord with the FARC ended a 52-year conflict, established new institutions to pursue justice for past crimes, and set in motion a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process for FARC ex-combatants. Colombia continues to struggle with persistent security, governance, and economic challenges in neglected rural regions vacated by the FARC. The Colombian government recognizes the illicit drug trade and the organized criminal groups it empowers are the greatest threats to peace and security in Colombia.

The Colombian government suspended aerial eradication of coca in October 2015, but President Duque has publicly stated his intent to restart the use of aerial spray as a component of an
integrated drug control strategy that includes both manual and aerial eradication combined with interdiction, alternative development, and counter-criminal network operations.

2. Supply Reduction

The United States estimates coca cultivation in Colombia increased 11 percent from 188,000 ha in 2016 to 209,000 ha in 2017. In 2017, the Nariño department remained the leading coca-producing region in Colombia, with an estimated 46,000 ha, up from 39,500 ha in 2016. Other top coca-producing departments also saw increases from 2016 to 2017: Norte de Santander (from 36,000 ha to 42,800 ha); Cauca (from 32,000 ha to 39,000 ha); and Putumayo (from 19,500 ha to 21,000 ha).

Several factors contributed to the surge in coca cultivation in Colombia since 2013, including: the end of aerial spray of glyphosate on coca; a crop substitution program that created perverse incentives for coca growers to grow more coca; and the failure of the FARC to comply with the illicit drug provisions of the peace agreement. Drug traffickers employ effective counter-eradication tactics such as protests and the use of improvised explosive devices in coca fields to kill, injure, and demoralize eradicators and to slow eradication operations.

The Colombian government continued to make drug interdiction one of its drug control priorities, alongside investigating, prosecuting, and dismantling criminal groups and extraditing top drug traffickers to the United States. Reducing the availability of illicit drugs requires a stable post-peace accord environment, the extension of citizen security and the rule of law throughout Colombia, economic development in rural areas, and the countering of illegal armed groups that have plagued Colombia for decades. Colombian authorities, and third countries using Colombian intelligence, reported seizing over 450 MT of pure cocaine and cocaine base in 2018, as well as approximately 250 MT of marijuana, over 320 kilograms of heroin, and destroyed 3,855 cocaine base laboratories and 319 cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) laboratories.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

According to the most recent National Household Survey of Drug Consumption, from 2014, drug use in Colombia rose between 2008 and 2013, making Colombia the country with the fourth highest consumption of cocaine and marijuana in South America. Previously, it had one of the lowest consumption rates in the region. As of 2013, there were over three million consumers of all categories of illicit drugs in Colombia, of which around two million were in major cities including Bogota, Medellin, and Cali.

There are indications that drug use continues to increase among Colombian youth, with marijuana the substance of choice. Use of inhalants and a cocaine by-product called “basuco” is high among those displaced by years of internal conflict in Colombia. The Colombian National Police (CNP) has a prevention unit of 2,000 instructors who teach drug prevention to vulnerable schoolchildren nationwide.

On October 1, 2018, two months after assuming office, President Duque signed a decree instructing the CNP to confiscate any drugs held by individuals in public spaces and issue a fine.
Legislation and judicial rulings previously allowed citizens to carry small amounts of marijuana and cocaine for personal use.

Colombia focuses treatment on youth substance abusers. Acknowledging that severe criminal sanctions disproportionately affect the most vulnerable in the drug-trafficking chain and contribute to prison overcrowding, the Colombian government created a juvenile drug court in Medellin and is planning juvenile drug courts in five other departments. The Colombian government is working to expand restorative justice programs and programs that teach life, leadership, and cultural skills to youth treatment and detention centers. The Colombian government will begin training professionals in the U.S.-developed Universal Treatment Curriculum and Universal Prevention Curriculum in 2019. These curricula will provide evidence-based methods for improving treatment and prevention within Colombia.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Colombian government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor the laundering of proceeds of illicit drugs. Nevertheless, corruption remains a significant problem.

There were a series of high-profile corruption cases in 2018, including in Colombia’s justice sector where at least three Supreme Court justices are under investigation for, or charged with, corruption related to their positions. The Colombian Supreme Court recently convicted the chief anticorruption prosecutor for corruption. The prosecution of such high-profile, powerful individuals can be seen as a reflection of strengthened justice institutions, which have the capacity, political will, and autonomy to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate corruption.

Notwithstanding these notable corruption cases, the Colombian government has made significant strides in implementing its 2013 anticorruption strategy to improve transparency of, and public confidence in, government institutions. The 2014 transparency and access to public information law was implemented in 2016, requiring all government entities to release information pertaining to salaries, management evaluations, the hiring processes, and the public budget.

The government held an August 2018 referendum on anticorruption measures that would have strengthened accountability and transparency measures such as public bidding for contracts and imposed harsher penalties for those convicted of corruption. While the referendum failed to meet the participation threshold, among the 11.5 million Colombian citizens who voted, 99 percent voted in favor of the anticorruption measures.

Colombia benefits from an independent attorney general (Fiscal) and inspector general (Procurador), both of whom publicly identify anticorruption efforts as a priority for their institutions. Between August 1, 2016 and October 30, 2018, the Attorney General’s office opened 2,332 corruption investigations, 788 of which were against current government employees. Two-hundred and three of those were against judicial branch employees, including 106 investigations of current employees of the Attorney General’s office. Another 550 were against former government employees and 994 were against private citizens.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

On December 13, 2018, the Duque administration released its counternarcotics strategy, which sets clear goals and mandates a whole-of-government approach in key drug supply regions of the country. The strategy outlines four pillars that aim to reduce growing domestic consumption, decrease the supply of drugs, dismantle criminal organizations, and disrupt illicit financial flows. It also focuses on increasing state presence and economic opportunity in poor rural areas where criminal organizations and coca cultivation thrive. The strategy is an important step toward achieving the U.S.-Colombia bilateral goal to cut coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia by 50 percent by the end of 2023.

The United States provides counter-drug assistance to the CNP, the Colombian military, and judicial institutions, including the offices of the attorney general and inspector general, the judiciary, and the corrections system, which investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers and other criminals. The United States supports integrated programs designed to expand Colombia’s rural policing capabilities, while enabling the transition of rural communities out of coca-based economies by expanding the presence of the state in post-conflict regions, strengthening licit market linkages (for example promoting alternative crops such as coffee, cacao, palm, fruits, and vegetables), and promoting the rule of law and protection of human rights. A notable example of this whole-of-government approach is the “Antioquia Libre de Coca (Free of Coca)” initiative, which brings together national and local governments, police and military forces, and the private sector to achieve sustainable drug control and development objectives. Antioquia was the only major coca-growing department to see a decrease in hectares under cultivation in 2017, according to U.S. government estimates.

Through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation, Colombia’s police and military export law enforcement capabilities and build regional connections by training Central America and Caribbean counterparts to counter transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. The Action Plan expanded to include 415 activities in nine countries during 2017. Bilateral maritime counterdrug cooperation, exercised under the Agreement to Suppress Illicit Traffic at Sea that was signed in 1997, continues to be one of the most effective in the region, enabling the seizure of over 146 MT of cocaine in 2016.

D. Conclusion

The illicit drug situation in Colombia remains a top concern of the U.S. government. The CNP and military forces have begun to increase efforts to stem coca cultivation and cocaine production. Colombia can achieve the Five-Year Goal to cut coca cultivation and cocaine production by 50 percent by the end of 2023 through aggressive implementation of and resourcing for its new whole-of-government drug control strategy, which seeks to increase eradication, interdiction, and counter-network operations, as well as to achieve sustainability of short-term efforts through rural development. Extradition remains a crucial tool against individuals involved in drug trafficking, and demonstrates the cooperative effort of Colombia and the United States. The U.S. government stands by the Colombian government in its efforts to achieve our shared objectives to combat illicit drug cultivation and trafficking. The U.S. government will continue to closely monitor the development and implementation of Colombia’s
drug control strategy to ensure progress is made to reduce the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
Costa Rica

A. Introduction

Costa Rica’s strategic location, vast maritime territory, and the small size of its security forces combine to make it an attractive transit and logistics hub for illicit drug trafficking. In 2018, Costa Rica remained one of the primary countries in the region for transshipment of cocaine to the United States. During the first nine months of 2018, Costa Rican authorities seized a total of 22.3 metric tons (MT) of cocaine.

Though low for the region, the murder rate in Costa Rica surpassed 600 homicides in 2018, setting a new record for the third year in a row. Continued turf war-related shootings and cartel-style assassinations have exacerbated heightened public concern and intensified the Costa Rican government’s sharp focus on the fight against illicit drug trafficking.

The government continued to increase its security spending in 2018, despite a severe fiscal crisis, allowing the hiring of more police officials across all services. Institutional changes are also leading to additional police professionalization, major advances in investigations and prosecutions, and improved success in drug interdiction and disruption of drug trafficking organizations, as well as prevention programs.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Costa Rican government enacted encouraging institutional changes to combat the heightened threats from illicit drugs. The Ministry of Public Security’s (MPS) budget increased by five percent in 2018, on top of an 11 percent increase in 2017. This was further boosted by a reinstated security tax on companies (in 2017) which now provides a new annual stream of extra-budgetary resources earmarked for security equipment and additional personnel. As a result, the national police added 1,500 new officers between 2017 and 2018; the Coast Guard (SNG) grew by a third, the Border Police added officials; and the Air Surveillance Service (SVA) doubled its cadre of pilots and mechanics. This represents continued growth in the capacity of the Costa Rican entities responsible for the majority drug seizures.

The government continued important police professionalization efforts in 2018, including outfitting a new police academy, upgrades in the tactical training site, and additional cooperation between national law enforcement agencies and those of local governments.

The reinstated security tax will also allow investment in new capabilities. Through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the government purchased a plane for $7.5 million that will be converted into the country’s first maritime patrol aircraft, which will be in service by late 2019. Costa Rica also used its own funds to initiate a $9 million purchase of four highly capable interceptor/patrol boats for its Coast Guard, which will be delivered in 2019-2020.
The SNG remained a highly effective regional partner for maritime interdiction, including a growing desire to develop joint operations with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The arrival of three U.S.-donated 110-foot USCG cutters in April 2018 transformed the SNG. The cutters have been used to great effect, and without pause, to establish Costa Rica’s first blue-water patrol in the busiest cocaine transit zone – at a fraction of the cost of using U.S. assets.

Following on its success as the first lab in the region to receive international accreditation in key disciplines, the Costa Rican National Forensics lab was reaccredited in October 2018 for chemical analysis, toxicology, and biochemistry (including DNA testing), and successfully added ballistics. This is the first lab in Central America to attain this top-level rating and only the third in the Latin American region (joining labs in Chile and Mexico). The accreditation of the lab enhances the credibility of forensic evidence in the investigation and prosecution of cases, including cases of drug trafficking and crime and violence with linkages to drug trafficking.

The six-year-old Border Police improved control of Costa Rica’s porous land border with Panama, including much expanded use of biometrics and improved cooperation with Panama. The Air Surveillance Service (SVA) pushed to better control its airspace using radar technology supported by the United States. In December, a multi-year project was initiated to donate and nationalize four twin-engine transport helicopters, providing Costa Rica with the ability, for the first time, to insert law enforcement teams where needed to counter the use of illicit airfields. The helicopters will also support maritime interdiction missions. SVA’s support for the Coast Guard will further expand upon the arrival of the maritime patrol aircraft (in late 2019), and with improved capability for night-operations. After a favorable constitutional court ruling in 2017, the government continued to expanded use of the Judicial Wire Intercept Program (JWIP) in 2018, and now boasts the largest JWIP capacity in Central America.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first nine months of 2018, Costa Rica seized 22.3 MT of cocaine, already exceeding the amount seized during all of 2017. In addition, the Costa Rican government, working closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and regional partners, reportedly disrupted more than 20 international drug trafficking rings in Costa Rica during the first 10 months of the year.

Costa Rica is a regional leader in eradicating and seizing marijuana. During the first nine months of 2018, Costa Rican authorities destroyed 1.25 million plants and seized an additional 4.3 MT of loose marijuana. Local marijuana is grown primarily for domestic use. To combat a growing cocaine-for-marijuana/arms trade between Jamaica and Costa Rica, the SNG will deploy more advanced maritime patrol boats in 2019 in the Caribbean.

The government expanded cooperation on maritime interdiction and information exchange with Panama and Colombia in 2018, and initiated contacts with Jamaica.

Seizure totals of illicit drugs other than cocaine and marijuana, including synthetic drugs, remained minimal in 2018. For example, no heroin was seized in Costa Rica during the first nine months of the year, compared to only seven kilograms during the same period in
2017. Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ) and the Costa Rican Drug Institute monitor for signs of synthetic drugs in Costa Rica, which remain rare. However, capacity building in this area increased in 2018, particularly related to identification of precursor chemicals, as well as understanding the criminal networks and patterns involved in its trafficking.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The production, trafficking, and sale of illicit drugs remain serious criminal offenses in Costa Rica, even if laws against personal consumption are rarely enforced. The Costa Rican Drug Institute is the government agency that oversees drug prevention programs, including publicity campaigns and materials for schools. The Institute on Alcohol and Drug Abuse also offers treatment and prevention programs, though considerable gaps remain. With the uptick in violence, the MPS is increasingly focused on prevention programs. The National Police implement the Drug Abuse Resistance and Education (DARE) program and the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program. GREAT began in August 2013, and has grown from 800 graduates in 2014 to over 15,000 in 2018.

4. Corruption

The Costa Rican government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. The growing presence of transnational criminal organizations and the harm they inflict on Costa Rican society, including corruption, is a chief concern. The government generally implements a 2006 law that penalizes official corruption; however, there are frequent reports of low- and mid-level corruption, and periodic cases of high-level corruption. The Costa Rican government has estimated it loses about seven percent of its GDP annually to corruption.

The judicial branch is in the midst of a two-year effort to strengthen ethics controls within the judiciary. The United States is actively supporting this and related efforts to stem corruption.

A corruption and influence peddling scandal that broke in July 2017 has triggered investigations and suspensions of officials, and continues to cause political ripples. The Judiciary has been most severely hit, with the head of the Supreme Court opting for early retirement, and a second justice removed from the court. Three separate legal proceedings are being pursued by the Attorney General, the banking sector supervisor, and the National Assembly.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Costa Rica shares the U.S. priorities of disrupting the flow of illicit drugs and dismantling organized crime. The United States supports Costa Rican efforts to investigate and prosecute crimes more effectively, to make its borders more secure, and to increase the safety of its citizens, consistent with the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).

The United States supports police professionalization through a range of training, police academy reform, and expanded tactical training capacity. In 2018, the Costa Rican government adopted a U.S.-supported community security program as its national crime reduction plan. In
In the justice sector, the United States supports training programs for investigators, prosecutors, and judges on a broad range of topics, including trafficking in persons, money laundering, and counternarcotics. The United States supports a highly successful restorative juvenile justice program, the second phase of which was launched in early 2018.

The United States continues to support Costa Rican efforts to further strengthen the SNG and SVA’s interdiction capabilities, providing boats with greater reach, a ground-based radar, equipment, training, and professional exchanges. These increasingly professional and strategic forces are willing partners with great potential. In early 2018, the first Costa Rican liaison reported to the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South, marking an important milestone for multilateral cooperation on maritime drug interdiction.

A U.S.-supported Maritime Interdiction Vetted Unit (MIVU) comprised of representatives from a specialized law enforcement unit and the SNG was organizationally revamped in 2016, retooled with improved equipment in 2017, and expanded to two units in 2018.

D. Conclusion

Costa Rica took another step forward in 2018 in its efforts to strengthen its ability to combat drug trafficking and tackle the rising presence of transnational criminal organizations. In addition to key investments in human capital and equipment, the government’s enactment of a security tax will provide an annual font of resources dedicated to security. That said, Costa Rica must maintain its planned security sector growth over the mid-term if it hopes to keep up with the rapid increase in drug flows now permeating its territory, and the associated criminality.

Top priorities for increasing effectiveness and efficiency should continue to include: 1) professionalizing police and judicial institutions, with an emphasis on anti-corruption; 2) augmenting the use of advanced investigative techniques aimed at organized crime; 3) further investment in border security, to include Border and Customs Police, and the continued build-up of the Coast Guard and Air Surveillance Service capabilities to control the country’s sovereign territory; 4) passing laws that specifically target organized crime and its proceeds; and 5) continuing to strengthen Costa Rica’s cooperation with regional partners. Its successful engagement with Panama and Colombia, for example, already yields results.
Cuba

Cuba is not a major consumer, producer, or transit point of illicit drugs. Cuba’s domestic production and consumption remain low due to active policing, strict sentencing, and nationwide prevention and public information programs. Cuba’s intensive security presence and interdiction efforts have kept supply down and prevented traffickers from establishing a foothold. Cuba concentrates supply reduction efforts on preventing smuggling through territorial waters, rapidly collecting abandoned drugs found washed up on coastal shores, and conducting thorough airport searches. Cuba dedicates significant resources to prevent illicit drugs and their use from spreading, and regional traffickers typically avoid Cuba.

While most maritime seizures are found washed up on the shores of Cuba’s southeastern coast, Cuban authorities have reported an increase in drugs found washed up on shores in the western provinces of Pinar del Rio and Isla Juventud. The United States and Cuba continue to hold expanded bilateral discussions on law enforcement and drug control cooperation.

With respect to international cooperation, the Cuban government reports 40 bilateral agreements for counterdrug cooperation, including the U.S.-Cuba Operational Cooperation Arrangement to Counter Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (signed in July 2016). The U.S. Embassy maintains a U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) liaison to coordinate with Cuban law enforcement, particularly the Cuban Border Guards. USCG and Cuban authorities share tactical information related to boats transiting Cuban territorial waters suspected of trafficking and coordinate responses between operational command centers. In addition, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) established direct communications with Cuba’s National Anti-drug Directorate in July 2016. Since then, DEA has received approximately 20 requests for information related to drug investigations, as well as cooperation leading to Cuba’s successful arrest of a fugitive wanted in the United States.

Cuba has demonstrated a willingness to turn over some U.S. fugitives of high interest. Cuba and the United States continue to share communication between the national central authorities of both countries, which has greatly enhanced bilateral cooperation within the context of the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue. Cuba has provided evidence and information to assist U.S. state and federal prosecutions. In another first in law enforcement cooperation, on July 7, 2018, the USCG turned over drug samples and a case package on two Jamaican nationals detained by Cuban Border Guard after the USCG collected their jettisoned drugs. Cuba continues to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate on law enforcement matters.
Dominican Republic

A. Introduction

The Dominican Republic is the top transshipment hub for cocaine passing through the Caribbean, and the U.S. government estimates approximately 90 percent of the cocaine bound for North America and Europe through the Caribbean transits through the Dominican Republic. Maritime routes, involving the use of “go-fast” boats and commercial containers, continue to be the primary method of smuggling drugs into and out of the country. The country is experiencing an increase in drug-related violence, especially as local groups engage in violent turf battles to control domestic drug distribution.

To combat the influence of drug traffickers, the Dominican Republic continued its cooperation with the U.S. government in 2018 to interdict illicit drug shipments and extradite criminals. The United States works actively with the Dominican Republic to plan and conduct international operations to seize illicit drugs and dismantle criminal organizations; however, corruption continues to hamper these efforts. The Dominican government conducts outreach efforts to warn youth about the dangers of drugs.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Cooperation remains strong between the Dominican and U.S. governments to combat drug trafficking and related transnational crime. The U.S. government’s primary partners are the National Directorate for the Control of Drugs (DNCD); the Dominican National Police (DNP); the National Council on Drugs (CND); the Office of the Attorney General; the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI); and the Dominican Armed Forces. The Dominican Specialized Corps for Port Security, working in conjunction with U.S. authorities and private port operators, continued efforts to improve security at key ports. The participation of the Dominican government in the Cooperative Situational Information Integration system, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Central America Integration System enhanced relations with the United States and regional Caribbean partners. Dominican authorities continued joint efforts with the Haitian National Police to exchange information by establishing liaison officers in their respective headquarters.

The Dominican Republic is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. In 1985, the United States and the Dominican Republic signed an agreement on international narcotics control cooperation. The Dominican Republic signed and ratified the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement and has a maritime counterdrug agreement with the United States that entered into force in 1995. The United States and the Dominican Republic signed an extradition treaty in 2015 that entered into force in December 2016, replacing the 1909 treaty, and provides for extradition on a much broader scope of crimes. In 2012, the United States and the Dominican Republic entered into a Permanent Forfeited Asset-Sharing Agreement. Through 2018, approximately $4 million in assets have been shared under this agreement.
The Dominican Republic continues to be one of the most active extradition partners in the world for the United States. Although there is no formal bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the Dominican Republic and the United States, requests for legal assistance are made through informal channels and formal means pursuant to multilateral law enforcement cooperation treaties and conventions to which the United States and the Dominican Republic are parties. The Dominican Republic processes U.S. requests for legal and judicial assistance in a timely manner.

2. Supply Reduction

Illicit drugs are seized throughout the country, but the majority of seizures are made through operations targeting vessels from South America. During the first eight months of 2018, 3.3 metric tons (MT) of cocaine were seized directly by Dominican forces within the territory of the Dominican Republic. During the same period, the Dominican government contributed to the seizure of 2.14 MT of cocaine entering and exiting the Dominican Republic by U.S. authorities and other international partners.

Illicit drugs remain available for local consumption and are transshipped to the United States and Europe, primarily through maritime routes. The DNCD and Dominican military continue to cooperate with the United States and international partners in planning and conducting operations to interdict go-fast vessels attempting to deliver illicit narcotics to the southern coast, as well as to interdict drugs exiting the Dominican Republic. One Dominican port, Caucedo, is certified under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a U.S. initiative to help increase security for maritime containerized cargo shipped to the United States. However, the other 15 Dominican ports, including Rio Haina, the other major Dominican port handling container traffic destined for the United States, are not CSI certified. The DNCD is increasing efforts to combat contraband at the ports.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Local drug use is concentrated in tourist centers and major metropolitan areas, although drug use and associated violence occurs throughout the country. The CND conducted demand reduction efforts in 2018 to warn Dominican youth of the negative effects of illicit drug use under the Strategic National University Plan on the Prevention and Use of Drugs. The DNP promoted community-based policing as an effective way to deal with crime locally. With the publication of its Community Policing manual, the DNP began outreach at the command level to implement community policing concepts more fully in the capital and other major population centers around the country.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Dominican government does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption remains endemic. The Government of the Dominican Republic has taken some steps to address corruption among military and law enforcement forces, but corruption remains a significant impediment to law enforcement efforts in the country and prosecution of
corrupt high-level officials is not the norm. The judiciary is politicized and riddled with corruption, and the legal system offers little recourse to those who lack money or influence.

A popular movement called the Green Movement that developed in response to the increased perception of corruption in the government, continued to protest impunity and pressure for greater transparency in 2018. The perceived inaction against those that received $92 million in bribes from Brazilian company Odebrecht spurred the continuation of popular unrest against the government. The Attorney General initially brought charges against 14 individuals, but eventually only presented charges against seven, including a previously sitting minister. The judicial case began in late 2018 and will be heard before the Supreme Court. While several judges were suspended in 2018 due to alleged links to narcotic traffickers and other officials in the executive and judiciary have been suspended from their functions due to anti-corruption investigations, there have been no convictions in these cases to date.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice through CBSI. With CBSI funds, the United States government implements programs designed to enhance existing Dominican law enforcement capabilities by improving technical and professional abilities to conduct investigations, to enable effective prosecution, and to coordinate and participate in drug control efforts with the United States and neighboring countries’ law enforcement agencies. The U.S. law enforcement community has strong relationships with its Dominican colleagues, as evidenced by the high number of extraditions and deportations of fugitives to the United States.

The United States provided equipment and training in 2018 to increase the capabilities of Dominican law enforcement entities, including support for the DNCD drug-detection canine units, and other specialized DNCD investigative and reactive units. The United States enhanced DNCD’s computer training, database expansion, and systems maintenance support. Dominican authorities work with neighboring countries to expand the use of a U.S.-supported canine facility as a regional training center. The United States continues efforts to strengthen maritime capabilities through training in maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, port security, crisis management, and professional development for the Dominican Navy’s officer and enlisted corps.

The United States provides tactical training, equipment, and other assistance to both the DNCD and Dominican military involved in illicit trafficking interdiction. The United States assists the DNP with its transformation into a professional, civilian-oriented organization by providing training at the entry and officer levels as well as technical assistance to strengthen strategic planning and communication, operations management and human resource systems. The Dominican legislature ratified a Police Organic Law in 2016 that has the potential to bring about significant institutional improvements to the DNP if fully implemented. The Dominican Republic continues to work towards passing legislative proposals related to illicit enrichment and anti-corruption by public officials. Efforts to strengthen the infrastructure of the Financial Analysis Unit remain ongoing.
The United States supports the Dominican Republic's efforts to establish a transparent and effective justice sector. U.S. assistance promotes justice sector reforms by strengthening Dominican government capacity to manage and prosecute complex money laundering, fraud, public corruption, and illicit trafficking cases, as well as to establish internal controls to prevent corruption. The United States works with the Offices of the Attorney General, Prosecutorial Training School, Judiciary, Public Ministry, Public Defense, Supreme Court of Justice, and Constitutional Tribunal. These CBSI programs strengthen justice sector career, integrity, and accountability systems, and contribute to building the capacity of the national police and prosecutors to develop stronger cases and coordinate efforts leading to more successful prosecutions. As part of CBSI, U.S. assistance strengthens Dominican civil society coalitions for citizen security and criminal justice reform, supports community justice houses that increase access to justice for vulnerable populations, and provides technical assistance for the implementation of the new organic law on police reform. CBSI funds crime prevention programs that help at-risk youth pursue education, vocational training, and employment. These programs support broader drug control efforts by enhancing life skills, facilitating positive interaction with police and improving communities’ trust in and willingness to work with police, thereby making communities more resilient to crime including crime with a nexus to drug trafficking, distribution, and drug use.

The Dominican Republic regularly participates in two recurring events to promote cooperation against maritime trafficking; the Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit and the Multilateral Maritime Interdiction and Prosecution Summit. These two events bring together counterdrug professionals from over 30 countries and over 80 international organizations spanning North, Central, and South America, and Europe.

D. Conclusion

Combating pervasive corruption, restoring public confidence in law enforcement, addressing illicit maritime drug smuggling, and confronting rising levels of drug-fueled violence are major challenges facing the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic’s aerial and maritime interdiction efforts demonstrate institutional capacity and political will to help stem the flow of drugs into the country. The Dominican government must continue to improve its efforts to build a coherent, multifaceted drug control program. Key to this effort will be increased domestic cooperation between the DNP, DNCD, and military units, combined with greater cooperation with law enforcement agencies in other countries in the region.
Dutch Caribbean

A. Introduction

The Dutch Caribbean consists of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba. Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten are autonomous countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba are special municipalities of the country of the Netherlands.

Aruba and Curaçao are located 30 to 40 miles north of Venezuela and continue to serve as northbound transshipment points for cocaine originating from Colombia and transiting Venezuela. Cocaine is primarily transported via fishing boats and inter-coastal freighters for transshipment to the United States, other Caribbean islands, Africa, and Europe. Sint Maarten is located in the Eastern Caribbean and is a transshipment hub for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana ultimately destined for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as well as Europe.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten have a high degree of autonomy over their internal affairs, with the right to exercise independent decision-making in a number of drug control areas. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is responsible for the islands’ defense and foreign affairs, and assists the governments in their efforts to combat drug trafficking through its support for the RST (Dutch acronym for “Special Police Task Force”).

In 2016, the United States, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Aruba, Sint Maarten, and Curaçao signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to enhance existing cooperation and strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice systems in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. No new counterdrug programs were initiated in 2018.

Aruba

Aruba’s police force, the Korps Politie Aruba (KPA), continues to evolve into a regional leader in the fight against narcotics trafficking and international criminal organizations. The KPA is at the forefront in collecting and sharing intelligence with regional law enforcement partners. Despite insufficient resources, the KPA continues to investigate trafficking organizations effectively. The Organized Crime Unit of the KPA conducted several successful investigations during fiscal year 2018, which led to the seizure of over 380 kilograms (kg) of cocaine; 75 kg of marijuana; one kg of heroin; $2,100,000 in illicit drug proceeds; and the arrest of multiple subjects.

Curaçao

Curaçao’s police force, the Korps Politie Curaçao (KPC), works closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to diminish the flow of illegal drugs transiting from
Venezuela and Colombia to the Dutch Caribbean. In June 2018, the KPC seized approximately 102 kg of cocaine, eight kg of heroin, and 11 firearms in a single incident. During the first 10 months of 2018, the KPC seized approximately 1.6 metric tons (MT) of cocaine and eight kg of heroin. KPC continues to investigate trafficking organizations effectively, but institutional weaknesses remain.

**St. Maarten**

St. Maarten/St. Martin is a transshipment point for cocaine in the Caribbean to the United States, partially due to its proximity to the U.S. Virgin Islands (approximately 100 nautical miles away) and Puerto Rico (approximately 200 nautical miles away), as well as to Europe. This small two-nation island is a challenging place for law enforcement to combat drug trafficking due to its separate legal jurisdictions between the Kingdom of the Netherlands (St. Maarten) and France (St. Martin). In 2015, authorities in St. Maarten lifted the visa requirement for Colombian and Venezuelan nationals to travel to St. Maarten. Colombian and Venezuelan drug trafficking organizations operating in St. Maarten/St. Martin mostly utilize Dominican nationals to transport large cocaine shipments, via “go-fast” vessel to the United States. Many of the go-fast vessels are stored at unlicensed marinas located on the French side of St. Martin.

According to DEA, multi-ton quantities of cocaine are smuggled into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands via go-fast vessels from St. Maarten/St. Martin on a monthly basis. In 2018, U.S. authorities worked effectively with Dutch, French, and Dutch Caribbean authorities to target maritime vessels trafficking large quantities of cocaine from St. Maarten/St. Martin to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. These operations resulted in the seizure of approximately 1.67 MT of cocaine and $143,000 in drug proceeds.

**Bonaire, St. Eustatius, Saba**

The National Office for the Caribbean in the Netherlands Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations assumes the responsibilities of law enforcement, security, and other administrative functions on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands for Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba.

### 2. Supply Reduction

Due to increased intelligence sharing and cooperation between Dutch Caribbean law enforcement organizations and U.S. authorities, the opportunity to further disrupt drug trafficking is improving. In addition, the aforementioned MOU promotes enhanced police enforcement and better organization for airport security and harbor/cruise terminal security with the goal of reducing drug trafficking. According to DEA, in 2018, Dutch Caribbean authorities working with U.S. law enforcement support seized approximately 3.64 MT of cocaine; 454 kg of marijuana; nine kg of heroin; conducted 112 drug related arrests; and seized approximately $2,243,000 in assets from drug traffickers. These statistics do not include seizures by the Dutch Navy.

### 3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment
Drug treatment and prevention is accomplished through a combination of privately and publicly funded foundations on each of the islands. Sint Maarten has one drug treatment foundation that suffered severe damage from Hurricane Irma in 2017 and has yet to fully recover.

4. Corruption

None of the Dutch Caribbean countries, as a matter of government policy, encourages or facilitates illegal activity associated with drug trafficking; however, in October 2018 approximately 500 kg of seized cocaine were stolen from the KPC’s evidence vault in Curaçao. There is an ongoing investigation, but the evidence obtained at this juncture points to internal corruption in the local police force as the catalyst of the theft.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The objectives of U.S. drug control policy in the Dutch Caribbean are to promote cooperation between law enforcement and military partners, and to reduce illicit drug trafficking. DEA works with its island counterparts to advance joint investigations, both within the Dutch Caribbean and the United States.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports drug control efforts by continuing to support U.S. Air Force Forward Operating Locations in Curaçao and Aruba. U.S. military aircraft conduct detection and monitoring flights over the southern Caribbean Sea. In addition, the Dutch Navy regularly conducts drug interdiction operations in the region as the lead for Task Group 4.4 under the auspices of Joint Interagency Task Force South. With support from the U.S. Coast Guard, the Royal Netherlands Navy interdicted approximately 5.1 MT of cocaine during the first 10 months of 2018 (not including Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard seizures).

D. Conclusion

Eight years after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are still establishing counterdrug organizational structures among their various agencies. It is imperative that both islands embrace regional cooperation and intelligence sharing efforts. Both Curaçao and Sint Maarten can look to Aruba as an example of how this is accomplished.
Eastern Caribbean

A. Introduction

The Eastern Caribbean (EC) refers to the independent countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines collectively in this report.

The EC is a transshipment point for cocaine and marijuana destined for North America, Europe, and the Caribbean. There is cannabis cultivation in all EC countries, mostly for local consumption, and the amount grown varies from country to country. There is a low local demand for cocaine, and negligible use of synthetic drugs.

The geographic and jurisdictional diversity of the EC represent major challenges to combating the illegal drug trade. These countries do not have sufficient maritime resources to effectively patrol their entire coastlines. Although traffickers use a variety of vessels like yachts and cargo ships to transport illicit drugs, “go-fast” boats are still popular, which enable traffickers to avoid capture by accessing multiple territorial waters.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

All EC countries have strong working relationships with the United States on drug control operations. Grenada’s National Anti-Drug Strategy (2014-2018) was near completion at the end of 2018, and covers legislation, interdiction, education, and public awareness. With the assistance of the Organization of American States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is in the process of establishing a new National Drug Council and creating a national drug policy. Saint Kitts and Nevis has increased the size of its police force and opened a new forensics laboratory. Saint Lucia appointed a new drug squad commander in October 2018. Antigua and Barbuda passed the 2018 Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act that exempts from criminal liability “a person who is in possession of a maximum of 15 grams of the drug Cannabis or Cannabis resin,” although smoking in public and selling it remains illegal. Children under the age of 18 are required to participate in drug counseling if caught with cannabis or cannabis resin. Barbados and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are planning to allow cultivation, domestic use, and export of medicinal marijuana under licensing controls to countries where medicinal cannabis is legal. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is also considering legalization of cannabis for religious purposes.

All of these countries have extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties in force with the United States. All have signed or ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Lucia ratified the Inter-American Convention on Extradition. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Grenada have signed and/or ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
2. Supply Reduction

During the first nine months of 2018, drug seizures in the EC totaled 661 kilograms of cocaine and nine metric tons of marijuana, according to data received from each country. Saint Kitts and Nevis reported eradicating 45 hectares (ha) of cannabis, while Saint Lucia (10.5 ha), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (eight ha), Dominica (1.2 ha), Antigua (.8 ha), and Grenada (.1 ha) reported eradicating smaller amounts of cultivation. During the same period, Antigua and Barbuda reported 142 drug-related arrests with 70 prosecutions and 66 convictions. Barbados reported 105 drug-related arrests with 105 prosecutions. Dominica reported 49 drug-related arrests, 45 prosecutions, and 18 convictions. Grenada reported 240 drug-related arrests, 401 prosecutions, and 275 convictions. Saint Kitts and Nevis reported 205 drug-related arrests, 205 prosecutions, and 97 convictions. Saint Lucia reported 146 drug-related arrests. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reported 213 drug-related arrests, 186 prosecutions, and 182 convictions.

Some countries report a growing market for strains of marijuana from the United States and Canada. Some countries also report an increase in the use of commercial cargo airlines and different types of marine vessels for transshipment. Barbados reported more small-scale trafficking in 2018.

The United States has provided assistance to all of the countries in the form of training and equipment. This assistance has built better relationships for operational law enforcement purposes.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Reliable statistics on consumption and use are not available, but the most commonly used drug is marijuana. All of the countries have some form of drug demand reduction programming. Barbados, Grenada, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have implemented the U.S. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program for youth. Barbados also has programs through the National Council on Substance Abuse, the Centre for Counseling Addiction Support Alternative, and Alcoholics Anonymous. The National Council on Substance Abuse monitors the programs through qualitative assessments, surveys, and pre- and post-tests. The National Drug Avoidance Committee in the Ministry of Education operates Grenada’s programs.

Notably, Saint Kitts and Nevis has four formal programs. The Explorer program targets children in the 5-12 year age range. Mentoring Advising Guiding Instructing Children (MAGIC) teaches children about the harmful effects of drugs. Teen and Police Service (TAPS) targets predominantly at-risk or troubled teens. Operation Future brings children and parents together to learn about the perils of drug use.

Saint Lucia’s Substance Abuse Advisory Council Secretariat develops policies and programs tailored to individuals, communities, and the entire country. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has numerous programs, including police youth clubs and summer programs and a local cadet force. The Pan Against Crime Initiative celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2018, and teaches young people to play steel drums. For adults, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has a Monday night radio program that allows police to reach a large audience with anti-drug messaging.
Not every country has drug rehabilitation clinics. Antigua and Barbuda has two private rehabilitation centers. Barbados has five drug rehabilitation clinics, while Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has one each.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the region’s governments do not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. In 2018, there were no arrests of senior government officials for drug-related activity.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to address crime and violence affecting EC citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean nations that seeks to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. CBSI programming in the Eastern Caribbean strengthens the capacity of law enforcement institutions to detect, interdict, prosecute, convict, and incarcerate criminals. The programs support information sharing networks, joint interagency operations, and regional training initiatives to promote interoperability.

The United States maintains bilateral agreements to suppress illicit traffic by sea with Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which include provisions regarding ship boarding, shipriders, pursuit, entry into territorial waters, overflight, and order to land.

In addition to the bilateral agreements the United States has with each country, the United States signed an agreement with the Regional Security System (RSS). The main drug control goals of that agreement include supporting operations of the RSS Air Wing and the RSS Digital Forensic Lab and collaborating on training for all member states.

D. Conclusion

The United States enjoys strong operational cooperation with EC countries on drug control matters. Through these relations, these countries prosecuted at least 10 major traffickers in 2018. The United States strongly recommends that all countries meet their financial commitments to the RSS and, for those in arrears, pay their back dues. The United States also recommends that standard operating procedures for communication and coordination domestically and internationally between and among EC countries be further developed and implemented, where those procedures do not already exist.
Ecuador

A. Introduction

Situated between two of the world’s largest cocaine producing countries, Ecuador is a major transit country for illicit drugs. Cocaine and heroin from Colombia and cocaine from Peru is trafficked through porous land borders and via maritime routes for distribution to the United States and Europe. While not a major drug producing country, Ecuador is a major transit country for chemical precursors to process illicit drugs and is vulnerable to transnational organized crime due to permeable borders and corruption. While committed to combating drug trafficking, Ecuador’s police, military, and judiciary lack sufficient resources to confront transnational criminal challenges.

The government of President Lenin Moreno, who took office in May 2017, remains committed to reducing both drug supply and drug demand, as reflected in a new 2017-2021 National Drug Prevention and Control Plan. Domestic drug consumption is rising and public treatment facilities are insufficient to treat the country’s population suffering from substance use disorders.

In the first quarter of 2018, the drug trafficking group Oliver Sinisterra Front, led by a former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla member, carried out attacks, kidnappings, and killings of journalists, military personnel, and private citizens along Ecuador’s northern border with Colombia. To respond to this threat, the Ecuadorian government has increased security forces at the border, strengthened cooperation with Colombia, and issued a new Northern Border Security, Peace, and Development Plan. The Moreno government has also made positive steps to expand cooperation with the United States and other international partners to fight transnational crime and drugs.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Ecuadorian government is concerned about the detrimental effects of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime throughout the country. During the first 10 months of 2018, 10,144 individuals were arrested for trafficking-related crimes, compared to 9,054 during the same period in 2017, an increase of 12 percent. In April 2018, as part of a government-wide downsizing initiative, President Moreno eliminated the Technical Secretariat of Drugs (SETED) that was previously responsible for coordinating the overall drug control policy in Ecuador. The Ministry of Health assumed coordination and oversight of drug prevention, demand reduction, and treatment programs. The Ministry of Interior is now responsible for combating the production, trafficking, sale, and use of illicit drugs, as well as regulating the use of controlled substances and destroying seized substances. The now defunct SETED destroyed 35 metric tons (MT) of seized illegal substances during the first six months of 2018. The Ministry of Interior reported it destroyed 16 MT of seized illegal substances between July and October. In early October, Ecuadorian media reported that 26.4 MT of seized drugs were being stored in five warehouses nationwide, waiting to be incinerated.
Ecuador’s 2008 constitution categorizes drug abuse as a public health problem and mandates that the government develop prevention programs and provide treatment and rehabilitation options to persons with substance use disorders. A criminal code (COIP) that went into effect in 2014 increased penalties for most crimes, while decriminalizing personal use, possession, and consumption of relatively small amounts of narcotics. The COIP created a tiered approach to drug trafficking and possession, with larger amounts carrying longer prison sentences.

In September 2015, the National Assembly approved amendments to the 2014 COIP that created a table of drug quantities and penalties, drastically reducing the minimum amount of narcotics required to trigger each tier of punishment. In 2016, Ecuador established two special crime laboratories in Quito and Guayaquil.

The Government of Ecuador has bilateral drug control agreements with many countries in the region, including the United States. The United States and Ecuador have agreements on measures to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals, the sharing of information for currency transactions over $10,000, and a customs mutual assistance agreement. In April 2018, the Ministry of Interior signed a MOU with DHS to establish a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, and a framework agreement MOU with U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement and the DEA to facilitate drug control and border security cooperation and information sharing.

In June 2018, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense signed a memorandum of agreement to place an Ecuadorian liaison officer at the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) in Florida. In September 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, under the authority of JIATF-S, initiated regular maritime patrol flights in coordination with the Ecuadorian Ministries of Defense and Interior and with the participation of Ecuadorian military and police riders, to monitor and interdict maritime drug trafficking in the Eastern Pacific. The U.S. Coast Guard and Ecuadorian maritime authorities also exercise Maritime Operational Procedures that coordinate the boarding of vessels claiming Ecuadorian nationality and stateless vessels in international waters. In October 2018, the Minister of Interior, the Attorney General, and DEA signed an MOU regarding information exchange. DEA continues to support a vetted unit within the National Police Antinarcotics Division.

The United States and Ecuador are parties to an 1873 extradition treaty and a supplementary treaty that entered into force in 1941. However, Ecuador’s constitution prohibits the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens. The United States has worked with the Moreno administration to improve administrative processes related to extradition requests. The United States and Ecuador do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, but cooperate under the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, as well as relevant UN conventions.

2. Supply Reduction

Ecuador remains a major transit country for cocaine shipments via air, land, and maritime routes, and heroin shipments via air and mail. Drug traffickers use various methods to move shipments, including containerized cargo ships, small fishing boats, self-propelled semi-submersible and fully-submersible submarines, “go-fast” boats, aircraft, human couriers, and mail. Ecuadorian maritime trafficking networks consistently use routes south of the Galapagos Islands to
destinations in Central America to circumvent law enforcement interdiction efforts. Transnational criminal organizations, many based in Mexico and Colombia, continue to operate in Ecuador.

Official police statistics indicate that during the first 10 months of 2018, cocaine seizures totaled 54 MT, equal to the 54 MT of cocaine seized during the same period in 2017. The volume of heroin seized during this same 10-month period totaled 198 kilograms (kg), a decline from 2017, when 305 kg were seized during the same period. Twelve MT of marijuana were seized during the first 10 months of 2018, compared with 10 MT during the first 10 months in 2017. In the month of August 2018 alone, several Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) units in conjunction with DEA carried out a series of highly effective operations that resulted in the seizure of 4.7 MT of cocaine hydrochloride, 14 MT of calcium chloride, 9.45 kg of heroin, and 21 arrests.

Maritime seizures of all illicit drugs totaled 5.8 MT during the first 10 months of 2018, compared to approximately 6.8 MT in all of 2017. This included three MT of cocaine seized in international waters close to the Galapagos Islands as a result of the first deployment of a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) P-3 maritime patrol aircraft to Ecuador in September 2018.

Drug traffickers use containerized cargo and shipping containers to smuggle drugs out of Ecuador, often concealing drugs in licit cargo. The Port of Guayaquil is a major transshipment hub for cocaine concealed in containerized cargo to Europe. The port authority, Contecon, employs security measures at its facility but inspects only 7 percent of containerized exports. During the first 10 months of 2018, the port authority inspected 38,745 containers. In July 2018, the United States and Ecuador signed a Declaration of Principles incorporating Ecuador into the Container Security Initiative, which permits CBP personnel to be posted at the Port of Guayaquil to work with Ecuadorian authorities to strengthen the port security and facilitate trade.

The last survey on coca cultivation in 2014 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) showed no significant coca cultivation in Ecuador. In 2018, Ecuadorian authorities detected small-scale coca cultivation along the northern border. The government’s policy is for the police or military to eradicate immediately coca, poppy, or cannabis when discovered, although nearly all poppy plants are wild and not cultivated for heroin production. Largely due to the refocusing of security efforts in response to violence on the northern border in early 2018, the government decreased eradication of coca plants from 10,100 to 3,798 and did not eradicate any poppy plants, compared to the 145,074 poppy plants eradicated during the first 10 months of 2017.

Synthetic drug production and consumption is an issue of growing concern for Ecuadorian authorities, and the government has made arrests of organized groups involved in trafficking synthetic drugs. Ecuador has reported to UNODC the emergence of new psychoactive substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment
Domestic drug abuse is a growing challenge in Ecuador. UNODC carries out demand reduction and drug prevention programs in Ecuador with funding from the United States, European Union, and other international donors. In May 2018, UNODC held a U.S.-funded policymakers workshop for 70 National Assembly members and their advisors on the nature, prevention, and treatment of drug use disorders. According to UNODC data, 12.7 percent of university students used some type of illicit drug in 2016. All drug offenders are entitled to drug treatment under the Ecuadorian constitution, but there is a lack of adequate resources and facilities to treat those with addictions. As of October 2018, there were 45 publicly funded outpatient drug treatment facilities and 12 public inpatient drug treatment facilities in Ecuador. Other drug treatment options, such as the 198 private facilities that provide drug treatment alternatives, are often prohibitively costly.

In January 2018, the Ecuadorian government launched the “2017-2021 National Plan for Comprehensive Prevention and Control of the Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Drugs.” In 2018, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior, and ENP conducted drug abuse public awareness campaigns targeted at teachers, religious leaders, children, and youth, among others. The Government of Ecuador also launched in January 2018 a public awareness television campaign called “Por Un Mar Sin Drogas” (“For a Sea without Drugs”) to highlight the dangers of drug abuse and deter fishermen from engaging in drug trafficking.

4. Corruption

President Moreno has made anticorruption a priority of his administration. A number of prosecutions in 2017-2018 have led to the conviction of government officials involved in corruption cases, including a six-year prison sentence for former Vice President Jorge Glas for illicit association in connection with the Brazilian company Odebrecht’s corruption scandal. As a matter of policy, the Ecuadorian government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. In February 2018, a national referendum approved a lifelong ban from public office of government officials convicted of corruption. The National Assembly is also considering proposals for a new law to recover illicit proceeds from corruption.

Drug-related corruption remains a problem within the public security forces. On September 12, two members of the Ecuadorian Air Force were arrested for carrying one metric ton of cocaine in the Ecuadorian military base in Manta. In October, Ecuadorian authorities arrested and said they intended to prosecute seven military officials and six civilians for altering the Armed Forces’ inventory system and trafficking ammunition to the drug trafficking group Oliver Sinisterra Front.

Ecuador has looked to increase international cooperation on anticorruption. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on Anti-Corruption with UNODC in 2017 to exchange international best practices on transparency, education, and prevention. In July 2018, Ecuador joined the Open Government Partnership, an international civil society initiative that promotes government transparency.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
The Moreno administration has expressed a strong commitment to work with international partners, including the United States, to fight transnational crime and drug trafficking and strengthen security, particularly in its northern border area. Between January and April 2018, the Oliver Sinisterra Front conducted a series of bombings and attacks against the military and police in Esmeraldas province that resulted in the death of four military officers and culminated in the kidnapping and murder of three journalists and two private citizens. The Government of Ecuador augmented its security presence along the northern border with Colombia to over 12,000 military and police personnel. The Moreno administration also increased its communication and coordination with Colombian authorities. At Ecuador’s request, the U.S. government provided assistance and training in post-blast investigations. In September 2018, the Government of Ecuador launched a Northern Border Security, Peace and Development Plan to provide a comprehensive approach to respond to insecurity on the northern border, and has proposed new laws to strengthen public security and strategic intelligence.

The U.S. and Ecuadorian governments reestablished in 2018 a framework for growing bilateral security and drug control cooperation. During a June 2018 visit to Ecuador, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence announced the United States would provide $3.45 million in new bilateral funding for capacity-building and technical assistance programs to strengthen Ecuador’s criminal justice and law enforcement capabilities. Additionally, per the request of the Ecuadorian government, the United States reestablished its Office of Security Cooperation at Embassy Quito in August 2018, which the previous Ecuadorian government had closed in 2014.

In 2018, the United States supported Ecuador’s drug prevention efforts in coordination with Ministry of Interior, National Assembly, SETED and other governmental and multilateral entities. In June 2018, the Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America organization began conducting U.S.-funded trainings and workshops in Duran to develop anti-drug use community coalitions.

Throughout 2018, the United States provided ongoing logistical and operational support for Ecuadorian counterdrug operations. As a result of regional cooperation among DEA, the Ecuadorian police, and Colombian law enforcement, Edison Prado Alava, a U.S. Government Consolidated Priority Organization Target, was extradited to the United States in February 2018 and pleaded guilty to charges in a Southern Florida court. Pursuant to the April 2018 agreement, the Ecuadorian National Police established a new Transnational Crime Investigative Unit that received U.S. training. The United States continues to work with Ecuadorian police and security officials to increase their interdiction capacity at sea and in port facilities, including through the P-3 program and Container Security Initiative.

Since 2006, the United States has maintained an operational arrangement with Ecuador to stop, board, and search Ecuadorian vessels reasonably suspected of drug smuggling encountered at sea. Ecuador is a founding member of the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summit, which brings together maritime counterdrug professionals from approximately 25 countries and over 60 international agencies spanning North, South and Central America, and Europe.
D. Conclusion

The United States supports Ecuador’s drug control efforts and strongly encourages Ecuador to take further steps to interdict illicit drugs and control of chemical precursors, both on land and at sea. To address the growing challenges of drug trafficking, the Ecuadorian government will need to continue working with international partners and devote additional resources to augment the capacity of the police and military through improved communications, equipment, and technology to facilitate investigations, and provision of additional training for the police and the military. The Ecuadorian government should also focus on securing containerized, maritime cargo from illicit use and increasing maritime interdiction capacity.
El Salvador

A. Introduction

El Salvador remains a transit country for illicit drugs originating from source countries in South America destined for the United States. In 2018, El Salvador maintained an active maritime presence though interdiction operations by the Salvadoran Navy and information-sharing with international partners that served to push most maritime traffic beyond the 200 nautical mile mark El Salvador claims as its territorial waters. Analysis of drug trafficking trends suggests drug trafficking organizations are trafficking cocaine shipments by maritime conveyance farther offshore into the Pacific Ocean, beyond the operational capacity of the Salvadoran Navy, to avoid detection.

Transnational cocaine-trafficking organizations use private vehicles to transport small amounts of cocaine to the Guatemalan border along the Pan-American Highway.

The Salvadoran government continues to implement Plan El Salvador Seguro (PESS), a geographically targeted approach to reducing crime in the most violent municipalities that includes support for drug prevention components. The Salvadoran government also continued a series of emergency measures launched in 2016 aimed at securing the nation’s prisons and dismantling gang leadership structures that play a role in local drug distribution, and transitioned the majority of the measures into the penal code. A lack of reliable information on the severity of drug consumption and internal distribution within El Salvador continues to present a challenge.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Anti-Narcotics Division (DAN) of the National Civil Police (PNC) is the primary agency responsible for combating drug-related crimes throughout El Salvador. The vetted Special Anti-Narcotics Group (GEAN) within the DAN is responsible for conducting sensitive drug investigations. In 2018, the GEAN continued to build institutional links with more advanced Sensitive Investigation Units (SIUs) in Guatemala and Colombia, greatly expanding El Salvador’s ability to respond to drug trafficking alerts and to investigate larger criminal organizations. El Salvador supports a full-time liaison officer within the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) to support regional drug control coordination.

El Salvador’s National Electronic Monitoring Center began operations in June 2012 with support from the United States. The center allows Salvadoran law enforcement authorities with judicial warrants to intercept electronic communications to support drug trafficking investigations, increasing operational coordination between the DAN, GEAN, other Salvadoran investigative authorities, and international partners. This improved intelligence sharing proved pivotal in the August conviction of 61 leaders and members of the transnational criminal gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) on more than 150 criminal charges including drug trafficking.
A sustained decline in maritime drug trafficking within Salvadoran territorial waters led to decreased littoral interdiction operations by the Joint Interagency Task Force “Grupo Conjunto Cuscatlán” (GCC). The unit, equipped for patrols along coastal waterways, encountered little drug trafficking in 2018, and thus continued its focus on operations supporting the arrest of gang members operating from remote estuarine and coastal safe havens. The Salvadoran Navy maintains primary responsibility for maritime interdiction at or beyond 200 nautical miles from El Salvador’s coastline. The average interdiction occurs between 400-500 nautical miles offshore, and suspects are detained and escorted ashore for processing by the Salvadoran justice system. The GCC maintains its primary headquarters away from military facilities and with a primary emphasis on anti-gang efforts, but remains equipped to coordinate with the Navy on littoral interdiction if maritime trafficking trends shift back to where they were in previous years. The deterioration of the GCC’s relationship with the Salvadoran Navy limited the GCC’s ability to regularly support naval interdictions.

In August 2018, El Salvador’s Attorney General and the Director of the PNC announced the arrests of over 350 MS-13 gang members and the seizure of 100 vehicles, property, and businesses during a complex yearlong investigation. The arresting agents secured warrants of known gang members, affiliates, and co-conspirators on charges including homicide, drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. As a result of United States assistance and training, the coordinated takedown represented a significant increase of the Government of El Salvador’s capability to debilitate MS-13 operations through large-scale arrest operations with asset forfeitures.

El Salvador is party to the Central American Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering Related to Drug-Trafficking and Similar Crimes, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition, and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

2. Supply Reduction

Between January 1 and November 20, Salvadoran authorities seized approximately 12.45 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, 877 kilograms (kg) of marijuana, and 3.39 kg of “crack” cocaine. Cocaine seizures in 2018 increased 120 percent compared to the same period in 2017, due to the GEAN and Salvadoran Navy’s increased cooperation and intelligence-driven operations with U.S. maritime authorities. In November, the Salvadoran Navy conducted an operation based on information provided by international partners that resulted in the seizure of 6.38 MT of cocaine 250 nautical miles off the coast of El Salvador, representing the largest seizure in Salvadoran history. El Salvador continued to divert human and material resources from the DAN to support anti-gang operations in 2018, though the impact on seizures was limited. During the first 10 months of 2018, Salvadoran authorities seized $550,314 in bulk currency – a 31 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2017 – and arrested 2,949 individuals on drug-related crimes.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Drug use among Salvadorans is a growing concern, particularly among youth. The government has not kept reliable statistics for illegal consumption since 2012. The PNC has been
successfully implementing the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program in public schools throughout Model Police Precinct (MPP) locations, which combine training and police-community relation activities. In 2018, the United States trained and certified 80 Salvadoran PNC officers as full-time GREAT instructors, raising the total trained since the program began in 2010 to 470. In 2018, these officers delivered GREAT to over 25,000 at-risk youth throughout the country. In addition to the GREAT program, the PNC established Police Athletic Leagues (PAL), benefitting over 18,800 at-risk youth.

As of October, the United States’ partnership with the PNC continued to support citizen security and prevention activities in 50 municipal districts through the MPP Program, with four additional communities scheduled to reach MPP status by the end of 2018. The MPP, GREAT, and PAL programs now cover all 19 delegations across El Salvador, and were nationalized into the Government of El Salvador’s National Prevention Strategy. These programs support broader drug control goals by facilitating positive interaction between youth and police and improving communities’ trust in and willingness to work with police, thereby making communities more resilient to crime including crime with a nexus to drug trafficking and use.

In 2018, the Government of El Salvador launched its School Resource Officer Program charged with the protection and education of students while promoting safety and respect for law enforcement. The United States provides training to support this initiative, and certified 60 officers in the program during 2018.

4. Corruption

The Government of El Salvador does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption within the Salvadoran political system remains a serious problem. The United States continues to utilize U.S.-trained Colombian polygraphists via the trilateral U.S.-Colombia Action Plan to assist El Salvador’s security forces with anticorruption efforts. During the first 10 months of 2018, Colombian polygraphists completed 630 exams of PNC investigative units, DAN, GCC, Attorney General staff, and U.S.-supported task forces, with plans to complete an additional 250 exams by the end of 2018. In September, Attorney General Douglas Melendez successfully won a conviction against former President Antonio Saca on corruption and money laundering charges, which marks the first former Salvadoran president tried and convicted for illegal acts during his time in office. Melendez, who made large strides in combating corruption in El Salvador, completed his three-year term in January. It is unclear whether his successor, Raul Melara, will demonstrate the same commitment to combating corruption.

In July, El Salvador’s legislative assembly passed new legislation giving greater autonomy to the country’s Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), in an effort to comply with a request from the Egmont Group, a network of international FIUs. However, a Presidential veto in August over constitutional concerns resulted in the suspension of El Salvador’s FIU from the Egmont Group, for its inability to maintain operational independence and autonomy. The Legislative Assembly managed to override a presidential veto in October, following intense pressure by the international community, and the law will be reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court. El Salvador now has until July 2019 to avoid being expelled completely from Egmont, which could further complicate prosecution of corruption cases.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports citizen security, law enforcement, and rule-of-law programs in El Salvador through the U.S. Strategy for Central America and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), supporting El Salvador’s implementation of PESS and the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity, a regional plan developed by the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These programs aim to expand Salvadoran capabilities to interdict, investigate, and prosecute illegal drug trafficking and other transnational crimes, implement prevention programs, and strengthen El Salvador’s justice sector. The United States also supports anti-gang and community policing in El Salvador with equipment, vehicles, training, and social and economic programs. The United States provided Salvadoran law enforcement the ability to use COMPSTAT, a statistical analysis tool that tracks the type and location of crime reports to more efficiently allocate law enforcement resources; AFIS, an automated fingerprint database; and IBIS, a ballistics database.

In 2018, U.S. assistance focused on enhancing the operational capacity of Salvadoran law enforcement agencies to interdict drug shipments and combat money laundering and public corruption. Assistance also promoted transparency, efficiency, and institutional respect for human and civil rights within law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system, including efforts to professionalize the PNC and reduce the role of the military in civilian policing. The United States supported efforts to combat transnational criminal organizations, particularly the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, while developing and implementing integrated initiatives to disrupt drug trafficking and other criminal activity.

In 2018, U.S. assistance included specialized training for over 1,000 PNC officers in areas such as intelligence-led policing, community relations, and complex investigations. The United States also helped strengthen the effectiveness of criminal justice procedures and practices by training 349 justice sector personnel in asset forfeiture, advanced investigation, and trial skills. The United States also provided technical assistance to increase coordination between justice sector agents and institutions; improve criminal investigations using scientific evidence; and build the capacity of the police and prosecutor’s offices.

The August 2000 United States-El Salvador bilateral agreement allows U.S. authorities to use the El Salvador International Airport as a forward operating location. It also allows U.S. access to ports and other governmental facilities in connection with aerial detection, monitoring, and tracking of illicit drug trafficking operations. El Salvador is a regular participant in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits, which bring together maritime counterdruge professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international organizations spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe.

D. Conclusion
El Salvador maintained its capacity to fight transnational crime in 2018, even as drug traffickers continued to shift their maritime routes further from El Salvador’s coast and beyond its territorial waters. Authorities demonstrated increased capacity to lead complex investigations, coordinate and share intelligence between agencies and with overseas counterparts, and dismantle organized crime structures. El Salvador still faces formidable challenges, including the political uncertainty of the future Attorney General and President following the February 2019 national elections.

The successes of 2018 can only be sustained if the Government of El Salvador demonstrates continued commitment to crime prevention, security, and rule of law. Progress in these fields, and the emergence of law enforcement actors capable of sharing information and coordinating effectively with international partners, likely contributed to the 2018 decline in maritime drug trafficking, but continued strengthening of the entire continuum of El Salvador’s criminal justice institutions needs to be strengthened to prevent the return of trafficking routes if interdiction efforts in neighboring countries continue to advance. Political will to confront corruption and maintain adequate resources for the DAN and Attorney General’s Office, including adequate pay and physical protection, remains a challenge, and the corrections system remains overcrowded and mismanaged.
Georgia

Georgia’s location along traditional smuggling routes in the Caucuses leaves it vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations that continue to traffic opium, heroin, and the main precursor chemical used to produce heroin, acetic anhydride. In April 2018, 15 metric tons of acetic anhydride were seized at Georgia’s port of Poti on the Black Sea – one of the largest seizures in history. The chemicals originated in China and were destined for Afghanistan to process heroin. Despite record high opium production in Afghanistan, drug seizures in Georgia have declined since 2016.

The Georgian government and non-governmental organizations report substantial drug and substance abuse challenges with an estimated 50,000 illicit drug users in the country. Synthetic and “club” drugs remain the most popular, particularly with the younger generation. April 2018 police raids on two popular Georgian nightclubs led to riots in Tbilisi. Thousands protested the raids as excessive abuses of authority and urged authorities to introduce less strict drug policies. Georgian authorities expressed concern that this type of citizen response may hinder future drug operations for fear of reprisal. In July 2018, the Constitutional Court of Georgia ruled unconstitutional blanket restrictions on marijuana use. The Constitutional Court also noted that imposing responsibility on marijuana use would be reasonable under specific circumstances such as threats to third persons, use in educational facilities, use on public transport, and use in the presence of juveniles. There is insufficient evidence to evaluate whether this will affect the consumption, sale, and transit of other illicit drugs.

The Government of Georgia actively cooperates with a wide range of actors to combat drug trafficking and consumption and to develop comprehensive responses to drug dependency. These partners include civil society, academia, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and other international organizations, regional partner states, and the European Union.

The United States continues to support Georgia’s fight against crime and illicit drug use and trafficking. Georgia Minister of Internal Affairs Giorgi Gakharia met with the acting administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration on July 25, 2018, and both parties affirmed their commitment to bilateral relations and combating drug trafficking in Georgia and the Caucasus region.
Ghana

Ghana remains a transit and destination point for illicit drugs trafficked from Asia and South America to other African nations, Europe, and the United States. Heroin and controlled pharmaceuticals from Asia, as well as cocaine from South America, are smuggled into the country for limited local consumption and onward shipment. Crystal methamphetamine produced in clandestine laboratories in Nigeria also transits the country. Precursor chemicals required to produce crystal methamphetamine are believed to be diverted from Ghanaian sources. Cannabis is also produced in substantial quantities within Ghana, primarily for domestic use but also trafficked to international markets. Officials report that the illegal importation and abuse of tramadol, a controlled pharmaceutical, is increasingly problematic.

Ghana law enforcement and intelligence agencies have alleged that transnational drug trafficking networks operating in the country have links to organized crime and terrorist organizations. Preliminary reports indicate that the volume of cocaine and heroin seized by Ghanaian authorities in 2018 was slightly less than in previous years, while the volume of seized cannabis increased. However, fragmented data collection and incomplete information sharing make accurate figures difficult to obtain.

Ghana’s government continues to push for modifications to its drug control laws. The Narcotics Control Commission Bill, which is pending approval in Parliament, will direct the government to treat drug use as a public health issue. It will also address gaps in interagency coordination and enhance the government’s toolset for fighting precursor chemicals. The legislation would reduce the stringent mandatory five-year imprisonment for possession and personal use of illicit drugs. The mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years would remain for trafficking.

Ghana maintained a high degree of cooperation with the United States and other international partners on drug control issues in 2018. The United States and Ghana continued successful law enforcement cooperation under the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Sensitive Investigative Unit program. Supported by U.S. funding, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime continued to implement a program to provide training and equipment to new drug law enforcement units in four regions. Ghana continues to work productively with international partners on law enforcement operations targeting transnational drug trafficking organizations and to attend U.S.-sponsored trainings that improve their capabilities. There is no mutual legal assistance treaty between Ghana and the United States, although mutual legal assistance can be provided on a reciprocal basis through letters of request. Extradition between Ghana and the United States is governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty.
Guatemala

A. Introduction

Guatemala is a transit country for precursor chemicals and illicit drugs bound for U.S. markets. Well-established criminal networks exploit the country’s strategic location, porous borders, and widespread corruption to facilitate drug trafficking through the country. Although precise volumes are difficult to determine, U.S. authorities estimate transnational criminal organizations smuggled more than 1,400 metric tons (MT) of cocaine through Guatemala during 2018 by air, land, and sea. While the bulk of cocaine arrives directly from South America via maritime conveyances, noncommercial air and overland smuggling from Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras remain persistent threats. Mexican cartels rely on Guatemalan networks and organizations to receive, store, and transport drugs to the United States through Mexico.

In addition to trafficking illicit drugs and precursor chemicals through Guatemala, criminal organizations cultivate cannabis and opium poppy within the country, and coca cultivation was detected for the first time in 2018. The absence of a permanent law enforcement presence in many areas of the country allows other forms of transnational crime, including alien smuggling and trafficking in persons, weapons, counterfeit goods, and other contraband, to flourish.

Ongoing political crises and high turnover of key government officials present challenges to U.S. cooperation on security and countering drug trafficking. Key Guatemalan government drug control officials lack the necessary political will to effectively counter drug trafficking and corruption. While Guatemala achieved some notable successes in 2018, including high levels of drug seizures and a number of extraditions of criminals charged with drug offenses in the United States, Guatemala’s fight against criminal organizations continues to be hindered by endemic corruption, weak public institutions, and inadequate resources.

U.S. assistance helped establish 99 Model Police Precincts (MPP) throughout Guatemala. In 2018, these locations improved citizen security and the relationships between police and the communities they serve. A decline in homicides and other violent crimes, noted since 2009, continues, and local police are embracing community-policing methods. MPPs support broader drug control efforts by facilitating positive interaction with police and improving communities’ trust in and willingness to work with police, thereby making communities more resilient to crime including crime with a nexus to drug trafficking, distribution, and drug use.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

High volumes of cocaine are trafficked into Guatemala along its Pacific Coast, although trends suggest much of the flow moved offshore in favor of direct routes from Colombia to Mexico for much of 2018. The Guatemalan Special Naval Forces (FEN) has been successful in disrupting maritime networks, pushing maritime trafficking further west, and 2018 was another record year in seizures. The FEN continues to face myriad maritime threats and trafficking challenges,
including the use of semi-submersible and low-profile vessels; small “pangas” boats; parasitic devices attached to larger ships; and an increase in “go-fast” vessels that are faster and hold larger shipments than pangas. In response to FEN pressure at sea, traffickers increasingly turned to aerial conveyance in 2018, with considerable success.

Guatemala lacks the capacity to intercept inbound aircraft suspected of trafficking drugs, and trafficking organizations are easily capable of shifting landing locations as necessary. The Guatemalan Air Force plays a critical role in detecting and monitoring aircraft suspected of trafficking illicit drugs in and out of Guatemala, but lacks capacity, including rotary wing assets. Guatemalan interdiction efforts resulted in the seizure of a single air-delivered cocaine load in 2018 (on the ground) and the seizure of several aircraft, including some hidden by traffickers in remote locations. Guatemalan agencies only disabled two suspected clandestine airfields in 2018, and one of those returned to operational use within two weeks. Traffickers will likely continue to exploit Guatemala’s capacity gaps in this sector.

U.S. assistance to Guatemala in the areas of vetted units, information sharing, and training led to better coordination and drug seizures in 2018. U.S. support to the border police (DIPAFRONT) enabled the addition of 100 agents to its force, now totaling 530, and the agency implemented successful binational operations with Mexico, Honduras, and El Salvador in 2018. Challenges still remain, including lack of infrastructure, equipment, supplies, and personnel. Guatemalan and U.S. law enforcement experts have estimated that 2,500 DIPAFRONT agents are needed to effectively patrol Guatemala’s borders.

Guatemala is a party to several relevant regional agreements, including the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, the Caribbean Regional Agreement on Maritime Counter Narcotics, and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. A maritime drug control agreement with the United States is fully implemented.

Guatemala continues to work closely with U.S. authorities on extradition matters and regularly extradites its own citizens, including high-level drug traffickers, to the United States for prosecution.

2. Supply Reduction

In May 2018, nearly 75,000 coca plants were discovered by Guatemalan authorities on one hectare (ha) of land in the municipality of Cobán. This was the first known identification of coca cultivation within Guatemala, and the plants were subsequently destroyed.

The Guatemalan government continues to struggle with estimating the number of ha under opium poppy cultivation in the San Marcos region, close to the border with Mexico. Guatemalan government authorities do not have an accurate estimate, and limited government presence and operations since the state of emergency in 2017 have reduced visibility into the current situation. While government authorities have informally claimed there is less poppy cultivation due to declining prices, there is no independent confirmation of these claims. High turnover in Guatemalan agencies led to the cancelation and/or delay of multiple eradication missions in
2018, and budgeted alternative development projects planned for San Marcos were not implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Seizures increased each year since 2016 despite insufficient interdiction resources. During the first 10 months of 2018, Guatemalan authorities reported seizing approximately 13.96 MT of cocaine, surpassing the total amount seized during all of 2017. During this same period, Guatemalan agencies reported confiscating seven kilograms of heroin, more than $3.6 million in bulk cash, and eradicating approximately 80 ha of opium poppy and 40 ha of cannabis.

Arrests of high-profile traffickers were down in 2018 to 53, approximately half the number arrested in 2017.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

A U.S.-funded national drug-use survey released in 2014 remains the most recent. That survey reported young people aged 11 to 20 used marijuana and cocaine at higher rates than their counterparts in Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica. It also identified specific risk factors for Guatemalan adolescents, including easy access to illicit drugs, as well as low risk perception associated with the use of marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA (ecstasy). Since the government lacks sufficient resources to address these emerging trends, a U.S. government grant helped reach over 19,000 students and promote drug abuse awareness and prevention among municipal leaders, teachers, students, parents, and the private sector.

The Ministry of Health administers drug treatment centers in Guatemala, but the agency has not provided updated statistics on treatment centers. A 2016 U.S.-funded study of 30 of the country’s 100 treatment centers concluded the majority of drug treatment providers, directors, and counselors lack expertise to meet the needs of patients. Most centers lack basic equipment and do not apply a formal therapeutic model to drug treatment.

Guatemalan authorities are concerned about internal drug use and have provided additional resources to fight it, but resources remain insufficient. There is some evidence that criminal organizations are attempting to create demand for illicit drugs in Guatemala to generate new markets. The coca plantation discovered in May, for example, appeared designed to meet internal consumption demands.

4. Corruption

The Guatemalan government does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illegal drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in the laundering of the sale of illicit drug proceeds. However, corruption permeates public and private institutions and exacerbates the country’s security, governance, and economic challenges. Guatemala’s Attorney General and the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) have investigated hundreds of government officials suspected of corruption. U.S. assistance also supports anticorruption efforts by developing and training specialized vetted units, particularly those tasked with countering drug trafficking, money laundering, and criminal gangs.
Accomplishments in the broader fight against corruption in 2018 included several high profile corruption cases resulting in convictions, including former Vice President Roxana Baldetti. She was convicted in the first of several corruption cases and sentenced to more than 15 years in prison. Former Minister of Government, Mauricio Lopez-Bonilla, was also convicted and received a sentence of more than eight years. U.S. officials assisted efforts to build capacity for police and prosecutorial units that apply enhanced special investigative methods. As a result of investigations, several asset forfeiture cases allowed Guatemala to recover more than $4.5 million, along with more than 100 assets, such as vehicles, airplanes, boats, real property, and equipment. The seized property will be sold or donated to state institutions and help strengthen state institutions involved in the fight against corruption. Unfortunately, the government’s expulsion of CICIG from Guatemala calls into question its commitment to fight entrenched corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Consistent with the U.S. Strategy for Central America and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (Carsi), and in support of the Central American governments’ Alliance for Prosperity, the United States continues to be a key provider of assistance to improve the professional capabilities and integrity of Guatemala’s security and judicial institutions to create sustainable, effective structures and organizations to fight illicit drug production and trafficking.

The United States maintains a bilateral agreement with Guatemala to suppress illicit traffic by sea and air, which includes provisions for ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry to investigate, over flight of territorial seas, order to land, and interdiction support. Guatemala also participates in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit, which attracts counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international agencies spanning North, Central, and South America, as well as Europe.

D. Conclusion

Guatemala made progress in the fight against criminal organizations in 2018, including enhanced institutional capacity, improved interagency and regional cooperation, and record interdictions. Significant challenges remain, including high turnover of government officials in key law enforcement roles and lack of political will in key areas. Corruption levels remain high, and, according to U.S. government-funded studies, public confidence in government institutions is low. Following the government’s actions against CICIG, there is growing concern about high-level Guatemalan commitment to the fight against corruption and impunity. Limited budget resources hinder the government’s effectiveness and ability to address the challenges associated with drug trafficking. The Guatemalan government needs to work to build sustainable counterdrug mechanisms, including accelerated judicial processes, improved interagency cooperation, and provide adequate financial support and personnel to relevant agencies and government ministries.
Guyana

A. Introduction

Guyana is a transit country for cocaine destined for the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Europe, and West Africa. Cocaine originating in Colombia is smuggled to Venezuela and onward to Guyana by sea or air. Smugglers also transit land borders and the shared river network with Brazil, Venezuela, and Suriname. Cocaine is concealed in legitimate commodities and smuggled through commercial and private air transport, maritime vessels, human couriers, “go-fast” boats, and various postal systems.

Drug traffickers are attracted by the country’s poorly monitored ports, remote airstrips, intricate river networks, porous land borders, as well as corruption and under-resourced security sector. Despite these challenges, the Government of Guyana has demonstrated political will to combat the trafficking of illicit drugs in and through Guyana.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Government of Guyana’s drug control institutions are the Guyana Police Force, Guyana Revenue Authority, Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit, Special Organized Crime Unit, and Guyana Defence Force. These agencies are responsible for the implementation of the National Drug Strategy Master Plan 2016-2020, and the National Anti-Narcotics Agency oversees these efforts. Despite this coordination mechanism, corruption and limited resources have historically limited the effectiveness of these drug control agencies.

In February 2018, the Government of Guyana passed the Witness Protection Act and the Protected Disclosures Act to complement its existing legislative regime addressing corruption and drug trafficking.

In 2008, Guyana acceded to and has since filed information requests under the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, to which the United States is also a party. Guyana has bilateral drug control agreements with its neighbors and the United Kingdom. Guyana is also a member of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD). Guyana signed a maritime drug control bilateral agreement with the United States in 2001, but has yet to take the necessary domestic action to bring the agreement into effect. The 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom is applicable to the United States and Guyana, and Guyana honors that treaty.

2. Supply Reduction

The Government of Guyana’s National Drug Abuse Control Unit trains public health officers, teachers, social workers, and civil society groups as part of the government’s supply reduction strategy. The Guyanese government has a drug enforcement presence at its international airports, post offices, and, to a lesser extent, at seaport and land-border entry points. Drug
control agencies reported several interdiction efforts and drug-related seizures and convictions during the first nine months of 2018. During the first nine months of 2018, authorities seized 164.9 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 889 kg of cannabis. Guyanese authorities initiated 358 prosecutions and convicted 24 individuals for drug trafficking.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Guyana has a growing domestic drug consumption problem. Marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in Guyana, followed by cocaine. The Guyanese government has also reported seizing smaller amounts of synthetic drugs, including MDMA (ecstasy). Guyana has a comprehensive demand reduction strategy that adequately addresses drug rehabilitation. The Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Social Protection are responsible for addressing demand reduction. Non-governmental organizations also offer rehabilitation services, with the government providing financial assistance. The Georgetown Public Hospital also provides free rehabilitation services for drug users. The University of Guyana has a demand reduction curriculum in place through OAS/CICAD funding. The Government of Guyana conducts anti-drug awareness sessions in secondary schools and has plans to create drug treatment courts. As part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the United States supports Guyana through targeted training for law enforcement and maritime officers.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Government of Guyana does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, a lack of resources, weak law enforcement institutions, an ineffective judicial system, and inadequate compensation for civil service employees and public safety officials facilitate corruption throughout all sectors.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to address crime and violence affecting Guyanese citizens, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean countries that seeks to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. Efforts to increase law enforcement capabilities, protect borders, air and seaports, strengthen workforce development, and promote anti-money laundering effectiveness directly address priority concerns shared by Guyana and the United States.

The Government of Guyana cooperates very closely with all relevant U.S. agencies and departments, but is limited by resource constraints. The current administration, which took office in May 2015, has expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the United States on drug control, extradition, mutual legal assistance, and other international crime issues.

CBSI-funded programs support Guyana’s maritime operations by providing interdiction assets, relevant command and control systems, and associated logistical support and training. In 2018, the United States provided port and maritime training to Guyana’s Coast Guard. U.S. assistance
programs also promote law enforcement professionalization and more effective drug investigations. By strengthening Guyana’s drug control capacities, the United States seeks to enhance interagency coordination within the Guyanese government including to gather better information on drug trafficking routes.

D. Conclusion

The United States enjoys strong cooperation with Guyana in advancing mutual interests against the threat of international drug trafficking. Guyana has shown strong interest in furthering collaboration under CBSI. The United States looks forward to tangible progress on investigations, prosecutions, and extraditions; expanding security sector capacity; engaging at-risk communities; and enforcing laws against money laundering and financial crimes. To advance cooperation, Guyana should take steps to implement the 2001 counterdrug bilateral agreement with the United States to suppress illicit trafficking by sea and air. Guyana should seek to enhance its anti-corruption initiatives and fully pursue prosecutions for drug trafficking in accordance with its laws.
Haiti

A. Introduction

Haiti remains a transit point for cocaine originating in South America and marijuana originating in Jamaica, traversing the country’s porous borders en route to the United States and other markets. This traffic takes advantage of Haiti’s severely under-patrolled maritime borders and its extensive land border with the Dominican Republic. Haiti’s main drug enforcement unit, Le Bureau de Lutte Contre le trafic de Stupéfiants (Bureau for the Fight Against Narcotics, or BLTS) led several successful investigations and joint interdiction operations against drug trafficking organizations along the southern coast in 2018. Haiti is not a significant producer of illicit drugs for export, although there is cultivation of cannabis for local consumption. Haiti’s primarily subsistence-level economy does not provide an environment conducive to high levels of domestic drug use.

In 2018, the Haitian National Police (HNP) strengthened the BLTS with additional officers, and officials at the highest levels of the government have spoken about the need to fight drug trafficking. However, seizures of illicit drugs and smuggled cash declined and the government is unable to secure the country’s borders to stem the flow of illicit drugs. The HNP and the Haitian government have recently begun to address the uncontrolled border crossings with the formation of a border police unit (POLIFRONT), based in Morne Casse, near the Ouanaminthe border crossing with the Dominican Republic in Haiti’s Northeast Department. POLIFRONT plans to expand to border crossing points at Anse-a-Pitre, Malpasse, and Belladere. The minimal maritime interdiction capacity of the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) creates a low-risk environment for drug traffickers. While Haiti’s interdiction capacity has improved marginally, a largely ineffective judicial system continues to impede successful prosecution of apprehended drug traffickers.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The HNP’s 28th Promotion Class graduated 1,022 recruits, including 117 women, in December 2017. The 29th HNP class of 692 recruits graduated in September 2018, bringing the total number of HNP officers to nearly 16,000. A larger force will help the HNP assume increasing responsibility for security as the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti starts to drawdown by October 2019.

The BLTS focuses on interdicting illicit drug trafficking. In 2018, the HNP deployed BLTS officers to Terrier Rouge and Ouanaminthe. The BLTS also plans to add officers in Jacmel in the Southeast Department, as well as in Anse-a-Pitres. The United States continues to provide training to the Maritime Counter Narcotics Task Force, made up of BLTS and HCG officers. In April, the United States finished installing a modular unit at the Cap Haitien seaport for BLTS officers to use as an operational base.
The HNP’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigates reports of officer misconduct, including participation in drug trafficking. The HNP still faces challenges regulating its internal affairs, particularly in more remote areas in Haiti. The OIG recommended officers for discipline for various offenses in 2018, but most of its recommendations have thus far gone unmet. The HNP held monthly press conferences to inform the public of their roles and responsibilities, and to report cases of misconduct. The OIG maintains a 24-hour hotline to receive public reports of police corruption or misconduct. As of August 2018, the OIG had recommended 23 officers for dismissal, compared with 11 such recommendations in 2017.

The HCG is the sole maritime enforcement agency in the country. An additional 42 officers from the 29th HNP promotion class joined the HCG, bringing the overall size of the unit to 204 officers. The HCG has operating bases in Cap Haitien, Killick (Port-au-Prince), and Les Cayes. The force has 15 maritime vessels, but only five are currently operational, with seven of the remaining 10 vessels non-repairable due to age. Maritime domain awareness and enforcement are daunting tasks for the HCG, considering Haiti’s 1,100 miles of coastline and seven international ports. Operational capacity remains low due to insufficient funding, management deficiencies, an inability to refuel, and unavailability of locally procured parts to maintain the vessels. These issues have prevented the HCG from serving as an effective deterrent force to maritime drug trafficking.

Haiti maintains several international agreements on drug control commitments and often cooperates effectively with the United States on drug-related cases. A 1997 bilateral letter of agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Drug Traffic allows U.S. law enforcement agencies to enter Haitian territorial waters and airspace in pursuit of suspect vessels or aircraft, to board and search suspect vessels, to patrol Haitian airspace, and to carry members of the HCG as passengers. Although there is no mutual legal assistance treaty between Haiti and the United States, the Haitian government has cooperated on many cases within the limits of Haitian law. A bilateral extradition treaty entered into force in 1905, and the Government of Haiti has willingly surrendered persons under indictment in the United States to U.S. law enforcement agencies.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first 10 months of 2018, BLTS executed several operations that resulted in the seizure of 371 kilograms (kg) of marijuana and 28 kg of cocaine. In addition, the HNP arrested 76 suspects for drug-related crimes during this period. There is no significant availability or traffic of illicit synthetic drugs in Haiti.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Illicit drug abuse is uncommon in Haiti, as the population’s minimal discretionary income mitigates against a widespread drug abuse problem. The Government of Haiti runs small-scale public awareness and demand reduction programs funded through the drug control policy commission (CONALD), but there is no data on these programs’ impact or usefulness.

4. Corruption
The Haitian government as an institution does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking, or the laundering of proceeds from illicit drug transactions. However, effective government action to fight corruption, particularly related to illicit drugs, is constrained by two major factors coupled with a lack of political will. The first is a historically weak legal framework. Haiti did not codify corruption as a crime until 2014, when a law formally criminalized public corruption and set penalties for bribery and illegal procurement. Implementation of this law, including training of judicial personnel on the law’s requirements, remains a challenge. Haiti’s asset seizure laws have enabled the financial intelligence unit (Central Unit of Financial Investigations) and the HNP’s financial crimes unit (Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau) to seize the assets of drug traffickers convicted outside of Haiti. The Haitian constitution’s grant of blanket immunity from prosecution to Members of Parliament is a point of concern for anticorruption and drug enforcement efforts.

The second constraining factor is systematically poor judicial performance, due to antiquated penal and criminal procedural codes, opaque court proceedings, lack of judicial oversight, and widespread judicial corruption. To date, there have been five successful convictions for drug trafficking, and only one conviction on corruption-related charges in Haitian courts. The Haitian Anti-Corruption Unit has advanced 32 corruption-related cases to the judiciary since its inception in 2005, but without tangible results.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S. drug control initiatives in Haiti focus on improving the capacity of the HNP, BLTS, and the HCG to detect, investigate, and deter the flow of illicit drugs. A 2004 letter of agreement (as amended) between the United States and Haiti and a second agreement signed in 2013 (amended annually) govern these activities. Core goals outlined in the agreements are to increase overall counter-drug capabilities, interdict drug shipments, and develop cases against traffickers and criminal organizations. Since 2012, five drug-related arrests have led to trials and convictions.

U.S. assistance supports the development of the HNP and the targeted support of BLTS via complementary programs. Support to the HNP covers a broad range of activities, including infrastructure, equipment, and training. Improved operational capacity and professionalism of the HNP are necessary for effective drug enforcement activity in Haiti.

Specific U.S. support to the BLTS includes provision of communications equipment, vehicles, non-lethal operational gear, canine and maritime units, and training. U.S. support also includes training opportunities for BLTS officers in the United States and in third countries, such as at the U.S.-supported International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador. The United States also supports the HNP’s Joint Maritime Counternarcotics Task Force through joint enforcement operations between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, the HCG, and the BLTS.

The United States will continue to support training of high-ranking HNP officials in the United States, including in cooperation with various U.S. law enforcement agencies, to develop leaders that can serve as change agents within the HNP.
D. Conclusion

The continued institutional development of both the HNP and BLTS is a positive trend that has helped improve public security and has marginally increased Haiti’s capacity to interdict drug trafficking. However, the dysfunctional Haitian judicial system drastically limits domestic prosecution of drug cases and thus reduces disincentives to trafficking operations. Drug seizures remain low, and Haiti’s minimal capacity to police its sea and land borders continues to be a particular point of concern.

Continued U.S. engagement in support of BLTS operations and general HNP development will help Haitian law enforcement capitalize on marginal gains in drug interdiction capacity. The benefits of such gains will be limited, however, if the judicial system remains weak, corrupt, and fails to convict drug traffickers. Only the concurrent strengthening of political will, the judiciary, law enforcement, and border security will enable Haiti to make real progress in combating drug trafficking.
Honduras

A. Introduction

Honduras is a transit country for cocaine destined for the United States and precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs. The Caribbean Coast of Honduras is vulnerable to drug trafficking by land, sea, and air due to its remoteness, limited infrastructure, and lack of government presence. Drug trafficking organizations are shifting their strategy to take advantage of these vulnerabilities by sending smaller shipments by fast boat or small airplane, making detection and interdiction increasingly challenging for Honduran authorities.

Despite advances, the overall security situation in Honduras remains challenging. While the homicide rate continues to drop, the overall crime rate remains high especially where elevated levels of criminal activity make it difficult for the under-resourced Honduras National Police (HNP) to operate. Transnational criminal street gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street, are not a significant part of the international drug logistics chain, except as facilitators of shipments through Honduras and small-scale local distributors.

The restructuring of the HNP, improvements in investigative and operational training for both the police and Public Ministry (PM), and the use of interagency task forces to strike against traffickers increased the interoperability of government entities to counter drug trafficking. Drug seizures by the HNP in 2018 surpassed 2017 levels. The Honduran government initiated a purge of the HNP in 2016 to remove corrupt or otherwise unqualified officers from duty; 5,218 HNP officers have been removed from duty as of November 1, 2018. The HNP’s lack of strong, mid-level management following the police purge along with a dearth of officers with significant counterdrug experience has hampered the force from staying ahead of evolving drug smuggling threats. However, the Government of Honduras continues its efforts to develop capacity to counter drug trafficking, and to increase seizures and disrupt criminal networks.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The political will of the Honduran government to combat drug trafficking and to coordinate with U.S. law enforcement agencies in doing so remains high. Challenges for drug control institutions include corruption, inadequate budget resources, and persistent violence. Corruption, combined with low tax collection rates, deprives law enforcement agencies, courts, and prosecutors of critical resources. The security tax, instituted in 2014 to offset funding challenges for security agencies, helped key law enforcement institutions somewhat, but funds are inadequate to meet the significant personnel, equipment, and technology needs required to address drug trafficking in Honduras.

U.S. assistance to Honduras in the areas of vetted police units, interagency task forces, criminal justice capacity building, information sharing, and training provided a foundation for government institutions to coordinate their efforts in the fight against the trafficking of illicit drugs. During 2018, the Government of Honduras emphasized interagency operations focused
on specific geographic areas experiencing spikes in criminal activity. These operations have resulted in a high number of arrests, arms seizures, and significant marijuana seizures, but have not yielded notable cocaine seizures or disruptions to drug trafficking organizations. The HNP Special Forces Directorate’s elite unit, the TIGRES, has been instrumental in providing the tactical, operational support required for these operations.

The HNP Antinarcotics Directorate (DNPA), created in 2018, began tactical operations in September with support from other HNP Directorates. The DNPA faces various challenges associated with being a new police directorate. As of October, the DNPA had 135 personnel, the bulk of whom are recent police academy graduates or officers with limited experience in drug operations. DNPA does not have an established headquarters, so personnel and leadership work from various locations. In January 2018, the HNP moved the Financial Crimes Task Force (OPIF) from the Directorate of Police Investigations to the DNPA to address the financial aspects of drug investigations. The U.S. government provides advisory support to the DNPA in the areas of organizational development, inter-directorate information sharing, operational planning, and financial investigations.

The U.S.-supported HNP Criminal Investigation School (EIC) provides coursework on the classification of illicit drugs, pharmacology, clandestine laboratories, chemical precursors, and trafficking methods, and incorporates drug control topics in all other courses offered. The HNP remains committed to utilizing continuing education as a means to professionalize their force generally, but also as a way to improve the investigative capacity of the force to counter drug trafficking. The Honduran National Congress increased the EIC budget from approximately $20,000 in 2016 to $1.3 million in 2018. The Government of Honduras is also investing, with support from U.S. and international donors, in a specialized training academy that will include a dedicated school for counterdrug training.

Honduras is party to several regional agreements that focus on drug trafficking, including the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission and the Caribbean Regional Agreement on Maritime Counternarcotics. Honduras has ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.

2. Supply Reduction

The willingness of civilian and military entities to combat illicit drug trafficking and steps taken by the Government of Honduras over previous years to create new drug control entities has not yet translated into significant increases in drug seizures or notable disruptions to drug trafficking organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, recognizing the improved capabilities of Honduran security forces, have begun moving drug shipments in smaller amounts to avoid detection and interdiction by Honduran authorities. While seizures by Honduran authorities in their territorial and maritime domain are down, there is no concrete information to suggest the overall volume of illicit drugs being trafficked through Honduras has decreased. During the first nine months of 2018, there was a threefold increase in seizures of cocaine transiting Honduras according to U.S. government data, seized mostly by non–Honduran authorities in territories outside of Honduras. In contrast to this assessment, in September, the Ministry of Defense claimed that Honduras achieved a 50 percent reduction in the volume of drugs transiting
Honduras, and destroyed nearly 50 clandestine airstrips. The U.S. government is still working to corroborate this information.

The Honduran Navy made efforts during 2018 to modernize its surface fleet and initiated the purchase of new vessels, but has not made a commensurate increase in operational budget and it is uncertain when the vessels will become an active part of the fleet. Fuel availability is a significant limitation for the Honduran Navy to interdict suspected drug trafficking vessels, as these ships often operate at long distances from the Navy’s control nodes and current fuel budgets are miniscule compared to the need.

The military controls wiretapping facilities and access to wiretapping results for civilian law enforcement remains inadequate, resulting in a significant loss of actionable intelligence for interdictions that could occur on land. The U.S. government is working with the Ministry of Security to gain additional access to the wiretapping facilities to assist in the development of intelligence for drug control entities.

The Ministry of Defense stated an interest in increasing information sharing with the United States on both licit and illicit maritime activities. Furthermore, the U.S. government began discussions in 2018 with the Ministry of Defense to train and outfit a Maritime Interdiction Unit (Fuerzas Especiales Navales) to be modeled after a similar U.S.-supported unit in Guatemala. The current aerial interdiction law in Honduras prevents the United States from sharing radar or other information related to illicit trafficking by air. The Honduran government does not currently have the capacity to track all suspected drug trafficking flights into or out of clandestine airstrips without outside support.

The analytic capabilities of the Merchant Marine (DGMM) Department of Analysis and Maritime Control, created in 2016, continue to improve and support the fight against drug trafficking. The Honduran Navy and the U.S. authorities receive the majority of DGMM’s intelligence, but the Honduran Navy is limited in its ability to make patrols based on this information because of resource constraints. Poor port security, inadequate container inspection protocols, and complicated interagency procedures limit the ability of Honduran authorities to act on DGMM’s information on suspect vessels or containers in port.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The primary focus of the Honduran government remains on improving security and economic conditions in Honduras. Public information on drug use is insufficient. Prevention and treatment programs are limited in both scope and geography. The National Directorate of Investigation and Intelligence released a report in August 2018 identifying data collection on drug use as a critical gap that inhibits an appropriate approach to drug use prevention and treatment. The DNPA’s Prevention Department is staffed by only two individuals, neither of whom have formal training in drug use prevention.

The United States supports comprehensive, balanced, and coordinated approaches to increase the capacity of the Government of Honduras to address and counter the demand for illegal drugs. Assistance included support to the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program,
estimated to have reached 100,000 students in 2018. Other U.S.-supported grants provided support to host country institutions that deal with drug treatment and prevention in the highest risk areas of Honduras.

4. Corruption

The Government of Honduras does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption remains widespread in public institutions. The Special Commission for the Purging and Restructuring of the HNP completed its original mission to expel corrupt police officers from the force in 2017 and is slated to disband in January 2019. The HNP continues to hire new police officers to achieve its target of 26,000 by 2022, and as of October 2018 numbered about 18,500 officers.

In April 2018, the OAS Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) completed two years of operations. The Honduran anticorruption court and the PM’s Anti-Corruption Unit (UFECIC), stood up with the support of MACCIH, began to investigate and try high-level corruption cases. Since late 2017, MACCIH has launched several large-scale corruption cases, including against current and former public officials. An UFECIC and MACCIH investigation against former First Lady Rosa Elena Bonilla de Lobo for alleged misuse of public funds, fraud, and money laundering, led to her arrest in February 2018. In June, UFECIC, in conjunction with MACCIH investigators, announced the Pandora Case. The case accuses 38 individuals, including a former Secretary of Agriculture and several Congresspersons, of acts of fraud, money laundering, falsifying documents, and abuse of authority. MACCIH continues to pursue a legislative agenda to strengthen anticorruption laws and reduce impunity.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States provides assistance through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to improve the professional capabilities of Honduran justice sector institutions, consistent with the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and the Central American governments’ Alliance for Prosperity Initiative. The overall objective of U.S. assistance is to reinforce Honduran security and justice sector institutions so they can account for their nation’s security, stability, and prosperity.

The U.S. government provides advisory and logistical support along with equipment to various HNP directorates, the PM, and the military to improve host country capacities to investigate and disrupt drug trafficking in Honduras. Specifically, the United States trains and equips HNP special units such as the Violent Crimes Task Force, the National Anti-Kidnapping Unit, the TIGRES, and the Special Tactical Operations Group (GOET). U.S. assistance to community policing efforts continued during 2018 and an additional seven Model Police Precincts (MPPs) were established. These MPPs support broader drug control efforts by facilitating positive interaction with police and improving communities’ trust in and willingness to work with police, thereby making communities more resilient to crime including crime with a nexus to drug trafficking, distribution, and use. U.S.-supported HNP vetted units include the Transnational
Anti-Gang Unit, the Sensitive Investigations Unit, and the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, which address drug trafficking and other transnational crime.

The United States maintains a bilateral agreement with Honduras to suppress illicit traffic by sea, which includes provisions for shipboarding, shipriders, pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight, order to land and for the use of third-party platforms. Honduras is a regular participant in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summits, which bring together counterdrug professionals from nearly 25 countries and over 65 international organizations spanning North, Central and South America, and Europe.

D. Conclusion

The United States works closely with Honduran authorities to improve the host government’s capacity to provide security and justice to its citizens and combat drug trafficking. In 2018, Honduras made progress in improving investigative capacity and the interoperability of security forces to fight criminal organizations but was not able to translate these improvements into notable disruptions to drug trafficking organizations. Inadequate resources and the inability to interdict the frequent, small shipments of illicit drugs through Honduras remain as difficult challenges. The Government of Honduras will need to continue on its path to reform its institutions, accelerate judicial processes, and provide adequate resources to its justice sector operators to achieve greater success against drug trafficking organizations.
India

A. Introduction

India’s geographic location and transport links make it an attractive transshipment point for illicit narcotics bound for Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and North America. Cross-border heroin trafficking from Pakistan to India continues to be a major problem due to India’s porous borders and capacity deficits that prevent the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) from reducing smuggling.

In 2018, India exported over $17 billion of licit pharmaceutical drugs, and it has been the leading generic drug manufacturer in the world for several years. Estimates suggest that India exports twice the volume of pharmaceutical drugs as China. Drug traffickers exploit this commercial infrastructure – and India’s rare combination of technical expertise and chemical source supplies – to market dangerous synthetic drugs in the United States and elsewhere. U.S. and international law enforcement authorities have voiced concerns that transnational criminal organizations could target India’s pharmaceutical laboratories and chemists to produce illicit fentanyl and fentanyl analogues.

U.S.-based customers obtain illegal pharmaceutical drugs from India through online pharmacies, non-indexed web sites (“Dark Web”), or call centers. Thousands of mail shipments of illicit pharmaceutical drugs are sent to the United States each year, feeding the current opioid epidemic. Neighboring countries including Nepal and Bhutan have also identified Indian pharmaceutical drugs as a major problem.

Trafficking of the opioid tramadol from India is another serious drug control challenge. India is the leading global producer of licit tramadol, and approximately 50 companies in the country are licensed to legitimately manufacture the drug. However, billions of tablets of mostly counterfeit tramadol originating in India have been seized across Asia, Africa, and Europe.

India is authorized to produce licit opium for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and is a major producer of precursor chemicals. There is evidence that opium is also grown illicitly in India, especially in the country’s northeast.

India appears to be committed to addressing its drug-related challenges but faces resources and capacity limitations, as well as insufficient law enforcement presence relative to its population size. Additionally, a lack of information technology, including integrated networks and case management software, hampers day-to-day enforcement of Indian drug laws.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

India continues to tighten regulations and increase law enforcement officer training. However, the capacity of India’s drug law enforcement personnel to collect and analyze data and conduct complex criminal drug manufacturing and trafficking investigations remains limited by
inadequate training, a lack of modern equipment, insufficient staffing, and poor interagency coordination.

To fulfill India’s United Nations treaty obligations for drug control, the Government of India implemented the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. This Act gave rise to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), India’s primary drug agency responsible for combating and preventing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. In 2018, 24 NCB officers attended a week-long training conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on precursor chemicals and diversion.

In addition to the NCB, India’s Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), Border Security Force (BSF), Indian Customs Service (ICS), and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) play a role in stemming the drug trafficking in India. India’s DRI, housed under the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, is the primary anti-smuggling intelligence and investigative law enforcement agency. Its responsibilities include investigating violations of the NDPS Act.

The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) supervises the licit cultivation of opium poppy in India. CBN is also responsible for the issuance of licenses required for the manufacture of synthetic narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances listed in the NDPS Act, as well as import/export authorizations for the movement of precursor chemicals and pharmaceutical drugs to and from India. Furthermore, CBN is the central agency authorized to interact with the International Narcotics Control Board and international governments in supervising international transactions of regulated substances.

BSF and ICS share primary responsibility for monitoring India’s borders. ICS manages official border crossing checkpoints with Pakistan and is responsible for checking all cargo and persons entering India. However, porous borders and capacity issues limit both agencies’ effectiveness in combatting illegal smuggling, cultivation, and production. The porous borders also contribute to the movement of Afghan-produced heroin throughout the region, enabling regional terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. BSF and ICS continue to lack the technology necessary to keep pace with traffickers.

India’s various national and state-level law enforcement agencies face challenges in institutionalizing effective coordination. Poor intelligence exploitation during drug seizures limits investigative leads. Lengthy delays between drug seizures and prosecutions also complicate efforts to develop an effective enforcement and prosecution strategy. Finally, a lack of modern drug legislation and effective drug courts also severely hamper Indian law enforcement agencies’ ability to conduct complex drug conspiracy investigations.

The Government of India has entered into bilateral agreements or memoranda of understanding for mutual cooperation to reduce demand and prevent the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals with 36 countries. India participates in mutual legal assistance treaties with 39 countries, including the United States. India also maintains extradition treaties with at least 28 countries plus additional extradition arrangements.
2. Supply Reduction

India has seen a sharp rise in pharmaceutical and chemical diversion cases with investigative links to the United States as illicit distributors increasingly connect with less-regulated markets such as India for their supply. Online sales (over both surface and non-indexed websites) and call center operations based in India continue to feed the U.S. appetite for opioids.

Based on leads passed from the DEA, Indian drug authorities in Gujarat, Mumbai, and other cities within India, made numerous seizures of diverted controlled drugs in 2018, most of which were destined for the U.S. illicit market. In 2018, Indian authorities acting on DEA information seized over 7.4 million tablets of tramadol destined for illicit diversion in the United States. In September, DEA and DRI also worked together to safely dismantle the first known illicit fentanyl laboratory in India, and seized approximately 11 kilograms (kg) of fentanyl.

In June 2018, Indian law enforcement raided multiple pharmaceutical factories illegally producing ketamine, resulting in the seizure of approximately 308 kg of ketamine and two metric tons of raw materials to manufacture ketamine, hashish, cocaine, and opium. The drug trafficking organization involved in these raids was responsible for trafficking ketamine to Australia, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam, demonstrating India’s role as a central transit point for international drug trade. One month later, officials seized approximately 300 additional kg of ketamine at two separate locations.

The first seizure of Indian fentanyl, believed to have been destined for the U.S. market, occurred in August 2018 in Mexico. In September, Indian Law Enforcement in conjunction with DEA successfully arrested three individuals involved in the operation of a fentanyl laboratory including a Mexican cartel member and a PhD-level chemist.

In October 2018, Indian law enforcement officials arrested a Pakistani national involved in trafficking 300 kg of heroin near the Nepal border, with a believed terrorism nexus. Seizures of MDMA (ecstasy) and ketamine manufactured in India have also been observed.

In 2017 (the most recent data available as of this report), NCB continued to use satellite imagery and other intelligence methods to track and reduce illicit poppy cultivation. NCB’s coordination and enforcement resulted in the identification and destruction of over 2,430 hectares (ha) of opium poppies (compared to 2,635 ha in 2016). The U.S. government has not validated these figures. In India’s northeast, where illicit poppy production is widespread, insurgent groups reportedly protect the poppy sites in exchange for compensation from traffickers and cultivators, complicating NCB efforts to identify and eradicate the sites.

In 2017, cannabis cultivation was also detected, totaling about 3,446 ha. This supply was subsequently destroyed. The U.S. government has not validated this data.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment
There is significant pharmaceutical drug abuse in the country, with a ready supply of drugs available over the counter at most pharmacies. However, given India’s size and large population, accurate estimates of the extent, pattern, and nature of its drug problem are difficult. Commonly reported drugs of abuse in India include heroin, opium, cocaine, ephedrine, cannabis, and MDMA. India’s Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MSJE) and NCB manage India’s public demand reduction strategy, which promotes drug abuse awareness, education, counseling, and treatment programs – and trains demand reduction volunteers.

Additionally, India’s National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) is implementing programs to reduce public health consequences of drug use in regions with a high concentration of injecting drug users, especially the Northeast and Punjab regions. Over 213 centers in the country provide services to 22,510 injecting drug users of the total estimated 160,968-person population of people who inject drugs in India, according to NACO statistics.

In terms of broader drug use, an opioid dependence survey carried out in Punjab in 2015 found that of the state’s 28 million-person population, 230,000 people were opioid dependent and 860,000 were opioid users.

To better understand the national prevalence of drug abuse, MSJE and the National Drug Dependence Treatment Centre of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences launched a survey to compile national and state-level estimates of the numbers of persons abusing drugs in July 2016. The two-year-long survey, originally scheduled for release in late 2018, will map the presence of treatment and rehabilitation services for drug-dependent individuals and identify the gaps in service delivery.

4. Corruption

Although the Government of India does not encourage or facilitate drug trafficking, national and local government officials have been implicated in drug-related corruption. Official corruption has historically undermined the effectiveness of government control regimes for illicit drugs, and Indian media reports allege widespread official corruption, with bribes paid to rural police stations and local governance bodies to ignore illicit poppy and cannabis fields under their jurisdiction. Corrupt border officials also enable the movement of heroin and precursor materials across the border. For example, in October 2018, the Anti-Corruption Bureau arrested an opium inspector and a contracted computer data operator posted at NCB for allegedly taking bribes from local farmers.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

U.S.-Indian law enforcement cooperation led to numerous high-yield and high-value seizures throughout 2018. NCB, DRI and DEA made joint arrests and seized significant amounts of narcotics. U.S. and Indian law enforcement authorities also continue to target international drug organizations based in the United States and other locations with extensive ties to India. Investigations have shown that Indian organizations have transferred proceeds from narcotics trafficking on behalf of multiple drug trafficking organizations.
D. Conclusion

India’s booming pharmaceutical and chemical industries are world leaders in pharmaceutical exports, particularly generic drugs. However, the large industry is fragmented, insular, and in some ways, difficult to regulate. Laws, regulations, and government enforcement have not kept adequate pace with the growth, and India is experiencing increased diversion from both licit pharmaceutical manufacturers and clandestine laboratories.

In 2018, Indian NCB and DRI worked closely and effectively with DEA and regional counterdrug partners in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Through this regional cooperation, Indian officials were able to make or facilitate numerous arrests and seizures. Further developing this relationship through intelligence sharing and cross training could lead to continued operational improvement.

This collaboration will be critical in 2019, as significant narcotics-related challenges facing the Indian government include growing production and trafficking of synthetic drugs such as fentanyl, as well as diversion of controlled substances from both licit and illicit channels; pharmaceutical smuggling from India to neighboring countries; and poor coordination among India’s drug enforcement agencies.

The profitability of manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine and other drugs has transformed India into a significant global source for precursor chemicals and drugs. Global demand for fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and other dangerous drugs has given rise to precursor chemical entrepreneurs in India who are retooling commercial chemical factories to illicitly produce large volumes of ephedrine, methamphetamine, and other drugs. As global demand for synthetic drugs continues to grow, so too will India’s illicit manufacturing and trafficking networks.
Indonesia

A. Introduction

As a transshipment and destination point for illicit drugs, the Indonesian government struggles with the maritime interdiction and border control issues inherent in policing the more than 17,000 islands comprising its territory. With the world’s fourth largest population, Indonesia is a significant consumer of cannabis, crystal methamphetamine, and MDMA (ecstasy). Much of the methamphetamine available in Indonesia originates in China, Taiwan, or Burma. MDMA is usually sourced from China, but also reaches Indonesia from the Netherlands, while cannabis is primarily grown in northern Sumatra for domestic consumption. The Indonesian Government, including the National Narcotics Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BNN) and Indonesia National Police (INP), continued efforts to investigate, disrupt, interdict, and prosecute crimes related to illicit drugs in 2018, and some traffickers continued to receive the death penalty.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Officers of BNN and INP continued to move aggressively against drug-trafficking suspects, and President Joko Widodo has called for strong enforcement measures to address the on-going drug emergency in Indonesia. International non-governmental organizations periodically criticize excessive use of force in counterdrug operations. On October 23, hundreds of residents attacked and burned a local police precinct building in Aceh following the suspicious death of a drug suspect, who was allegedly tortured while in police custody. Four police were investigated for committing “procedural violations.”

BNN’s 2018 budget included funding prevention, eradication, and demand reduction programs. According to BNN, each of the three deputies responsible for Prevention, Eradication, and Rehabilitation and Community Empowerment were provided equal funding.

BNN opened three new facilities to respond to narcotics supply and demand challenges: 1) a narcotics lab – the first of its kind in Indonesia – to address emerging issues related to new psychoactive substances; 2) a canine-unit training facility to increase drug interdictions at border areas and major entry points; and 3) a BNN community office pilot project in Surabaya to encourage the public to provide information and tips. BNN also purchased new equipment, including x-rays and scanners, and located them at air and seaports known to be entry points for illicit drugs.

In an effort to disrupt a key drug smuggling route, BNN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with PT (Pelabuhan Indonesia IV), a state owned enterprise that covers one of the biggest seaports in eastern Indonesia, Makassar Seaport. Internationally, BNN also signed a MOU with the Kingdom of Morocco to share information involving illicit drug production and trade, evidence seizure, drug rehabilitation and research. Indonesian authorities also continued to coordinate with partners on drug interdiction, including the United States and Taiwan.
BNN reported that during the first 10 months of 2018, 111,000 individuals were incarcerated on drug-related charges, and more than half of those specifically for trafficking. The United States provided counterdrug training for BNN and the INP, including for more than 45 law enforcement officers in February in Medan, North Sumatra. Participants received training in financial analysis, internet investigations, graphic analysis, and cultivating confidential sources. No mutual legal assistance treaty or extradition treaty exists between Indonesia and the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

BNN and INP continued to interdict illicit drugs successfully during 2018, and U.S. assistance proved helpful in this regard. Indonesian law enforcement made a number of significant seizures during the year. The largest, in February, was based on joint cooperation between BNN, INP, Indonesia Customs Narcotics Enforcement Team (CNET), Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) Task Force, and U.S. authorities that resulted in an initial seizure of approximately 470 kilograms (kg) of crystal methamphetamine from a fishing vessel operated by a Taiwanese syndicate, followed two weeks later by the seizure of another 725 kg of crystal methamphetamine from a fishing vessel suspected of being operated by the same Taiwanese organization. These seizures represent the largest Indonesian drug seizures to date.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

BNN did not publish any national surveys or research in 2018; the agency’s most recent drug research was published in December 2017. According to the December 2017 research, an average of 30 people died daily within the country from overdoses.

Rehabilitative services are provided by the Indonesian government, but supply does not meet demand. BNN is one of the government agencies that provides rehabilitative services, and has the capacity to offer treatment to up to 20,000 drug users annually. However, Indonesia’s total drug-using population tops four million, according to BNN statistics.

4. Corruption

The Indonesian government did not encourage or facilitate any illegal activity related to drug trafficking, and no senior government officials were known to be institutionally involved in any such activity. However, corruption at all levels of government and society continues to be endemic, and undermines the country’s drug control efforts. Nevertheless, Indonesia made some progress in 2018 in combating official corruption, primarily through the actions of the Corruption Eradication Commission.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

In 2018, the United States and Indonesia continue to follow through on most of the areas of bilateral drug demand reduction cooperation agreed upon in February 2016 at the U.S.-Indonesia Drug Demand Reduction Workshop in Jakarta. In October, two Community Anti-Drug
Coalitions (in Jakarta and Surabaya) graduated from two-year training programs that give communities the skills to assess their own local drug problems, inventory the community’s resources, and execute unique solutions to address problems.

The United States is also working with the Indonesian Maritime Police and Maritime Security Agency to promote interagency collaboration and cooperation within Indonesia, and to build maritime patrol and interdiction capacity.

D. Conclusion

Despite the efforts of the Indonesian government, demand for illicit drugs is believed to be growing in Indonesia. Indonesia’s commitment to reducing drug consumption and enforcing its drug control laws remains firm. The United States will continue to support Indonesian law enforcement efforts to disrupt the international drug trade, particularly in the maritime arena, while also helping Indonesia embrace a wide range of interventions aimed at reducing drug use and associated problems.
Iran

Iran is a significant transit and destination country for opiates and cannabis products originating mostly in Afghanistan. Significant volumes of methamphetamine are also produced and consumed within Iran, as well as trafficked to international markets. Most opiates and cannabis products are trafficked into Iran across its land borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug supplies transiting Iran are trafficked overland across Iran’s northern borders, primarily through Turkey and Azerbaijan, and to a lesser extent into Iraq. Heroin and other opioids are also trafficked by maritime conveyance from Iran into Eastern Africa, for further transshipment to international markets.

Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) is the country’s leading drug policy coordination body and reports directly to the country’s president. The Law Enforcement Force (LEF) comprises the country’s uniformed police units, including the Anti-Narcotics Police and border interdiction forces. According to media reports quoting DCHQ senior officials, Iranian authorities seized a total of 370 metric tons of all categories during the first five months of Iran’s lunar calendar in 2018 (March 21 – August 22). During this period, seizures of heroin, morphine, and opium significantly outpaced what was seized during the same period in 2017 – by 17 percent, 58 percent, and 3 percent, respectively.

The Iranian government recognizes that illicit drug consumption within Iran is a serious challenge, and increasingly prevalent. In 2018, DCHQ authorities estimated that 2.8 million people regularly use some form of illicit drug within the country, with half that total suffering from substance use disorders. Other Iranian authorities and non-governmental organizations have cited higher estimates. Opium is the most widely-used illicit drug in Iran, according to Iranian authorities, followed by cannabis products and methamphetamine (known locally as “shisheh,” or “glass”). Approximately 43 percent of Iran’s inmate population is jailed for drug offenses, according to media reports. Non-governmental organizations and the private sector implement the vast majority of demand reduction and treatment programs in the country, including opioid substitution treatment, voluntary counseling centers, prison-based treatment, and school-based prevention campaigns.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime maintains a field office in Tehran that provides some training and capacity support to Iranian authorities, including on demand reduction, drug interdiction, and forensic analysis of drug seizures. Iran maintains liaison relationships with some neighboring countries, but operational cooperation on investigations appears limited. Drug control cooperation between Iran and European states has been limited partially due to concerns over the Iranian government’s widespread application of the death penalty for drug offenses. In January 2018, the country’s strict trafficking laws were amended, raising the threshold that triggers the death penalty in drug possession cases.
Jamaica

A. Introduction

Jamaica remains the largest Caribbean source country of marijuana and a significant transit point for cocaine trafficked from South America to North America and other international markets. Traffickers also export Jamaican-grown marijuana to other Caribbean countries in return for illicit firearms and other contraband. Jamaica’s geographic position in the western Caribbean and its difficult-to-patrol coastline, high volume of tourist travel, and status as a major containerized cargo transshipment hub contribute to its use for drug trafficking via commercial shipping, small watercraft, air freight, human couriers, and private aircraft.

The U.S. and Jamaican governments continue to successfully utilize bilateral legal assistance and extradition treaties, as well as agreements on maritime law enforcement cooperation and sharing forfeited assets. Additionally, the United States and Jamaica made progress in 2018 toward an agreement to formalize information sharing between customs agencies.

Jamaica’s drug control efforts face significant challenges from corruption, organized crime, gang activity, resource constraints, and an inefficient criminal justice system.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Cooperation between the United States and Jamaica against illicit drugs and related transnational crime remains strong. The U.S. government’s primary Jamaican partners are the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF, police), the Jamaica Defense Force (military), the Jamaica Customs Agency, the Major Organized Crime and Anti-corruption Agency (MOCA), and the Financial Investigation Division of the Ministry of Finance. Jamaica’s Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center, housed at the JCF’s police college, provides counterdrug training to several regional partners.

The United States and Jamaica are bilateral parties to both a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty. The countries have a strong extradition and mutual assistance relationship, and both treaties were successfully used in 2018. The United States and Jamaica also utilized a reciprocal agreement to share forfeited criminal assets and a bilateral agreement on law enforcement cooperation on maritime interdiction of illicit traffickers, including boarding of suspicious vessels and embarkation of law enforcement officials on the other country’s ships.

In 2018, the U.S. and Jamaican governments made some progress toward finalizing a bilateral customs mutual assistance agreement (CMAA). The CMAA will provide a legal framework for the exchange of trade information between U.S. and Jamaican customs agencies, which in the long term will assist in targeting the flow of drugs, guns, and other contraband through U.S. and Jamaican ports of entry. The CMAA is still under review by the Jamaican government and is not expected to be signed and in effect until 2019. The Jamaican government ended in 2018 an existing non-binding memorandum of understanding previously used to share intercept
information, on the basis that it did not meet the legal framework required under the Jamaican constitution. The absence of a formal agreement to share intercept information has hampered U.S. investigations in some areas. The United States and Jamaica are currently in negotiations to find a way forward to reaching a mutually agreeable mechanism to restore this longstanding area of cooperation between both governments.

The Jamaica Defense Force Coast Guard is responsible for maritime law enforcement in Jamaica’s over 92,000 square mile maritime domain. The Jamaican military purchased its first fixed-wing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, and held the launch ceremony on November 14, 2018. Additionally, the Jamaican government has assigned a military officer to serve as a liaison at the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, Florida, for coordination of operations against maritime traffickers.

Jamaica’s efforts to bring traffickers to justice are hobbled by an under-resourced, overburdened judicial system. Repeated delays and trial postponements contribute to significant case backlogs; frustration among police, witnesses, jurors, and the public, and; impunity for many offenders. In response, the Jamaican government passed a plea bargain reform bill in 2017, drafted with U.S. support and designed to incentivize plea bargaining to increase the courts’ efficiency and reduce the backlog of criminal cases.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the JCF, authorities seized 63 kilograms (kg) of cocaine over the first nine months of 2018. Jamaican authorities seized 658 kg during the same period in 2017. In 2018, the JCF’s forces have been stretched thin by various state of emergency operations.

Significant cocaine seizures at or near the Port of Kingston have indicated that large shipments reached Jamaica via commercial shipping containers from South America. Cocaine also arrives in Jamaica via small “go-fast” watercraft from Central and South America, likely with the assistance of larger fishing vessels that serve as mother ships. After reaching Jamaica, some cocaine shipments are transshipped in containers through the Port of Kingston onto vessels bound for the United States and other international markets. Other shipments enter the country and are divided into smaller quantities for outbound shipment via other means, including concealment in luggage, human couriers, air freight, or small watercraft.

In 2015, legislation to decriminalize the possession and use of small amounts of marijuana for personal use went into effect. During the first nine months of 2018, Jamaican authorities eradicated 186 hectares (ha) of cannabis plants and seized approximately 20.2 metric tons of cured marijuana, according to police data. Jamaican farmers cultivate an estimated 15,000 ha of cannabis every year. The police, supported by the United States, employ an eradication team to cut growing plants, seize seedlings and cured marijuana, and burn them in the field. The team conducts only manual eradication, since Jamaican law prohibits the use of herbicides.

Traffickers smuggle Jamaican-grown marijuana out of the country via commercial shipping and small watercraft. Small fishing vessels and speed boats carry marijuana to Haiti, the Cayman Islands, and the Bahamas. A thriving “guns for ganja (marijuana)” trade continues between
Jamaica and Haiti, as evidenced by seizures in 2018 of illegal firearms traced to Haiti and marijuana shipments prepared for embarkation from coastal Jamaica. Police and customs officials also target marijuana shipments smuggled via commercial shipping directly to the United States.

Jamaica prohibits the manufacture, sale, transport, and possession of MDMA (ecstasy) and methamphetamine and regulates the precursor chemicals used to produce them. There were no reports of synthetic drugs or precursor chemicals produced or trafficked in Jamaica in 2018. The National Council on Drug Abuse, the Pharmacy Council, and the Ministry of Health work to expand awareness among health professionals of the potential for diversion of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine to produce methamphetamine.

U.S. law enforcement agencies work closely with Jamaican police and customs officials to develop leads, share information, and facilitate interdiction of drug shipments originating in or transiting through Jamaica. The U.S. government has supported the Jamaican police’s Narcotics Division with equipment, including 17 donated vehicles and a training room, as well as training.

3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment

The Ministry of Health’s National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA), working through the primary care system and mental health clinics, provides assessment, counseling and treatment services for substance abusers. The Jamaican government operates one detoxification center located at the University Hospital of the West Indies in Kingston and also offers services at Kingston’s Bellevue Hospital (a mental health institution). In collaboration with the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Jamaica offers a university-level certificate program in drug addiction and drug prevention. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime works directly with the Jamaican government and non-governmental organizations on demand reduction.

4. Corruption

As a matter of policy, the Jamaican government does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking or the laundering of proceeds from illicit drug transactions. Jamaican law penalizes corruption, but in practice, corruption remains entrenched and widespread, and the judicial system has a poor record of prosecuting corruption cases against law enforcement and government officials. The last time a Member of Parliament or similarly high-ranking official was tried or convicted on corruption charges was in 1990, when a former minister of labor was convicted for diverting money from a farm worker program for personal gain. Corruption at Jamaica’s airports and seaports allegedly facilitates the movement of drug shipments across borders, and organized crime leaders have historically had ties to government officials, creating a permissive environment for drug trafficking.

In October 2018, the Jamaican government passed a bill to make MOCA, which investigates organized crime and official corruption, fully independent of the police. MOCA was previously a task force within the JCF; the new legislation makes it a free-standing entity with its own
dedicated resources, potentially increasing its freedom to investigate corruption cases throughout the government.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The U.S. and Jamaican governments coordinate closely on shared priorities related to narcotics control, including investigative capacity, customs cooperation, maritime security, and support to the judicial system.

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI support to Jamaica includes training, equipment, and logistical assistance for interdicting illicit drugs and firearms trafficking; combating cybercrime, money laundering, financial fraud, and other organized crime; improving Jamaica’s efforts to seize and forfeit criminally-acquired assets; and enhancing Jamaica’s maritime law enforcement capabilities. The United States also funds projects to improve the effectiveness of prosecutors and the courts, the National Forensic Sciences Laboratory, and the Financial Investigation Division.

To increase public and government attention on the need for anticorruption reforms, the United States provides support to the non-governmental organization National Integrity Action (NIA). NIA provides training to government, civil society, and media partners to increase awareness and conducts campaigns to increase public demand for more effective action against corruption.

The United States and Jamaica entered into a bilateral agreement to suppress maritime illicit trafficking in 1998. This agreement includes provisions to stop, board, and search suspect vessels, the authority to overfly Jamaica’s territorial waters, the ability to order to land, and the use of third-party boarding platforms. Jamaica is a regular participant in the Multilateral Maritime Interdiction and Prosecution Summits, which bring together maritime counter drug professionals from more than 20 countries across the Caribbean, Europe, and the United States.

D. Conclusion

Cooperation between Jamaica and the United States related to drug trafficking and transnational crime continued to be strong in 2018, as evidenced by the high number of high-level extraditions of wanted criminals from the United States to Jamaica.

Progress against drug trafficking will significantly depend on efforts to combat corruption and strengthen the judicial system so traffickers are held criminally accountable. New legislation to create an independent anticorruption investigation agency and U.S.-supported programs to weed out corrupt officials may represent a step forward in this regard.
Kazakhstan

A. Introduction

Kazakhstan is a transit country for Afghan heroin and other opiates destined for Russia and Europe. Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies continued to report declining volumes of seizures of Afghan heroin in Kazakhstan in 2018, continuing a multi-year trend. Official statistics were not available at the time of this report. Kazakhstani authorities credited this reported decline to the Government of Kazakhstan’s effort to enhance border security in the south of the country, as well as a possible shift in trafficking patterns away from Central Asia in favor of routes through South Asia and the Balkans. The U.S. government lacks sufficient information to corroborate these possible explanations.

Cultivation and trafficking of cannabis occurs within Kazakhstan, with most cannabis originating in the Zhambyl region on the southern border with the Kyrgyz Republic. Law enforcement conducts operations to eradicate cultivation and interdict trafficking of cannabis within those areas of the country. The Government of Kazakhstan has expressed growing concern about the use and trafficking of synthetic drugs within Kazakhstan, many of which are purchased via the internet and imported into the country from Russia, China, Southeast Asia, and Europe.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Government of Kazakhstan pursues efforts to prevent drug addiction and combat drug trafficking as high priorities, and has integrated counterdrug activities into its National Security Strategy. Kazakhstan implements drug demand reduction treatment projects in line with its national healthcare program for 2016-2019.

Kazakhstan embraces regional cooperation to counter drug trafficking, including by hosting of the Central Asia Regional Information Coordination Center for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC). The country’s law enforcement agencies use CARICC as a platform to exchange operational information on transnational drug trafficking in Central Asia. The government cooperates with various multilateral organizations on drug control activities and policy discussions, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. Kazakhstan continues to provide training assistance to Afghanistan and other states in the region. Cadets from Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan study at Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Border Guard Service academies.

In 2018, Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies participated in several counterdrug operations and exercises under a CSTO regional umbrella operation called “Kanal” (Channel). Kazakhstan hosted two operations under this initiative, in May and September, respectively. In cooperation with UNODC, Kazakhstan also implemented five capacity building projects to counter illicit
trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors in Central Asia and other neighboring countries. SCO members adopted an Anti-Narcotics Strategy for 2018-2023, an action plan for its implementation, and a “concept of prevention of abuse of narcotics and psychotropic substances.”

In 2016, Kazakhstan developed draft legislation that would allow scheduling of potentially dangerous psychoactive substances as analogues of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including on an emergency basis. The law still awaits approval by Kazakhstan’s parliament.

2. Supply Reduction

During the first nine months of 2018, Kazakhstan’s law enforcement agencies reported detecting 6,516 criminal drug-related offences, including 2,147 drug-related crimes, 1,446 illicit drug sales, and 172 instances of drug smuggling. Law enforcement agencies reported conducting six controlled delivery operations that resulted in the seizure of 16.5 kilograms (kg) of illicit drugs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported disrupting nine drug trafficking organizations, initiating 15 criminal cases targeting organized criminal groups, and initiating 12 cases targeting illicit drug sales. Law enforcement reported seizing 18.9 metric tons (MT) of illicit drugs in total (down from 38.5 MT during the same period in 2017), including 55.3 kg of heroin (126.6 kg in 2017); 740 kg of hashish (439.6 kg in 2017); 7.4 kg of opium; and 16.4 MT of marijuana (32.3 MT in 2017).

Kazakhstan conducted its annual cannabis eradication operation from May 20 through October 20. During the first nine months of 2018, the MVD reported detecting 1,571 internet sites involved in illicit drug sales, and the Ministry of Information and Communications blocked 1,446 of those sites. Another 125 sites are still under review.

The MVD reported seizing approximately 1.8 kg of synthetic drugs in 2018, including 1.2 kg of pyrovalerone, 856 grams of fentanyl, and 23.8 grams of methylmethcathinone. The relatively small synthetic drug seizure totals may not accurately reflect the true scale of trafficking within the country. Kazakhstani agencies have limited forensic capacity to identify new psychoactive substances, and the country’s current legislation does not criminalize analogue substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The MVD Counternarcotics Department cooperates with 73 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on drug demand reduction activities and the medical and social rehabilitation of persons suffering from substance abuse disorders. New narcology standards, treatment methods, prison addict rehabilitation, and harm reduction programs are in development, but remain antiquated.

The Counternarcotics Department worked with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and Science, and NGOs to conduct 6,453 drug demand reduction events in 2018, reaching over 333,000 youth. The government also introduced a new program in schools to assist with early diagnosis of drug use. A drug use prevention project initiated by the MVD and the Ministry of Education and Science called “Young Police Assistants” has reached 55,000 school children.
The government reported 23,105 registered drug users in 2018, including 1,704 women and 126 minors.

4. Corruption

The Government of Kazakhstan does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, there are instances of corruption among law enforcement agencies, particularly among front line law enforcement officers, whose low salaries incentivize bribe requests. The government rewards citizens for reporting police corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Kazakhstan is committed to advancing its drug demand and supply reduction goals and strengthening international cooperation in these fields. To reduce the illicit inflow of drugs, Kazakhstan plans to revise its border procedures for foreign nationals, especially from countries identified as illicit drug trafficking threats. The government is also developing measures to identify and combat maritime trafficking channels.

The United States continues to support drug control capacity building with relevant authorities. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the MVD in November 2016 to support bilateral drug control efforts and information sharing, allowing a closer relationship, information sharing, and joint operations. DEA also signed an MOU with Committee for National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KNB) on June 27, 2018, which yielded fruitful cooperation over the course of the year. The United States supports efforts to strengthen Kazakhstan’s border security, including efforts to expand Kazakhstan’s Coast Guard capacity on the Caspian Sea. In 2018, the United States organized 36 training programs for Kazakhstani drug enforcement officers. All U.S. government programs aim to improve Kazakhstan’s capacity to combat drug trafficking and drug demand, and enjoy full host government support and shared funding.

D. Conclusion

Kazakhstan remains concerned about regional drug trafficking trends linked to illicit drug production in Afghanistan. To confront the increasing synthetic drug threat, Kazakhstan should work to finalize and adopt its pending legislation that would allow it to schedule narcotic analogues for control, including on an emergency basis, a step that will greatly enhance its ability to counter this threat. The government is seeking to expand its drug control cooperation with international partners, especially the United States, and is also taking steps to combat existing and emerging public health and national security threats posed by drug trafficking and addiction.
Kenya

Kenya is a significant transshipment route for illicit drugs destined for other international markets, and, to a lesser extent, a consumer country of illicit drugs. Transnational criminal organizations that transship drugs through Kenya also engage in a wide range of additional criminal activity, including corruption, money laundering and wildlife trafficking. Drug trafficking organizations utilize Kenya as a transshipment point for heroin and to a lesser extent, cocaine and methamphetamine. The most commonly used illicit drug by Kenyan adults is cannabis, followed by heroin and diverted pharmaceutical drugs.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act of 1994 and its various amendments provide the basis for drug law enforcement within Kenya. Criminal asset forfeiture laws are also in place allowing for the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds from drug trafficking, as well as assets used in furtherance of such crimes. The Anti-Narcotic Units of the Kenya Police Service enforce narcotics laws throughout the country, while other law enforcement agencies frequently assist in drug enforcement matters.

The importation of heroin into Kenya is a major focus of law enforcement authorities. This criminal activity brings with it a multitude of other threats, including corruption and increased local use of the drug. Although heroin is used throughout Kenya, consumption is most prevalent along the coastal area surrounding Mombasa. Heroin enters Kenya both through maritime smuggling and over land borders, primarily in the south of Kenya. Cocaine frequently transits Kenya, primarily by couriers traveling commercial airlines. Although a majority of the cocaine is destined for other markets, there is evidence of local cocaine trafficking and consumption.

The United States and Kenya enjoy an excellent bilateral relationship and fully cooperate on multilateral drug enforcement efforts. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration works closely with Kenya to target national and international drug trafficking organizations. In turn, Kenyan counternarcotics law enforcement authorities also liaise with their counterparts in neighboring countries and throughout the region, fostering a coordinated multinational approach in targeting transnational criminal organizations.
Laos

A. Introduction

Laos is a major drug source country of illicit opium cultivation, and a significant transit hub and consumer of other illicit drugs, particularly amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Most of the opium grown in Laos is destined for export and refinement into heroin, with only a small percentage consumed in Laos. Laos is not a significant source of opiates being sent to the United States. ATS production within Laos appears to be limited but increasing, and seizure data indicates that ATS trafficking into Laos from neighboring countries is increasing, fueling rising drug use within the country. Laos shares approximately 3,000 miles of porous land and riverine borders with Burma, Thailand, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Although infrastructure remains rudimentary, improving road, bridge, and communication networks in Laos have increased opportunities for drug trafficking.

Poppy cultivation in Laos decreased 96 percent between 1998 and 2007 due to aggressive government action and international cooperation, particularly U.S. alternative development assistance. Although significant amounts of opium poppy are still grown in Laos, often in remote and difficult to access areas, overall cultivation appears to have been relatively stable in recent years, if not declining marginally. According to the most recent UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Laos Opium Survey, Laos cultivated an estimated 6,200 hectares (ha) of opium poppy in 2014 and 5,700 ha in 2015. The most recent available data, from a survey completed by Lao and Chinese technical staff, found 5,328 ha of opium poppy in 2017.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Since 1989, the United States has provided Laos approximately $47 million in law enforcement and drug control assistance, which helped to eliminate much of Laos' opium poppy cultivation. The Lao Bureau for Drug Control and Supervision (LBDC) and the Counternarcotics Police Department (DCD), both under the Ministry of Public Security, are the main coordinating bodies for the implementation of drug demand reduction, crop control, alternative development, and law enforcement activities. The top policy-making body for drug control is the National Steering Committee to Combat Drugs (NSCCD), chaired by the Prime Minister. Lao drug police are organized into 18 provincial counterdrug police divisions known as Counter Narcotics Units (CNUs), one for each province and Vientiane Capital.

Laos does not have a bilateral extradition or a mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States, though Laos has acceded to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation. While the Lao are receptive to training opportunities, bilateral cooperation with the United States on international drug trafficking investigations has been rare to date.

2. Supply Reduction
Lao drug control authorities have increased their cooperation over the past several years on border control and interdiction with counterparts in neighboring countries. In January 2017, Laos joined other ASEAN Member States in adopting the ASEAN Cooperation Plan to Tackle Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golden Triangle (2017-2019). The Plan is a concerted effort to solve drug problems in the Golden Triangle, and builds on both the Safe Mekong Joint Operation Project, which began in 2013, and the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs (2016-2025). In October 2018, Laos took over hosting the Safe Mekong Coordination Center and will play the role of host until January 2019. The Safe Mekong Operation Project on Drug Control is specifically focused on disrupting the flow of drugs out of the Golden Triangle and intercepting the flow of chemical precursors into the Golden Triangle. The Safe Mekong initiative partner countries are China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, and Cambodia.

Several Lao drug traffickers were arrested and sentenced in 2017-18. Lao national Xaysana Keophimpha was arrested at Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok in January 2017 and sentenced to life in prison in Thailand in March 2018. Several of his associates have also been arrested, including Sisouk Daoheuang (arrested in Laos) and Akarakit Worarojcharoendet (arrested in Thailand), and have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms or are awaiting sentencing.

During the first six months of 2018, the DCD reportedly seized 71.13 kilograms (kg) of heroin; 53.36 kg of opium; 5.9 kg of cannabis; 102.83 kilogram (kg) of crystal methamphetamine; 1,775,360 ATS tablets (weighing 260.53 kg), and 25.9 kg of precursor chemicals. The DCD investigated 2,947 drug cases and arrested 4,404 people, including 110 foreign nationals. Statistics for the second half of the year were not available at the time of this report. The Lao government also continues to support longstanding efforts to assist former poppy-growing farmers by fostering alternative livelihoods, mostly financed by donors.

In 2016, the U.S. government launched a three-year, $1.5 million alternative development program with the UNODC in Houaphan province. The project focus includes the development of coffee plantations and improved technology for livestock production. In 2018, the U.S. government signed a new $1.225 million Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the Lao Department of Customs focused on improving border security and disrupting the flow of illicit substances into Laos. The U.S. government has an existing LOA with the Ministry of Public Security’s Counternarcotics Police Division and capacity building trainings with Lao CNUs are ongoing.

### 3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The current Lao government, led by Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, has made combating illicit drugs a top priority, and the Lao government has increased efforts to raise awareness of the risks and negative consequences of illicit drugs through mass media such as television, radio, newspaper, and other channels.

ATS use is thought to be concentrated among Laos' youth population, mostly consumed as “yaba,” a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine that is popular throughout Southeast Asia.
The Lao Government uses an estimate of 40,000 consumers, although this figure is likely an underestimate.

Government drug treatment facilities lack the resources to provide evidence-based treatment and post-discharge follow-up. To support demand reduction efforts, the United States supports the adoption of community-based, voluntary treatment. The United States has provided approximately $600,000 to the UNODC and the World Health Organization to establish and operate 28 Community-Based Treatment centers providing screening and counseling services at district hospitals across six provinces. The United States is also funding the translation and training for Lao National Trainers on the U.S.-developed Universal Prevention Curriculum and Universal Treatment Curriculum, with the Colombo Plan and UNODC as the implementers.

4. Corruption

The Lao government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. However, salaries for police, military and civil servants are low, and corruption in Laos is endemic.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The Lao government’s guiding drug control strategy document, the “National Drug Control Master Plan 2016-2020,” was approved in May 2016. The Master Plan, which was developed with support from the United States and the UNODC, articulates nine priorities for the Lao government, including:

- Formulation and improvement of legal instruments concerning narcotic;
- Data/Information collection and analysis;
- Education/Training/Dissemination of the laws and adverse consequences resulting from drug abuse;
- Treatment and vocational training for drug addicts;
- Alternative development, replacing opium poppy and cannabis cultivation;
- Law enforcement;
- Precursor control, analysis and test of drug use;
- International cooperation; and
- Streamlining the organizational machinery of the national commission for drug control and supervision at the central and local levels.

The Master Plan implements the country’s National Drug Law (promulgated in 2015), and calls for a budget of $18 million over five years from 2016-2020. Funds for implementing the plan are expected to come from the Lao government and international donors.

The United States supports Laos’ goal to strengthen the rule of law by 2020 and to create a better environment for combating transnational crime. Most U.S. counterdrug assistance to Laos supports law enforcement efforts, including training for the DCD, CNUs, and Customs Department.
D. Conclusion

Drug control cooperation between Laos and the United States is increasing and continues to emphasize border security and improved law enforcement capacity. Drug trafficking networks across Southeast Asia ignore national borders, requiring strong regional law enforcement capacity and cooperation. Laos’ justice, law enforcement, and security systems lack the resources necessary to counter the increased sophistication of drug-related crime that has accompanied the country’s growing economic development. Continued support for institution building within the Lao government as well as basic law enforcement training, emphasizing interdiction, investigation, and prosecution, remains needed.
Liberia

A. Introduction

While Liberia is not a significant transit country for illicit narcotics, the country’s nascent law enforcement capacity, porous border controls, and proximity to major drug transit routes contribute to trafficking to and through Liberia. While Liberia is also not a significant producer of illicit drugs, local drug use is very common. There is no reliable data on drug consumption trends within Liberia because of poor transportation and communications infrastructure, and a lack of capacity within the Government of Liberia to undertake the necessary research. However, a recent U.S.-administered survey of Liberian youth found that marijuana, tramadol, and methamphetamine are the drugs of choice. Other drug usage includes heroin (mostly smoked) and cocaine (snorted). Local authorities have reported an increased prevalence of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and intravenous drugs. Other than marijuana, locally consumed drugs enter Liberia via commercial aircraft, maritime vessels, and across land borders by foot and vehicle traffic. Drug use among the country’s youth population is a growing public concern.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Local law enforcement agencies, including the Liberia National Police (LNP), Coast Guard, National Security Agency, and the Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency (LDEA), work in concert to fight drug trafficking in Liberia. Established Nigerian criminal networks operate within Liberia, some of which traffic drugs. Local authorities are aware of the threat and are working with the United States and other international partners to prevent illicit criminal networks from gaining a stronger foothold.

During 2018, the LDEA made a number of interdictions and arrests of drug traffickers based upon intelligence and international cooperation. Drug seizures have increased from a few grams of drugs on a single user to multi-kilogram seizures and arrests of international drug traffickers. This is a significant change, as prior to 2013, the LDEA did not have the capacity to perform the basic investigations and surveillance necessary to obtain warrants, maintain chain of custody, and present a proper case in court.

Since 2014, when the LDEA Act and a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act came into effect, Liberian pursuit and prosecution of drug trafficking has increased. In 2015, 107 individuals were arrested under the new Anti-Drug Law with seven indictments; in 2016, there were 70 arrests with 24 indictments leading to 20 prosecutions. In 2017, there were 88 arrests with 11 indictments and 10 prosecutions, leading to a cumulative total of 76 years of imprisonment. During the first 10 months of 2018, there were 83 arrests with nine indictments and four prosecutions. The decline in indictments and prosecutions in 2018 can be attributed to the December 2017 election of a new President who spent several months staffing his administration. Notably, in December of 2016, the LDEA facilitated the transfer and arrest of a Pakistani heroin dealer wanted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which resulted in
in his conviction in a U.S. court in May 2018. Many of the effective interdictions and seizures during 2018 came about because of LDEA’s increased cooperation with international partners, which has led to greater intelligence sharing and capacity to collect and act on intelligence.

The LDEA continues to improve its operational capacity and professionalism, with such activities as using confidential sources; working with private businesses; initiating controlled deliveries; investigating international smuggling groups; and effectively working across Liberian government agencies. The U.S.-Liberia extradition treaty dates from 1939 and is in effect, and while no mutual legal assistance treaty between Liberia and the United States exists, Liberia is a party to multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

Local marijuana production is not seen as a major concern by the public, and while there is little information on the extent of local cannabis cultivation, or the local sales networks, marijuana is clearly the most widely available drug in the country.

In 2018, the LDEA seized a total of approximately 4.5 metric tons (MT) of marijuana, 4.8 kilograms (kg) of cocaine, 12.5 kg of heroin, and 6 kg of methamphetamine (a new class of illicit drugs just seen in Liberia over the past two years). Also in 2018, the LDEA made significant progress in its fight to counter international drug trafficking through air couriers, and successfully interdicted six foreign nationals and seized 267 kg of khat (a traditional stimulant used in Northern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula), four kg of heroin, and two kg of cocaine at Roberts International Airport.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Due to a lack of resources and capacity, the government has conducted very little drug prevention, rehabilitation or treatment since the 1970’s (pre-civil war), with persons with substance use disorders being referred to the only psychiatric hospital in Liberia or to one of the few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the field. A bright spot was on June 26, when the LDEA hosted International Day Against Illicit Drugs-World Drug Day, logistically supported by the United States, which achieved the largest public turnout for this annual event since it was first held in 2003. The event promoted drug demand reduction and community engagement in fighting drug abuse, underscored various enforcement efforts, and highlighted Liberian inter-agency security cooperation to combat drug trafficking and transnational crime. The 2018 event culminated in the public destruction (burning) of seized drugs, an action widely covered in the media as it demonstrated a new level of transparency. The LDEA destroyed 4.38 MT of marijuana, 4.9 kg of cocaine and 12.3 kg of heroin at this event.

4. Corruption

The Government of Liberia does not encourage or facilitate the production or distribution of illicit drugs, nor the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions, as a matter of policy.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States is working with the Government of Liberia to fight international drug trafficking and reduce local demand. Among ongoing initiatives, the United States is funding a $2.4 million project through the U.N Office on Drugs and Crime to enhance the capacities of Liberian law enforcement agencies to counter transnational crime and trafficking of drugs and other contraband. While these efforts continue, U.S. assistance seeks to build the Government of Liberia’s capacity to develop criminal cases against international trafficking organizations active in the country, and encourage judicial application and attorney understanding of anti-drug laws. Many of the seizures and successful cases recorded in 2018 are a direct result of international cooperation in countering international drug trafficking.

D. Conclusion

The Government of Liberia is committed to preventing transnational criminal organizations from gaining a major foothold in its territory, but lacks the resources and capacity to respond adequately to this challenge. Despite significant constraints, the LDEA is also working with other regional drug enforcement entities to exchange intelligence and information – collaboration that has led to the interdiction of international traffickers within Liberia’s borders. After four years of effort to overcome institutional and political resistance, the LDEA has deployed to all the Liberian Ports of Entry, and given the advancements in LDEA capacity, judicial acceptance, and successful prosecutions, it is anticipated that 2019 will see significant results. The United States will continue to support and assist Liberia’s efforts to strengthen its law enforcement capacities and fulfill its international drug control commitments.
Malaysia

Malaysia is not a significant source country or transit point for U.S.-bound illicit drugs. Nevertheless, trafficking through Malaysia to supply international markets continues and transnational criminal organizations are attempting to expand crystal methamphetamine production within the country. Drugs smuggled into Malaysia include marijuana, heroin, and amphetamine-type stimulants. Synthetic drugs are also trafficked through Malaysia, including MDMA (ecstasy), nimetazepam (a diverted pharmaceutical drug), and crystal methamphetamine. There is no notable cultivation of illicit drug crops in Malaysia and local demand and consumption for illicit drugs is limited.

Although the Royal Malaysian Police are generally effective in arresting drug offenders, Malaysian prosecutors have shown limited success in prosecuting and convicting drug traffickers as Malaysia does not have an effective drug conspiracy law. Coupled with the high burden of proof required for a drug trafficking conviction, which in many cases leads to a mandatory death sentence, prosecutors are limited in their ability to charge and prosecute such cases. The new Prime Minister, elected in May 2018, is seeking to abolish the death penalty in Malaysia, and currently has support in Parliament for the measure.

Drug trafficking through Malaysia in 2018 remained relatively consistent with previous years. Overall, Malaysian authorities seized approximately $23 million worth of drugs in the first half of 2018, according to the latest Malaysian government statistics available, which is a 17 percent decrease from the same time period last year. Arrests for supplying and possessing drugs decreased 2 percent and 5 percent, respectively, compared to the first half of 2018, while arrests for drug use, based on urinalysis, fell by 27 percent.

Malaysia has an extradition treaty and mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States and is generally cooperative in these cases. The United States continues to send Malaysian police for counter-drug training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. The U.S. Coast Guard continued its maritime law enforcement training program with the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency. In 2019, the United States will seek to promote further coordination between Malaysian and U.S. law enforcement authorities, including joint interdiction efforts, information sharing, and training to further improve Malaysia's investigative and prosecutorial capacity.
Mali 

Mali is a transit point for illicit drugs trafficked mostly to Europe. Instability and lawlessness stemming from the ongoing violent extremist conflict in Central and Northern Mali pose challenges to the government’s modest drug interdiction efforts, while offering the violent extremists a source of revenue by providing protection for illicit shipments. Senior officials have requested international assistance in both interdiction and in combatting the growing domestic use of illicit drugs in the country.

The Ministry of Security has a dedicated office for drug control, the interagency Central Narcotics Office, with approximately 140 officers, detailed from the Police, Immigration, Gendarmes and Customs services. Although the ministry maintains a number of international liaison relationships, regional drug control cooperation is virtually non-existent.

Drug trafficking is concentrated along the southern and western Malian borders. Mali’s 4,500 miles of borders are mostly unpatrolled, and the movement of almost all goods is unregulated. Illicit drugs have also been trafficked through the country by aerial conveyance, though on a lesser scale.

There is a growing concern from Mali’s government and traditional and religious leaders over the growing use of illicit drugs among the population, primarily among young people. Consumption of methamphetamine, flunitrazepam, and the synthetic opioid tramadol is growing, fueled by high employment and low costs.

Corruption among counterdrug officials is a concern, and the United States supports a number of on-going security and governance programs to address this matter.

Mali and the United States share common goals of reducing the use and traffic of illicit drugs, and in denying violent extremists access to revenue from the sale of such contraband. The United States is increasing its efforts to work with Mali to combat the illicit flow of drugs through the country, as well as work with the government on domestic efforts to reduce demand for dangerous drugs.
Mexico

A. Introduction

Mexico is a significant source and transit country for heroin, marijuana, and synthetic drugs destined for the United States and a main transit country for cocaine from South America. Mexico is a source of illicit opium poppy and believed to be the primary source of heroin to the U.S. domestic market. Mexico is also a main transit route for fentanyl originating from China. Drug trafficking and its related violence and corruption in Mexico pose considerable problems to citizen security and economic development. According to the Mexican government, murders increased 19 percent nationally (to 27 murders per 100,000 residents) during the first eight months of 2018 compared to the same period in 2017.

The Merida Initiative is the U.S. government’s primary mechanism to implement civilian security assistance in Mexico. Merida Initiative projects disrupt transnational criminal organizations and hinder their ability to produce and traffic drugs to the United States. Assistance includes training and equipment to dismantle clandestine drug labs; a poppy eradication tracking program; advanced airport security technology; inspection equipment for border crossings and checkpoints; and reconnaissance technologies to improve maritime interdiction. The United States also provides security assistance for drug interdiction equipment and training to military and law enforcement personnel.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

On July 1, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the National Regeneration Movement party (MORENA) won Mexico’s presidential election with 53 percent of the vote. The new administration has expressed a commitment to reducing crime and violence, including through the creation of a new Public Security Ministry, increased investigation and prosecution of financial crimes, and cannabis legalization and regulation as a purported crime-reduction measure. Mexico’s 2018 federal budget for justice and national and domestic security increased 6.2 percent compared to 2017.

Mexico is party to several legal agreements relevant to drug control, including the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the 1996 Anti-Drug Strategy, and the 1990 Ixtapa Declaration and Program of Action. Mexico is a regional observer in the Central American Integration System and participates with Canada and the United States in the North American Maritime Security Initiative to share information, improve response to transnational threats, and develop protocols for maritime interdictions. Mexico participates with the United States and Canada in the North American Dialogue on Drug Policy. The current U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty has been in force since 1980, and Mexico remains one of the United States’ strongest extradition partners. Moreover, a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in force since 1991 fosters a broad range of cooperation in criminal matters.

2. Supply Reduction
The U.S. government estimates opium poppy cultivation in Mexico reached 44,100 hectares (ha) in 2017, an increase from 32,000 ha in 2016. Most poppy cultivation occurred in the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, and Guerrero. A team from the Mexican Attorney General’s Office (PGR), Army (SEDENA), Navy (SEMAR), Foreign Ministry (SRE), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is working on a new opium yield study with the support of the U.S. government to estimate heroin production. The United States is supporting the project with equipment donations and is collaborating closely with the Mexican government to use the yield study data to establish mutually agreed upon production estimates.

PGR’s National Center for Planning, Analysis, and Information to Combat Organized Crime (PGR/CENAPI) publishes drug eradication and seizure statistics for civilian law enforcement agencies. According to PGR/CENAPI, in calendar year 2017, Mexico eradicated 4,231 ha of marijuana and 29,207 ha of opium poppy. During the first six months of 2018, Mexico eradicated 1,162 ha of cannabis and 17,288 ha of opium poppy. In calendar year 2017, Mexico reportedly seized approximately 12.6 MT of cocaine; 416 MT of marijuana; 34,841 cannabis fields; 766.9 kilograms (kg) of opium gum; 202,279 poppy fields; 11.3 MT of methamphetamine; 356 kg of heroin; and 103 clandestine laboratories. During the first six months of 2018, Mexico reportedly seized approximately 5.53 MT of cocaine; 110.7 MT of marijuana; 16,267 cannabis fields; 38.5 kg of opium gum; 149,357 poppy fields; 6.3 MT of methamphetamine; 316 kg of heroin; and 37 clandestine laboratories.

The United States supports SEMAR, SEDENA, the Federal Police, Customs (SAT), and PGR with intelligence, training, and specialized equipment. In August, SEMAR seized and destroyed more than 130 MT of processed methamphetamine and more than 29,000 liters and 10,000 kg of precursor chemicals from multiple clandestine laboratories and underground storage facilities in Sinaloa and Durango. SEMAR used equipment and training provided by DEA under the Merida Initiative to handle and destroy the chemicals on site.

Since January 2018, SEMAR has seen a significant increase in maritime seizures, capturing 11.4 MT of cocaine, almost all of it in the Eastern Pacific. The U.S. government supported the seizures through information-sharing and foreign assistance efforts, including four CASA 235 aircraft with U.S.-managed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) upgrades. The ISR-enabled video systems will generate inalterable aerial footage, making it a possible source of evidence for use in court proceedings. The United States recently completed upgrades to four SEMAR Maritime Patrol Aircraft, and is supporting SEMAR interdiction and information gathering efforts.

During the first nine months of 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 151 kg of fentanyl at U.S. southwest border ports of entry. In April, officials in Tijuana seized 361 small fentanyl packets that had been prepared for street-level distribution. In August, a Merida-donated canine team discovered 2.6 kg of fentanyl pills and 1.1 kg of crystal methamphetamine during an inspection at a commercial shipping office in Jalisco. In September, Baja California State Police uncovered a suspected carfentanil pill production mill (carfentanil is a fentanyl analogue and up to 100 times as potent). At the site, police found precursor chemicals and a kilogram of suspected carfentanil.
Canines donated through the Merida Initiative to Mexico made significant seizures of illicit drugs in 2018, including fentanyl. In May, Merida-donated canines discovered 25 liters of chemical precursor and 450 liters of hydrochloric acid at parcel companies in Durango and Guadalajara. In July, a Merida-donated canine team located 1,280 liters of sulfuric acid at a parcel company in Guadalajara, and 4.9 kg of methamphetamine during an inspection in Michoacan.

In 2018, Mexican officials consolidated oversight of counterdrug efforts under a new Office of National Drug Policy (ONPD) within PGR.

### 3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

In 2018, Mexico’s National Commission Against Addictions (CONADIC) released official results from a national survey of drug, alcohol, and tobacco usage. The study showed overall marijuana use at 8.6 percent (up from 6 percent in 2011); stable cocaine use at 3.5 percent; inhalants at 1.1 percent; and amphetamine-type stimulants at 0.9 percent. There was no indication of domestic fentanyl use in Mexico.

The United States supports the implementation of court-supervised treatment for criminal offenders with drug use problems in Mexico. Currently, six Mexican states operate 30 drug treatment courts including six juvenile courts, all of which receive training and assistance from the Merida Initiative to facilitate court-supervised drug treatment and social reinsertion.

### 4. Corruption

As a matter of government policy, Mexico does not encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. Nevertheless, corruption continues to impede Mexican drug control efforts. Mexico’s National Anti-Corruption System seeks to address impunity for corruption, but implementation is not yet complete. The Senate has not yet appointed a special anticorruption prosecutor or approved the selection of the 18 administrative judges charged with ruling on corruption cases.

A joint working group between the new Lopez Obrador administration and civil society is devoted to transforming the PGR into a new Fiscalia General de la Republica, which would make the Attorney General’s Office autonomous from the Presidency. In September, MORENA submitted a bill to congress that would allot one year for the transition from PGR to the new Fiscalia to begin, with 2022 as the completion date for the transition.

A number of high-ranking government officials faced corruption-related charges in 2018, including five former governors currently in custody on pre-trial detention. A sixth, former Veracruz Governor Javier Duarte, pleaded guilty to criminal association and money laundering charges in September and received a sentence of nine years. Federal and state authorities have opened corruption investigations into former Governor of Nayarit Roberto Sandoval and former Governor of Veracruz Flavino Rios. In total, nearly 20 former governors have been sentenced, face corruption charges, or are under formal investigation.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The Merida Initiative is the primary driver of bilateral security cooperation, and it plays a key role in addressing the U.S. opioid epidemic through its efforts to stop illicit opioids from being produced in Mexico and trafficked into the United States. The U.S. government works closely with multiple federal and state agencies of the Mexican government on fentanyl detection and seizure. The Merida Initiative supports training for Mexico’s fentanyl response teams and for canines and handlers on fentanyl detection; gas chromatography machines for the PGR forensics laboratory to test unknown drug samples; and non-intrusive inspection equipment to help interdict the transportation of fentanyl and other illicit items.

In February 2018, experts from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), with funding from the Merida Initiative, provided canine fentanyl detection training in Mexico City. RCMP trained canine teams from the Federal Police and SAT; subsequent training in October focused on SEDENA and PGR canine programs. In July, the Nogales Border Patrol Station and the Consulate General Nogales’ Regional Security Office conducted a fentanyl class for 34 Mexican law enforcement officials, including federal and state police and customs officials. In August, DEA opioid and synthetic drug experts provided fentanyl awareness and processing procedures training to 70 officers of the Sonora State Police.

As of August, the Government of Mexico had deployed a U.S.-funded biometric data sharing program in all of its 52 migration processing stations. The program supports Mexico’s ability to detect threats and has vastly improved Mexico’s capability to partner with U.S. law enforcement to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and improve border control. As of October, authorities had identified hundreds of gang members and drug traffickers.

In Mexico City, the bilateral Drug Policy Working Group has taken the lead to operationalize agreements reached at the 2017 cabinet-level meetings of the “Strategic Dialogue on Disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations” and the “Security Cooperation Group” (a sub-cabinet group with participants from more than 20 U.S. and Mexican federal agencies). The working group met for the fourth time in January 2018, headed by the Embassy Mexico City’s Deputy Chief of Mission and PGR. The group focuses on implementing projects to diminish illicit drug production, enhance interdiction efforts, and share best practices to respond to drug demand in both countries.

D. Conclusion

Drug trafficking, corruption, and related violence remain substantial challenges for citizen security in Mexico. The United States will continue to look for opportunities to enhance bilateral cooperation and work toward achieving shared goals through effective targeting of transnational criminal networks, opium poppy eradication, improved interdiction of illicit drugs, and cooperation against money laundering in both countries.
Morocco

Morocco is one of the top cannabis and hashish-producing countries of the world, with Europe being a primary market. Traffickers may be decreasing the use of commercialized containers for smuggling activity due to the deployment of x-ray scanners at the port of Tangier, and increasing the use of “go-fast” boats and non-commercial airplanes to smuggle drugs into Spain. Traffickers may also be expanding internal routes by moving hashish south and then to Morocco’s coast for non-commercial maritime shipment to Europe or overland shipment to African markets. Moroccan hashish is also smuggled south into Mauritania, and then moved east across Mali and Niger into Libya for onward transshipment and distribution.

Over the past decade, Moroccan cannabis farmers have substituted traditional seeds with hybrid strains capable of producing larger yields and higher tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) levels. Yields obtained from hybrid seeds and improved agricultural techniques are three to five times higher than those obtained from traditional cannabis farming methods. Media and U.S. law enforcement reporting indicates that the switch to hybrid seeds was driven by market forces as European customers demanded a higher quality THC product. Accurate estimates for cannabis cultivation and hashish production levels are not available.

Morocco remains a transit point for the commercial and non-commercial maritime shipment of cocaine smuggled into Europe. South American and Mexican drug trafficking organizations utilize West Africa as a transit point for cocaine smuggled into the European market, and Morocco remains a key transit point for this route. Transnational criminal organizations take advantage of Morocco’s pre-existing hashish transportation networks to facilitate the flow of cocaine from West Africa to Europe. During 2018, a coordinated operation between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Morocco law enforcement dismantled a commercial maritime operation smuggling cocaine from Brazil to Europe via containerized shipping transiting the port of Casablanca, arresting one Brazilian and five Moroccans. Six vehicles, 541 kilograms of cocaine, and approximately $1.5 million were seized. Media reports indicate Moroccan hashish continues to be smuggled to South America and the Caribbean in exchange for cocaine transported to Europe for distribution.

The United States has a mutual legal assistance treaty with Morocco that entered into force in 1993. The U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Morocco, but Morocco has been willing to surrender fugitives to the United States via deportation, expulsion, or otherwise lawful removal pursuant to its domestic law.
Mozambique

Mozambique continues to be a transit point for heroin, hashish, cocaine, and precursor chemicals. Transnational criminal organizations based in Asia and South America use Mozambique as a transit hub both to access the South African market and to move products through neighboring countries to their final destinations in Europe and North America. Cocaine transiting through Mozambique from South America is also becoming more prevalent given the ease of access. Resource constraints, endemic corruption, its long coastline, and porous unguarded land borders hamper drug control efforts in Mozambique.

Criminal organizations exploit Mozambique’s vast, largely unpatrolled coastline. Heroin and hashish are primarily imported via maritime shipments from South Asia. Shipments arrive hidden in cargo containers or on ships anchored illegally off Mozambique’s coastline where they are off-loaded onto smaller watercraft. Cocaine from South America arrives via commercial flights, transported by courier, or hidden in air cargo. Once in the country, illicit drugs can easily be warehoused and transported via the national highway system to any of six neighboring countries. Access to major international air and cargo hubs both in Mozambique and South Africa allow for further international distribution.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has established a working relationship with the office of the Attorney General (PGR) and Mozambique’s National Criminal Investigations Service (SERNIC). SERNIC investigates and prosecutes all major criminal activity in Mozambique. In 2018, SERNIC agreed to establish a joint DEA/SERNIC drug investigative unit to combat transnational organized crime. The primary objective of this bilateral cooperation is to increase Mozambique’s law enforcement capacity and promote future sustainability.

Although systemic challenges remain, SERNIC executed two significant arrests of well-known international heroin brokers. Notably, in addition to indicting the suspects on drug-related charges, the PGR identified and evaluated evidence of official corruption. As a result, investigators expect those involved will be penalized and additional arrests will be made, serving as a good example of the Government of Mozambique’s political will to confront drug-related crime and corruption.

The United States has neither a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty nor an extradition treaty with Mozambique. Some mutual legal assistance requests are processed under multilateral conventions that enable such cooperation.
The Netherlands

The Netherlands is a significant transit country for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, entering through the port of Rotterdam. The Netherlands also remains an important source country of synthetic drugs, primarily MDMA (ecstasy), destined for international markets. The volume of internet-facilitated trafficking of synthetic drugs through the country has increased significantly.

The Dutch Opium Act prohibits the possession, commercial distribution, production, preparation of production, import, and export of all illicit drugs. The act distinguishes between “hard” drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, MDMA), and “soft” drugs (cannabis products). Sales of less than five grams of cannabis products are “tolerated” (illegal but not prosecuted) in regulated establishments called “coffee shops.” Enforcement is a local matter; for example, some cities choose to implement a requirement limiting coffee shop purchases to local residents, while others, including Amsterdam, do not.

A study by the police estimated that the total revenue of synthetic drugs production in the Netherlands in 2017 was close to 20 billion euros. Synthetic drug producers are considered to be at the source of various other types of crime, including local government corruption, especially in the south of the Netherlands. The national government prioritized fighting organized drugs groups.

Dutch police and mail delivery companies established a Mail/Parcel Intervention Team (PIT) in 2017 to intercept outbound envelopes and parcels containing small amounts of drugs.

The port of Rotterdam is a European import hub for cocaine from South America. In 2017 (the most recent year for which data is available), authorities seized 5.3 metric tons of cocaine in the port of Rotterdam. However, due to increased efforts by authorities, Dutch drug smuggling gangs increasingly use the port of Antwerp as a point of entry. There have been incidents of fraud and corruption within the port authority and associated businesses.

Historically, Dutch and U.S. law enforcement agencies have maintained close operational cooperation, but due to a recent reorganization of the Dutch police and capacity issues, there has been a significant decrease in the exchange of information. The United States and the Netherlands have fully operational extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements.

The Royal Netherlands Navy patrols the Dutch Caribbean for drug interdiction operations. The Netherlands has a memorandum of understanding with the United States, which enables the deployment of U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Teams and Airborne Use of Force Detachments on Royal Netherlands Navy vessels to suppress illicit trafficking in the waters of the Caribbean. The Netherlands is a party to the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement and a partner in the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South. The Netherlands is a member of the Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre-Narcotics.
Nicaragua

A. Introduction

Nicaragua remains a transit route for illicit drug trafficking, and domestic production of marijuana also occurs in the country. Nicaragua’s long Atlantic and Pacific coasts, large inland lakes, porous border crossings, and sparsely populated and underdeveloped Caribbean coastal region provide a favorable environment for international criminal groups to smuggle contraband, including drugs, weapons, currency, and people. Although there is no statistical data to determine current drug consumption trends within Nicaragua, marijuana and crack cocaine are believed to be the most commonly consumed illicit drugs within the country.

Nicaragua does not have sufficient resources to exercise complete control over its air, land, and sea borders. Nicaragua’s limited technical and logistical capacity to conduct successful interdiction operations, including a lack of dedicated air assets, is further challenged by limited mobility and communications to patrol the sparsely populated parts of the Caribbean region where some traffickers operate freely.

Nicaragua’s efforts to fight drug trafficking are hindered by widespread corruption within the ranks of the police, the prosecutor general’s office, and the supreme court. Drug control cooperation between Nicaraguan authorities and international counterparts is limited and inconsistent, and all levels of government lack transparency.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Nicaraguan National Police and Nicaraguan military are the primary institutions responsible for countering drug trafficking in the country. There is limited information sharing between the two institutions and there is limited law enforcement coverage of the country, particularly in the sparsely populated Caribbean Coast region. The Nicaraguan military continues to target illicit drugs through its “Retaining Wall” strategy, which incorporates land-based, air, and maritime patrolling from permanent bases located at key border crossings and maritime and air routes. Coupled with limited resources, however, the principal challenge for Nicaraguan authorities in 2018 was the politicization of the police and the restive political climate resulting from the government’s harsh repression of widespread protests.

On August 23, the Government of Nicaragua appointed Francisco Diaz, who was sanctioned by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act, as the new National Police Director. Diaz was sanctioned due to his involvement in serious human rights abuses against political opponents. According to local security experts, a police unit tasked with anti-organized crime responsibilities is also involved in grave violations of human rights, including illegal detentions of protestors. The police promoted 452 officers of this unit in September.

Nicaragua maintains close ties with Russia. In April, Russia trained 20 police officers from Central America, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic at a Russian Counternarcotics Training
Center in Managua, but the effectiveness of cooperation agreements with Russia against drug trafficking is not yet visible. Also in April, the Nicaraguan and Honduran military forces signed a cooperation agreement to continue joint operations and maintain security levels in both countries; however, a lack of vetted units, limited information sharing, lack of transparency, and limited working-level cooperation hinder regional operation efforts against organized crime and drug trafficking.

Nicaragua participates in the Cooperative Situational and Information Integration System, which enables greater international law enforcement intelligence sharing. A maritime counterdrug bilateral agreement has also been in place between Nicaragua and the United States since 2001. However, information sharing from Nicaragua is limited, and often not accurate or timely.

The Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, to which Nicaragua and the United States are both parties, facilitates the sharing of legal information between countries. In spite of being part of this treaty, cooperation in this area is not robust due to the low volume of requests. In the past, the Government of Nicaragua has rarely provided assistance within requested time frames.

The United States and Nicaragua are parties to an extradition treaty signed in 1905 and ratified in 1907, but the Nicaraguan Constitution bars the extradition of Nicaraguan citizens. Cooperation by the Government of Nicaragua with extradition requests has historically been very limited. An International Criminal Police Organization Red Notice is usually required for wanted individuals in order for the Government of Nicaragua to cooperate with the United States in expelling non-Nicaraguan citizen fugitives.

2. Supply Reduction

There was no discernible change in the volume of drugs transiting Nicaragua in 2018. However, there continues to be evidence of increased domestic drug use, increased illegal drug production (mainly of marijuana), and the existence of clandestine airstrips in remote areas of the country. Though some traffickers continue to smuggle illicit drugs through the isolated Caribbean Coast, many trafficking organizations have shifted their operations to deep-water routes off the Pacific Coast using larger, longer-range transportation. This allows larger quantities of drugs to travel further out to sea, avoiding detection by law enforcement and the threat of pirates in the Caribbean regions.

Illicit drugs are also trafficked via land and air. Beginning in April 2018, drug trafficking organizations changed their routes due to roadblocks raised during the political unrest. Traffickers temporarily utilized more sea vessels and aircraft as alternatives, but at the close of 2018 there was evidence that traffickers were slowly returning to land routes.

The Nicaraguan government reported that it conducted 4,416 operations targeting local and international drug trafficking in 2018, a 44 percent reduction from the 7,833 operations conducted in 2017. The government also reported seizing 2.58 metric tons (MT) of cocaine during the first nine months of 2018, a 46 percent decrease from the 4.8 MT seized in all 2017. The Nicaraguan Navy reported seizing 725 kilograms of the total cocaine seized in the country.
Authorities also reportedly seized 1.58 MT of marijuana; destroyed 36,821 cannabis plants growing along the country’s Caribbean Coast; and seized $11,263,060 in cash, 295 vehicles, 150 weapons, 926 communications devices, and four boats. Authorities reportedly arrested 2,305 people for drug crimes (1,138 of whom had been formally accused in court as of October). Nicaraguan authorities do not share with U.S. officials any information about their methods of destroying seized illicit drugs.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

There are no reliable national statistics on drug consumption within Nicaragua, but there are anecdotal reports of increased use of marijuana, crack, and powder cocaine, especially in the Caribbean Coast regions and among adolescents. The lack of statistics makes it difficult to measure the impact of prevention and treatment programs.

The Government of Nicaragua reports that the Nicaraguan National Police, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, the Institute Against Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, rehabilitation centers, and other government institutions, provided drug prevention education for 12,167 youths in 164 schools in 2018. In 2018 the government reached only 5 percent of the 240,000 youth reached in 2017, and only 1 percent of the school age population. The Nicaraguan government also reported offering drug prevention activities for 19,201 young people with substance use disorders and 648 juvenile offenders, to include educational movie screenings, prevention talks, neighborhood meetings, as well as marches, sports, and cultural activities to raise awareness and to prevent violence and drug use.

The police have cooperation agreements with 14 of the 22 privately run drug rehabilitation centers, to which they refer substance abusers. In 2018, the government referred 134 youth to the 14 centers. According to administrators at private rehabilitation centers, as a result of the socio-political unrest, there is an exponential increase in requests for rehabilitation for young people between 15-25 years of age.

Private treatment centers in Nicaragua offer two models of patient service: outpatient and residential. Free treatment centers are scarce in Nicaragua, and some treatment centers charge a high monthly fee between $2,000 and $3,000 per patient. Non-governmental organizations continue efforts to prevent drug use and provide treatment to those suffering from substance abuse. The United States provides support to fund programs focused on citizen security, drug prevention, and life skills for at-risk youth, including a grant for a multi-media drug and violence prevention campaign that has reached more than one million people.

4. Corruption

The Government of Nicaragua does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, and there were no public indications that it is involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs.

Nicaragua’s close relationship with Venezuela, reports of institutional corruption at all levels, and international claims that officials in Nicaragua were complicit in money laundering are of
concern. In December 2017, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned Roberto Rivas under Global Magnitsky authority for corruption. Rivas was serving as President of the Supreme Electoral Council. The Office of the Controller General of Nicaragua failed to investigate his corruption and the origin of his considerable personal wealth.

The head of a counterdrug patrol, who had been sentenced to an 11-year prison term for killing a woman and two children during a failed operation in July 2015, was promoted in September 2018 to the rank of Commissioner and decorated for “heroic actions” while supposedly in prison.

Although Nicaragua’s criminal law contains provisions against corruption such as bribery, abuse of authority, influence peddling, and embezzlement, the politicization of and corruption within the police and the judicial system hinder meaningful prosecution of serious crimes. There is also a law regarding the investigation and prosecution of organized crime (Law 735), but in 2018 it was used to criminalize government opponents. Law 735 provides for the establishment of a unit to administer seized assets; however, there is no public accountability in how seized assets are managed. In 2018, the government did not enforce criminal laws against corruption; instead, there was impunity for corrupt officials loyal to the ruling political party.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Bilateral drug control cooperation between Nicaragua and the United States is limited and inconsistent. However, the Nicaraguan government has demonstrated some willingness to take action on information about drug-related activities provided by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Information provided by DEA to Nicaraguan authorities resulted in successful interdiction of 2.3 MT of cocaine and $12.7 million in cash in 2018. The United States also supported the participation of two police officers at the International Drug Enforcement Conference in 2018 to strengthen regional interoperability, and continues to support the integration and active participation of Nicaragua into the Cooperative Situational and Information Integration System.

The United States cooperates with the Nicaraguan Navy to enhance maritime interdiction capacity. In 2018, the United States provided equipment to support drug interdiction, refurbished four boats and trailers, and provided parts for two additional boats at a total cost of $600,753.

In 2018, consistent with U.S. policy to reduce the flow of illegal drugs to the United States and improve security in Central America, the United States assisted Nicaragua by funding drug demand reduction programs with non-governmental organizations. The programs are implemented in the North and South Caribbean Autonomous Regions, the Managua area, and some departments on the Pacific side of the country, where populations are vulnerable to drugs and violence. These grant projects have served to increase citizen security through drug prevention awareness campaigns, community development, youth leadership training, and alternative education intervention programs for at-risk youth in Nicaragua.
The United States maintains a bilateral agreement with Nicaragua to suppress illicit traffic by sea, which includes provisions regarding ship boarding, ship riders, pursuit, entry into territorial waters, overflight, order to land, and international maritime interdiction support. Nicaragua was a participant in the semi-annual Multilateral Maritime Counter Drug Summit held in May, which attracted 125 maritime counterdrug professionals from 26 countries and over 65 international agencies spanning North, Central, and South America and Europe.

D. Conclusion

The Government of Nicaragua has developed policies and programs to combat drug trafficking and reduce drug demand, but should improve its efforts to combat organized crime by expanding its capacity to monitor air, land, and maritime space within the vulnerable Caribbean Coast and Pacific border regions of the country. Productive and more transparent efforts to combat organized crime would require a change in government policy, a political commitment to fight corruption, and the professionalization of the police, as well as halting the counterproductive diversion of police resources to the repression of peaceful protesters.
Niger

Niger is a transit point for illicit drug trafficking and is also experiencing a rapidly expanding drug consumption problem. Instability stemming from ongoing violent extremist conflict in the country’s southern and western regions, as well as instability in Libya to the North – all pose challenges to the government’s drug interdiction efforts.

Illicit drug trafficking is concentrated along Niger’s southern border with Nigeria, as well as within Northern Niger and the city of Agadez. The National Police of Niger have a dedicated counterdrug unit, the Central Office for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, consisting of approximately 100 officers.

Transnational criminal organizations are involved in trafficking drugs through Niger. Illicit opioids and other pharmaceutical drugs are readily available, as are cannabis and hashish originating from Morocco. The Government of Niger and civil society leaders are increasingly concerned with growing illicit drug use among the population, primarily among youth. Consumption of methamphetamine, flunitrazepam, and the synthetic opioid tramadol is growing, fueled by high unemployment and low costs.

The director of the National Police and other security officials have identified illicit proceeds from the drug trade as corrosive to their respective organizations. The United States has several programs to assist the Government of Niger in addressing corruption, operational planning, and improving border management, through support to the border police known as the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire).
Nigeria

A. Introduction

Nigerian drug traffickers remain the preeminent international drug trafficking threat based in Africa. Nigerian trafficking networks operate in the United States as well as throughout Africa, South America, Europe, and Asia. Nigerian drug traffickers have strengthened partnerships with international cocaine and heroin distribution networks to procure and distribute significant quantities of drugs in the United States and other lucrative markets.

Nigeria is also experiencing an opioid epidemic. The most widely used opioid in Nigeria is tramadol, a pharmaceutical product originating mostly from India. Both legitimate Indian pharmaceutical companies and illicit clandestine labs mass-produce and ship tramadol and counterfeit tramadol tablets in 200, 225, and 250-milligram dosages for the Nigerian market. Members of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) regularly intercept container loads of tramadol at Apapa Port in Lagos based on intelligence from the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The NCS declines to release the tramadol to NDLEA for destruction, and NDLEA reports that NCS officers frequently sell seized tramadol back to its original owners. Codeine is also widely abused, particularly by women in northern Nigeria.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

During 2018, the NDLEA received a major boost in capacity following the complete refurbishment of the NDLEA Murtala Muhammed International Airport (MMIA) Command office building into a state-of-the-art complex, which is now the site of the newly formed Joint Border Task Force (JBTF). The $10 million JBTF project is mostly funded and overseen by the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency (NCA). The JBTF is a multi-agency effort to target, interdict, disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute Nigerian-based transnational criminal organizations. The task force, a joint endeavor supported by both the United States and the United Kingdom, is comprised of fully vetted and well-trained Nigerian law enforcement investigators. MMIA is viewed as the gateway for Nigerian criminal organizations involved in drug smuggling, as well as the movement of unlawful proceeds; human trafficking/smuggling; wildlife trafficking; weapons trafficking; and an array of other illegal cross-border activity. The NDLEA is the lead agency at the JBTF, contributing 140 officers and investigators who receive mentoring and investigative assistance from U.S. and UK law enforcement professionals embedded within the unit. The task force is further comprised of 20 investigative officers from the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking of Persons (NAPTIP), as well as six prosecutors.

2. Supply Reduction

In 2018, the United States continued to assist in transitioning the NDLEA from a reactive agency to an intelligence-driven one through mentoring and investigative support. During the first eight months of 2018, the NDLEA reported the arrests of 4,736 individuals on drug trafficking charges (4,395 men and 341 women). The agency seized approximately 59 metric tons (MT) of
cannabis; 119 kilograms (kg) of methamphetamine; 17 MT of tramadol; and approximately eight MT of codeine-infused cough syrup. The NDLEA reports that in 2018, the agency destroyed 267 MT of seized drugs overall.

In addition to these totals, the U.S.-supported NDLEA Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) is credited with seizing and destroying over 1,700 hectares of cannabis plantations; six-and-a-half MT of processed cannabis; four MT of tramadol; four kg of cocaine; and 250 kg of ephedrine. The SIU seized properties and financial instruments approximately totaling $2 million and arrested 25 drug traffickers. Additionally, the SIU shared intelligence with counterparts in Benin and Japan that led to seizures of methamphetamine totaling 40 kg.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Consumption of illicit and misused drugs within Nigeria is increasing alarmingly. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has called on the government of Nigeria to address the growing abuse of pharmaceuticals by many Nigerian youths.

While cocaine is not readily accessible to the middle and lower classes, drugs such as codeine, rohypnol, and tramadol are accessible and available from street vendors on the streets of every city and town in Nigeria.

The NDLEA’s Demand Reduction Directorate nominally has programs that target youth, sex workers, community leaders, and transport workers. However, resources allocated for counseling and rehabilitation for substance use disorders are negligible.

4. Corruption

A large percentage of senior government officials are engaged, either directly or indirectly, in corrupt practices. In 2017 (the latest available data), the annual operating budget for the NDLEA was approximately $25,450,000. Salaries alone for the 5,001 NDLEA personnel were estimated at approximately $24,000,000, leaving the entire organization to operate on a meager $1,450,000 per year. NDLEA is comprised of 42 commands that typically each receive approximately $2,800 per month to fund their operations, to include fuel for vehicles and generators, utilities, travel, and various investigative expenses. In 2018, NDLEA staff from various commands reported that no funds were dispersed. This failure at both the institutional and federal government levels encourages NDLEA staff to supplement their salaries and enforcement activities through the acceptance of bribes and extortion.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The NDLEA’s primary national goals for 2018 were the passage of a Drug Sentencing Bill requesting a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for drug possession, and an increase of 15,000 personnel. The sentencing bill remained pending before the National Assembly at the conclusion of 2018, and although President Muhammmadu Buhari approved the agency’s request for an increase in personnel in 2017, funding had not been allocated to begin recruitment.
D. Conclusion

The NDLEA provides a framework for the Government of Nigeria to pursue its drug control objectives and cooperate with international partners to achieve these goals. To increase the agency’s effectiveness, the government of Nigeria will need to provide, and equitably distribute, increased funding and training to the NDLEA. The United States will continue to engage the Government of Nigeria to combat drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, and other criminal issues. The institutional and societal factors that contribute to these criminal activities remain deeply rooted and will require a comprehensive and collaborative effort. Progress will require sustained Nigerian government efforts and an increased political will.
Pakistan

A. Introduction

Pakistan continues to be one of the world’s top transit corridors for opiates and cannabis products, which are trafficked through the country’s porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Once in Pakistan, illicit drugs are subsequently trafficked globally through Pakistan’s seaports, airports, postal services, and unpatrolled coastal areas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates Pakistan is the destination and transit country for approximately 45 percent of the opiates produced in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a major transit country for precursor chemicals used to produce heroin and methamphetamine, though Pakistan is only able to interdict a fraction of the chemicals funneled through the country.

Due to a lack of reliable data since 2016, it is difficult to estimate current levels of poppy cultivation. Most opium poppy cultivation continues to take place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the areas formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), enabled by low levels of economic development and civilian security in these regions.

In 2018, Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies reported to have disrupted 13 domestic and international drug trafficking organizations. Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), the country’s lead drug enforcement agency and staffed at senior levels by the Pakistani military, reported that during the first 10 months of 2018 it seized approximately 53 metric tons (MT) of morphine, heroin, opium, cocaine, and hashish – a two-thirds decrease from what was seized during the same period in 2017. The Government of Pakistan’s budget limitations and, in some cases, lack of political will hindered drug control efforts. As poppy cultivation and opiate production increase in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s limited resources and law enforcement capacity will be further strained.

Domestic drug consumption continues to be an area of concern. According to a 2013 UNODC nationwide survey, Pakistan is home to 6.7 million drug users, and approximately 20 MT of heroin is consumed within the country annually. Pakistan currently lacks the capacity to provide effective, non-residential treatment for substance use disorder and to incorporate an evidence-based approach systematically to drug prevention education.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

ANF is an agency within Pakistan’s Ministry of Narcotics Control (MNC). In 2018, the MNC finalized a long-awaited revision of its national drug control policy, last amended in 2011. Formal publication of the policy is expected in early 2019. The Ministry also initiated a precursor control oversight mechanism, though such efforts were still nascent at the close of 2018.

ANF’s 2018 budget was $18.6 million, a 9 percent increase over 2017. The Government of Pakistan indicated that it plans to increase ANF’s budget in 2019 to $19.3 million. Nevertheless,
the funds are insufficient to support ANF’s daunting mission and limit its capacity to perform key functions adequately, such as operational maintenance of vehicles and equipment. Over 60 percent of ANF’s budget is used to pay the salaries of its 3,100 employees, who are thinly deployed across 40 stations and field offices. These posts span every province and territory, except the former FATA. ANF anticipates establishing a new coastal regional directorate with jurisdiction along the Makran Coast. The coastal directorate will more than double the agency’s capacity in the province by adding 25 officers and 655 staff. However, due to budget constraints, personnel have not been hired yet. In 2018, the ANF Academy provided instruction to over 300 trainees across Pakistan’s law enforcement community.

In 2018, ANF continued nominally to chair the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), comprising 27 Pakistani agencies and intended to enhance coordination and communication on drug control. However, the IATF’s effectiveness is negligible and it did not meet in 2018.

ANF coordinated illicit drug investigations with multiple foreign counterparts in 2018, including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, Malaysia, Greece, Spain, Poland, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates. Pakistan hosts 39 foreign Drug Liaison Officers as part of its Paris Pact obligations. ANF also partnered with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency to operate several Special Investigative Cells (SICs).

The United States and Pakistan do not have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty. Pakistan is a party to relevant multilateral law enforcement conventions that have mutual legal assistance provisions. The United States and Pakistan can also make and receive requests for assistance on the basis of domestic laws. Enforcement of the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom (adopted by Pakistan upon independence) has been problematic.

2. Supply Reduction

In 2018, Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies reported multiple noteworthy seizures and claim to have disrupted 13 domestic and international drug trafficking organizations. ANF reported that during the first 10 months of 2018, it seized approximately five MT of morphine and heroin; four MT of opium; 2.5 kilograms of cocaine; and 41.5 MT of hashish. Overall 2018 seizure totals by ANF represent a two-thirds decrease from 2017, and the total volume of cocaine seized in 2018 was negligible. Twenty additional law enforcement agencies reported arresting nearly 36,000 individuals for drug trafficking. Those agencies reported seizing over 106 MT of morphine, heroin, opium, cocaine, and hashish, as compared to 51 MT seized during the same period in 2017.

According to a 2009 UNODC study, the most recent available, 160 to 200 MT of Afghan heroin and 350 to 400 MT of opium were trafficked from Afghanistan to Pakistan annually. Pakistan is only able to interdict a fraction of that traffic. The overwhelming majority of drugs trafficked through Pakistan are destined for global markets, while a minority is consumed within Pakistan. ANF represents less than one-half of 1 percent of Pakistan law enforcement personnel in the country. The rest of the nearly 700,000 police and paramilitary forces in Pakistan lack rigorous drug interdiction training, and most do not address it as part of their core mission.
Pakistan’s main opium poppy growing areas are in the former FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Insecurity and extremist activity in these regions have prevented reliable ground surveying to determine precise cultivation levels. ANF reported 34 hectares (ha) of poppy were cultivated during the 2017-2018 growing season, all of which were reportedly eradicated. However, these figures are unreliable. The most recent U.S. government estimates from 2016 indicate that approximately 1,400 ha were under cultivation in traditional poppy growing areas. Alternative livelihood and development programs for farmers, including distribution of seeds, agricultural training, and construction of small-scale roads and irrigation projects, have discouraged poppy cultivation in some communities of KP. Pakistan depends heavily on foreign assistance to implement and monitor such programs. The United States government has provided over $50 million since 1989 for these types of programs, benefitting over 1.2 million Pakistanis and contributing to an estimated 87 percent decrease in poppy cultivation since that time.

ANF is responsible for conducting complex drug investigations with a small staff, while working within a judicial system where prosecutors and judges are overworked, underpaid, and ill-prepared to prosecute cases that involve modern investigative techniques. Suspects arrested by ANF are tried in special drug courts that hear only those cases brought by ANF’s own prosecutor corps. During the first 10 months of 2018, ANF registered 1,000 drug arrest cases. ANF reported that 96 percent of the total cases brought to trial resulted in convictions, with 20 percent of the convictions overturned on appeal. However, the vast majority of prosecuted cases were low-level possession or small quantity courier trafficking. Pakistan has a conspiracy law, but it is rarely pursued in drug cases, hindering prosecutions of high-value targets. Lengthy trial and appeal processes mean that suspects can spend years in pre-trial or under-trial detention before a final verdict is reached.

Though the ANF is a federal agency, Pakistan devolved considerable authority to its provinces under its 18th amendment in 2010 for responsibilities including health and social welfare. However, provincial drug control units are still in nascent stages of operation. Enhanced coordination between provincial and federal efforts would benefit overall drug control performance within the country, as would enhanced coordination between federal agencies through the IATF.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

UNODC’s 2013 nationwide drug use survey indicated that 6.7 million Pakistanis aged 15 to 64 had used drugs for non-medical purposes at least once in the previous 12 months. In total, the survey classified 4.25 million drug users aged 15 to 64 as suffering from substance use disorders. Cannabis and opioids were the most prevalent drugs consumed. The survey results also showed that for the 1.5 million female drug users, the majority reported misuse of opioid-based painkillers or synthetic tranquilizers and sedatives, rather than the cannabis, heroin, and opium used by male drug users.

In 2018, Pakistan continued efforts to raise public awareness about the dangers of illicit drug use. ANF conducted 245 public awareness-raising activities and lectured frequently at universities, colleges, and schools about drug awareness.
ANF opened two new drug treatment centers in 2018, adding 120 beds and increasing existing capacity by 62 percent. However, Pakistan could make better use of provincial-level institutions, such as hospitals and medical centers, to provide non-residential treatment options. Pakistan’s drug treatment capacity, with fewer than 100 clinics operating nationwide, remains insufficient. Due to insufficient government resources, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operate more than 90 percent of Pakistan’s detoxification centers. Because Pakistan lacks the institutional capacity to serve women, the majority of drug users receiving treatment are men. Donor-funded “train-the-trainer” programs have increased the number of addiction centers that provide evidence-based treatment.

4. Corruption

The Government of Pakistan does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, corruption remains a challenge, undermining the country’s criminal justice system. The National Accountability Board (NAB) is Pakistan’s anti-graft agency responsible for eliminating corruption. Since it was established more than 17 years ago, the NAB has recovered more than $2 billion and has received and taken action on more than 370,000 complaints. Yet, the consequences for convicted perpetrators are rarely severe. Corruption corrodes the government’s ability to address illicit drugs, as bribed public servants may facilitate movement of contraband or otherwise interfere with the arrest and prosecution of suspects.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States remains strongly committed to a comprehensive approach to drug control assistance in Pakistan. U.S. supply reduction assistance builds Pakistani capacity to interdict drug shipments and dismantle criminal organizations. The United States strives to help all relevant Pakistani law enforcement entities develop their capacity to conduct sophisticated operations, such as controlled deliveries, financial crime investigations, and container profiling. To counter illicit drug trafficking and transnational organized crime effectively, the United States aims to help Pakistan cultivate a model for collaborative, intelligence-driven, and corruption-free law enforcement by facilitating interagency, cross-border, and international coordination. The United States also provides alternative means for farmers to grow licit crops instead of poppy, including the distribution of seeds, the construction of small roads, and alternative livelihood irrigation projects.

Over the past five years, U.S. supply reduction assistance has mainly funded poppy reduction programs and ANF interdiction activities. In 2018, bilateral cooperation on interdiction programs between the United States and Pakistan shifted to a more strategic framework, including a focus on cross-border cooperation with Afghan counterparts and an emphasis on capacity building, rather than assistance for daily operating costs. The United States continued to strengthen and diversify cooperation with law enforcement agencies, including by signing a memorandum of understanding with a provincial drug control department for the first time.
To support demand reduction and recovery efforts, the United States funds various drug treatment and practitioner training programs. In 2018, the U.S. government continued its assistance to NGOs operating free-of-charge drug treatment centers and prevention activities, prioritizing the funding of projects benefitting women and children, and providing training for drug treatment professionals to improve evidence-based protocols. Working with the Colombo Plan and UNODC, the U.S. government funded 53 drug awareness campaigns in 2018, and provided free-of-cost residential treatment for nearly 500 patients with substance use disorders, including 28 women and 140 adolescents. The U.S. government also provided training to 330 youth leaders and teachers, as well as 65 drug treatment professionals. U.S. assistance continued to focus on evidence-based approaches to treatment and prevention.

D. Conclusion

Pakistan continues to face enormous economic and security challenges that often supersede drug trafficking in national security priorities, thus limiting attention and resources put toward drug control. Pakistan could reduce drug trafficking more effectively by encouraging its law enforcement agencies to better coordinate engagement, share information more readily, and expend limited resources more efficiently. There is also a need for greater investigative focus on the financial aspects of the drug trade, including better training to counter money laundering. Pakistan should also look to strengthen drug control cooperation with neighboring countries, do more to target high-level drug kingpins rather than low-level traffickers, and focus on maritime interdiction along the Makran Coast. Greater mobilization of provincial institutions could provide an important multiplier for interdiction, prevention, and service delivery.
Panama

A. Introduction

Panama is not a major producer of illicit drugs, but transnational criminal organizations take advantage of the country’s transportation infrastructure, free trade zones, and the canal to smuggle cocaine to the United States and other international markets. Although Panama does not suffer from extensive domestic drug consumption, the increasing flow of drugs from Colombia makes greater domestic drug use a distinct possibility.

Panama is a regional leader in the fight against the international drug trade and transnational criminal organizations, and a trusted strategic U.S. partner in interdicting illicit drug shipments. The United States collaborates well with all of Panama’s security services, which continue to make progress in developing their institutional capacity.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Developments

Panama continues to improve its security institutions, with U.S. assistance playing an important role. While the Ministry of Public Security increased its budget for the tenth consecutive year in 2018, Panamanian security institutions continue to face challenges with interagency cooperation, procurement management, and budget constraints hampering its ability to combat human and drug trafficking networks. Panama’s security forces are often hampered by their inability to fund basic costs associated with core security and drug enforcement missions. In an attempt to overcome challenges in interagency operational coordination, the Ministry of Public Security has since created an interagency task force led by a former Minister of Public Security. The effectiveness of this task force on Panama’s drug enforcement operations are to be determined.

Panama’s National Police (PNP) continues to reform its training of Antinarcotics Police Officers. Through the National Public Safety Institute, basic and commissioned officers receive ongoing basic and advance training, including drug identification, overdose response, and tactical entries/takedowns, basic drug investigations, as well as undercover operations, complex conspiracy courses.

In 2018, the Government of Panama fully implemented Real Time Crime Centers (DACTERS in Spanish) throughout the country, providing data analytics that contributed to a significant reduction in major crimes including homicides and drug trafficking. The PNP uses comparative statistics (COMPSTAT) to analyze criminal trends, redistributing its resources and officers that resulted in greater success against gangs and drug trafficking in 2018.

In 2016, Panama fully implemented an accusatory justice system similar to the U.S. system to increase transparency, reduce pretrial detention, and adjudicate cases quicker. Since the transition to the accusatory justice system, the length of time required to resolve cases dropped from an average of 296 days to 42 days, according to a 2018 academic study. According to Panama’s Office of Drug Prosecution, since 2016, Panama convictions of drug-related crimes
have been above 90 percent, achieving a 98 percent conviction rate in 2018. While the Government of Panama continues to demonstrate an increased capacity in drug prosecutions, there still remains challenges in the investigation and prosecution of complex cases.

The United States collaborates effectively with Panama’s 27 district attorneys responsible for prosecuting drug trafficking crimes, especially those handling maritime interdiction cases in conjunction with the Panamanian Coast Guard (SEAN) and border force (SENAFRONT), which patrol rivers and coastal areas. Although the number of drug-related prosecutions increased in 2018, few leaders of drug trafficking organizations were successfully prosecuted. The justice sector continues to struggle with complex cases such as money laundering, organized crime, and criminal forfeiture cases, and official corruption remains a problem.

Panama has mutual assistance and extradition treaties with the United States, but Panama’s constitution does not permit extradition of Panamanian nationals.

2. Supply Reduction

Panamanian authorities seized approximately 73 metric tons (MT) of illicit drugs in 2018. With U.S. assistance, SENAN routinely interdicted maritime narcotics shipments, often based on information provided by U.S. authorities or other Panamanian agencies. When provided intelligence by the United States or other international partners, SENAN acted upon 90 percent of reports and 20 percent of operations resulted in seizures. SENAN seized 22.5 MT of illicit drugs, mostly cocaine, and 28 vessels; 77 individuals were arrested in the course of these operations. In 2018, SENAN’s interdiction success rate of targeted maritime vessels increased by eight percent as compared to 2017.

Panamanian units vetted by the U.S. government and working in partnership with U.S. law enforcement agencies conducted sensitive investigations and operations related to illicit drugs, money laundering, migrant smuggling, and other transnational crimes. In 2018, investigations and operations by these vetted units resulted in 568 arrests and the seizure of over 26 MT of cocaine and 202.7 MT of marijuana – increases of approximately 32 percent and 3,875 percent, respectively, from what was seized in 2017 and approximately $5.53 million in cash. Approximately $5.53 million in cash and counterfeit items with a street value of approximately $1.86 million were also seized in 2018, demonstrating significant progress in the development of Panama’s capabilities.

The United States provided state-of-the-art scanning equipment to the Tocumen international airport in 2018 to modernize the processing of more than 15 million passengers transiting this terminal per year. The equipment operates at a much lower x-ray spectrum, capable of producing full body images that enhances the detection of small quantities of drugs and other commonly smuggled items. The United States provided similar equipment at the Marcos A. Gelabert Airport, a secondary facility that handles direct flights to Colombia and Costa Rica.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment
Panama has not experienced high levels of drug usage or gang activity from transnational groups active in other Central American countries. Local gangs, operating primarily in the Caribbean coast, take part in a variety of criminal activities. Panamanian officials are increasingly concerned that instability in other countries in the region could eventually spill into Panama and lead to increased drug usage and gang activity. The increased flow of drugs from Colombia presents greater risks for domestic drug use as well. The government of Panama has not reported significant use of synthetic opioids, though synthetic drugs have reached the streets of Panama and likely transit the canal in container ships.

Panama has modest drug demand reduction programs in schools and the Ministry of Health supports a drug-counseling program. Panama has not conducted a drug-demand study since 2015 and has not updated its published strategy on demand reduction since 2007, making it difficult to assess current trends.

The United States partners with the PNP to implement programs such as the Drug Awareness and Resistance Education (DARE), and the Gang Resistance Education and Training Program (GREAT), as well as community policing initiatives, to help at-risk youth.

4. Corruption

The Government of Panama does not, as a matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illegal drug production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of the sale of illicit drugs. However, transnational criminal organizations target the security services, customs, and justice sector to facilitate drug trafficking, raising concerns about official corruption at all levels. Panamanian authorities recognize the threat and actively investigate officials for corruption.

As part of this effort, the United States assisted SENAN in establishing an internal affairs unit in 2017. In 2018, this unit dramatically increased the number of pre-employment background investigations and polygraph examinations. As a result, SENAN rejected multiple individuals with criminal records or other derogatory information. An investigation from this unit also led to the arrest and conviction in 2018 of two crew members accused of providing locations of patrol vessels to drug traffickers. Panama will need to continue to institutionalize these aggressive steps to reduce the threat of drug trafficking-fueled corruption.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Consistent with the U.S. Strategy for Central America and through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARS1), the United States supports citizen security, law enforcement, and rule-of-law programs in Panama to expand Panamanian capabilities to interdict, investigate, and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other transnational crimes while strengthening Panama’s justice sector. The United States provides assistance to modernize and maintain SENAN, SENAFORENT, and PNP vessels, equipment, and facilities in support of interdiction efforts. U.S.-provided aviation assets have helped SENAN expand its ability to support joint drug enforcement operations. The United States supports trilateral cooperation with Panama and Colombia, whereby Colombian law enforcement, justice sector, and military experts train their Panamanian counterparts.
In April 2018, the United States and Panama, together with Costa Rica and Colombia, executed OPERATION KRAKEN II, a month-long multinational surge of interdiction operations modeled on a previous effort taken in 2017. During this operation, the combined forces seized 9.9 MT of cocaine, 1.7 MT of marijuana, and apprehended 59 individuals of various nationalities. This operation demonstrated Panama’s ability to efficiently work with the United States and regional partners in complex environments.

The bilateral Salas-Becker Agreement to cooperate on maritime interdiction permits Panamanian security officers to accompany U.S. maritime patrol aircraft and vessels. The United States provides training to Panamanian authorities to improve implementation of the agreement and enhance interdiction operations. In May, the United States committed to send five experienced attorneys to Panama to assist in standardizing procedures for prosecuting maritime crime and mentoring prosecutors. The United States also established a new program in 2018 to provide expert guidance to help Panamanian authorities build maritime interdiction capacity, enhance investigative techniques, and apply best practices during preparation of maritime crime cases for prosecution. Bilateral U.S.-Panamanian engagement on security issues is facilitated by the High-Level Security Dialogue, an ongoing coordination mechanism initiated in 2017.

D. Conclusion

Panama has established itself as a regional leader in drug interdiction, and a strategic ally in U.S. efforts to fight transnational criminal organizations and the flow of drugs into the United States. The Panamanian government has made significant achievements in reforming its justice sector institutions and developing the capacity of its law enforcement agencies. Despite the Panamanian government’s willingness to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, the increasing volume of drugs from Colombia and the spillover of criminality from neighboring countries exceeds the capabilities of Panama’s security services to manage these challenges alone.

While Panama continues its efforts to lay the groundwork for systemic improvements, bureaucratic and institutional deficiencies prevent it from effectively dealing with transnational criminal organizations. The United States continues to support Panama’s implementation of reforms and remains committed to partnering with the country’s security services to conduct more effective and organized actions against transnational crime and drug trafficking.
Paraguay

Paraguay made progress in seizing cocaine shipments and improving interagency coordination against illicit drugs in 2018, but remains among the largest source countries for marijuana in the Western Hemisphere and a transit country for Andean cocaine. Traffickers exploit the country’s porous borders, clandestine airstrips, lack of airspace control, extensive internal waterways, and under-resourced law enforcement and judicial officials to transit cocaine, mainly to Brazil or through Brazil to overseas markets, though rarely the United States. Transnational criminal organizations engage in drug trafficking and other illicit activities, aided by corruption and legal impunity. President Abdo Benitez took office on August 15, and his Administration has shown initiative in pursuing counterdrug activities.

During the first nine months of 2018, the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD) seized and destroyed 893 metric tons (MT) of processed marijuana and eradicated 1,222 hectares (ha) of cannabis. During the first 10 months of 2018, SENAD seized and destroyed 714 kilograms (kg) of cocaine. This included a 448 (kg) seizure, SENAD’s single largest seizure since 2012. In September, SENAD also arrested Paraguayan alleged drug kingpin Reinaldo Javier “Cucho” Cabaña. During the first nine months of 2018, the Paraguayan National Police seized and destroyed 54 MT of processed marijuana, eradicated 874 ha of cannabis, and seized 99 kg of cocaine. There were 125 convictions on drug trafficking charges in 2018.

The United States and Paraguay are parties to a 2001 extradition treaty that remains in force. There is no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, though both countries are party to multilateral conventions providing for cooperation in criminal matters. In June, government representatives issued the 2017 – 2022 Paraguayan National Policy on Drugs. The National Civil Aviation Authority began installing a radar system in July to monitor illicit air travel and ultimately feed into law enforcement systems.

Paraguayan authorities report an increase in domestic drug consumption. Outpatient community-based drug treatment programs, supported by the United States and other donors, supplement the three main government-run drug treatment centers, including the Ministry of Health’s 30-bed inpatient detoxification facility. Paraguay’s 2017 asset forfeiture legislation allocates 50 percent of proceeds to demand reduction and crime prevention efforts.

U.S. law enforcement cooperation continues to help facilitate drug seizures, arrests, and prosecutions by Paraguayan authorities. Increased Paraguayan government efforts to enhance interagency coordination, improve the judicial system’s ability to prosecute cases quickly and effectively, and reduce corruption would help further deter drug production and trafficking.
Peru

A. Introduction

Peru was the second-largest producer of cocaine and coca, with an estimated 49,800 hectares (ha) under cultivation in 2017, the most recent year for which data is available. Potential pure cocaine production in Peru increased to 491 metric tons (MT). Though the amount cultivated throughout much of Peru decreased in 2017, increased cultivation in the Valley of the Rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM) negated the successes realized in the remainder of the growing region. Eradication efforts in the VRAEM are complicated by limited access and significant security challenges that threaten the safety of eradicators. The areas of Apurímac and Puno account for two-thirds of the country’s cultivation. Despite this, Peru has demonstrated great successes in alternative development and eradication programs as represented by the decreases in coca cultivation and cocaine production outside of the VRAEM.

Peruvian cocaine is trafficked throughout South America, traveling to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, and the United States. In addition to coca cultivation, Peru is a major importer of precursor chemicals for cocaine production. Following former President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski’s resignation in March 2018, President Martín Vizcarra’s government has maintained the commitment to implementing Peru’s 2017-2021 drug control strategy eradication goals. During the first nine months of 2018, Peru’s coca eradication force (CORAH) eradicated 20,843 ha, completing 83 percent of its annual goal of 25,000 ha. The military and the Peruvian National Police’s (PNP) anti-drug unit (DIREJANDRO) conducted joint counter-drug operations in the VRAEM. Peru approved the VRAEM Strategy 2021, which involves heavy investment in development but does not include eradication operations in the region.

The terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), relying upon cocaine trafficking for funding, maintains a strong hold in the VRAEM. In 2018, the group killed four military personnel and four police officers, and continued to provide a safe haven for drug traffickers.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Peruvian government’s 2017-2021 drug control strategy includes goals for eradication, interdiction, and alternative development. It also addresses the control of precursor chemicals, organized crime, money laundering, and the rule of law. In 2018, the Government of Peru allocated $134 million towards implementation of this strategy, $16.5 million less than 2017.\[^{[1]}\] Peru contributed $21.2 million towards eradication efforts and concomitant aviation support in 2018, which is equivalent to its 2017 contribution.

\[^{[1]}\]Budget calculated from relevant budget line items in Peru’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) website. The MEF’s online budget contained a calculation error in previous years in which eradication numbers were duplicated on multiple lines. The correct counternarcotics strategy implementation budgets from previous years are as follows: $150.8 million (2017), $142 million (2016), and $145.1 million (2015).
A 2015 law authorized the Peruvian Air Force to intercept suspicious aircraft entering Peruvian airspace without appropriate flight clearance authorization. The law includes a measure that allows for lethal force in the case of non-compliance. Though the “shoot down” policy is designed to be applied only as a last resort option, it is inconsistent with U.S. and international law prohibiting the use of lethal force against civil aircraft.

Peru published the 2018-2021 Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing National Plan in March, which includes prevention, detection, and sanctioning activities based on identified sectoral vulnerabilities. With U.S.-provided technical assistance, Peru passed legislation creating a civil asset forfeiture regime in August.

The Ministry of Justice is implementing the New Criminal Procedure Code (NCPC), which transitions the legal system from an inquisitorial to an accusatory system. In 2018, 31 of 34 judicial districts were operating under the NCPC, with 20 districts operating exclusively under the new system. All 34 judicial districts are required to adjudicate corruption and organized crime cases under the NCPC. Three districts in Lima, handling approximately 35 percent of the national caseload, will complete the transition by July 2020.

Peru and the United States have an international extradition treaty.

2. Supply Reduction

The U.S. government estimates that 49,800 ha of coca were under cultivation in Peru in 2017, a 13 percent increase from the 2016 estimate of 44,000 ha. The U.S. estimate for potential pure cocaine production increased from 410 MT in 2016 to 491 MT in 2017 due to coca yield and maturity.

As of September 30, CORAH eradicated 20,843 ha of its annual goal of 25,000 ha in Peru’s Ucayali, Pasco, Huánuco, and San Martín regions. On October 10, the Peruvian government approved the VRAEM Strategy 2021, which involves heavy investment in social and economic development, but does not include eradication operations for the region that accounts for an estimated 65 percent of Peru’s total potential pure cocaine production.

DIREJANDRO received a $12.3 million budget in 2018, identical to its 2017 budget. During the first nine months of 2018, this unit seized 39.7 MT of narcotics, including 9.6 MT of cocaine base, 17.2 MT of cocaine hydrochloride, and 12.8 MT of marijuana. DIREJANDRO units destroyed 243 cocaine laboratories and seized 61.8 MT of coca leaf.

The movement of cocaine by small aircraft from Peru to Bolivia and Brazil remains a significant concern to the United States, even though the number of illicit drug flights remained constant in 2018. Illicit flights continue to originate from the areas of Ciudad Constitución and the Junín-Huancavelica border zone. Large cocaine seizures continue to occur in source zone areas and the coastal, northern border between Peru and Ecuador. Peruvian authorities continue to see high-THC Colombian marijuana (known locally as “cripy”) enter Peru across the country’s northern border with Ecuador, for distribution in Chile.
The police and military continued to destroy clandestine runways – 64 runways through September 30, 2018, compared to 78 runways in 2017.

Peruvian, Colombian, Mexican, and Eastern European traffickers maintain sophisticated networks to ship cocaine to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean, the United States, and other Western Hemisphere countries. Peru and the United States undertake joint maritime operations that permit U.S. authorities to board Peruvian-flagged vessels in international waters. In joint investigations with U.S. law enforcement, DIREJANDRO identified and disrupted major international cocaine trafficking organizations using maritime and air conveyances.

During the first nine months in 2018, PNP and Customs officials at Lima’s International Airport and the Port of Callao seized 7.1 MT of cocaine, arresting 108 smugglers. These officials also seized 29 fraudulent passports at ports of entry. PNP and Customs officials registered 5,136 individuals in the Biometrics Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP). In May, DIREJANDRO’s Sensitive Investigative Unit executed “Operation Empresario,” which resulted in the seizure of 1.3 MT of cocaine and the arrest of 13 members of a Peruvian-Colombian drug trafficking organization that was shipping cocaine from the Port of Paita in Peru’s north.

PNP investigations resulted in the seizure of financial assets. One case resulted in the seizure of $15 million worth of properties from a money laundering organization tied to corruption and drug trafficking. In another case, the PNP seized $3.6 million worth of gold bullion that was destined to Swiss company Metalor from the Puno-based Minerales Del Sur company, which had prior links to laundering drug trafficking proceeds. In July, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) signed a cooperative agreement with several Peruvian law enforcement agencies to establish vetted investigative units handling money laundering cases linked to drug trafficking.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Peru’s anti-drug agency (DEVIDA) estimates 200,000 Peruvians are addicted to illicit substances; 60,000 cocaine users, 130,000 marijuana users, and 10,000 users of other illicit substances. Use of inexpensive, highly addictive coca paste is increasing. Drug use is increasing along drug trafficking routes in midsize cities east of the Andes and in coastal transit cities.

DEVIDA’s budget for drug abuse prevention and treatment increased from $14.9 million in 2017 to $15.2 million in 2018. Drug abuse counseling services reach over 30,000 people annually.

Public treatment facilities in Peru remain insufficient, with only 169 beds for patients. Less than 10 percent of female addicts seek and receive drug treatment. Mental health hospitals added 22 beds for inpatient drug treatment and mental disorder services for women, bringing the total number of beds for women to 42 nationwide. DEVIDA and the Ministry of Health (MINSA) operate 162 mental health and drug services facilities used by over 15,000 patients. Peru has approximately 400 privately run therapeutic community centers, but only 24 meet public health
legal standards. MINSA opened 55 community mental health centers, bringing the total to 77 nationwide. Of Peru’s 66 prisons nationwide, few offer drug treatment and rehabilitation programs.

4. Corruption

The Government of Peru does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs. Corruption is widespread, eroding faith in Peru’s institutions and damaging Peru’s generally positive investment climate. According to October 2018 polling, 94 percent of Peruvians think there is high-level corruption in Congress, the Judiciary, the Attorney General’s Office, regional governments, and the PNP. Corruption scandals have ensnared many of Peru’s political figures, including former presidents, members of Congress, Supreme Court justices, National Magistrate’s Council representatives, and ministry officials.

Peru approved the 2018-2021 National Plan on Integrity and Combating Corruption in April, which calls for the development of OECD-recommended activities to address public corruption. President Vizcarra approved measures to strengthen integrity and combat corruption, including the creation of the Public Integrity Secretariat, the implementation of centers to report corruption, and a requirement of high-level officials to issue sworn statements on conflicts of interest. In July, the Peruvian government passed a legislative decree that would bar public officials from holding government positions when they have committed certain crimes.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States funds projects to support Peru’s drug control strategy through training, technical assistance, capacity-building, intelligence, and the targeted provision of equipment.

The United States and Peru jointly finance manual coca eradication and alternative development efforts. The United States provides aviation support to eradication and interdiction activities. While Peru has not made the decision to commence eradication operations in the VRAEM, the PNP has increased interdiction operations there with DEA assistance.

In communities where alternative development followed eradication, coca cultivation dropped by just less than 90 percent using 2016 data provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. With technical and institutional assistance from the United States, DEVIDA invested $29 million in 2018 towards alternative development. In 2018, U.S.-supported alternative development efforts generated an estimated 30,000 new jobs, assisted 41,439 families, and supported these families in the planting, maintenance, and improvement of 75,620 ha of cacao and coffee.

U.S. support to the PNP helped to enhance law enforcement capabilities and support citizen security. Interdiction programs increased seizures of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. The U.S.-supported Model Police Station Program focuses on community policing in five Callao neighborhoods, and has led to a 39 percent reduction in crime since 2015. The United States is supporting the PNP’s educational reform project by assisting with the establishment of a specialized criminal investigations academy, which will include a virtual shooting range, forensic laboratories, and a simulation courtroom.
The U.S.-supported Ports and Customs Program worked with the PNP’s Precursor Chemicals Investigation Divisions (DIVICDIQ) and the National Superintendence of Customs and Taxes (SUNAT) to establish a Joint Tactical Taskforce that processes interagency intelligence products to conduct viable checkpoint operations in high-risk areas, such as the VRAEM. The program provided capacity-building initiatives to enhance the operational effectiveness of PNP and SUNAT officials, including trainings on canine operations, drug concealment methods, imposter detection, and passenger risk analysis. The program continued its work with the Tactical Command Center, the Immigration Intelligence Unit, and BITMAP.

The United States continued to collaborate with the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative in 2018 to support Peru’s transition to the accusatory system with training to judicial operators. The United States also sponsored Peruvian judges to attend the Department of Justice’s Judicial Studies Institute and provided specialized trainings on illegal mining and anticorruption investigations.

To support treatment and recovery for persons suffering from drug addiction, the United States sponsored the Guiding the Recovery of Women (GROW) Training Program to certify trainers on specialized drug treatment for female patients. In total, 1,200 healthcare professionals have received GROW training. To improve the quality of services for Peru’s LGBTI community, the United States initiated the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity specialized drug treatment training course in October for 45 healthcare professionals and civil society leaders. In coordination with the OAS and DEVIDA, the United States also initiated an adolescent drug treatment court pilot project and supported the launch of a school-based drug prevention project.

The United States continued a mentoring project in 2018 to assist Peru to increase asset forfeiture convictions. The project has led to 36 asset forfeiture convictions and sentences. The United States assisted specialized prosecutorial units on environmental crimes to strengthen their investigations into transnational criminal organizations’ involvement in illegal mining and logging. The United States also supported the Public Ministry’s Office of Strategic Criminal Analysis, which supports active organized crime cases.

**D. Conclusion**

President Vizcarra demonstrates the political will to address drug production and trafficking. In 2018, Peru increased resources to treat vulnerable populations afflicted by illegal substance abuse. The U.S. partnership with Peru to implement its drug control strategy remains critical; however, both sides should work toward implementing robust counterdrug efforts in the VRAEM, to include eradication, interdiction, and alternative development.
Philippines

A. Introduction

The Philippines remains a regional transit and destination point for illicit drug trafficking, particularly for methamphetamine and its precursors from China. “Shabu” (the local street name of methamphetamine hydrochloride) and marijuana rank respectively as the first and second most widely consumed drugs in the Philippines. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s antidrug campaign continued to receive domestic and international scrutiny due to accusations of “extra-judicial killings” by police and vigilante groups. To date, more than 1.3 million individuals have surrendered to authorities, as key government entities have taken steps to intensify implementation of both supply and demand reduction programs. Nonetheless, drug trafficking remained a highly lucrative illicit business with limited risks due to systemic poverty, ineffective criminal justice institutions, outdated drug control laws, poorly controlled maritime borders, and public corruption.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

   1. Institutional Development

Due to the administration’s prioritization of efforts to combat illicit drug production, trafficking, and use, multiple government agencies took steps to amplify drug control engagement in 2018. Limited financial, human, and technical resources and competing bureaucratic interests hampered effective policy coordination. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 designates the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) under the Office of the President as the country’s lead policy and strategy-making body on drug control and prevention. During 2018, the DDB benefited from strong leadership that sought to implement a comprehensive, multi-sector approach to reduce both supply and demand. The Dangerous Drugs Act also created the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) as the DDB’s implementing arm and lead law enforcement agency for drug control.

With an executive order issued by President Duterte in 2017, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency took over as chair of the Interagency Committee on Anti-Illlegal Drugs, a newly established 21-agency body created to implement drug policy under four clusters: enforcement; justice; advocacy; and rehabilitation and reintegration. The PDEA effectively collaborated with the DDB on drug control and prevention in 2018. Other executive branch entities, the judiciary, and local government units played an increasingly important role in drug control policy, though these efforts were at times disjointed and uncoordinated. In order to bring together these multiple efforts under one comprehensive strategy, the Dangerous Drugs Board drafted a Philippine Anti-Drug Strategy, which was formally approved by President Duterte via executive order on October 29. Implementation on this strategy will begin in early 2019.

The use of plea bargains in drug cases resumed after the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a 2002 provision barring their use in late 2017. However, inadequate coordination between the treatment facilities, law enforcement, and the judiciary have challenged the plea bargain’s effective implementation. Restrictions imposed by the 1965 Anti-Wiretapping
Act, which bars the use of intercepted criminal communications in court, remained in place. The Philippines are party to both an extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States, and regularly coordinates extradition and mutual legal assistance requests. Cooperation is excellent, although bureaucratic procedures slow execution of the requests. The Philippines maintains a cooperative relationship with international partners, including the United States, on transnational drug interdictions and demand reduction.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the PDEA, trafficking organizations use critical entry points (68 major seaports; 11 international airports; a 22,548-mile coastline; and the mail and parcel system) for both transshipment and drop-off points to smuggle drug shipments. Most high-volume drug smuggling cases involve foreign nationals. Chinese drug syndicates dominate the illegal drug trade through bulk smuggling via cargo ships and foreign-flagged fishing vessels, according to Philippine authorities. These organizations have also established clandestine laboratories and illegal chemical warehouses in key locations throughout the Philippines. Authorities also note evidence of drug syndicates operating from Africa and Latin America.

Philippine authorities have conducted operations against both international drug syndicates and local dealers. During the first 10 months of 2018, the PDEA conducted 25,467 counterdrug operations, which dismantled four clandestine methamphetamine laboratories and led to the arrest of 23,749 individuals. The government addresses the negligible cannabis cultivation through a pilot alternative development program in Cebu, La Union, and Kalinga.

Trafficking organizations commonly utilize multiple simultaneous shipments in the belief that authorities would catch some but not all of the illicit shipments. For example, on August 7, a joint Bureau of Customs and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency operation seized 355 kilograms of shabu (with an estimated street value of $63 million) from two magnetic scrap lifters originating from Malaysia at the Manila International Container Port (MICT). However, on August 8, authorities discovered four already empty identical lifters of the same origin suspected to have contained $127 million in shabu. The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency later issued a statement indicating that large amounts of shabu seized from between July and October contain the same “synthetic impurities” and “production methods” as the shipment interdicted at the MICT.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The government currently estimates that 4.7 million individuals are involved in either the use or trafficking of drugs. The DDB conducted the most recent nationwide survey of drug use in 2015, which revealed the majority of drug users are male, employed adults (18-59 years old) with a high school education. The top three drugs by use are methamphetamine, marijuana, and (to a lesser extent) cocaine. Injection continues to rise as a method of drug use increasing exposure to other risk factors such as Hepatitis C and HIV/AIDS.

In 2018, the government’s counterdrug strategy increasingly incorporated drug demand reduction programs. Key agencies in government, such as the DDB, the PDEA, the Departments
of Interior and Local Government, Health, Education, and Social Welfare, and local officials are working to incorporate drug treatment, prevention, and rehabilitation efforts that are evidence-based and appropriate in a local context. Civil society and the faith-based community are highly active in drug demand reduction in the Philippines and work with government and law enforcement officials, when appropriate, to develop solutions to address the country’s drug problem. DDB’s new antidrug strategy aims to bring these activities under one national approach.

4. Corruption

As a matter of public policy, the Government of the Philippines does not encourage or facilitate any illegal activity related to drug trafficking. However, endemic corruption is present at multiple levels of government and there are frequent allegations of public officials linked to drug trafficking. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 imposes criminal penalties for government officials found to have benefited from drug trafficking proceeds.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Cooperation between the Philippines and the United States related to drug policy strengthened in 2018 through ongoing transnational interdiction assistance efforts and a new bilateral agreement designed to increase Philippine capability to reduce drug use through prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. With this assistance, the United States has supported Philippine government officials, including law enforcement, with developing evidence-based prevention and treatment protocols. U.S. assistance has supported the interdiction of methamphetamine shipments to the Philippines through parcel services from California in collaboration with PDEA’s Airport Interagency Drug Interdiction Task Group. U.S. assistance is also working with the Philippine government to expand the provision and access to justice.

D. Conclusion

Complementing the surge in enforcement actions that took place in 2017, 2018 saw significant expansion in government drug demand reduction efforts. As these efforts continue to expand across multiple sectors, key government authorities will need to ensure these programs are complementary and evidence-based. Expansion in treatment accessibility, plea bargain agreements, and community-based services could provide an effective alternative to pretrial detention for low-level drug offenders in overcrowded detention facilities. Enforcement actions could be further complemented through better collaboration between law enforcement and prosecutors in order to identify, investigate, and prosecute transnational criminal organizations.
Russia

Russia remains a major destination country for heroin and other Afghan opiates. Smuggled opiates are primarily trafficked into Russia through Central Asian countries. Other illicit drugs, including cocaine, are typically smuggled into the country via St. Petersburg and Black Sea ports by drug couriers or concealed within maritime shipments originating largely in the Caribbean region and South America.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) are Russia’s two federal agencies responsible for drug-related investigations. In October 2017, the availability of synthetic drugs surpassed heroin in the Russian drug market. The MVD has reported targeting synthetic drugs sold via the internet and non-indexed internet sites (“Dark Web”). In September 2017, authorities effectively shut down the Russian Anonymous Marketplace, a Dark Web hub featuring over 1,300 websites selling illicit drugs. In 2017, the most recent year for which statistics are available, Russian law enforcement seized 24.4 metric tons (MT) of illicit drugs. Of this total amount, 977.3 kilograms were opiates; 5.6 MT were synthetic drugs; 14.3 MT were cannabis products; and 437.3 kilograms were psychotropic substances.

In 2016, the government disbanded the Federal Narcotics Control Service (FSKN) and assigned its functions largely to the MVD, which absorbed many of FSKN’s employees. Since December 2016, Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolokoltsev has served as Chair of the State Anti-Drug Committee, which coordinates Russia’s drug control policy. The Ministries of Health and Labor assumed responsibility for drug user rehabilitation and Ministries of Health and Education for prevention of drug use. In February 2018, President Putin introduced amendments to the National Anti-Drug Policy Strategy confirming the MVD’s coordinating role. The MVD took over management of illicit drug statistical information, but released less data as compared with its predecessor.

According to the MVD State Anti-Drug Committee’s report for 2017, there were 2.2 million drug users and 208,681 drug crimes registered in Russia. MVD detected 7,179 drug crimes committed through the internet in 2017. Drug addiction in Russia is typically not treated according to evidence-based modern protocols, and is often treated with antipsychotic drugs suited to treat schizophrenia. Experts from civil society have also criticized Russian addiction treatment and rehabilitation programs due to poor interagency and inter-sectoral cooperation, and for the lack of a cohesive national rehabilitation program.

In 2013, Russia terminated its letter of agreement with the United States that funded counterdrug capacity-building programs. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has a well-established robust relationship with all host-country counterparts, including the MVD, FSB, Federal Customs Services, Moscow City Police, and General Prosecutor’s Office.
Senegal

Historically, Senegal’s location and transportation infrastructure have made it a transit point for the movement of illicit drugs from West Africa to Europe, mostly cocaine. International trafficking networks have utilized Senegalese fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine shipments into and through the country, according to law enforcement reports. In 2018, however, both maritime and land-based trafficking activity through Senegal appeared to diminish, perhaps due to an increase in direct maritime and aerial transshipment from South America to Europe.

Locally, cannabis is cultivated in the southern Casamance region for domestic use and to supply markets across West Africa. Seizures of multi-ton quantities of marijuana continued in 2018, but the bulk of these actions occurred in the northern part of Senegal and involved truck-borne cannabis shipments from southern Mali.

Senegal’s 1997 Drug Law was amended in 2006 with tougher penalties for drug trafficking. Senegal’s latest drug control plan, launched in 2017, aims to reduce the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs, as well as to inform the population of the dangers of illicit drug use, and promote the rehabilitation of persons with substance use disorders. As of 2018, the effectiveness of the plan remains unproven. While Senegal continues to lack the resources to reliably identify and seize illicit drugs, the capacity and professionalism of Senegalese authorities are slowly improving, particularly with assistance from international partners.

Senegal collaborates with partners from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to combat drug trafficking. For example, in September 2018, the Senegalese National Police and the Drug Law Enforcement Agency of The Gambia signed a memorandum of understanding to increase coordination and collaboration on drug enforcement issues. In 2018, the United States continued to provide assistance to strengthen the capacities of the Gendarmerie, the Marine Nationale, and the Senegalese National Police to monitor, detect, and interdict drug traffickers in Senegal’s maritime approaches and territory.

The United States and Senegal do not currently have a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty or an extradition treaty, but Senegalese government has asked that that treaties be negotiated in the future. Senegal is a party to multilateral law enforcement conventions that have mutual legal assistance provisions.

The Government of Senegal has the political will to fight drug trafficking, but limited infrastructure and funding impede its efforts. Incremental improvement is taking place, but continued support from the United States and other international partners remains critical.
Serbia

Serbia is not a significant source or consumer country of illicit drugs but remains a transit area for drugs smuggled through its territory to other European markets, including opiates originating in Afghanistan and cocaine originating in South America. Some small clandestine laboratories produce synthetic drugs within the country for local use, and cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug domestically.

Amphetamine-type stimulants and new psychoactive substances (NPS) are produced in small quantities in clandestine labs throughout Serbia (primarily synthetic cannabinoids). These drugs are mainly exported to Western Europe and the Middle East, but also supply a small but growing domestic market. In 2018, seizures of cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamines decreased, while seizures of heroin increased by 12 percent. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported that drugs continue to be trafficked along the “Balkan Route” into Europe, primarily entering Serbia from Kosovo and Albania, with Serbian drug trafficking groups facilitating logistics. While Serbian authorities believe heroin and MDMA (ecstasy) use is declining within the country, NPS use is believed to be rising. According to the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) Counter-Narcotics Unit, fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and ketamine have not been detected in Serbia, and precursor chemical diversion through the country has not been significant. To better monitor the importation of possible precursor chemicals, Serbia’s 2005 Law on Precursor Drugs is being amended to require more stringent licenses and permits to better track the use of the chemicals.

Serbia established the MOI Service for Abuse of Drugs and Drug Trafficking in 2014, which is responsible for drug-related investigations and addiction prevention programs. Treatment and prevention of drug addiction is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, but nongovernmental organizations also provide services. Bigger cities such as Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad have police units dedicated to curbing the use of illicit drugs and investigating drug-related crimes. Serbian law enforcement has been shifting to a more centralized approach by creating a database of criminals and investigations that can be accessed by all 27 departments throughout the country.

The United States provides ongoing assistance to the MOI to support criminal justice capacity building. The Serbian government also seeks to amplify its cooperation with regional partners to address drug trafficking throughout the Western Balkans, in line with European Union standards.
Spain

Spain is a leading transit point in Europe for cocaine originating from South America and for hashish from Morocco. Cocaine arrives in Spain in large containerized shipments and in lower-volume shipments via recreational boats, sailboats, and within parasitic devices attached to cargo ships. Transnational criminal organizations frequently traffic cocaine mixed within cargo to avoid detection. Domestic illicit drug production is minor, although there are a small number of indoor cannabis cultivation operations and clandestine labs involved in cutting, mixing, and reconstituting cocaine and heroin.

The drug control efforts of Spanish authorities have resulted in record-breaking drug seizures, utilizing strong border control and coastal monitoring; sophisticated geospatial detection technology; domestic police action; internal affairs investigations; and international cooperation. In 2017, the most recent year for which data is available, Spain seized and destroyed a record 477 metric tons (MT) of illicit drugs. The volume of seized cocaine more than doubled from 2016, totaling 40.96 MT in 2017. Heroin seizures more than doubled to 524 kilograms. In April 2018, Spanish authorities seized nearly nine MT of cocaine at the port of Algeciras, hidden in a shipment of bananas. This was the largest cocaine seizure in European history. In July 2018, Spain arrested 10 Algeciras stevedores who were working with drug cartels to facilitate trafficking through the port.

In February 2018, the Spanish government approved a 2017-24 national strategy to fight drug addiction. The strategy prioritizes equal access to treatment for minors, women, and the elderly. Spanish authorities estimate that 9.5 percent of Spaniards consume cannabis and two percent consume cocaine.

Spain continued to enjoy excellent bilateral and multilateral law enforcement cooperation with international partners in 2018. Cooperation on EU operations in the Mediterranean continued, and U.S. law enforcement agencies maintained strong working relationships with Spanish police and customs authorities, leading to significant drug seizures and arrests. November 2018, Spain’s parliament approved new legislation to ban certain small high-speed watercraft from Spanish waters. The law provides for the creation of a registry for exempted boats of this type – which are frequently used to smuggle illicit drugs, especially in the vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar – and permits Spanish customs to seize unregistered ships regardless of whether drugs or other contraband are found onboard.
Suriname

A. Introduction

Suriname is a transit zone for South American cocaine en route to Europe, Africa, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Cargo containers carry most illicit drugs smuggled through Suriname, but smaller fishing vessels, commercial and private air transport, and human couriers also conceal cocaine. Suriname’s sparsely populated coastal region and isolated jungle interior, together with weak border controls and infrastructure, make illicit drug detection and interdiction efforts difficult. There is little evidence of illicit drug production within Suriname.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Government of Suriname is officially opposed to illicit drug trafficking, but Suriname’s practical ability to apprehend and prosecute drug traffickers remains inhibited by drug-related corruption, bureaucratic hurdles, and the lack of financial and material resources. The Suriname Police Force (KPS) is responsible for detecting and combating drug-related activities with five units having specific drug control responsibilities. The KPS Narcotics Unit investigates and arrests individuals involved in trafficking illicit drugs, and the Narcotics Intelligence Unit gathers intelligence related to illegal drug trafficking. At the country’s major international airport, the Combating International Drug Trafficking Unit (BID) screens passengers on outbound flights. The BID team receives training from international experts, and is assisted by a canine unit for inspecting luggage.

The Container Control Unit (CCP) is the fifth unit with specific drug control responsibilities. It uses risk analysis and other proactive techniques to systematically target high-risk containers. The government replaced all members of the U.S.-funded, UN-implemented Container Control Unit at the Terminal of Jules Sedney Haven (Port of Paramaribo) in August 2018. The Unit’s operating protocol requires permission and oversight of Surinamese Customs authorities during inspections.

The Ministry of Justice and Police included the creation of an Integrated Security Plan in the 2019 draft budget. Under the plan, police, military, and the Directorate of National Security would intensify cooperation on a variety of security issues, including combatting the trafficking of illicit drugs and strengthening technical investigation skills.

Drug prevention and control activities are coordinated by Suriname’s National Drug Master Plan, developed under the aegis of the National Antidrug Board. This document is supposed to be developed every five years, but the most recent plan expired in 2015. The Government of Suriname reported that a new plan for the period 2018-2022 was near completion at the end of 2018.

Suriname is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and Migrant Smuggling and the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. Since
1976, Suriname has shared drug-related information with the Netherlands as part of a mutual legal assistance agreement among former Dutch colonies to exchange crime-related data. Suriname has also signed bilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking with Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia. A comprehensive bilateral maritime counterdrug enforcement agreement between the United States and Suriname has been in force since 1999. Suriname does not have a mutual legal assistance agreement or extradition treaty in place with the United States.

2. Supply Reduction

Suriname is not a source country for illicit drugs or precursor chemicals, but it continues to be a transshipment point for illicit drugs. During the first nine months of 2018, Surinamese authorities seized approximately 648 kilograms (kg) of cocaine; 16.4 liters of liquid cocaine; 569.1 kg of marijuana; 875 grams of hashish; 524 grams of MDMA (ecstasy) powder; and 504 MDMA tablets. Authorities seized less cocaine, but more marijuana and MDMA compared to the first three quarters of 2017. With support from U.S. authorities, Surinamese law enforcement agencies seized a self-propelled semi-submersible vessel in Saramacca on March 1, 2018, the first ever seized in Suriname. Local authorities seized a Cessna 210 aircraft containing 488 kg of cocaine two weeks later. The Attorney General’s Office received 139 drug-related cases from police for additional investigation and brought 71 cases to court.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Illicit drug use is relatively rare in Suriname, with marijuana being the primary drug consumed locally. Police have warned of growing use of MDMA in powder form (locally called “sukru”) as a party drug. There is one government-run detoxification center, and other treatment centers are run by non-governmental organizations. The government’s National Antidrug Board (NAR) continued awareness activities including meeting with drug prevention and treatment stakeholders.

4. Corruption

As a policy matter, the Government of Suriname does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, widespread and credible allegations suggest that corruption pervades many government offices and that corruption has influenced the government’s investigation of some cases. The National Parliament passed an anti-corruption law in September 2017. President Desire Bouterse had not signed the act into force as of October 2018. The Minister of Justice and Police announced his intention to create an integrity commission after 10 police officers were arrested, five on narcotics-related charges, in a span of three weeks.

Local criminal investigations and prosecutions of alleged corrupt acts are rare. However, in October a court convicted and sentenced a customs officer to nine months in prison and a customs broker to two months in prison in one of the largest drug trafficking cases of 2017, an attempt to smuggle 395 kg by shipping container. Courts in the Netherlands, France, and the United States convicted senior government officials of drug trafficking in previous reporting periods.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a range of efforts designed to address crime and violence in Suriname, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean nations that seeks to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. CBSI support to Suriname includes training and equipment, primarily to the KPS and justice sector actors, to prevent and interdict drug trafficking, enhance border enforcement capabilities, and combat money laundering. Recent changes to weaken the structure of KPS support for drug control efforts, if not remedied, will complicate U.S.-Suriname bilateral efforts.

D. Conclusion

Suriname continues to be a transit country for illicit drugs originating in South America. The United States encourages the Government of Suriname to combat corruption and take further steps to increase the effectiveness of drug interdiction efforts within the country, as well as subsequent investigations and prosecutions.
Tajikistan

A. Introduction

Tajikistan sits astride one of several illicit drug trafficking routes for opiates and cannabis leaving Afghanistan en route to markets in Russia and Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent, Central Asia. Known as the “Northern Route,” a 2018 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report estimates that between 2011 and 2015, 44 to 74 metric tons of heroin transited the route annually, the bulk of which is believed to have transited Tajikistan to the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. During the same period, Tajikistan accounted for 34 percent of all opiate seizures in Central Asia. However, the actual amounts seized compared to the estimated flows trafficked through the country were strikingly low.

After several years of decline, the first nine months of 2018 saw an increase in opiate seizures in Tajikistan. It remains unclear whether the increase is directly linked to an increase in heroin production resulting from the record opium crop in Afghanistan in 2017.

As in past years, the number of registered drug users in the country (primarily heroin users) remains relatively unchanged; however, that may be more a result of the way individuals are enrolled in the program than indicative of a stable drug-use population. Anecdotal information indicates the price of street-level heroin increased substantially in 2018 as availability may have declined.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Tajikistan’s drug investigative and interdiction agencies are capable and have the needed legislative tools. U.S. law enforcement authorities cooperate well with their Tajik counterparts on drug cases, but Tajikistan’s focus appears to be on the domestic market rather than interdicting drugs transiting to foreign markets. This issue is exacerbated by a lack of feedback and information sharing by other international partners.

In 2018, U.S. government drug control assistance focused on Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency under the President of Tajikistan (DCA) and supported training, equipment and infrastructure projects.

Tajikistan does not have an extradition or mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States, though Tajikistan is party to multilateral conventions that enable law enforcement cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

According to statistics provided by the DCA, the total volume of all illicit drug seized during the first nine months of 2018 was approximately 3.27 metric tons, a three percent decrease from the same period in 2017. The decline is attributed to a 42 percent decline in the amount of hashish and cannabis interdicted. However, opiate seizures increased overall by 42 percent, with 201
kilograms (kg) and 1,313 kg of heroin and opium seized, respectively. When compared to the same period in 2017, heroin seizures increased by 74 percent, while seized opium increased by 38 percent. The reason given for the increase in opiate seizures according to government officials was the large opium crop in Afghanistan, which they believed resulted in an increase in heroin manufacture and export. All agencies involved in drug interdiction or investigation saw increases in opiate seizures, while simultaneously seeing a decline in cannabis seizures. During the first nine months of 2018, over 15,500 MDMA (ecstasy) tablets were seized, a significant increase compared to 2017.

Tajik authorities estimated that the street price per kilogram of heroin from January to July increased from $7,000 to $8,000, while the kilogram price of opium during that period declined from $1,600 to $1,200.

There were 266 kg of the precursor chemical acetic anhydride seized in 2018. Historically, the Northern Route has not been a conduit for precursors entering Afghanistan, the ultimate destination for the chemical.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

There are 6,888 registered persons with substance use disorders in Tajikistan, down slightly from the 6,930 in 2017. Individuals can elect to register for five years, which means their number remains relatively stable year to year. Being registered is a last resort for most users, since it denies the use government employment, a driver’s license and, because a marriage permit requires a drug test, the ability to marry. However, if they elect to, registration allows intravenous drug users to receive methadone through internationally funded HIV prevention projects.

A recent U.S. government funded survey estimated there were between 29,000 and 50,000 intravenous drug users in Tajikistan. Anecdotal information indicates that street-level heroin was harder to obtain in 2018, with the dosage-unit price increasing substantially in the past year, forcing low-income addicts to find other drugs, generally less expensive and easily obtained prescription pain killers. Opium is abused more than heroin. Crystal methamphetamine is available, but its higher price limits its use to the wealthy. New psychoactive substances have yet to make an impact on the local drug market.

4. Corruption

In stated policy, the Government of Tajikistan does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. In April 2018, the deputy head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs drug investigation section was arrested for soliciting a bribe. Under a 2016 law, he was convicted in October, fined $8,700, released, and ordered by the court to return the approximately $19,700 bribe he received. That law was amended in mid-2018, making imprisonment mandatory for future cases. Extremely low salaries for state workers, the profitability of illegal drugs, and the dearth of other profitable business options all contribute to corruption within the country’s counterdrug forces.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

During the first nine months of 2018, the U.S. government contributed or dedicated $4.9 million in assistance to Tajikistan’s drug control efforts. The aid consisted of training, buildings, equipment and other expenses. Most of the assistance focused on the DCA, the principal drug enforcement organization in the country. The U.S. government has a strong relationship with the DCA.

D. Conclusion

After years of decline, increased seizures are a positive indicator of effort, but seizures still remain very low as a percentage of the estimated amount of drugs transiting Tajikistan. The increase in price and drop in availability of heroin at the street level may result from increased effectiveness of law enforcement conducting local investigations. However, there may be other factors influencing availability.
Tanzania

Tanzania is a significant transit country for illicit drugs. Domestic drug use is also increasing. Tanzania-based trafficking organizations and courier networks operate globally, and play a prominent role in the Southwest Asian heroin trade. In 2018, Tanzanian courts convicted and upheld convictions of numerous drug traffickers. During the year, Tanzanian authorities demonstrated increased interdiction capacity with several seizures resulting from authorities’ quick response to real time intelligence. In several incidents, Tanzanian citizens were arrested for narcotics trafficking in various African and Asian countries.

Tanzania’s geographical location, prevalence of corruption, and porous borders present considerable challenges to drug interdiction. Traffickers exploit Tanzania’s 854 mile coastline and inadequate security at Tanzanian seaports. Southwest Asian heroin is transported in multi-hundred kilogram quantities by small vessels to Zanzibar and the Tanzanian coastline. Large quantities of heroin transit Tanzania’s land border with Kenya for transshipment to Europe and North America. Smaller amounts (three to five kilograms) are trafficked to Europe, India, and North America from Dar es Salaam via commercial flights and air cargo. South American cocaine is trafficked into Tanzania by air for further international distribution. Tanzania produces cannabis and khat for domestic consumption and regional distribution.

The Tanzanian Drug Control and Enforcement Authority (DCEA), the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service (TISS), the Tanzanian Police Service’s Anti-Narcotics Unit, the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force (TPDF), and Tanzanian Maritime Police contribute to Tanzania’s fight against illicit drug trafficking. These agencies work with U.S. and other international law enforcement partners. Regional cooperation on drug interdiction is improving.

Extradition between Tanzania and the United States is governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty. There is no bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between Tanzania and the United States, though both countries are parties to various multilateral conventions with provisions for assistance.

The Government of Tanzania does not encourage or facilitate the production or trafficking of illicit drugs as a matter of policy, but corruption remains a barrier to effective enforcement. Drug traffickers use their considerable financial resources to influence politicians, law enforcement officers, and others in positions of power.

The United States promotes improved interdiction operations through law enforcement cooperation and by encouraging a strong Tanzanian government commitment to drug interdiction, combatting corruption, and improving criminal justice and rule of law.
Thailand

A. Introduction

Thailand remains a drug transit route for trafficking to international markets, and domestic drug use is a significant challenge. Thailand does not cultivate or produce any significant quantities of opiates, methamphetamine, or other illicit drugs. Various transnational criminal organizations continue to exploit Thailand as a destination and transit country for heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) originating from Myanmar, specifically methamphetamine.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Thai government has not reported eradicating opium poppy since 2013. However, in 2017, the Thai Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) reported that approximately 1.97 metric tons (MT) of opium poppy plants were seized during the first six months of 2017, compared to 662.2 kilograms (kg) during all of 2016. Heroin seizures have increased in Thailand since a significant drop in 2015, and methamphetamine seizures have also increased since 2016.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

The Narcotics Act 2522 (1979) and the Psychotropic Substances Act 2518 (1975) are the primary laws relating to drug offenses in Thailand. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) has overall responsibility for the prevention and suppression of illegal drug use. The Act on Measures for the Suppression of Offenders in an Offence Relating to Narcotics 2534 (1991) provides for asset seizure related to drug trafficking cases. Criminal penalties vary by narcotics classification, generally ranging from the imposition of fines to life imprisonment. Thai law provides for capital punishment for those convicted of possession of more than 20 grams of Schedule I substances with “intent to sell” though the death penalty is not commonly imposed; the last reported execution of a drug offender was in 2009.

Thailand has bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States. Thailand is an effective and cooperative partner, with U.S. assistance facilitating and enhancing that cooperation.

2. Supply Reduction

Methamphetamine production and trafficking by non-state armed groups and other regional producers in neighboring Burma remains a serious challenge for Thailand. Thai authorities estimate that 90 percent of the crystal methamphetamine smuggled into Thailand enters across the Burma border. While a portion of the methamphetamine is intended for the domestic Thai market, most of it is trafficked to other Asian markets. A notable amount is trafficked south from Thailand into Malaysia. Seizures were at record levels in 2018. Between January and September, Thailand seized approximately 12.97 MT of crystal methamphetamine, compared to a total of 7.61 MT total during all of 2017. Thailand is similarly on track to surpass record high seizure totals of methamphetamine tablets (“yaba”) from 2017. As of September 2018, Thailand
had seized 222 million yaba tablets compared to 239.9 million total tablets during all of 2017. Despite the uptick in seizures, the price of yaba has decreased by approximately 40-50 percent in the Bangkok metropolitan area, suggesting an expansion in supply.

Similar to the methamphetamine trade, heroin supplies trafficked through Thailand also originates largely from Burma. Thai authorities report the involvement of West African crime syndicates that use Thai nationals (generally females) to carry drugs onward to China, Malaysia, and other regional markets. Heroin seizures remained largely stable in 2018. During the first nine months of 2018, Thai authorities reported seizing 570 kg of heroin, compared to 593 kg during same period in 2017.

MDMA (known locally as “ya-E” or “ecstasy”) is typically smuggled into Thailand from Malaysia. Domestic use is trending upward, but is largely confined to Bangkok and other tourist areas. Tablets remain relatively expensive with a street price ranging from $12-18. As of September 2018, Thai authorities had seized 187,163 tablets.

Cocaine trafficking and abuse remains limited in the domestic market. Annual cocaine seizures are generally around 50 kg and have never exceeded 70 kg. During the first nine months of 2018, Thai authorities seized approximately 22 kg of cocaine. Thai authorities attribute most cocaine trafficking to West African crime syndicates, which largely smuggle cocaine from South America via air transport.

Marijuana continues to be readily available throughout Thailand and the region. Though limited quantities of cannabis are cultivated domestically, most of the marijuana seized in Thailand originates from Laos. Marijuana seizures are trending downward. Through September 2018, Thai authorities had seized a total of 13.19 MT, compared to an average of 30 MT in previous years.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Substance abuse has been a high-profile social and public health problem in Thailand for decades. According to press reporting and academic studies, an estimated three million people between the ages of 12-65 years old, or 5.8 percent of the total population, have used at least one illegal addictive substance at some point in their lives. Thailand carries out comprehensive demand reduction programs, combining drug use prevention programs with treatment for those suffering from substance use disorders. Drug treatment and rehabilitation is offered at hospitals, as well as some military camps, temples, and mosques. Methadone use is approved for detoxification treatment under the national health coverage.

4. Corruption

Official corruption remains a challenge in Thailand and the sale of illicit drugs is sometimes facilitated by complicit law enforcement officers. As a matter of policy, though, the Thai government does not permit, encourage, or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic/psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of drug proceeds, by individuals or government agencies. Thai authorities frequently prosecute corrupt officials.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States and Thailand enjoy a strong cooperative relationship on law enforcement matters. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other federal law enforcement agencies continued to work closely with their Thai counterparts on coordinated investigations in 2018. Thailand is one of several countries in which DEA maintains Sensitive Investigative Units (SIUs). Thai SIU participants receive specialized training and undergo a rigorous vetting process.

Additionally, the United States provides a stream of training and assistance to Thai law enforcement and criminal justice entities specific to drug trafficking. Through the International Law Enforcement Academy and other programs, the United States and Thailand are working to enhance regional cooperation to combat transnational crime. The United States also provides training and other assistance to Thai customs officials, Thai Maritime Police, and other law enforcement authorities to improve border protection and investigation skills. Thailand uses U.S.-developed curriculum to support training and professionalization of its substance treatment workforce. With U.S. support, the program is establishing a cadre of national trainers who will disseminate the training throughout the country.

D. Conclusion

The U.S. government enjoys a particularly close and collaborative relationship with Thai law enforcement. The United States will continue to assist the Thai government to promote greater cooperation between its police and prosecutors, prevent corruption, and further advance regional drug control cooperation.
Trinidad and Tobago

A. Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago is a twin-island nation in the Southern Caribbean. The country’s close proximity to Venezuela, porous borders, and direct transportation routes to Europe, the United States, and Canada make it an ideal location for illicit drug transshipment. While there is some local marijuana production, the majority of marijuana consumed domestically is imported from other islands in the Caribbean and South America. Cocaine and other illicit drugs also transit the country or remain on the islands for domestic consumption.

The Trinidad and Tobago government continues to make incremental progress in its ability to investigate drug cases, but remains challenged by insufficient resources and capacity. Law enforcement seized more marijuana and cocaine in 2018 compared to 2017. The government remains committed to drug demand reduction, though treatment capacity is under-resourced and there is a lack of comprehensive data regarding domestic drug use.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Trinidad and Tobago demonstrates continued commitment to drug control through bilateral cooperation with the United States and other countries. Trinidad and Tobago’s drug control institutions, however, remain challenged by deficiencies in staffing and funding. There are ongoing efforts to break down existing silos within Trinidad and Tobago’s intelligence community, the military, law enforcement, and other agencies, though distrust continues to impede coordination.

In May, Trinidad and Tobago’s Parliament passed an Anti-Gang Act, now in effect, that criminalizes gang membership and otherwise aims to suppress criminal gang activity, which are viewed by the country’s authorities as among the primary drivers of drug trafficking and violent crime. In August, the government named a new Minister of National Security, and appointed its first permanent Commissioner of Police since 2012. Though the government’s draft 2019 budget proposes a slight decrease overall for national security matters, there are a number of initiatives to enhance police effectiveness, including a broad restructuring of the police service, which could improve drug control efforts.

Trinidad and Tobago, in collaboration with the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, also continues to expand a Regional Counterdrug Intelligence Training School to serve the English-speaking member states in the Caribbean.

Trinidad and Tobago has mutual legal assistance treaties with the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The country is also party with the United States to a drug control and law enforcement letter of agreement; a maritime law enforcement agreement that enables the United States to patrol Trinidad and Tobago’s waters and detain vessels suspected of trafficking drugs; a shiprider agreement that allows U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments aboard Trinidad
and Tobago Coast Guard vessels to board suspected ships in Trinidad and Tobago waters; and a customs mutual assistance agreement, which allows for the exchange of information to assist in the prevention and investigation of customs offenses.

The United States also maintains an extradition treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, and the Trinidad and Tobago government is largely cooperative with respect to extradition and mutual legal assistance matters.

2. Supply Reduction

Marijuana is the only known locally produced illicit drug in Trinidad and Tobago. Production is concentrated in small farms in heavily forested, mountainous regions. Traditionally, local producers compete with imports from St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica, and Guyana that are perceived to be of a higher quality. Law enforcement information suggests that marijuana continues to enter the country via Venezuela, as part of a trend of increased trade of both licit and illicit goods between the two countries.

Other illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, are trafficked through the country by local and transnational organized crime groups, exploiting its close proximity to Venezuela, porous coastlines, and vulnerabilities at ports of entry. The main destination for these drugs continues to be the European market, often via Africa, but some also reach the United States and Canada. Criminal groups utilize commercial airlines, cargo ships, and small, privately owned boats and yachts to transport illicit drugs. Anecdotal reports continue to suggest that small amounts of ketamine originating from Asia are also trafficked through the country.

Trinidad and Tobago law enforcement entities seized approximately 1.34 metric tons of marijuana and 325 kilograms (kg) of cocaine within the country during the first nine months of 2018, compared to seizures totaling approximately 956 kg and 47 kg, respectively, for the same period in 2017. Robust crop, seedling, and cured plant eradications continued in 2018.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Information on drug-use trends in Trinidad and Tobago is largely anecdotal given the lack of comprehensive data. The primary drug used is marijuana, followed by cocaine. Drug treatment professionals assess that drug usage continues to increase among youth. There are a number of drug treatment programs in Trinidad and Tobago supported by the government, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, and hospitals.

Trinidad and Tobago’s 2014 National Drug Policy and its companion Operational Plan for Drug Control in Trinidad and Tobago 2014-2018 aim to reduce both the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Drug prevention efforts include school-based education programs, training for educators, anti-drug media campaigns, and special outreach events. The United States supported adolescent drug intervention training in 2018, including for police, prison, and probation officers. The United States also supported a Juvenile Court Project, which established two children’s courts, promoted innovative youth peer resolution mechanisms, and introduced a restorative
justice approach to managing youth in conflict with the law, including with respect to drug matters.

4. Corruption

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago neither directly encourages nor facilitates the illicit production or distribution of drugs nor the laundering of proceeds from the sale of illicit drugs. No charges of drug-related corruption were filed against senior government officials in 2018. Media and anecdotal reports of drug-related corruption in the ranks of the Police Service, Prison Service, Defense Force, Customs and Excise Division, and port employees are common.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

The United States supports a wide range of efforts designed to address crime and violence affecting citizens in Trinidad and Tobago, primarily through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). CBSI is a security partnership between the United States and Caribbean nations that seeks to substantially reduce illicit drug trafficking, advance public safety and citizen security, and promote justice. The Trinidad and Tobago government is an active partner in CBSI programs.

Through CBSI, the United States continues to provide training and support to law enforcement and security agencies responsible for drug control, including the Police Service, Transnational Organized Crime Unit, Customs and Excise Division, Prison Service, and Coast Guard. This support, together with joint law enforcement cooperation on drug trafficking investigations, resulted in a number of substantial drug seizures in 2018. In May, for example, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service’s Organized Crime and Intelligence Unit arrested and charged five airport personnel for attempting to smuggle 86.8 kg of cocaine – with an estimated street value of approximately $34 million – bound for New York from Trinidad’s Piarco International Airport.

The United States maintains a bilateral agreement with Trinidad and Tobago to suppress illicit traffic by sea and air. This agreement includes provisions for ship boarding, shipriders, pursuit, entry to investigate, and over flight of territorial seas.

D. Conclusion

The United States and Trinidad and Tobago enjoy a cooperative relationship against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The individuals and units working to combat drug trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago, however, continue to face considerable institutional challenges. The Trinidad and Tobago government should continue to implement reforms to improve the capacity of its law enforcement and criminal justice institutions to detect drug trafficking and effectively investigate, arrest, and prosecute suspected drug traffickers in a timely manner.
Turkey

Turkey remains a transit country for illicit drug trafficking. Heroin, opium, and cocaine are generally trafficked through Turkey to European markets, and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are trafficked to markets in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Turkish authorities continue to seize large amounts of opiates and hashish in Turkey. Cooperation is inhibited by the Government of Turkey’s detention of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) local staff member for more than a year without charge.

The Turkish National Police Counter Narcotics Department is the country’s most proactive counterdrug force. DEA works with the Counter Narcotics Department. Components of the Ministry of Interior, also have some drug control responsibilities, and the Ministry of Health is responsible for regulating pharmaceutical products and the importation of chemicals for legitimate use. The United States offers regional training opportunities to Turkish officials to provide additional skills to combat the illicit drug trade, although no Turkish official participated in trainings in 2018.

Most heroin trafficked via Turkey is destined for Western Europe. Turkey is also a transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan via Iran. Turkish smugglers are frequently involved in both heroin sales and transport, as well as production and smuggling of synthetic drugs. Transnational criminal networks reportedly have interests in heroin conversion laboratories operating in Iran near the Turkish border. The government strictly controls licit opium poppy cultivation and pharmaceutical morphine production, with no apparent diversion into the illicit market.

Turkey is a transit route for methamphetamine smuggled from Iran and bound for Southeast Asia, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants from Eastern Europe destined for the Middle East. Cocaine is trafficked from South America through Turkey to Europe. Hashish is imported or grown domestically for local consumption.

According to Turkish authorities, during the first 10 months of 2018, Turkish authorities seized more than 71 metric tons (MT) of marijuana; nearly 15 MT of heroin; more than one MT of cocaine; nearly 300 kilograms (kg) of opium; nearly 400 kg of methamphetamine; seven million MDMA (ecstasy) tablets; and 16 million fenethylline tablets.

Illegal drug use in Turkey is relatively low, compared to other countries in the region, but there seems to be an increase in the number of people seeking treatment. Turkey does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotics or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. No senior-level government official is alleged to have participated in such activities in 2018.
Ukraine

Although Ukraine is not a major drug source country, its location astride several important drug trafficking routes into Western Europe leaves it vulnerable as an important transit country. Ukraine’s numerous ports on the Black and Azov seas, its extensive river routes, and its porous northern and eastern borders make Ukraine an attractive route for drug traffickers into the European Union’s (EU) illicit drug market.

Heroin from Afghanistan is trafficked through Russia, the Caucasus, and Turkey, before passing through Ukraine. Latin American cocaine is moved through Ukrainian seaports and airports for both domestic use and further transit to EU countries. Ukrainian law enforcement occasionally interdicts large shipments of drugs in commercial shipments transiting southern ports. Usually, however, drugs are found in small quantities, ranging from several grams to several hundred grams. Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, including arming, training, and fighting alongside separatists, has created a new vulnerability for drug transit through the region.

The use of synthetic drugs and psychotropic substances, especially amphetamine-type stimulants, has been rapidly increasing in Ukraine over the past decade, following international trends. Synthetic drugs are trafficked to Ukraine primarily from Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands, but they are also produced locally in small clandestine labs.

Most domestic drug abuse, however, continues to be focused on drugs made from illicit drug crops (cannabis and opium poppy) grown in the region. These account for more than 90 percent of the total drug market in Ukraine. In most instances, these drugs are either locally produced or supplied from Russia and Moldova.

During the first 10 months of 2018, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (National Police of Ukraine, or NPU) reportedly detected and disrupted 37 international drug trafficking routes, dismantled 115 clandestine labs, and eliminated 63 organized criminal drug trafficking groups. Approximately 3.89 metric tons of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, and other controlled substances were seized, including 38.9 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 32 kg of psychotropic drugs.

The United States is providing assistance to help Ukraine bring its law enforcement institutions up to European standards, facilitating Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has established good working relationships across the Ukrainian law enforcement sector, and ongoing training programs have deepened these relationships. Through a variety of projects, the United States also assists the NPU in developing its capacities while simultaneously strengthening the Border Guards capability to control Ukraine’s 3,490 mile-long border.
United Kingdom

Although the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) is not a source country for illicit drugs, it faces a serious domestic drug problem and is a major consumer and transshipment country. Transnational criminal organizations continue to engage in drug trafficking within the UK, as well as additional criminal activity to include violent and financial crimes. Demand in the UK for all common forms of illicit drugs is high. The country’s consumption rates for cocaine and heroin are among the highest in Europe. There are significant seizures of cannabis at UK borders, and UK authorities regularly disrupt domestic cannabis growth, varying from as few as 10 plants to warehouse quantities. “Crack” cocaine use has increased, particularly in rural and coastal towns. Crack cocaine has been linked to drug-trafficking networks active in England, Wales, and Scotland.

Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are also present in the UK, though not on the scale seen in North America. Although testing limitations prevent UK authorities from fully ascertaining the scale of the problem, 122 fentanyl-related deaths were recorded from between 2017 and March 2018. Most fentanyl and fentanyl-related analogues available in the UK are manufactured in China and purchased on restricted internet sites, the so-called “Dark Web.” In 2018, the National Crime Agency reported its first conviction for trafficking in fentanyl. Unlike the United States, where historic widespread availability of prescription medicine was a driving force for opioid abuse and the use of fentanyl, there is far less prescription opioid abuse in the UK. As the illicit online trade grows, the UK is among the largest global purchasers of drugs on the Dark Web, and a survey taken in 2018 showed that more than a quarter of British drug users bought substances on the Dark Web paying with cryptocurrency.

The United States and the United Kingdom enjoy an excellent bilateral relationship and cooperate closely on multilateral drug enforcement efforts. U.S. authorities continue to conduct coordinated drug trafficking and money laundering investigations with the UK National Crime Agency and Metropolitan Police Service, as well as Police Scotland, the Police Services of Northern Ireland, and other UK law enforcement agencies. U.S. authorities also regularly provide lead information on drug shipments bound for the UK, including couriers, parcels, and containerized cargo.
Uzbekistan

A. Introduction

Sharing an 85-mile border with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan remains a significant transit country for Afghan opiates. Traffickers exploit the country’s shared borders with Afghanistan and Tajikistan to smuggle illicit drugs through Uzbekistan primarily to Russia and Europe. Criminals capitalize on Uzbekistan’s good infrastructure, corruption, and rugged border terrain to traffic drugs. Uzbekistan’s long, poorly protected border with Tajikistan presents the country’s biggest challenge to interdicting illicit drugs. Ten border crossing points along the Tajik-Uzbek border re-opened in 2018 after having been closed for more than a decade, increasing the risk of drug trafficking.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

Uzbekistan’s drug control strategy is detailed in the “Program of Complex Measures on Counteracting Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking for 2016-2020.” The strategy outlines government agency responsibilities to restrict illicit drug trafficking, reduce demand, prevent abuse, improve enforcement-related legislation, and cooperate with international partners. The Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service, the State Border Protection Committee, and the State Customs Committee are responsible for combatting narcotics trafficking, while the National Information and Analytical Center for Drug Control (NCDC) oversees policy coordination, data collection, and capacity development, but does not have an operational role. An NCDC-led interagency working group is drafting a law to amend the Criminal Code and relevant regulations to include provisions for new psychoactive substances (NPS).

Uzbekistan shares drug enforcement information with its neighbors through the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) and has two law enforcement professionals working on the CARICC staff in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan also participates in several regional programs implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including the Container Control and Border Liaison Office programs, as well as the Central Asia and South Caucasus Mutual Legal Assistance Network. Uzbekistan has signed cooperation agreements with other Central Asian countries, Russia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Japan, and China. Cooperation is generally focused on programs rather than operational activities.

Uzbekistan has neither an extradition treaty nor mutual legal assistance agreement with the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in place for joint investigative activities and intelligence exchanges with the Ministry of Interior and the Office of the Prosecutor General’s Financial Intelligence Unit dedicated to money laundering investigations. The DEA also has an MOU with the NCDC, facilitating information sharing and joint training.

2. Supply Reduction
Uzbekistan is not a significant source country of illicit drugs. Although Uzbek officials identify the country’s poorly protected border with Tajikistan as the biggest challenge to interdicting smuggled drugs, it is likely that significant quantities also enter the country through official border crossing points, primarily from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

On an annual basis, Uzbekistan conducts a “Black Poppy” eradication campaign to destroy illicitly cultivated opium poppy and cannabis. In 2017, the last year for which information is available, Uzbek authorities uncovered 895 cases of illegal drug cultivation – a 16 percent decrease from 2016 – and eradicated an aggregate cultivated area of 0.33 hectares. During the first six months of 2018, Uzbek authorities registered 2,332 drug-related offenses – a 22 percent drop from the same period in 2017 – and detained 1,751 persons. Also during the first six months of 2018, the government reported seizing 188.1 kilograms (kg) of marijuana; 179.1 kg of opium; 33 kg of hashish; and 14.9 kg of heroin. Opium seizures have dropped considerably since 2016, declining 44.8 percent by volume in 2017 and again by 76.6 percent during the first six months of 2018 in comparison to the same period in 2017. The NCDC attributes this decline to enhanced deterrence due to interdiction efforts at the country’s borders, as well as to changing patterns of drug trafficking from Afghanistan that might be reducing the flow of drugs through Uzbekistan. The United States lacks sufficient information to verify these claims.

By volume, reported NPS seizures in 2017 fell to 361 grams from 579 grams in 2016. However, the NCDC believes that drug use within Uzbekistan is shifting away from Afghan-sourced opioids to NPS and synthetic drugs, particularly Iranian-sourced methamphetamine and synthetic cannabinoids known locally as “spice” from China. During the first six months of 2018, the authorities seized 247 NPS substances.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

Official data on domestic drug consumption is unreliable. According to the latest available official statistics from 2017, the number of registered drug users declined by 23 percent from 2016 to 8,036. Of this population, heroin users constituted 32.6 percent, and cannabis users 32.2 percent. UNODC estimates that only 2.3 percent of drug users are female. The last study of drug use prevalence in Uzbekistan was conducted in 2006 by UNODC.

Uzbekistan administers demand reduction and treatment programs. The government regularly organizes outreach to school administrators on addiction prevention and support to persons with substance use disorders. The EU is training local government representatives in prevention techniques. With U.S. and UNODC support, Uzbekistan is implementing a long-term continuing education project to professionalize all substance use treatment staff in the country. In 2018, UNODC conducted a series of trainings for 136 doctors on treatment and care for intravenous drug users. In 2017, 2,202 patients – including 1,485 in-patients – received treatment. Over 95 percent of such patients were male. Drug treatment institutions also support phone “hotline” consultations, but these efforts likely reach only a small proportion of those suffering from substance use disorders. Furthermore, as Uzbekistan prohibits opioid substitution therapy, treatment options are limited.

4. Corruption
Uzbekistan is implementing a National Anti-Corruption Action Plan and does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. However, there is evidence of corruption at multiple levels of government, which confounds national drug control efforts. Some government officials have reportedly been convicted on corruption charges. Although most cases target low to mid-level officers, there are occasional high-profile cases, such as Uzbekistan’s former prosecutor general, who is under investigation for alleged extortion, bribery, and abuse of office.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Uzbekistan’s drug control strategy seeks to increase the institutional capacity of the country’s law enforcement and criminal justice institutions through training. In 2018, the U.S. government provided training and equipment to assist the Uzbek government to modernize its border crossing checkpoints, improve forensic capabilities, develop judicial capacity, and enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies. However, the agreements between the DEA and Uzbek agencies have not translated into significant operational cooperation. Since closing its office in Uzbekistan in 2017, the DEA maintains liaison relationship from the regional DEA office in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

D. Conclusion

Drug control cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan continued to grow slowly in 2018. Uzbekistan made progress in regional cooperation and data sharing with CARICC members and the United States. However, given the lack of independent data on drug use and trafficking within the country, it is difficult to estimate the true extent of the problem and whether Uzbekistan’s low seizure statistics accurately reflect law enforcement efficacy. Sustainable anti-corruption practices, an independent drug use study, and increased exposure to international best practices could promote sustainable improvements in Uzbekistan’s ability to combat transnational drug trafficking.
Venezuela

A. Introduction

Venezuela continues to be a major drug-transit country and is one of the preferred trafficking routes in the Western Hemisphere for illegal drugs, predominately cocaine. In 2018, Venezuela’s porous border with Colombia, weak judicial system, almost nonexistent international drug control cooperation, and permissive and corrupt environment provided ideal conditions for drug trafficking operations and associated violence.

There is insufficient data to determine current drug consumption trends in Venezuela. The Venezuelan National Anti-Narcotics Office (ONA) has not published any statistics since 2015. In 2018, under the government of former President Nicolás Maduro, the country’s porous borders offered a permissive environment to known terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The Maduro government took no action against individuals and companies designated as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers by the U.S. Department of Treasury for playing a significant role in international drug trafficking.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2013, the Venezuelan National Anti-Narcotics Office (ONA) developed a National Anti-Drug Plan for 2015-2019 that sought to reduce drug consumption and increase prevention activities. ONA reported working closely with civil society to provide anti-drug education training and athletic programming in different areas around the country to increase awareness and prevent consumption.

In May 2014, Venezuela signed an international agreement with Russia to cooperate in the fight against drugs. Venezuela announced joint operations between the Russian Federal Drug Control Service and ONA. The 2010 Organic Law on Drugs increased the penalties for drug trafficking and gave ONA the authority to seize the assets of individuals connected with drug trafficking.

Conflicting statistics make it difficult to assess 2018 seizures. On February 4, ONA reported that since 2005 it had seized 658 metric tons (MT) of drugs, destroyed 284 laboratories, seized 37 planes, and closed 481 illegal landing strips. Additionally, on September 28, ONA President Juan Grillo told the media that ONA had seized more than 22 MT of drugs in 2018, and added that the government seized 35 percent more marijuana compared to 2017. However, during an October 25 press conference, OFAC-sanctioned Attorney General Tarek William Saab shared that since August 2017, the government had seized almost 20 MT of drugs (7.2 MT of cocaine, 12 MT of marijuana and other illicit substances). Saab also claimed that Venezuela had seized 23 planes, closed 14 illegal landing strips, and arrested 49 people linked to drug trafficking.

2. Supply Reduction
Venezuela remains a major transit country for cocaine shipments via aerial, terrestrial, and maritime routes. Most flights suspected of trafficking drugs depart from Venezuelan states bordering Colombia, mainly from Zulia state. Trafficking by maritime conveyance includes the use of large cargo containers, fishing vessels, and “go-fast” boats.

The vast majority of illicit drugs that transited Venezuela in 2018 were destined for the Caribbean, Central America, the United States, West Africa, and Europe. Colombian drug-trafficking organizations – including the FARC, ELN, and other criminal groups – facilitate the shipment of illicit drugs through Venezuela.

The Venezuelan government occasionally reports drug seizures, arrests, and destruction of drugs and airstrips to the public. Venezuela is not a member of the Cooperative Situational Information Integration System through which countries predetermine information to share automatically with the United States. Venezuelan authorities similarly do not share evidence about destruction of illicit drugs with U.S. officials.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The consumption of illicit drugs within Venezuela, especially cannabis and cocaine, remained a problem in 2018, but recent statistical data is unavailable. ONA implemented a National Treatment System in 2013 as part of a nationwide program to treat substance use disorder. The system uses professional care for detoxification and social reinsertion of those suffering from substance use disorders through a three-level program that includes the Center of Family Guidance, the Specialized Center for Prevention and Comprehensive Assistance, and the Socialist Therapeutic Community.

4. Corruption

Although the Venezuelan government under former President Maduro did not officially encourage or facilitate illicit drug production or distribution as a matter of stated policy, public corruption was a major problem that made it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and smuggle illicit drugs.

Two nephews of former Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, Efrain Campo Flores and Francisco Flores de Freitas, were arrested in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in November 2015 and expelled to the United States. In December 2017, a U.S. federal court sentenced both nephews to 18 years in prison following their convictions on drug trafficking charges.

The Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on at least 22 individuals and 27 companies by designating them as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. These designations include current or former Venezuelan officials: in 2008, General Hugo Carvajal, General Henry Rangel Silva, and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín; in 2011, Freddy Bernal Rosales and Amilcar Jesús Figueroa, Major General Cliver Alcalá Cordones, and Ramón Isidro Madriz; in 2017, then Vice President Tareck El Aissami and front man Samarak López, and; in 2018, Pedro Luis Martín and two of his associates. The Maduro government failed to take action against these or other government and military officials.
with known links to the FARC or the Mexican cartels in 2018. The government called the sanctions designation a “foreign plot to destabilize our government.”

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives

Drug control cooperation between Venezuela and the United States has been limited and inconsistent since 2005, when Venezuela refused to sign a negotiated addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to improve anti-drug cooperation. The United States and Venezuela continue to exercise a 1991 maritime bilateral agreement allowing each country to board vessels of the opposite flag suspected of illicit drug trafficking in international waters.

D. Conclusion

In 2018, the Venezuelan government failed to make demonstrable efforts to combat illegal drug activity and prosecute corrupt officials or suspected drug traffickers, including those sanctioned by the United States government. The Maduro administration demonstrated a complete lack of will to make much-needed policy changes to enforce existing laws. This created an extreme level of impunity exacerbated by lack of transparency and high levels of corruption.
Vietnam

A. Introduction

Vietnam is not a significant source or transit country for illegal drugs entering the United States, but remains a significant transshipment point for international criminal organizations that traffic heroin, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), and cocaine to markets throughout East Asia and the Pacific. Historically, the cultivation and production of illegal drugs within Vietnam has been uncommon, and the Vietnamese police did not conduct any investigations in 2018 targeting ATS production in the country.

The Government of Vietnam reports that approximately 90 percent of the illicit drugs seized in the country originate in Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, and China and are smuggled into the country via overland routes. Lesser volumes of illegal drugs are smuggled through Vietnam via sea and air routes by use of human couriers, sea freight, and commercial cargo services. Vietnam’s drug interdiction capacities are limited by poor equipment and training, as well as the rugged and remote terrain that defines much of the country’s borders.

Heroin remains the most commonly trafficked and abused illegal drug in the country, with persons addicted to heroin accounting for approximately 85 percent of the country’s registered users. ATS is commonly available in both pill form and as crystal methamphetamine and is the second most commonly trafficked and used drug. From 2017 to 2018, the cost of crystal methamphetamine in Vietnam continued to decline, signifying increasing availability. Cocaine trafficking is also increasing in Vietnam, and 2018 saw the largest cocaine seizure on record in Vietnam.

B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends

1. Institutional Development

In 2017, Vietnam’s government allocated $95 million through 2020 to support drug control and drug prevention, and the country continued to implement its 2011 comprehensive anti-drug strategy. Vietnam works with neighboring countries to carry out interdiction operations, with border liaison offices situated along the country’s borders with Laos and Cambodia. The United States promotes counterdrug information sharing, coordination of operations, and capacity building with Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security.

Despite this, several factors still significantly inhibit Vietnam’s ability to investigate and prosecute drug trafficking organizations effectively. Vietnam’s counterdrug police receive little to no formal training, and lack the resources necessary to conduct complex investigations. Furthermore, Vietnam’s penal code lacks a conspiracy statute and prohibits the introduction of many types of evidence normally used to prosecute complex organized crime cases.

Vietnam does not have a mutual legal assistance or an extradition treaty with the United States. The decision to engage bilaterally with the United States on international drug trafficking investigations is made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with a memorandum of
understanding between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security.

2. Supply Reduction

According to the Government of Vietnam, in 2017, Vietnamese police investigated approximately 22,346 drug related cases and arrested 34,494 people involved in drug related crimes. According to official Government of Vietnam statistics, during the first six months of 2018, Vietnamese police investigated approximately 12,863 drug related cases and arrested 18,472 people involved in drug related crimes, representing an approximate 9 percent increase in investigations and a 5 percent increase in arrests over the same period in 2017. During this same six-month period, Vietnamese police seized 880 kilograms (kg) of heroin, twice the amount of heroin seized during 2017; 81 kg of opium; 1,090 kg of cannabis; 414 kg of ATS and other synthetic drugs; 485,000 ATS tablets; 100 kg of cocaine; and 2.5 metric tons of khat.

Synthetic drug production is rare in Vietnam, as there is a ready supply of synthetic drugs entering Vietnam from neighboring countries. In April 2017, the Vietnamese police dismantled a nation-wide drug trafficking organization that operated 13 clandestine ATS laboratories throughout southern Vietnam, but they did not identify any other clandestine ATS laboratories for the remainder of 2017 or the first half of 2018.

3. Public Information, Prevention, and Treatment

The Government of Vietnam promotes and funds drug abuse and awareness programs as part of its comprehensive anti-drug strategy. However, the willingness of Vietnamese citizens to seek drug abuse treatment is limited by the fear of involuntary incarceration in “drug rehabilitation centers,” which, in reality, are no different from prisons and provide minimal actual treatment for addiction.

In 2017, the United States budgeted $1.4 million to provide technical support for medication assisted therapy and other programming to address the substance abuse issues that drive HIV transmission, including intravenous drug abuse. The Government of Vietnam reports that the total number of registered heroin and ATS users is 224,690 people, which represents a less than one percent increase from the previous year. The Government of Vietnam also estimates that approximately 25 percent of new HIV infections in 2017 resulted from intravenous drug abuse.

4. Corruption

Corruption is endemic in Vietnam and plagues almost every sector of the government. However, Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security and other agencies involved in drug control operations continue to pursue an aggressive drug control agenda, as is evidenced by the year-to-year increases in drug-related investigations, arrests, and seizures.

C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
Vietnamese police continued to expand their cooperation with foreign governments in 2018 to combat regional drug trafficking, particularly with China, Laos, and Cambodia. The Vietnamese police also collaborate closely with Australian and U.S. law enforcement authorities to target international drug trafficking organizations. In 2016, Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security renewed its memorandum of understanding with DEA. As a result, in 2017 and 2018, information-sharing expanded dramatically between DEA and Vietnam’s law enforcement authorities, and the number of joint U.S.-Vietnamese investigations increased significantly.

In 2017, the United States began a comprehensive, four-year assistance program intended to strengthen the capacity of Vietnam’s counternarcotics police. The program is designed to create a cadre of 100 subject matter experts on drug trafficking investigations within the Vietnamese police force. This program continued through 2018, and remains on track for completion in 2020.

D. Conclusion

Vietnam continues to struggle with controlling drug trafficking and abuse, but maintains an aggressive posture against drug trafficking organizations. Senior law enforcement officers continue to maintain support for increased engagement with the United States on both investigations and capacity building. Barring any significant policy shifts, Vietnam’s law enforcement capacity is poised to continue to grow and professionalize with international support. The United States encourages the Government of Vietnam to consider taking additional steps to modernize and expand its capacity to provide treatment and rehabilitation programs for those suffering from substance use disorders.